Act provides that any claim in Illinois

2024People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 449 (2001); 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2018).

2023People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 449 (2001); 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2020).

2017The Act provides that any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or amended petition is subject to the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2010); People v. Smith, 341 Ill.

2016The Act provides that any claim of substantial denial of constitutional 48 No. 1-12-3371 rights not raised in the original or amended petition is subject to the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2010); People v. Smith, 341 Ill.

2015App. 3d 924, 931 (2008) (quoting McDonald, 364 Ill.

2015App. 3d 924, 931 (2008) (quoting McDonald, 364 Ill.

2015Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16 . ¶ 50 The Act provides that any claim not raised in defendant's original petition or in an amended petition is waived (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2010)), and our supreme court has held that a claim that was not included in the postconviction petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 475 (2006); People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 507-08 (2004)). ¶ 51 Our supreme court has observed a low threshold for survival of a petitioner's claims at the first stage, noting that most petitions at this point are drafted by defendants wi

2015Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16 . ¶ 50 The Act provides that any claim not raised in defendant’s original petition or in an amended petition is waived (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2010)), and our supreme court has held that a claim that was not included in the postconviction petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 475 (2006); People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 507-08 (2004)). ¶ 51 Our supreme court has observed a low threshold for survival of a petitioner’s claims at the first stage, noting that most petitions at this point are drafted by defendants wi

2015"After reviewing the entire transcript of the original trial, we are unable to conclude that there exists no reasonable likelihood that [the missing evidence] would not have affected the jury's deliberative process and judgment." Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 396 . ¶ 225 "A ruling on an initial postconviction petition has res judicata effect with respect to all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the petition. [Citation.] Section 122-3 of the Act provides that any claim of a substantial denial of a constitutional right not raised in a - 57 - No. 1-11-3075 defendant's original postco

2015“After reviewing the entire transcript of the original trial, we are unable to conclude that there exists no reasonable - 32 - likelihood that [the missing evidence] would not have affected the jury’s deliberative process and judgment.” Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 396 . ¶ 225 “A ruling on an initial postconviction petition has res judicata effect with respect to all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the petition. [Citation.] Section 122-3 of the Act provides that any claim of a substantial denial of a constitutional right not raised in a defendant’s original postconviction petit

2015Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16 . ¶ 50 The Act provides that any claim not raised in defendant's original petition or in an amended petition is waived (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2010)), and our supreme court has held that a claim that was not included in the postconviction petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 475 (2006); People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 507-08 (2004)). ¶ 51 Our supreme court has observed a low threshold for survival of a petitioner's claims at the first stage, noting that most petitions at this point are drafted by defendants wi

2015Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16 . ¶ 50 The Act provides that any claim not raised in defendant’s original petition or in an amended petition is waived (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2010)), and our supreme court has held that a claim that was not included in the postconviction petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 475 (2006); People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 507-08 (2004)). ¶ 51 Our supreme court has observed a low threshold for survival of a petitioner’s claims at the first stage, noting that most petitions at this point are drafted by defendants wi

2015People v. Torres, 228 Ill. 2d 382, 394 (2008).

2015People v. Torres, 228 Ill. 2d 382, 394 (2008).

1999In People v. Erickson, 183 Ill. 2d 213, 222-23 , 700 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (1998), the supreme court addressed the issue of successive postconviction petitions and wrote the following: “The [Act] contemplates the filing of only one post[ ]conviction petition, although successive petitions may be allowed where the proceedings on the initial petition were deficient in some fundamental way. [Citation.] The Act provides that any claim of a substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived. [Citations.] Moreover, a ruling on a post[ ]conviction peti

1999In People v. Erickson, 183 Ill. 2d 213, 222-23 , 700 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (1998), the supreme court addressed the issue of successive postconviction petitions and wrote the following: “The [Act] contemplates the filing of only one post[ ]conviction petition, although successive petitions may be allowed where the proceedings on the initial petition were deficient in some fundamental way. [Citation.] The Act provides that any claim of a substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived. [Citations.] Moreover, a ruling on a post[ ]conviction peti

2006Section 122-3 of the Act provides that any claim of a substantial denial of a constitutional right not raised in a defendant's original postconviction petition is waived. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2002); People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d 444, 456 , 275 Ill.Dec. 838 , 793 N.E.2d 609, 620-21 (2002) (stating that in the context of a successive postconviction petition, the procedural bar of waiver is not merely a principle of judicial administration; it is an express requirement of the statute).

2006Section 122-3 of the Act provides that any claim of a substantial denial of a constitutional right not raised in a defendant's original postconviction petition is waived. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2002); People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d 444, 456 , 275 Ill.Dec. 838 , 793 N.E.2d 609, 620-21 (2002) (stating that in the context of a successive postconviction petition, the procedural bar of waiver is not merely a principle of judicial administration; it is an express requirement of the statute).

1998The Act provides that any claim of a substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived. 725 ILCS 5/122 — 3 (West 1996); see Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 274 .

1998The Act provides that any claim of a substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1996); see Flores, 153 Ill.2d at 274 , 180 Ill.Dec. 1 , 606 N.E.2d 1078 .

2004"The question raised in an appeal from an order dismissing a post-conviction petition is whether the allegations in the petition, liberally construed and taken as true, are sufficient to invoke relief under the Act." Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 388 , 233 Ill.Dec. 789 , 701 N.E.2d 1063 ; People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 148 , 284 Ill.Dec. 287 , 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004).

2004"The question raised in an appeal from an order dismissing a post-conviction petition is whether the allegations in the petition, liberally construed and taken as true, are sufficient to invoke relief under the Act." Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 388 , 233 Ill.Dec. 789 , 701 N.E.2d 1063 ; People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 148 , 284 Ill.Dec. 287 , 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004).

2004Here, the appellate court, citing People v. McNeal, 194 Ill.2d 135, 147 , 252 Ill.Dec. 19 , 742 N.E.2d 269 (2000), noted that a defendant *1238 is generally precluded from adding an issue while the matter is on review, because section 122-3 of the Act provides that any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.

2004Here, the appellate court, citing People v. McNeal, 194 Ill.2d 135, 147 , 252 Ill.Dec. 19 , 742 N.E.2d 269 (2000), noted that a defendant *1238 is generally precluded from adding an issue while the matter is on review, because section 122-3 of the Act provides that any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.