23 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. United Airlinesgreen2 sentences2021No tortfeasor -9- is liable to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the common liability. (c) When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide but it reduces the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of any amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration actually paid f 2020In particular, section 2(c) of the Con- tribution Act states as follows: “When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide but it reduces the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of any amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration actually paid for it, whichever is greater.” 740 | 3 | 13 |
Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc.green2 sentences2018This provision does not affect any right of contribution nor any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship." 740 ILCS 100/2 (West 2012). ¶ 13 This court has recognized that "the Contribution Act seeks to promote two important public policies-the encouragement of settlements and the equitable apportionment of damages among tortfeasors." Johnson v. United Airlines , 203 Ill. 2d 121 , 135, 271 Ill.Dec. 258 , 784 N.E.2d 812 (2003) (citing Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc. , 197 Ill. 2d 185 , 193-94, 258 Ill.Dec. 562 , 756 N.E.2d 836 (2001), and In re Guardianship of Babb , 2018This provision does not affect any right of contribution nor any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship." 740 ILCS 100/2 (West 2012). ¶ 13 This court has recognized that "the Contribution Act seeks to promote two important public policies-the encouragement of settlements and the equitable apportionment of damages among tortfeasors." Johnson v. United Airlines , 203 Ill. 2d 121 , 135, 271 Ill.Dec. 258 , 784 N.E.2d 812 (2003) (citing Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc. , 197 Ill. 2d 185 , 193-94, 258 Ill.Dec. 562 , 756 N.E.2d 836 (2001), and In re Guardianship of Babb , | 3 | 4 |
Babb v. City of Champaigngreen2 sentences2020In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153, 161 (1994). 2018This provision does not affect any right of contribution nor any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship." 740 ILCS 100/2 (West 2012). ¶ 13 This court has recognized that "the Contribution Act seeks to promote two important public policies-the encouragement of settlements and the equitable apportionment of damages among tortfeasors." Johnson v. United Airlines , 203 Ill. 2d 121 , 135, 271 Ill.Dec. 258 , 784 N.E.2d 812 (2003) (citing Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc. , 197 Ill. 2d 185 , 193-94, 258 Ill.Dec. 562 , 756 N.E.2d 836 (2001), and In re Guardianship of Babb , | 2 | 6 |
Lard v. AM/FM Ohio, Inc.green1 sentence2026This statutory provision has been explained as follows: “A nonsettling defendant may claim as a setoff any amount that the plaintiff recovered in a prior settlement with settling defendants, but the only amounts that may normally be applied are those which compensated for the same injury *** for which the nonsettling defendant was ultimately found liable.” Lard v. AM/FM Ohio, Inc., 387 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Belleville Radiologists, Ltd.green1 sentence1999While Illinois public policy favors the peaceful and voluntary resolution of disputes through settlement agreements (Johnson v. Belleville Radiologists, Ltd., 221 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Nguyen v. Tilwalligreen1 sentence1988See, e.g., Nguyen v. Tilwalli (1986), 144 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Although the Municipalities argue that the Settlement fails to satisfy four factors establishing whether a settlement was made in good faith, as articulated in Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 317 Ill. 2003Although the Municipalities argue that the Settlement fails to satisfy four factors establishing whether a settlement was made in good-faith, as articulated in Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc. , 317 Ill. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Rakowski v. Lucente
green
2 sentences1991If we were now to add limitations not expressed in the general language of the settlement instrument or in the provisions of the Contribution Act, we would make those who desire to end litigation wary and uncertain of what they would accomplish by settlement." ( Rakowski v. Lucente (1984), 104 Ill.2d 317, 325 , 84 Ill.Dec. 654 , 472 N.E.2d 791 .) Furthermore, this court has held that the entire circumstances of the settlement need to be examined in determining whether or not the settlement was entered into in good faith. 1991If we were now to add limitations not expressed in the general language of the settlement instrument or in the provisions of the Contribution Act, we would make those who desire to end litigation wary and uncertain of what they would accomplish by settlement." ( Rakowski v. Lucente (1984), 104 Ill.2d 317, 325 , 84 Ill.Dec. 654 , 472 N.E.2d 791 .) Furthermore, this court has held that the entire circumstances of the settlement need to be examined in determining whether or not the settlement was entered into in good faith. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Hamburger v. Paterson Tallow Co.
green
2 sentences1986In the alternative, plaintiff urges, that should this court hold the Act inapplicable, we should hold, in accordance with the opinions of the majority of commentators and the case law in other jurisdictions, that a covenant reserving rights against unnamed tortfeasors does not operate to release those tortfeasors, including employers only secondarily liable. ( Plath v. Justus (1971), 28 N.Y.2d 16 , 268 N.E.2d 117 , 319 N.Y.S.2d 433 ; Hamburger v. Paterson Tallow Co. (1939), 122 N.J.L. 457 , 5 A.2d 487 ; Henry B. 1986In the alternative, plaintiff urges, that should this court hold the Act inapplicable, we should hold, in accordance with the opinions of the majority of commentators and the case law in other jurisdictions, that a covenant reserving rights against unnamed tortfeasors does not operate to release those tortfeasors, including employers only secondarily liable. ( Plath v. Justus (1971), 28 N.Y.2d 16 , 268 N.E.2d 117 , 319 N.Y.S.2d 433 ; Hamburger v. Paterson Tallow Co. (1939), 122 N.J.L. 457 , 5 A.2d 487 ; Henry B. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Plath v. Justus
green
2 sentences1986In the alternative, plaintiff urges, that should this court hold the Act inapplicable, we should hold, in accordance with the opinions of the majority of commentators and the case law in other jurisdictions, that a covenant reserving rights against unnamed tortfeasors does not operate to release those tortfeasors, including employers only secondarily liable. ( Plath v. Justus (1971), 28 N.Y.2d 16 , 268 N.E.2d 117 , 319 N.Y.S.2d 433 ; Hamburger v. Paterson Tallow Co. (1939), 122 N.J.L. 457 , 5 A.2d 487 ; Henry B. 1986In the alternative, plaintiff urges, that should this court hold the Act inapplicable, we should hold, in accordance with the opinions of the majority of commentators and the case law in other jurisdictions, that a covenant reserving rights against unnamed tortfeasors does not operate to release those tortfeasors, including employers only secondarily liable. ( Plath v. Justus (1971), 28 N.Y.2d 16 , 268 N.E.2d 117 , 319 N.Y.S.2d 433 ; Hamburger v. Paterson Tallow Co. (1939), 122 N.J.L. 457 , 5 A.2d 487 ; Henry B. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.