22 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kaysen v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Where a “demand is filed during a term in which there is no jury impaneled to try the case, the time allowed by the two-term requirement does not begin to run until the term following that during which the demand was filed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kaysen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 734, 735 ( 382 SE2d 737 ) (1989); Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 126 (3) ( 303 SE2d 437 ) (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U. S. 39 (104 SC 2210, 81 LE2d 31) (1984). “[I]n computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted” 1998Where a “demand is filed during a term in which there is no jury impaneled to try the case, the time allowed by the two-term requirement does not begin to run until the term following that during which the demand was filed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kaysen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 734, 735 ( 382 SE2d 737 ) (1989); Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 126 (3) ( 303 SE2d 437 ) (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U. S. 39 (104 SC 2210, 81 LE2d 31) (1984). “[I]n computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted” | 5 | 5 |
State v. McDonaldgreen2 sentences2003State v. McDonald, 242 Ga. 487, 489 ( 249 SE2d 212 ) (1978). “[J]urors must be present and available to serve . . . for a court term to count as one of the two terms in which the state must try the defendant.” Pope v. State, 265 Ga. 473, 474 ( 458 SE2d 115 ) (1995). “[W]e reject the argument that a court term should count so long as jurors were impaneled previously during that term. 2003State v. McDonald, 242 Ga. 487, 489 ( 249 SE2d 212 ) (1978). “[J]urors must be present and available to serve . . . for a court term to count as one of the two terms in which the state must try the defendant.” Pope v. State, 265 Ga. 473, 474 ( 458 SE2d 115 ) (1995). “[W]e reject the argument that a court term should count so long as jurors were impaneled previously during that term. | 3 | 3 |
Waller v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Where a “demand is filed during a term in which there is no jury impaneled to try the case, the time allowed by the two-term requirement does not begin to run until the term following that during which the demand was filed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kaysen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 734, 735 ( 382 SE2d 737 ) (1989); Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 126 (3) ( 303 SE2d 437 ) (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U. S. 39 (104 SC 2210, 81 LE2d 31) (1984). “[I]n computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted” 1998Where a “demand is filed during a term in which there is no jury impaneled to try the case, the time allowed by the two-term requirement does not begin to run until the term following that during which the demand was filed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kaysen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 734, 735 ( 382 SE2d 737 ) (1989); Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 126 (3) ( 303 SE2d 437 ) (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U. S. 39 (104 SC 2210, 81 LE2d 31) (1984). “[I]n computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted” | 3 | 3 |
Deadwiley v. Stategreen2 sentences1992“It was incumbent upon [Mclver] to show by competent evidence both that a jury was impaneled and qualified to try him at the term when his demand was filed and that there was a jury impaneled and qualified to try him during the next succeeding term. [Cit.] . . . ‘(I)n computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted.’ [Cits.]” Deadwiley v. State, 192 Ga. App. 229 ( 384 SE2d 221 ) (1989). 1992“It was incumbent upon [Mclver] to show by competent evidence both that a jury was impaneled and qualified to try him at the term when his demand was filed and that there was a jury impaneled and qualified to try him during the next succeeding term. [Cit.] . . . ‘(I)n computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted.’ [Cits.]” Deadwiley v. State, 192 Ga. App. 229 ( 384 SE2d 221 ) (1989). | 2 | 3 |
In Re Singhgreen2 sentences2024VI, § IX, ¶ II (“The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals shall dispose of every case at the term for which it is entered on the court’s docket for hearing or at the next term.”); In re Singh, 276 Ga. 288 , 290 n. 3 ( 576 SE2d 899 ) (2003) (noting that “the ‘remedy’ for an appellate court’s failure to timely dispose of a case to which the two-term rule is applicable is the affirmance of the lower court’s judgment by operation of law”). 2024VI, § IX, ¶ II (“The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals shall dispose of every case at the term for which it is entered on the court’s docket for hearing or at the next term.”); In re Singh, 276 Ga. 288 , 290 n. 3 ( 576 SE2d 899 ) (2003) (noting that “the ‘remedy’ for an appellate court’s failure to timely dispose of a case to which the two-term rule is applicable is the affirmance of the lower court’s judgment by operation of law”). | 1 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 305 Ga. App. 528, 530 ( 699 SE2d 754 ) (2010). 2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones, 305 Ga. App. at 530 . | 1 | 2 |
Ramirez v. Stategreen2 sentences1995The case was called to trial again in February 1993, but the trial was delayed because defendant filed a motion for discharge and acquittal on the grounds that he was not tried within the two-term rule enunciated in Ramirez v. State, 196 Ga. App. 11 (2), 12, supra. The trial court denied this motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed in Ramirez v. State, 211 Ga. App. 356 , supra, finding that the two-term rule does not begin to run until entry of judgment on the remittitur. 1 The case was called for trial again on April 11, 1994, at which time defendant pressed a plea in bar, arguing that the t 1994Ramirez v. State, 196 Ga. App. 11, 12 ( 395 SE2d 315 ) (1990); see Butler v. State, 207 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 429 SE2d 280 ) (1993). | 1 | 2 |
May v. MacIocegreen1 sentence2016Those related appeals were docketed in this court on May 16, 2016 , but briefing was not due to be completed before this appeal had to be decided under this Court’s two-term rule. 3 Nor are a Fulton County trial court’s findings in a related case involving a claim for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 dispositive of any issues in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Union v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Union v. State, 273 Ga. 666, 666 ( 543 SE2d 683 ) (2001) (citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted). 2014Union v. State, 273 Ga. 666, 666 ( 543 SE2d 683 ) (2001) (citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted). | 1 | 1 |
MacInnis v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See MacInnis v. State, 235 Ga. App. 732, 734-735 ( 510 SE2d 557 ) (1998). 2004See MacInnis v. State, 235 Ga. App. 732, 734-735 ( 510 SE2d 557 ) (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Superb Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Thomasongreen2 sentences2003See Superb Carpet Mills v. Thomason, 183 Ga. App. 554, 556 ( 359 SE2d 370 ) (1987) (on motion for rehearing). 2003See Superb Carpet Mills v. Thomason, 183 Ga. App. 554, 556 ( 359 SE2d 370 ) (1987) (on motion for rehearing). | 1 | 1 |
Pope v. Stategreen2 sentences2003State v. McDonald, 242 Ga. 487, 489 ( 249 SE2d 212 ) (1978). “[J]urors must be present and available to serve . . . for a court term to count as one of the two terms in which the state must try the defendant.” Pope v. State, 265 Ga. 473, 474 ( 458 SE2d 115 ) (1995). “[W]e reject the argument that a court term should count so long as jurors were impaneled previously during that term. 2003State v. McDonald, 242 Ga. 487, 489 ( 249 SE2d 212 ) (1978). “[J]urors must be present and available to serve . . . for a court term to count as one of the two terms in which the state must try the defendant.” Pope v. State, 265 Ga. 473, 474 ( 458 SE2d 115 ) (1995). “[W]e reject the argument that a court term should count so long as jurors were impaneled previously during that term. | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. Stategreen2 sentences1994Ramirez v. State, 196 Ga. App. 11, 12 ( 395 SE2d 315 ) (1990); see Butler v. State, 207 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 429 SE2d 280 ) (1993). 1994Ramirez v. State, 196 Ga. App. 11, 12 ( 395 SE2d 315 ) (1990); see Butler v. State, 207 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 429 SE2d 280 ) (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Stategreen2 sentences1991In Strickland v. State, 192 Ga. App. 613, 615 ( 386 SE2d 165 ) (1989), we held it was immaterial whether a defendant sought a bench trial or a jury trial but that “[p]ursuant to [OCGA § 17-7-170], acquittal depends on the availability of a jury (and, logically, the court sitting without a jury) to try defendant.” “[I]n computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted.” Kaysen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 734, 735 ( 382 SE2d 737 ) (1989). 1991In Strickland v. State, 192 Ga. App. 613, 615 ( 386 SE2d 165 ) (1989), we held it was immaterial whether a defendant sought a bench trial or a jury trial but that “[p]ursuant to [OCGA § 17-7-170], acquittal depends on the availability of a jury (and, logically, the court sitting without a jury) to try defendant.” “[I]n computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted.” Kaysen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 734, 735 ( 382 SE2d 737 ) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Lusher v. Stategreen2 sentences1989See also Lusher v. State, 192 Ga. App. 606 (_ SE2d _) (1989). 1989See also Lusher v. State, 192 Ga. App. 606 (___ SE2d ___) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Keller v. Stategreen2 sentences1988This court has also held that where a UTC is transferred from a traffic court to a state court, “the accusation was not filed or ‘found’ as contemplated by OCGA § 17-7-170 until the traffic violation was docketed as a misdemeanor criminal case in the state court. . . .” Keller v. State, 183 Ga. App. 717, 719 ( 359 SE2d 714 ). 1988This court has also held that where a UTC is transferred from a traffic court to a state court, “the accusation was not filed or ‘found’ as contemplated by OCGA § 17-7-170 until the traffic violation was docketed as a misdemeanor criminal case in the state court. . . .” Keller v. State, 183 Ga. App. 717, 719 ( 359 SE2d 714 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Luke v. Statered2 sentences1992“There is no inherent authority in a court of this state to compel an accused’s presence or in-court attendance where such defendant is incarcerated by or in the control of a different sovereign. [Cits.]” Luke v. State, 180 Ga. App. 378, 379 ( 349 SE2d 391 ) (1986), overruled by State v. Collins, 201 Ga. App. 500 ( 411 SE2d 546 ) (1991), only to the extent that it required physical presence. 1992“There is no inherent authority in a court of this state to compel an accused’s presence or in-court attendance where such defendant is incarcerated by or in the control of a different sovereign. [Cits.]” Luke v. State, 180 Ga. App. 378, 379 ( 349 SE2d 391 ) (1986), overruled by State v. Collins, 201 Ga. App. 500 ( 411 SE2d 546 ) (1991), only to the extent that it required physical presence. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Waller v. Georgia
green
2 sentences1998Where a “demand is filed during a term in which there is no jury impaneled to try the case, the time allowed by the two-term requirement does not begin to run until the term following that during which the demand was filed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kaysen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 734, 735 ( 382 SE2d 737 ) (1989); Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 126 (3) ( 303 SE2d 437 ) (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U. S. 39 (104 SC 2210, 81 LE2d 31) (1984). “[I]n computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted” 1989OCGA § 17-7-170 (b) provides: “If the person is not tried when the demand is made or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter, provided at both court terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try him, *735 he shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted. . . .’’In Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 126 (3) ( 303 SE2d 437 ) (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U. S. 39 (104 SC 2210, 81 LE2d 31) (1984), the Georgia Supreme Court held that where the demand is filed during a term in which there is no jury impaneled to try the case, “the time allowed by the two-term trial requirement | 3 | 1989–1998 |
Williamson v. State
green
2 sentences2018Likewise, even if jurors have been impaneled and qualified at some point in the term, "[i]f jurors have been dismissed and are not subject to recall when the demand is filed, the term in which the demand is filed does not count for computation of the two-term requirement of OCGA § 17-7-170 (b)." Id."For purposes of the statute, [the Supreme Court has determined] that impaneled means jurors who have been summoned, have appeared for service, and have not yet been discharged." Williamson v. State , 295 Ga. 185 , 188 (1), 758 S.E.2d 790 (2014). 2018Likewise, even if jurors have been impaneled and qualified at some point in the term, "[i]f jurors have been dismissed and are not subject to recall when the demand is filed, the term in which the demand is filed does not count for computation of the two-term requirement of OCGA § 17-7-170 (b)." Id."For purposes of the statute, [the Supreme Court has determined] that impaneled means jurors who have been summoned, have appeared for service, and have not yet been discharged." Williamson v. State , 295 Ga. 185 , 188 (1), 758 S.E.2d 790 (2014). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
George v. State
green
2 sentences1998Where a “demand is filed during a term in which there is no jury impaneled to try the case, the time allowed by the two-term requirement does not begin to run until the term following that during which the demand was filed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kaysen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 734, 735 ( 382 SE2d 737 ) (1989); Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 126 (3) ( 303 SE2d 437 ) (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U. S. 39 (104 SC 2210, 81 LE2d 31) (1984). “[I]n computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted” 1998Where a “demand is filed during a term in which there is no jury impaneled to try the case, the time allowed by the two-term requirement does not begin to run until the term following that during which the demand was filed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kaysen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 734, 735 ( 382 SE2d 737 ) (1989); Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 126 (3) ( 303 SE2d 437 ) (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U. S. 39 (104 SC 2210, 81 LE2d 31) (1984). “[I]n computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted” | 1 | 1998–1998 |
McIver v. State
green
1 sentence1997In computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 649 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Ramirez v. State
green
1 sentence1995The case was called to trial again in February 1993, but the trial was delayed because defendant filed a motion for discharge and acquittal on the grounds that he was not tried within the two-term rule enunciated in Ramirez v. State, 196 Ga. App. 11 (2), 12, supra. The trial court denied this motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed in Ramirez v. State, 211 Ga. App. 356 , supra, finding that the two-term rule does not begin to run until entry of judgment on the remittitur. 1 The case was called for trial again on April 11, 1994, at which time defendant pressed a plea in bar, arguing that the t | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Collins
green
2 sentences1992“There is no inherent authority in a court of this state to compel an accused’s presence or in-court attendance where such defendant is incarcerated by or in the control of a different sovereign. [Cits.]” Luke v. State, 180 Ga. App. 378, 379 ( 349 SE2d 391 ) (1986), overruled by State v. Collins, 201 Ga. App. 500 ( 411 SE2d 546 ) (1991), only to the extent that it required physical presence. 1992“There is no inherent authority in a court of this state to compel an accused’s presence or in-court attendance where such defendant is incarcerated by or in the control of a different sovereign. [Cits.]” Luke v. State, 180 Ga. App. 378, 379 ( 349 SE2d 391 ) (1986), overruled by State v. Collins, 201 Ga. App. 500 ( 411 SE2d 546 ) (1991), only to the extent that it required physical presence. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Kersey v. State
green
1 sentence1989See also State v. McDonald, supra, 242 Ga. 487 ; Kersey v. State, 191 Ga. App. 847 (_ SE2d _) (1989). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Spence
green
1 sentence1988Likewise, the court in which the demand is made must also impanel juries, because the two term rule is applicable only in a term in which “there were juries impaneled and qualified to try him. ...” The issue is further complicated by the requirement of the statutory demand for speedy trial that can be made only in the term, or next regularly succeeding terms, in which the accusation is “found.” This court has held that “an accusation embodied in an existing uniform traffic citation is ‘found’ within the meaning of OCGA § 17-7-170 (a) at the moment any court which is lawfully entitled to do so | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.