23 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pendletongreen2 sentences1998Specifically, the court of appeals’ majority relied upon the case of State v. Pendleton (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 785 , 663 N.E.2d 395 , wherein it is stated that “the mere possibility that the offender may be able to pay the fine in the future, or pay it in the future in installments, is not a proper basis on which to find that a defendant is not indigent.” Pendleton at 788 , 663 N.E.2d at 397 (interpreting former R.C. 2925.03[L]). 1998Specifically, the court of appeals’ majority relied upon the case of State v. Pendleton (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 785 , 663 N.E.2d 395 , wherein it is stated that “the mere possibility that the offender may be able to pay the fine in the future, or pay it in the future in installments, is not a proper basis on which to find that a defendant is not indigent.” Pendleton at 788 , 663 N.E.2d at 397 (interpreting former R.C. 2925.03[L]). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Speakman, 08ap-456 (3-17-2009)green2 sentences2024No. 08AP-456, 2009-Ohio-1184 , we held that Fugate was inapplicable to a factual situation in which “the court sentenced appellant [for a community control violation] to an amount of time equal to the amount of jail time credit he had, which resulted in appellant having already served his sentence for the community control violation by the time of the sentencing hearing” on his new convictions. 2015Franklin Nos. 08AP-456 to 458, 2009-Ohio-1184, ¶ 13 (affirming where "the court sentenced appellant to an amount of time equal to the amount of jail time credit he had, which resulted in appellant having already served his sentence for the community control violation by the time of the sentencing hearing"); State v. Maddox, 8th Dist. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Brewergreen1 sentence2020No. 14CA1, 2014-Ohio-1903, ¶ 46 (concluding the trial court had considered the defendant's present and future ability to pay restitution as the "record included Brewer's statements that he was 28, suffered from no major physical or mental problems, and was an experienced carpenter and forklift operator"). {¶ 33} Appellant, however, asserts the trial court considered his family's ability to pay restitution rather than his personal ability to pay. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Maddoxgreen1 sentence2014Cuyahoga No. 99120, 2013-Ohio-3140, ¶ 49 (finding Fugate inapplicable where the trial court did not order appellant to concurrent -5- Butler CA2013-11-204 sentences for his probation violation and new crimes, and instead, "essentially sentenced Maddox to time served for those violations"); and State v. Smith, 10th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Beasleygreen1 sentence1990See also, State v. Beasley (1984), 14 Ohio St. 3d 74, 75 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gipson
green
2 sentences2021The Supreme Court recognized that under these circumstances, although Gipson was indigent and unemployed at the time of the sentencing hearing, “the trial court could have reasonably determined * * * he was not ‘unable to pay’ the mandatory fine over the course of his probation.” Id. 2009Id. {¶ 9} R.C. 2929.19(B)(6) provides that before imposing a financial sanction, “the court shall consider the offender’s present and future ability to pay the amount of the sanction or fine.” This court has concluded that when determining a defendant’s present and future ability to pay, there are no express factors a trial court must consider or findings a court must make. | 2 | 2009–2021 |
State v. Jordan
green
2 sentences2019State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , 817 N.E.2d 864 . 2008In fact, several years subsequent to its *Page 6 holding in Woods , the Supreme Court released its holding in State v. Jordan , 104 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , which addressed, inter alia, the specific issue of whether a trial court must notify an offender of post-release control at the time of the sentencing hearing {¶ 19} In Jordan , similar to the case sub judice, the trial court failed to notify the defendant of post-release control requirements at the time of sentencing, but incorporated that notice into its sentencing entry. | 2 | 2008–2019 |
State v. Gwynne
green
1 sentence2024State v. Gwynne, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-4607 , ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 31 (“Gwynne IV”). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Fugate
green
1 sentence2023Bloom offers no actual calculation or detailed analysis of the time he spent in local custody to support his assignment of error; rather, Bloom merely asserts that “the record herein is sufficiently convoluted that it is unclear whether proper jail time credit has been given or whether the trial court did its duty as required under statute to do such a calculation.” {¶9} “The practice of awarding jail-time credit, although now covered by state statute, has its roots in the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.” State v. Fugate, 117 Ohio St.3d 261 , 2008-Ohio-856 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Davis (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2022State v. Davis, 159 Ohio St.3d 31 , 2020-Ohio-309 , 146 N.E.3d 560, ¶ 16 . {¶60} The record does not support Ludwick’s factual assertion that he was indigent at the time of the sentencing hearing. 2022State v. Davis, 159 Ohio St.3d 31 , 2020-Ohio-309 , 146 N.E.3d 560, ¶ 16 . {¶60} The record does not support Ludwick’s factual assertion that he was indigent at the time of the sentencing hearing. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Brooks
green
2 sentences2017R.C. 2929.15 further provides in section (B)(3) as follows: "[t]he prison term, if any, imposed upon a violator pursuant to this division shall be within the range of prison terms available for the offense for which the sanction that was violated was imposed and shall not exceed the prison term specified in the notice provided to the offender at the sentencing hearing pursuant to division (B)(2) of the section 2929.19 of the Revised Code." {¶ 19} The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Brooks , 103 Ohio St.3d 134 , 2004-Ohio-4746 , 814 N.E.2d 837 , held at paragraph two of the syllabus that "[p] 2017R.C. 2929.15 further provides in section (B)(3) as follows: "[t]he prison term, if any, imposed upon a violator pursuant to this division shall be within the range of prison terms available for the offense for which the sanction that was violated was imposed and shall not exceed the prison term specified in the notice provided to the offender at the sentencing hearing pursuant to division (B)(2) of the section 2929.19 of the Revised Code." {¶ 19} The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Brooks , 103 Ohio St.3d 134 , 2004-Ohio-4746 , 814 N.E.2d 837 , held at paragraph two of the syllabus that "[p] | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Nice, 07-Ca-2 (11-5-2008)
green
1 sentence2017The terms of a plea agreement are determined based on “what the parties reasonably understood at the time the defendant entered his guilty plea.” (Emphasis added.) Id. {¶14} Although Mr. Walter “recollect[ed]” at the time of the sentencing hearing that there had been an agreement to recommend work release, that recollection is not consistent with the plea hearing transcript. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Brumback
green
2 sentences2012State v. Brumback, 109 Ohio App.3d 65, 83 , 671 N.E.2d 1064 (9th Dist.1996). 2012State v. Brumback, 109 Ohio App.3d 65, 83 , 671 N.E.2d 1064 (9th Dist.1996). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Xie
green
1 sentence2012Id. {¶15} At the time of the sentencing hearing, Bates made an oral motion to withdraw his plea. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Lemmons
neutral
1 sentence2011State v. Lemmons, Delaware App. No. 10-CA-48, 2011-Ohio-3322, ¶39 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Barnes
green
1 sentence2009Id. {¶ 48} Appellant disputes the trial court's calculation of jail-time credit that had accrued by the time of the sentencing hearing. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Curd, Unpublished Decision (12-30-2004)
green
1 sentence2006State v. Curd, Lake App. No. 2003-L-030, 2004-Ohio-7222 , at ¶ 109. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Woods v. Telb
green
1 sentence2003Defendant responded "yes." Id. {¶ 33} At the time of the sentencing hearing, the court informed the defendant as follows: "Post[-]release control is also mandatory for this particular crime and you could be returned to prison for up to nine months, with a maximum for repeated violations of 50 percent of your stated terms. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.