accomplice instruction in Minnesota

2010Because our case law clearly states that the accomplice instruction must be given wherever a witness can reasonably be considered an accomplice, see, e.g., Strommen, 648 N.W.2d at 689 (citing Shoop, 441 N.W.2d at 479 ), we conclude that the error here was plain.

2010Because our case law clearly states that the accomplice instruction must be given wherever a witness can reasonably be considered an accomplice, see, e.g., Strommen, 648 N.W.2d at 689 (citing Shoop, 441 N.W.2d at 479 ), we conclude that the error here was plain.

2015See State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 689 (Minn. 2002) (providing that an accomplice instruction be given “in any criminal case in which it is reasonable to consider any witness against the defendant to be an accomplice”).

2010Because our case law clearly states that the accomplice instruction must be given wherever a witness can reasonably be considered an accomplice, see, e.g., Strommen, 648 N.W.2d at 689 (citing Shoop, 441 N.W.2d at 479 ), we conclude that the error here was plain.

2015Appellant did not ask for an accomplice instruction at trial. “[W]here a district court fails to give a required accomplice corroboration instruction and the defendant does not object, an appellate court must apply the plain error[3] analysis.” State v. Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572 , 584 n.4 (Minn. 2007).

2010In State v. Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572, 585 (Minn.2007), for example, we held that even though the failure to give an accomplice instruction was plain error, the error did not affect substantial rights because of the strength of the corroborating evidence.

2010See Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741 .

2010See Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741 . *614 II.

2010Larson’s argument is based on the premise that Andujar was an accomplice to Cady’s murder. 6 The State contends that because Larson presented alternative perpetrator evidence regarding Andujar, the accomplice instruction was not required under State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 877 (Minn.2008).

2010Id.

2006If the facts are undisputed, the district court determines whether a witness might reasonably be considered an accomplice, but if the “evidence is disputed or susceptible to different interpretations, then the question whether the witness is an accomplice is one of fact for the jury.” State v. Flournoy, 535 N.W.2d 354, 359 (Minn.1995) (citing State v. Jensen, 289 Minn. 444, 447 , 184 N.W.2d 813, 815 (1971)).

2004In determining whether a witness is an accomplice for the purpose of an accomplice instruction, the inquiry is whether the witness “could have been indicted and convicted for the crime with which the accused is charged.” State v. Flournoy, 535 N.W.2d 354, 359 (Minn.1995) (quotation omitted).

2015Jackson, 726 N.W.2d at 461-62 .

2009State v. Jackson, 726 N.W.2d 454, 461 (Minn.2007) (citing State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 864 (Minn.2006), and State v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309, 317 (Minn.2004)).

2009State v. Jackson, 726 N.W.2d 454, 461 (Minn.2007) (citing State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 864 (Minn.2006), and State v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309, 317 (Minn.2004)).

2007Regarding claim (6), that the court erred by failing to include an accomplice instruction, we held that “Hollingsworth *247 * * * is clearly not an accomplice in the underlying felony” and “any error in the district court’s failure to give the accomplice corroboration instruction was harmless.” Id. at 864-65 .

2009State v. Jackson, 726 N.W.2d 454, 461 (Minn.2007) (citing State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 864 (Minn.2006), and State v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309, 317 (Minn.2004)).

2009First, we consider that the requirement for the instruction is based on the fact that the “credibility of an accomplice in inherently untrustworthy.” Lee, 683 N.W.2d at 316 .

2015See State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2014) (applying only third prong of plain-error test to deny defendant’s constitutional claim, stating that it was unnecessary to consider whether there was plain error when any violation did not affect defendant’s substantial rights).

2014This “duty arises from the very real possibility that a jury might discredit all testimony except the accomplice testimony, and thus find the defendant guilty on the accomplice testimony alone.” State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540, 548 (Minn. 2012) (quotations omitted).

2014Accordingly, district courts must give an accomplice instruction in any “case in which it is reasonable to consider any witness against the defendant to be an accomplice.” Barrientos–Quintana, 787 N.W.2d at 610 (quotation omitted).

2010To prevail on the third prong of the plain-error test, Barrientos-Quintana “bears the heavy burden of showing” prejudice, which means “there is a reasonable likelihood that [the error] had a significant effect on the jury verdict.” State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650, 659 (Minn.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2010To prevail on the third prong of the plain-error test, Barrientos-Quintana "bears the heavy burden of showing" prejudice, which means "there is a reasonable likelihood that [the error] had a significant effect on the jury verdict." State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650, 659 (Minn.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2009The accomplice-instruction rule does not require that the corroborative evidence, standing alone, be sufficient to support a conviction; rather, such evidence “must affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and point to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial degree.” State v. Sorg, 275 Minn. 1, 5 , 144 N.W.2d 783, 786 (1966).

2009The accomplice-instruction rule does not require that the corroborative evidence, standing alone, be sufficient to support a conviction; rather, such evidence “must affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and point to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial degree.” State v. Sorg, 275 Minn. 1, 5 , 144 N.W.2d 783, 786 (1966).

2008See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 42 , 109 S.Ct. 285 . .

2008See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 42 , 109 S.Ct. 285 . .

2007To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must demonstrate that “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 587 (Minn.2005) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)) (quotation marks omitted).

2006If the facts are undisputed, the district court determines whether a witness might reasonably be considered an accomplice, but if the “evidence is disputed or susceptible to different interpretations, then the question whether the witness is an accomplice is one of fact for the jury.” State v. Flournoy, 535 N.W.2d 354, 359 (Minn.1995) (citing State v. Jensen, 289 Minn. 444, 447 , 184 N.W.2d 813, 815 (1971)).

2006If the facts are undisputed, the district court determines whether a witness might reasonably be considered an accomplice, but if the “evidence is disputed or susceptible to different interpretations, then the question whether the witness is an accomplice is one of fact for the jury.” State v. Flournoy, 535 N.W.2d 354, 359 (Minn.1995) (citing State v. Jensen, 289 Minn. 444, 447 , 184 N.W.2d 813, 815 (1971)).

2004State v. LaJambe, 300 Minn. 539, 541 , 219 N.W.2d 917, 919 (1974).

2004State v. LaJambe, 300 Minn. 539, 541 , 219 N.W.2d 917, 919 (1974).

1989State v. Soltau, 212 Minn. 20, 26 , 2 N.W.2d 155, 159 (1942).

1989State v. Soltau, 212 Minn. 20, 26 , 2 N.W.2d 155, 159 (1942).