essential facts claim in New York

2014When determining whether leave to file a late notice of claim should be granted, the court must consider “whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense” (Matter of Dubowy v City of New York, 305 AD2d 320, 321 [1st Dept 2003]).

2013When presented with an application for leave to file a late notice of claim, the court considers “whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense” (Matter of Dubowy v City of New York, 305 AD2d 320, 321 [1st Dept 2003]).

2026Petitioner correctly points out that, in Matter of Richardson v New York City Housing Authority ( 136 AD3d 484, 484 [1st Dept 2016]), the Appellate Division, First Department reversed the court below and granted leave to serve a late notice of claim solely because the [*5]respondent was not substantially prejudiced, even though the respondent did not have timely, actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim and the petitioner lacked a reasonable excuse.

2025Petitioner relies heavily on Matter of Richardson v New York City Housing Authority ( 136 AD3d 484, 484 [1st Dept 2016]) for the proposition that leave to serve a late notice of claim should still be granted where the respondent has not been “substantially prejudiced, even though the respondent did not have timely, actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim and the petitioner lacked a reasonable excuse” (affirmation in reply ¶ 21).

2026Once the petitioner establishes timely notice of the essential facts of the claim, the burden of showing lack of prejudice has been met ( see Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d 658 , 838 NYS2d 624 [2d Dept 2007]).

2026Once the petitioner establishes timely notice of the essential facts of the claim, the burden of showing lack of prejudice has been met ( see Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d 658 , 838 NYS2d 624 [2d Dept 2007]).

2014As we have repeatedly stated, actual knowledge of the essential facts of a claim requires “[k]nowledge of the injuries or damages claimed by a [claimant], rather than mere notice of the underlying occurrence” (Santana v Western Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 2 AD3d 1304, 1305 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 704 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Dalton v Akron Cent.

2014As we have repeatedly stated, actual knowledge of the essential facts of a claim requires “[k]nowledge of the injuries or damages claimed by a [claimant], rather than mere notice of the underlying occurrence” (Santana v Western Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 2 AD3d 1304, 1305 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 704 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Dalton v Akron Cent.

2023Consequently, " '[k]nowledge of the injuries or damages claimed . . . , rather than mere notice of the underlying occurrence, is necessary to establish actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within the meaning of General Municipal Law § 50-e (5)' " ( Turlington , 143 AD3d at 1248). "[T]he [plaintiff] bears the burden of demonstrating that the [public corporation] had actual knowledge" ( Dalton , 107 AD3d at 1519 ).

2022Moreover, " '[k]nowledge of the injuries or damages claimed . . . , rather than mere notice of the underlying occurrence, is necessary to establish actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within the meaning of General Municipal Law § 50-e (5)' . . . , and the claimant has the burden of demonstrating that the respondent had actual timely knowledge" [*3]( Turlington , 143 AD3d at 1248).

2020"Generally, knowledge of a police officer or of a police department cannot be considered actual knowledge of the [municipal] corporation itself regarding the essential facts of a claim" ( Caselli v City of New York , 105 AD2d 251, 255 ; see Matter of D'Agostino v City of New York , 146 AD3d at 881 ).

2018"Generally, knowledge of a police officer or of a police department cannot be considered actual knowledge of the public corporation itself regarding the essential facts of a claim" ( Caselli v City of New York , 105 AD2d 251, 255 ).

2007This prejudice is particularly significant because NYCHHC did not have actual knowledge of the essential facts within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter (Williams, 6 NY3d at 539 [proof that defendant had actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter is an important factor in determining whether defendant is prejudiced]).

2006Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006].) The notice must be served within 90 days after the claim arises, but courts have discretion to grant an extension of time for service of a late notice of claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [1], [5]). “ ‘The key factors which the court must consider in determining if leave should be granted are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable ti

2014Furthermore, by demonstrating that the defendants acquired timely knowledge of the essential facts of the claim, the infant plaintiff met his initial burden of establishing a lack of substantial prejudice to the defendants (see Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d at 660 ; Gibbs v City of New York, 22 AD3d at 719 ; Matter of Schiffman v City of New York, 19 AD3d at 207 ; see also Williams v Nassau County Med.

2008Furthermore, by demonstrating that the Village acquired timely knowledge of the essential facts of the claim, the petition ers met their initial burden of establishing a lack of substantial prejudice to the Village should late service of the notice of claim be allowed (see Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d at 660 ; Gibbs v City of New York, 22 AD3d at 719 ; Matter of Schiffman v City of New York, 19 AD3d at 207 ; see also Williams v Nassau County Med.

2006Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006].) The notice must be served within 90 days after the claim arises, but courts have discretion to grant an extension of time for service of a late notice of claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [1], [5]). “ ‘The key factors which the court must consider in determining if leave should be granted are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable ti

2006Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006].) The notice must be served within 90 days after the claim arises, but courts have discretion to grant an extension for service of a late notice of claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [1], [5]). “ ‘The key factors which the court must consider in determining if leave should be granted are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time there

2021Claimant's unsubstantiated assertion that he informed guards on duty at the courthouse of his fall and injuries fails to establish that respondents received actual knowledge constituting the essential facts of the claim within 90 days ( see General Municipal Law § 50-e [1] [a]; [5]; Le Mieux , 1 AD3d at 996 ; Matter of Riordan v East Rochester Schools , 291 AD2d 922, 923 [4th Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 603 [2002]; Matter of Morrison v New York City Health & Hosps.

2016It is well established that “[k]nowledge of the injuries or damages claimed . . . , rather than mere notice of the underlying occurrence, is necessary to establish actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within the meaning of General Municipal Law § 50-e (5)” (Lemma v Off Track Betting Corp., 272 AD2d 669 , 671 [2000]), and the claimant has the burden of demonstrating that the respondent had actual timely knowledge {see Matter of Riordan v East Rochester Schools, 291 AD2d 922, 923 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 603 [2002]).

2007School Dist., 3 AD3d 492, 493 [2004]; Matter of Bordan v Mamaroneck School Dist., 230 AD2d 792 [1996]; Matter of Sica v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 226 AD2d 542, 542-543 [1996]).

2006School Dist., 3 AD3d 492, 493 [2004]; see Matter of Termini v Valley Stream Union Free School Dist.

2009School Dist., 50 AD3d 138 [2008]), after considering “whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense” (Matter ofValestil v City of New York, 295 AD2d 619 [2002]; see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Felice v Eastport!South Manor Cent.

2008School Dist., 50 AD3d 138 [2d Dept 2008]; Matter of Lodati v City of New York, 303 AD2d 406 [2003]), after considering “ ‘whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense’ ” (Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d 658, 659 [2007], quoting Matter of Hicks v City of New York, 8 AD3d 566 [2004]; see Matter of Vale

2024Discussion In deciding to grant or deny a timely application for an extension of time to serve a late notice of claim upon a public entity, courts must give great ,vcight to whether the public entity acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within ninety (90) days after the date the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter (General Municipal Law §50-e [5]; sec Pierson v. City of New York, 56 NY2d 950 r1992_1 ).

2024In making such decision this Court must give great weight to whether the public entity acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim with in ninety (90) days after the date the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter (General Municipal Law §50-e [5]; see Pierson v. City of New York_ 56 NY2d 950 [1992]; Bertone Commissioning v City of New York, 27 AD3d 222 l} st Dept 2006}; Orozco v City oflv'ew York, 200 A.D.Jd 559, 161 N.Y.S.Jd 1 [1st Dept 2021]) Other key factors to consider, include the reason why the Petitioner did not serve the prerequisite, required, and mandatory notice

2016It is well established that “[k]nowledge of the injuries or damages claimed . . . , rather than mere notice of the underlying occurrence, is necessary to establish actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within the meaning of General Municipal Law § 50-e (5)” (Lemma v Off Track Betting Corp., 272 AD2d 669 , 671 [2000]), and the claimant has the burden of demonstrating that the respondent had actual timely knowledge {see Matter of Riordan v East Rochester Schools, 291 AD2d 922, 923 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 603 [2002]).

2016It is well established that “[k]nowledge of the injuries or damages claimed . . . , rather than mere notice of the underlying occurrence, is necessary to establish actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within the meaning of General Municipal Law § 50-e (5)” (Lemma v Off Track Betting Corp., 272 AD2d 669 , 671 [2000]), and the claimant has the burden of demonstrating that the respondent had actual timely knowledge {see Matter of Riordan v East Rochester Schools, 291 AD2d 922, 923 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 603 [2002]).

2023Consequently, " '[k]nowledge of the injuries or damages claimed . . . , rather than mere notice of the underlying occurrence, is necessary to establish actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within the meaning of General Municipal Law § 50-e (5)' " ( Turlington , 143 AD3d at 1248). "[T]he [plaintiff] bears the burden of demonstrating that the [public corporation] had actual knowledge" ( Dalton , 107 AD3d at 1519 ).

2014Schools, 107 AD3d 1517, 1518 [2013]).

2008School Dist., 287 AD2d 761, 762 [2001], quoting Matter of Jensen v City of Saratoga Springs, 203 AD2d 863, 863 [1994]).

2004School Dist., 287 AD2d 761, 762 [2001]).

2009School Dist., 50 AD3d 138 [2008]), after considering “whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense” (Matter ofValestil v City of New York, 295 AD2d 619 [2002]; see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Felice v Eastport!South Manor Cent.

2008School Dist., 50 AD3d 138 [2d Dept 2008]; Matter of Lodati v City of New York, 303 AD2d 406 [2003]), after considering “ ‘whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense’ ” (Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d 658, 659 [2007], quoting Matter of Hicks v City of New York, 8 AD3d 566 [2004]; see Matter of Vale

2000In considering whether or not to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the key factors are: (1) whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within the statutory 90-day period, (2) whether the petitioner had a reasonable excuse for the delay, and (3) whether the municipality will be substantially prejudiced by the delay in its defense on the merits (see, Matter of Bordan v Mamaroneck School Dist., 230 AD2d 792 ; Matter of Sica v Board of Educ., 226 AD2d 542 ; General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]).

1997Moreover, the appellant did not obtain actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within the limitations period (Matter of Sica v Board of Educ., 226 AD2d 542 ) and would be prejudiced if leave to serve a late notice of claim were now granted (cf., Brower v New York City Hous.

2017“Generally, knowledge of a police officer or of a police department cannot be considered actual knowledge of the public corporation itself regarding the essential facts of a claim” (Caselli v City of New York, 105 AD2d 251, 255 [1984]; see Matter of Mitchell v Town of Greenburgh, 96 AD3d 852, 853 [2012]; Matter of Leiblein v Clark, 207 AD2d 348, 350 [1994]; Matter of Dube v City of New York, 158 AD2d 457, 458 [1990]; Williams v Town of Irondequoit, 59 AD2d 1049, 1050 [1977]).

2008In Caselli v City of New York ( 105 AD2d 251, 255 [2d Dept 1944]) the court, when discussing the information contained in police reports, stated that “[generally, knowledge of a police officer or of a police department cannot be considered actual knowledge of the public corporation itself regarding the essential facts of a claim (See, e.g., Williams v. Town of Irondequoit, 59 AD2d 1049, 1050 ).” The court in Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent.

2008School Dist., 50 AD3d 138 [2d Dept 2008]; Matter of Lodati v City of New York, 303 AD2d 406 [2003]), after considering “ ‘whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense’ ” (Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d 658, 659 [2007], quoting Matter of Hicks v City of New York, 8 AD3d 566 [2004]; see Matter of Vale

2008The key factors in determining whether to allow service of a late notice of claim are whether (1) the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d at 659 ; Matter of Lodati v City of New York, 303 AD2d at 407 ).

2007Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the accident claim form and student incident report, completed shortly after the incident, did not provide the appellant with actual notice of the essential facts of the claim because while they stated that the infant petitioner was injured while playing table tennis at the school, they did not suggest a connection between the happening of the accident and any alleged negligence by the appellant in assembling the table the infant petitioner was using or in providing supervision (see Matter of Padovano v Massapequa Union Free School Dist., supra; Matter

2006Finally, although it is not necessary to reach the issue of prejudice in view of the foregoing (see Matter of Carpenter v City of New York, 30 AD3d 594, 595-596 [2006]), the plaintiff, in any event, failed to demonstrate that the NYCTA was not prejudiced in its ability to investigate the accident and prepare a defense as a result of the substantial delay in providing notice of the essential facts of the claim (see Matter of Henriques v City of New York, 22 AD3d 847 [2005]; Alexander v City of New York, 2 AD3d 332 [2003]).

1993In these circumstances, and in the absence of an allegation in the complaint that any employee of the County participated in the negligent acts, it cannot be said that the County acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim from the events themselves or from any subsequent investigation (see, Braverman v City of White Plains, 115 AD2d 689 ).

1990Clearly, the record does not support claimants’ speculative contention that respondent received actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within a reasonable time; rather, the record discloses that the failure to serve a timely notice of claim would substantially prejudice respondent (see, Braverman v City of White Plains, 115 AD2d 689, 690 ).