uniform jury instruction in Oregon

2024The instructions included the uniform jury instruction on “serious physical injury,” as well as the state’s 2 It appears that the state’s special instruction regarding “protracted disfig- urement” was based on State v. Alvarez, 240 Or App 167, 171 , 246 P3d 26 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 408 (2011).

2024The instructions included the uniform jury instruction on “serious physical injury,” as well as the state’s 2 It appears that the state’s special instruction regarding “protracted disfig- urement” was based on State v. Alvarez, 240 Or App 167, 171 , 246 P3d 26 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 408 (2011).

2024The instructions included the uniform jury instruction on “serious physical injury,” as well as the state’s 2 It appears that the state’s special instruction regarding “protracted disfig- urement” was based on State v. Alvarez, 240 Or App 167, 171 , 246 P3d 26 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 408 (2011).

2024The instructions included the uniform jury instruction on “serious physical injury,” as well as the state’s 2 It appears that the state’s special instruction regarding “protracted disfig- urement” was based on State v. Alvarez, 240 Or App 167, 171 , 246 P3d 26 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 408 (2011).

2025See, e.g., State v. George, 337 Or 329, 339-40 , 97 P3d 656 (2004) (concluding that the defendant did not have to propose an instruction to preserve an objection on the fail- ure to instruct where the trial court already had announced that it would not give the uniform jury instruction or any variation of it); State v. Olmstead, 310 Or 455, 461 , 800 P2d 277 (1990) (explaining that, when a trial court “excludes an entire class of evidence by declaring, in advance, that it is Cite as 339 Or App 684 (2025) 691 inadmissible as a matter of law, the ruling renders a further offer futile”).

2025See, e.g., State v. George, 337 Or 329, 339-40 , 97 P3d 656 (2004) (concluding that the defendant did not have to propose an instruction to preserve an objection on the fail- ure to instruct where the trial court already had announced that it would not give the uniform jury instruction or any variation of it); State v. Olmstead, 310 Or 455, 461 , 800 P2d 277 (1990) (explaining that, when a trial court “excludes an entire class of evidence by declaring, in advance, that it is Cite as 339 Or App 684 (2025) 691 inadmissible as a matter of law, the ruling renders a further offer futile”).

2025See, e.g., State v. George, 337 Or 329, 339-40 , 97 P3d 656 (2004) (concluding that the defendant did not have to propose an instruction to preserve an objection on the fail- ure to instruct where the trial court already had announced that it would not give the uniform jury instruction or any variation of it); State v. Olmstead, 310 Or 455, 461 , 800 P2d 277 (1990) (explaining that, when a trial court “excludes an entire class of evidence by declaring, in advance, that it is Cite as 339 Or App 684 (2025) 691 inadmissible as a matter of law, the ruling renders a further offer futile”).

2025See, e.g., State v. George, 337 Or 329, 339-40 , 97 P3d 656 (2004) (concluding that the defendant did not have to propose an instruction to preserve an objection on the fail- ure to instruct where the trial court already had announced that it would not give the uniform jury instruction or any variation of it); State v. Olmstead, 310 Or 455, 461 , 800 P2d 277 (1990) (explaining that, when a trial court “excludes an entire class of evidence by declaring, in advance, that it is Cite as 339 Or App 684 (2025) 691 inadmissible as a matter of law, the ruling renders a further offer futile”).

2023We conclude that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury, because plaintiff’s arguments are foreclosed by Haas v. Estate of Carter, 370 Or 742 , 525 P3d 451 (2023).

2023We conclude that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury, because plaintiff’s arguments are foreclosed by Haas v. Estate of Carter, 370 Or 742 , 525 P3d 451 (2023).

2017The "touchstones" of appellate evaluation of jury instructions are "legal accuracy and clarity." Estate of Michelle Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc. , 348 Or. 442 , 454-55, 235 P.3d 668 , adh'd to on recons , 349 Or. 521 , 246 P.3d 479 (2010) ("Although it is possible that a jury could glean [a complex legal] distinction from defendant's proposed instructions in combination with the uniform jury instruction, it is not probable. * * * When the law draws a line between the proper and improper use of evidence, a jury instruction must be equally explicit in describing what falls on each side of that

2017The "touchstones" of appellate evaluation of jury instructions are "legal accuracy and clarity." Estate of Michelle Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc. , 348 Or. 442 , 454-55, 235 P.3d 668 , adh'd to on recons , 349 Or. 521 , 246 P.3d 479 (2010) ("Although it is possible that a jury could glean [a complex legal] distinction from defendant's proposed instructions in combination with the uniform jury instruction, it is not probable. * * * When the law draws a line between the proper and improper use of evidence, a jury instruction must be equally explicit in describing what falls on each side of that

2017The "touchstones" of appellate evaluation of jury instructions are "legal accuracy and clarity." Estate of Michelle Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc. , 348 Or. 442 , 454-55, 235 P.3d 668 , adh'd to on recons , 349 Or. 521 , 246 P.3d 479 (2010) ("Although it is possible that a jury could glean [a complex legal] distinction from defendant's proposed instructions in combination with the uniform jury instruction, it is not probable. * * * When the law draws a line between the proper and improper use of evidence, a jury instruction must be equally explicit in describing what falls on each side of that

2017The "touchstones" of appellate evaluation of jury instructions are "legal accuracy and clarity." Estate of Michelle Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc. , 348 Or. 442 , 454-55, 235 P.3d 668 , adh'd to on recons , 349 Or. 521 , 246 P.3d 479 (2010) ("Although it is possible that a jury could glean [a complex legal] distinction from defendant's proposed instructions in combination with the uniform jury instruction, it is not probable. * * * When the law draws a line between the proper and improper use of evidence, a jury instruction must be equally explicit in describing what falls on each side of that

2012After trial, but before the parties submitted their briefs on appeal, the Supreme Court decided State v. Oliphant, 347 Or 175 , 218 P3d 1281 (2009), which concerned, among other issues, UCrJI 1227 — the same uniform jury instruction at issue here.

2012After trial, but before the parties submitted their briefs on appeal, the Supreme Court decided State v. Oliphant, 347 Or 175 , 218 P3d 1281 (2009), which concerned, among other issues, UCrJI 1227 — the same uniform jury instruction at issue here.

2010As to the giving of the uniform jury instruction, plaintiff, in his answering brief, argued that defendant “ha[d] waived any challenge to this instruction.” In a reply brief, defendant disputed that characterization and asserted that “[t]he trial court also erred in giving instructions [on punitive damages] that were affirmatively misleading.” In Dunlap v. Dickson, 307 Or 175 , 180 n 4, 765 P2d 203 (1988), this court indicated that it would exercise its discretion to reach an issue presented to the Court of Appeals (1) when there was a “close connection” between the issues, and (2) “to avoid u

2010As to the giving of the uniform jury instruction, plaintiff, in his answering brief, argued that defendant “ha[d] waived any challenge to this instruction.” In a reply brief, defendant disputed that characterization and asserted that “[t]he trial court also erred in giving instructions [on punitive damages] that were affirmatively misleading.” In Dunlap v. Dickson, 307 Or 175 , 180 n 4, 765 P2d 203 (1988), this court indicated that it would exercise its discretion to reach an issue presented to the Court of Appeals (1) when there was a “close connection” between the issues, and (2) “to avoid u

2025“However, you may find that the defendant was negligent if you find that the incident that caused damage to the plain- tiff is one that, in the normal course of events, would not have occurred unless the defendant was negligent.” 1 We recently discussed res ipsa loquitur in Jackson v. KA-3 Associates, LLC, 331 Or App 574 , 546 P3d 950 , rev allowed, 373 Or 81 , 546 P3d 950 (2024): “In the absence of evidence of negligence or the exact cause of an acci- dent, a factfinder can infer negligence and causation under res ipsa loquitur, a rule of circumstantial evidence, if the ‘accident is of a kind

2025“However, you may find that the defendant was negligent if you find that the incident that caused damage to the plain- tiff is one that, in the normal course of events, would not have occurred unless the defendant was negligent.” 1 We recently discussed res ipsa loquitur in Jackson v. KA-3 Associates, LLC, 331 Or App 574 , 546 P3d 950 , rev allowed, 373 Or 81 , 546 P3d 950 (2024): “In the absence of evidence of negligence or the exact cause of an acci- dent, a factfinder can infer negligence and causation under res ipsa loquitur, a rule of circumstantial evidence, if the ‘accident is of a kind

2022As Cite as 317 Or App 672 (2022) 685 such, defendant argues that the uniform jury instruction on breath-test refusals (UCrJI 2712), which told the jury that it could consider his breath-test refusal as evidence of his guilt, inaccurately stated the law under Banks II.

2021In giving that instruction, the trial court informed the jury that, to find defendant guilty of the PSV charge, it must find that defendant had “possessed a vehicle that was the subject of theft” and that defendant “knew or believed the vehicle was the subject of theft.” Cite as 309 Or App 31 (2021) 43 In reaching our conclusion, we agree with defen- dant that the district could not have been the owner of the department property in February 2013, when the alleged offenses occurred.

2020As alleged in the indictment, the basis of defendant’s unlawful- use-of-a-weapon conviction was his conduct in “carry[ing] or Cite as 307 Or App 560 (2020) 563 possess[ing] a dangerous weapon, to wit: a bat, with intent to use said weapon unlawfully against [S].” At trial, defendant asked the court to give the jury a witness-false-in-part instruction.2 The applicable uniform jury instruction provides: “Sometimes a witness may give incorrect or even incon- sistent testimony.

2019Id. at 348-49 , 427 P.3d 1130 .

2019Id. at 348-49 , 427 P.3d 1130 .

2016A uniform jury instruction was later devised based on that ruling, one that this court endorsed in State v. Allen, 301 Or 35 , 717 P2d 1178 (1986).

2016A uniform jury instruction was later devised based on that ruling, one that this court endorsed in State v. Allen, 301 Or 35 , 717 P2d 1178 (1986).

2015We distinguished that case from Hale because the underlying criminal trial in Hale was decided before State v. Anlauf 164 Or App 672 , 995 P2d 547 (2000), where we signaled that the uniform jury instruction misstated the law.

2015We distinguished that case from Hale because the underlying criminal trial in Hale was decided before State v. Anlauf 164 Or App 672 , 995 P2d 547 (2000), where we signaled that the uniform jury instruction misstated the law.

2013Id. at 583 .