three-year time bar in Iowa

2018See id. at ___ (noting “where the only counsel provided to an applicant has been ineffective, a violation of the statute [requiring counsel to be effective] occurs”); id. at ___ (discussing Wilkins v. State, 522 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1994) and its holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not fall into the exceptions to the section 822.3 time bar and stating the Wilkins court “gave no consideration to the constitutional implications of the ruling”); id. at ___ (discussing Dible v. State, 557 N.W.2d 881 (Iowa 1996), abrogated in part by Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iow

2018See id. at ___ (noting “where the only counsel provided to an applicant has been ineffective, a violation of the statute [requiring counsel to be effective] occurs”); id. at ___ (discussing Wilkins v. State, 522 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1994) and its holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not fall into the exceptions to the section 822.3 time bar and stating the Wilkins court “gave no consideration to the constitutional implications of the ruling”); id. at ___ (discussing Dible v. State, 557 N.W.2d 881 (Iowa 1996), abrogated in part by Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iow

2017Smith v. State, 542 N.W.2d 853, 854 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“[A]n applicant for postconviction relief cannot circumvent the effect of the three-year time bar by merely claiming the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel.” (citing Wilkins v. State, 522 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa 1994))).

2016As procedendo issued in February 2003, and Hartsfield did not institute the current PCR action until 2010, this matter is clearly untimely under section 822.3. “[I]neffective assistance of counsel does not provide an exception to the limitation period set forth in section 822.3.” Bergantzel v. State, No. 15-1273, 2016 WL 2745065 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016) (citing Wilkins v. State, 522 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa 1994)); see also Jackson v. State, No. 12-1496, 2013 WL 4505114 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2013) (“Our courts have repeatedly held that ‘an application for postconviction reli

2023See Perez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 354, 361 (Iowa 2012) (“What [the defendant] does not explain is how [a Supreme Court opinion] can be both a clarification of the law and a ground he could not have raised within the three-year time bar.”); cf. Thongvanh v. 3 State, 938 N.W.2d 2 , 10 (Iowa 2020) (distinguishing Perez on the ground that the supreme court had espoused disagreement about the applicable law, whereas no such disagreement was voiced with respect to the law raised by the defendant).

2016See Perez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 354, 361 (Iowa 2012).

2021And the ground-of-fact exception does not require a showing that “the ground of fact would likely or probably have changed the outcome of the underlying criminal case in order to avoid a limitations defense.” Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 143 (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003)); see also Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 799 (Iowa 2018).

2018See id. at ___ (noting “where the only counsel provided to an applicant has been ineffective, a violation of the statute [requiring counsel to be effective] occurs”); id. at ___ (discussing Wilkins v. State, 522 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1994) and its holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not fall into the exceptions to the section 822.3 time bar and stating the Wilkins court “gave no consideration to the constitutional implications of the ruling”); id. at ___ (discussing Dible v. State, 557 N.W.2d 881 (Iowa 1996), abrogated in part by Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iow

2018So my guess is that on my review of the trial record and appellate record, the initial appellate record, there was just no reasonable argument to be made. 2 See James v. State , 858 N.W.2d 32 , 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (noting we have not applied the equitable tolling doctrine to avoid the three-year time bar found in Iowa Code section 822.3 ); see also McCullough v. State , No. 17-0434, 2018 WL 346463 , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018) (same); Long v. State , No. 16-1220, 2017 WL 2684345 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017) (same); Harrington v. State , No. 16-0953, 2017 WL 2684340 , at *1

2018See James v. State, 858 N.W.2d 32, 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (noting we have not applied the equitable tolling doctrine to avoid the three-year time bar found in Iowa Code section 822.3); see also McCullough v. State, No. 17-0434, 2018 WL 346463 , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018) (same); Long v. State, No. 16-1220, 2017 WL 2684345 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017) (same); Harrington v. State, No. 16-0953, 2017 WL 2684340 , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017) (same); Perdue v. State, No. 15-1237, 2016 WL 4036173 , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 27, 2016) (same); Weatherly v. State, No. 15-0681,

2018So my guess is that on my review of the trial record and appellate record, the initial appellate record, there was just no reasonable argument to be made. 2 See James v. State , 858 N.W.2d 32 , 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (noting we have not applied the equitable tolling doctrine to avoid the three-year time bar found in Iowa Code section 822.3 ); see also McCullough v. State , No. 17-0434, 2018 WL 346463 , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018) (same); Long v. State , No. 16-1220, 2017 WL 2684345 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017) (same); Harrington v. State , No. 16-0953, 2017 WL 2684340 , at *1

2018See James v. State, 858 N.W.2d 32, 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (noting we have not applied the equitable tolling doctrine to avoid the three-year time bar found in Iowa Code section 822.3); see also McCullough v. State, No. 17-0434, 2018 WL 346463 , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018) (same); Long v. State, No. 16-1220, 2017 WL 2684345 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017) (same); Harrington v. State, No. 16-0953, 2017 WL 2684340 , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017) (same); Perdue v. State, No. 15-1237, 2016 WL 4036173 , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 27, 2016) (same); Weatherly v. State, No. 15-0681,

2022Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 823–24 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (noting that unless newly discovered evidence is needed to avoid the three-year time bar on PCR claims set out in 8 section 822.3, “[a] mere denial of guilt is enough to get new counsel appointed and get the ball rolling” on an actual-innocence claim).

2021And the ground-of-fact exception does not require a showing that “the ground of fact would likely or probably have changed the outcome of the underlying criminal case in order to avoid a limitations defense.” Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 143 (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003)); see also Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 799 (Iowa 2018).

2023On appeal, Brown seeks to avoid the three-year time bar of Iowa Code section 822.3 by citing Allison v. State, 914 N.W.2d 866, 891 (Iowa 2018), where the supreme court adopted a very narrow exception to the statutory provision.

2020Weatherspoon countered that the Plain issue fell within an exception to the three-year time bar for a ground 1 In Plain, the court applied the second prong of what has come to be known as the Duren test governing fair cross-section challenges. 898 N.W.2d at 827 ; see Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) (requiring a showing “that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community”).

2017See Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 749-50 (Iowa 2016) (“Since Nguyen had filed his application for postconviction relief within three years, his claims as to 4 retroactivity were not time-barred.”); see, e.g., Burkett v. State, No. 14-0998, 2015 WL 5278970 , at *1-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2015); Thompson v. State, No. 14-0138, 2015 WL 1332352 , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2015).

2016See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding the prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

2014See State v. Ross, 845 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Iowa 2014); see also Smith v. State, 542 N.W.2d 853, 854 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (holding PCR applicant “cannot circumvent the effect of the three-year time bar by merely claiming the ineffective assistance of [PCR] counsel.”).