justifiable reliance standard in Alabama

2003Foremost , supra. The justifiable-reliance standard was first advanced by Chief Justice Hornsby in his special concurrence in Southern States Ford, Inc. v. Proctor , 541 So.2d 1081 , 1087 (Ala. 1989): "`Reliance' should be assessed by the following standard: A plaintiff, given the particular facts of his knowledge, understanding, and present ability to fully understand the nature of the subject transaction and its ramifications, has not justifiably relied on the defendant's representation if that representation is `one so patently and obviously false that he must have closed his eyes to avoid

2003Foremost , supra. The justifiable-reliance standard was first advanced by Chief Justice Hornsby in his special concurrence in Southern States Ford, Inc. v. Proctor , 541 So.2d 1081 , 1087 (Ala. 1989): "`Reliance' should be assessed by the following standard: A plaintiff, given the particular facts of his knowledge, understanding, and present ability to fully understand the nature of the subject transaction and its ramifications, has not justifiably relied on the defendant's representation if that representation is `one so patently and obviously false that he must have closed his eyes to avoid

2012At the time Wilma Corp. was decided, the justifiable-reliance standard announced in Hickox v. Stover, 551 So.2d 259, 263 (Ala.1989), governed the reliance element in fraud cases.

2008Before it decided Hickox v. Stover, 551 So.2d 259 (Ala.1989), in which it adopted the justifiable-reliance standard, this Court had applied a reasonable-reliance standard in regard to a fraud claim.

2016As previously noted, however, in Foremost, supra, this Court rejected the justifiable-reliance standard set forth in Hickox and reinstated the reasonable-reliance standard. .

2012In 1997, the supreme court abandoned the justifiable-reliance standard in favor of the reasonable-reliance standard in Foremost Insurance Co. v. Parham, 693 So.2d 409, 421 (Ala.1997).

2004The reasonable-reliance standard was well stated in Torres v. State Farm Fire Casualty Co. , 438 So.2d 757 (Ala. 1983), a case decided before the Court abandoned the reasonable-reliance standard in favor of the justifiable-reliance standard in Hickox v. Stover , 551 So.2d 259 (Ala. 1989).

2004The reasonable-reliance standard was well stated in Torres v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 438 So.2d 757 (Ala.1983), a case decided before the Court abandoned the reasonable-reliance standard in favor of the justifiable-reliance standard in Hickox v. Stover, 551 So.2d 259 (Ala.1989).

2002Nor do I think that the language in Ex parte Seabol, 782 So.2d 212, 216 (Ala.2000), that "the documents at issue are not as easily understood" as those in Foremost is a meaningful standard to guide us through this thicket.

2000A purchaser's " reliance is reasonable in the absence of independent knowledge sufficient to arouse the purchaser's suspicion, and he is not obligated to make an independent investigation as to the truth of the seller's representations absent such knowledge." Saranthus v. McIntyre, 557 So.2d 1275, 1276 (Ala.Civ.App.1989) (emphasis added).

1999See McGowan v. Chrysler Corp., 631 So.2d 842, 846 (Ala.1993) (salesman's statements to sophisticated purchaser that automobile was a "top-of-the-line" car and a "smooth-riding" car were considered "puffery," under the justifiable-reliance standard).

1998Co. v. Parker, 703 So.2d 307, 308 (Ala.1997), we recognized that under the justifiable reliance standard "`[f]raud is discoverable as a matter of law for purposes of the statute of limitations when one receives documents that would put one on such notice that the fraud reasonably should be discovered.'" (Quoting Kelly, 628 So.2d at 458 ) (emphasis omitted; citations omitted).

1998We also recognized that where a plaintiff, after receiving such notice, is misinformed by the defendant, "`he running of the limitations period is ... tolled as to the fraud claim.'" Parker, 703 So.2d at 309 (quoting Kelly, 628 So.2d at 459 ) (emphasis omitted).

1998Thus, the justifiable reliance standard applies to the fraud claims in this case. [3] Professional Insurance Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So.2d 347, 352 (Ala.1997). [4] If a party could show, as was done in Jackson, supra, actual reliance on the rule of law that is being overruled, there is current authority for not applying the new rule to that party; however, the trial courts have made no findings of such reliance in the two cases now before us.

1997See, e.g., Lloyd v. Jordan, 544 So.2d 957 (Ala. 1989); Webb v. Reese, 505 So.2d 321 (Ala.1987); Williamson v. Matthews, 379 So.2d 1245 (Ala. 1980). [10] See 3 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 607, at 656 (1960) (reciting the traditional standard for unilateral mistake that "[o]ne who signs or accepts a written instrument without reading it with care is likely to be surprised and grieved at its contents later on"). [11] See generally Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218, 223 (Ala.1989) (providing that the size of punitive damages awards should "encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongd

1997See, e.g., Lloyd v. Jordan, 544 So.2d 957 (Ala. 1989); Webb v. Reese, 505 So.2d 321 (Ala.1987); Williamson v. Matthews, 379 So.2d 1245 (Ala. 1980). [10] See 3 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 607, at 656 (1960) (reciting the traditional standard for unilateral mistake that "[o]ne who signs or accepts a written instrument without reading it with care is likely to be surprised and grieved at its contents later on"). [11] See generally Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218, 223 (Ala.1989) (providing that the size of punitive damages awards should "encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongd

1997See Harris v. M & S Toyota, Inc., 575 So.2d 74, 77-78 (Ala.1991) ("the new standard of justifiable reliance places a burden on the party making the statement—the burden of knowing the truthfulness of a statement"); Southern States Ford, Inc. v. Proctor, 541 So.2d 1081, 1088 (Ala.1989) (Hornsby, C.J., concurring specially) (stating that the justifiable reliance standard merely requires a plaintiff not to rely on "patently ridiculous representations" such as promises of the "moon"). [9] This assumes, of course, that Buyer does not fall within that narrow class of consumers that, through lack of

1991See Trio Broadcasters, Inc. v. Ward , 495 So.2d 621 (Ala. 1986), and Wilson v. Brown , 496 So.2d 756 (Ala. 1986), for a general discussion of the elements of a cause of action for fraudulent suppression.

1991See Trio Broadcasters, Inc. v. Ward , 495 So.2d 621 (Ala. 1986), and Wilson v. Brown , 496 So.2d 756 (Ala. 1986), for a general discussion of the elements of a cause of action for fraudulent suppression.