attorney fee hearing in Oregon

2026The trial court concluded that the easement was valid, including the attorney fee provision, and that it was binding on plaintiffs, the successors in interest to the origi- nal purchasers from defendant. 1 The provision stated: “If either party brings suit to enforce or declare the meaning of this Agreement, then the prevailing party in such suit, in addition to any other relief, shall be entitled to recover from the non-prevailing party reason- able attorneys’ fees and costs, including any on appeal or review.” 2 The court in its letter opinion awarding fees explicitly refuted plaintiffs’ cha

2020When a cause of action or an alleged cause of action against the defendant in a proceeding exists only because of a tort of another, the defendant can notify the other to defend the proceeding and if the other fails to defend the defendant can either defend, subsequently recovering all the reasonable expenses of the defense, or refuse to defend, in which case he can recover from the tortfeasor the amount of any judgment obtained against him.” Cite as 305 Or App 565 (2020) 593 Notwithstanding that footnote, Georg Fischer and Plastic Services moved for a directed verdict on the attorney-fee clai

2020That aspect of the attorney-fee claim is not at issue on appeal. 11 Consistent with its pleading, Quality Plus’s proposed verdict form included a separate claim for the jury to consider with regard to attorney fees. 594 JH Kelly, LLC v. Quality Plus Services, Inc. Plus points out that one of the cases cited in the footnote, Rocky Mountain Festivals, Inc., 242 P3d 1067 , allowed a party to recover attorney fees notwithstanding its own fault in the underlying third-party litigation.

2020We, therefore, do not discuss them. 200 State v. Nichols upon Restatement section 914 when it rejected the defen- dant’s argument that attorney fees and litigation expenses were not recoverable in a civil action as economic dam- ages. 358 Or at 600-01;5 see also Montara Owners Assn. v. La Noue Development, LLC, 357 Or 333 , 362 n 16, 353 P3d 563 (2015) (noting that “Oregon has relatively little case law on the requirements that must be met” to prevail on such an attorney fee claim, but quoting one treatise that includes as an element that “ ‘the fees and expenses which were incurred were the n

2020We, therefore, do not discuss them. 200 State v. Nichols upon Restatement section 914 when it rejected the defen- dant’s argument that attorney fees and litigation expenses were not recoverable in a civil action as economic dam- ages. 358 Or at 600-01;5 see also Montara Owners Assn. v. La Noue Development, LLC, 357 Or 333 , 362 n 16, 353 P3d 563 (2015) (noting that “Oregon has relatively little case law on the requirements that must be met” to prevail on such an attorney fee claim, but quoting one treatise that includes as an element that “ ‘the fees and expenses which were incurred were the n

2019Cite as 300 Or App 530 (2019) 539 Armatta, when concluding that the plaintiffs sought to ben- efit all Oregonians by their challenge to the ballot measure and that they should be awarded their attorney fees, the court cited Gilbert, which did not involve a constitutional challenge.

2019Questioning Marbet, we stated, “Without deciding whether we were correct in Marbet in limiting Deras only to questions of constitutional magnitude, it is clear that the logic of the attorney fee analysis in Deras and later cases applies only when the issue is one of some magnitude and when the plaintiff obtains some cognizable public benefit.” Id. (emphasis in original).

2018Cite as 23 OTR 22 (2018) 27 The record shows that trial lasted eight days.7 The court has no difficulty concluding that the expenses for the appraisal report and the testimony of taxpayer’s appraiser, Tim Landolt, were reasonably incurred.

2015Co., 343 Or 175, 182 , 166 P3d 519 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 343 Or 394 , 171 P3d 352 (2007), the Supreme Court had held, under ORS 742.061(2) (the “safe-harbor” provision applicable the context of claims relating to PIP benefits), that the phrase “the only issue [in the plaintiffs PIP coverage action] is the amount of benefits due the insured” demonstrated the legislature’s “intent to limit the attorney fee exception of ORS 742.061(2) to disputes over the quantum of benefits and to exclude from the effect of that provision other disputes about the ‘benefits due the insured.’” Cardenas

2015Co., 343 Or 175, 182 , 166 P3d 519 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 343 Or 394 , 171 P3d 352 (2007), the Supreme Court had held, under ORS 742.061(2) (the “safe-harbor” provision applicable the context of claims relating to PIP benefits), that the phrase “the only issue [in the plaintiffs PIP coverage action] is the amount of benefits due the insured” demonstrated the legislature’s “intent to limit the attorney fee exception of ORS 742.061(2) to disputes over the quantum of benefits and to exclude from the effect of that provision other disputes about the ‘benefits due the insured.’” Cardenas

2015Under the so-called American rule regarding the award of attorney fees, “Generally, a party cannot recover attorney fees unless there is a statute or a contract that authorizes recovery of those fees.” Peace River Seed Co-Op v. Proseeds Marketing, 355 Or 44, 65 , 322 P3d 531 (2014).

2015Under the so-called American rule regarding the award of attorney fees, “Generally, a party cannot recover attorney fees unless there is a statute or a contract that authorizes recovery of those fees.” Peace River Seed Co-Op v. Proseeds Marketing, 355 Or 44, 65 , 322 P3d 531 (2014).

2012The attorney fee clause provides: “Should any legal proceeding, including arbitration, be necessary to enforce or interpret the terms of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees incurred including any costs and attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the agreement provides for mandatory attorney fees to the prevailing party; it “does not vest any discretion in the trial court not to award attorney fees.” Beggs v. Hart, 221 Or App 528, 536 , 191 P3d 747 (2008) (discussing a substantially similar attorney fee

2012The attorney fee clause provides: “Should any legal proceeding, including arbitration, be necessary to enforce or interpret the terms of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees incurred including any costs and attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the agreement provides for mandatory attorney fees to the prevailing party; it “does not vest any discretion in the trial court not to award attorney fees.” Beggs v. Hart, 221 Or App 528, 536 , 191 P3d 747 (2008) (discussing a substantially similar attorney fee

2007In addition, the court is not required "to receive evidence to supply detail that is totally lacking in a statement." Orendain , 97 Or App at 613 n 1. 3 TCR 70 A(2)(a)(viii) provides: "If the judgment awards costs and disbursements or attorney fees, that they are awarded and any specific amounts awarded.

2007First, the court stated that, by acknowledging that plaintiff had a policy with defendant and that defendant would pay PIP benefits under the policy, defendant had “accepted coverage.” 207 Or App at 596 .

2007IBC relies on our decision in Russell v. Nikon, Inc., 207 Or App 266 , 140 P3d 1179 , adh’d to as clarified on recons, 208 Or App *578 606, 145 P3d 312 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 299 (2007), where we dismissed an appeal on the ground that, in the absence of a transcript of an attorney fee hearing, we were unable to adequately review the appellant’s assignment of error concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s decision.

2007IBC relies on our decision in Russell v. Nikon, Inc., 207 Or App 266 , 140 P3d 1179 , adh’d to as clarified on recons, 208 Or App *578 606, 145 P3d 312 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 299 (2007), where we dismissed an appeal on the ground that, in the absence of a transcript of an attorney fee hearing, we were unable to adequately review the appellant’s assignment of error concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s decision.

2007The Supreme Court has explained that, in order to preserve an assignment of error for appeal, “it is essential to raise the relevant issue at trial, but less important to make a specific argument or identify a specific legal source with respect to the issue raised.” State v. Stevens, 328 Or 116, 122 , 970 P2d 215 (1998); see also State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188 , 766 P2d 373 (1988) (setting forth the issue-source-argument preservation hierarchy).

2007The Supreme Court has explained that, in order to preserve an assignment of error for appeal, “it is essential to raise the relevant issue at trial, but less important to make a specific argument or identify a specific legal source with respect to the issue raised.” State v. Stevens, 328 Or 116, 122 , 970 P2d 215 (1998); see also State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188 , 766 P2d 373 (1988) (setting forth the issue-source-argument preservation hierarchy).

2007Dockins, 329 Or at 28 . 6 At the attorney fee hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel asserted that the issue whether the policy covered damages related to methamphetamine contamination “has no bearing whatsoever in this case.” Instead, plaintiffs argued that their complaint alleged that all of their losses were covered under the policy and that, because defendant did not file a motion to require plaintiffs to specify which damages were actually covered under the policy, defendant’s settlement offer encompassed damages from the decontamination cleanup.

2007IBC relies on our decision in Russell v. Nikon, Inc., 207 Or App 266 , 140 P3d 1179 , adh’d to as clarified on recons, 208 Or App *578 606, 145 P3d 312 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 299 (2007), where we dismissed an appeal on the ground that, in the absence of a transcript of an attorney fee hearing, we were unable to adequately review the appellant’s assignment of error concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s decision.

2006In the absence of a transcript, we cannot determine what took place at the attorney fee hearing. 2 See Arden-Mayfair v. Patterson, 46 Or App 849, 857 , 613 P2d 1062 , rev den, 290 Or 149 (1980), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Strader v. Grange Mutual Ins.

2006In the absence of a transcript, we cannot determine what took place at the attorney fee hearing. 2 See Arden-Mayfair v. Patterson, 46 Or App 849, 857 , 613 P2d 1062 , rev den, 290 Or 149 (1980), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Strader v. Grange Mutual Ins.

2006Co., 179 Or App 329, 339 , 39 P3d 903 , rev den, 334 Or 190 (2002) (appellate courts may not consider material not contained in the record below).

2006Co., 179 Or App 329, 339 , 39 P3d 903 , rev den, 334 Or 190 (2002) (appellate courts may not consider material not contained in the record below).

2005They rely on the attorney fee clause in the subcontract between Keeton and plaintiff and this court’s decision in CMS Sheep Co., Inc. v. Russell, 179 Or App 172 , 39 P3d 262 , rev den, 334 Or 260 (2002), to support that argument.

2005They rely on the attorney fee clause in the subcontract between Keeton and plaintiff and this court’s decision in CMS Sheep Co., Inc. v. Russell, 179 Or App 172 , 39 P3d 262 , rev den, 334 Or 260 (2002), to support that argument.

2005Oakleaf Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or App 458 , 75 P3d 908 (2003), rev den, 336 Or 376 (2004), is consistent with Lumbermen’s .

2005Oakleaf Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or App 458 , 75 P3d 908 (2003), rev den, 336 Or 376 (2004), is consistent with Lumbermen’s .

2005Id.

2001Quality Contractors, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 139 Or App 366, 369 , 911 P2d 1268 , rev den 323 Or 691 (1996).

2001Quality Contractors, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 139 Or App 366, 369 , 911 P2d 1268 , rev den 323 Or 691 (1996).

2000Auto Depot is mistaken. *141 In Fernley v. Lloyd, 164 Or App 109 , 988 P2d 930 (1999), the trial court found that a pre-printed land sale contract form containing an attorney fee provision did not represent an agreement between the parties.

2000Auto Depot is mistaken. *141 In Fernley v. Lloyd, 164 Or App 109 , 988 P2d 930 (1999), the trial court found that a pre-printed land sale contract form containing an attorney fee provision did not represent an agreement between the parties.

1996Elect., 25 Or App 469, 488 , 550 P2d 465 (1976), rev’d on other grounds 277 Or 447 , 561 P2d 154 (1977), which involved no constitutional issues, we denied fees based on our observation that the Oregon Supreme Court had employed the Deras rule “only in cases of constitutional significance.” In Koon v. City of Gresham, 123 Or App 513 , 860 P2d 848 (1993), rev den 318 Or 326 (1994), we elaborated on Marbet: “Without deciding whether we were correct in Marbet in limiting Deras only to questions of constitutional magnitude, it is clear that the logic of the attorney fee analysis in Deras and later

1996Elect., 25 Or App 469, 488 , 550 P2d 465 (1976), rev’d on other grounds 277 Or 447 , 561 P2d 154 (1977), which involved no constitutional issues, we denied fees based on our observation that the Oregon Supreme Court had employed the Deras rule “only in cases of constitutional significance.” In Koon v. City of Gresham, 123 Or App 513 , 860 P2d 848 (1993), rev den 318 Or 326 (1994), we elaborated on Marbet: “Without deciding whether we were correct in Marbet in limiting Deras only to questions of constitutional magnitude, it is clear that the logic of the attorney fee analysis in Deras and later