21 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wilkinsongreen2 sentences2026“Consequential damages” in this context are losses that do not flow “directly and immediately” from the criminal act, but rather “only from the consequences or results of such act.” Id. at 478, ¶ 16 (quoting State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 328 , 331, ¶ 11 (2022)); see also State v. Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. 27, 29, ¶ 7 (2002) (holding that “the statutes direct a court to award restitution for those damages that flow directly from the defendant’s criminal conduct, without the intervention of additional causative factors” (emphasis added)). 2025Courts must award restitution only for losses that “flow directly from the defendant’s criminal conduct, without the intervention of additional causative factors.” Id. | 10 | 21 |
State v. Lindsleygreen2 sentences2008Section 13-105(14), A.R.S., defines “economic loss” as “any loss incurred by a person as a result of the commission of an offense ... including] lost earnings.” Wages lost due to voluntary attendance at trial are recoverable, State v. Lindsley, 191 Ariz. 195, 198-99 , 953 P.2d 1248, 1251-52 (App.1997), as are a victim’s travel expenses. 2008Section 13-105(14), A.R.S., defines “economic loss” as “any loss incurred by a person as a result of the commission of an offense ... including] lost earnings.” Wages lost due to voluntary attendance at trial are recoverable, State v. Lindsley, 191 Ariz. 195, 198-99 , 953 P.2d 1248, 1251-52 (App.1997), as are a victim’s travel expenses. | 2 | 2 |
White v. Batemangreen2 sentences2008See White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 114 , 358 P.2d 712, 714 (1961) ("The fact that the construction of the statute in question rests on a single case does not render it any less the duty of this court to utilize the doctrine of stare decisis...."). ¶ 41 The rule of law depends to a great extent upon a healthy respect for precedent. 2008See White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 114 , 358 P.2d 712, 714 (1961) ("The fact that the construction of the statute in question rests on a single case does not render it any less the duty of this court to utilize the doctrine of stare decisis...."). ¶ 41 The rule of law depends to a great extent upon a healthy respect for precedent. | 2 | 2 |
Town of Gilbert Prosecutor's Office v. Downiegreen2 sentences2025Aside from remaining faithful to statutory language, this limitation “also prevents the restitution statutes from conflicting with the right to a civil jury trial preserved by Arizona Constitution Article II, Section 23.” Id. ¶ 11; see also Downie, 218 Ariz. at 469 ¶ 14 (describing the restitution framework as “preserv[ing] the 4 Whether lost wages would have been incurred but for the crimes of child abuse and endangerment is not before us. 2022Cnty. of Maricopa, 218 Ariz. 466 , 472 ¶ 28 (2008) (stating that criminal restitution will not always fully compensate the victim because losses may not “flow directly from the crime” and echoing concerns about “too broadly combin[ing] civil liability with criminal sentencing” (quoting Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 30 ¶ 12)); Patel, 251 Ariz. at 135 ¶ 14 (“The right to restitution is thus a right to the full amount required to restore victims to the position they were in before the loss or injury caused by the criminal conduct.”); State v. Slover, 220 Ariz. 239 , 242–43 ¶ 5 (App. 2009) (concluding “ | 1 | 2 |
State v. Morrisgreen1 sentence2022Cnty. of Maricopa, 218 Ariz. 466 , 472 ¶ 28 (2008) (stating that criminal restitution will not always fully compensate the victim because losses may not “flow directly from the crime” and echoing concerns about “too broadly combin[ing] civil liability with criminal sentencing” (quoting Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 30 ¶ 12)); Patel, 251 Ariz. at 135 ¶ 14 (“The right to restitution is thus a right to the full amount required to restore victims to the position they were in before the loss or injury caused by the criminal conduct.”); State v. Slover, 220 Ariz. 239 , 242–43 ¶ 5 (App. 2009) (concluding “ | 1 | 1 |
State v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2008Section 13-105(14), A.R.S., defines “economic loss” as “any loss incurred by a person as a result of the commission of an offense . . . includ[ing] lost earnings.” Wages lost due to voluntary attendance at trial are recoverable, State v. Lindsley, 191 Ariz. 195, 198-99 , 953 P.2d 1248, 1251-52 (App. 1997), as are a victim’s travel expenses, State v. Madrid, 207 Ariz. 296, ¶ 10 , 85 P.3d 1054, 1058 (App. 2004). ¶19 The record suggests that Gail sought restitution for her lost wages and travel expenses related to the trial; Sarah sought restitution for her costs in obtaining an annulment.6 Upon 2008Section 13-105(14), A.R.S., defines “economic loss” as “any loss incurred by a person as a result of the commission of an offense . . . includ[ing] lost earnings.” Wages lost due to voluntary attendance at trial are recoverable, State v. Lindsley, 191 Ariz. 195, 198-99 , 953 P.2d 1248, 1251-52 (App. 1997), as are a victim’s travel expenses, State v. Madrid, 207 Ariz. 296, ¶ 10 , 85 P.3d 1054, 1058 (App. 2004). ¶19 The record suggests that Gail sought restitution for her lost wages and travel expenses related to the trial; Sarah sought restitution for her costs in obtaining an annulment.6 Upon | 1 | 1 |
State v. Madridgreen2 sentences2008Section 13-105(14), A.R.S., defines “economic loss” as “any loss incurred by a person as a result of the commission of an offense . . . includ[ing] lost earnings.” Wages lost due to voluntary attendance at trial are recoverable, State v. Lindsley, 191 Ariz. 195, 198-99 , 953 P.2d 1248, 1251-52 (App. 1997), as are a victim’s travel expenses, State v. Madrid, 207 Ariz. 296, ¶ 10 , 85 P.3d 1054, 1058 (App. 2004). ¶19 The record suggests that Gail sought restitution for her lost wages and travel expenses related to the trial; Sarah sought restitution for her costs in obtaining an annulment.6 Upon 2008Section 13-105(14), A.R.S., defines “economic loss” as “any loss incurred by a person as a result of the commission of an offense . . . includ[ing] lost earnings.” Wages lost due to voluntary attendance at trial are recoverable, State v. Lindsley, 191 Ariz. 195, 198-99 , 953 P.2d 1248, 1251-52 (App. 1997), as are a victim’s travel expenses, State v. Madrid, 207 Ariz. 296, ¶ 10 , 85 P.3d 1054, 1058 (App. 2004). ¶19 The record suggests that Gail sought restitution for her lost wages and travel expenses related to the trial; Sarah sought restitution for her costs in obtaining an annulment.6 Upon | 1 | 1 |
State v. Roscoegreen2 sentences2008Yet the putative victim’s role in a crime may be a threshold question courts must answer in order to determine whether the crime was committed against someone in “the plain language of . . . our constitution.” Knapp, 170 Ariz. at 239 , 823 P.2d at 687 ; see also State v. Roscoe, 185 Ariz. 68, 71 , 912 P.2d 1297, 1300 (1996). 11 damages that flow directly from the defendant’s criminal conduct, without the intervention of additional causative factors”). 2008Yet the putative victim’s role in a crime may be a threshold question courts must answer in order to determine whether the crime was committed against someone in “the plain language of . . . our constitution.” Knapp, 170 Ariz. at 239 , 823 P.2d at 687 ; see also State v. Roscoe, 185 Ariz. 68, 71 , 912 P.2d 1297, 1300 (1996). 11 damages that flow directly from the defendant’s criminal conduct, without the intervention of additional causative factors”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Guilliams
green
2 sentences2017We find the analysis in State v. Guilliams, 208 Ariz. 48 , 90 P.3d 785 (App. 2004), controls this case. 2017We find the analysis in State v. Guilliams, 208 Ariz. 48 , 90 P.3d 785 (App. 2004), controls this case. | 3 | 2009–2017 |
United States v. Vaknin
green
2 sentences2009Based on its independent evaluation of the evidence adduced at trial, see § 13-804(1), and applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof, the trial court could find “ ‘the causal nexus between [Lewis’s criminal] conduct and the [victim’s] loss [was] not too attenuated.’ ” Guilliams, 208 Ariz. 48, ¶ 18 , 90 P.3d at 790 , quoting Vaknin, 112 F.3d at 590 . 2009Based on its independent evaluation of the evidence adduced at trial, see § 13-804(I), and applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof, the trial court could find “‘the causal nexus between [Lewis’s criminal] conduct and the [victim’s] loss [was] not too attenuated.’” Guilliams, 208 Ariz. 48, ¶ 18 , 90 P.3d at 790 , quoting Vaknin, 112 F.3d at 590 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State of Arizona v. Vivek a Patel
green
1 sentence2022Cnty. of Maricopa, 218 Ariz. 466 , 472 ¶ 28 (2008) (stating that criminal restitution will not always fully compensate the victim because losses may not “flow directly from the crime” and echoing concerns about “too broadly combin[ing] civil liability with criminal sentencing” (quoting Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 30 ¶ 12)); Patel, 251 Ariz. at 135 ¶ 14 (“The right to restitution is thus a right to the full amount required to restore victims to the position they were in before the loss or injury caused by the criminal conduct.”); State v. Slover, 220 Ariz. 239 , 242–43 ¶ 5 (App. 2009) (concluding “ | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Slover
green
1 sentence2022Cnty. of Maricopa, 218 Ariz. 466 , 472 ¶ 28 (2008) (stating that criminal restitution will not always fully compensate the victim because losses may not “flow directly from the crime” and echoing concerns about “too broadly combin[ing] civil liability with criminal sentencing” (quoting Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 30 ¶ 12)); Patel, 251 Ariz. at 135 ¶ 14 (“The right to restitution is thus a right to the full amount required to restore victims to the position they were in before the loss or injury caused by the criminal conduct.”); State v. Slover, 220 Ariz. 239 , 242–43 ¶ 5 (App. 2009) (concluding “ | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Knapp v. Martone
green
2 sentences2008Yet the putative victim’s role in a crime may be a threshold question courts must answer in order to determine whether the crime was committed against someone in “the plain language of . . . our constitution.” Knapp, 170 Ariz. at 239 , 823 P.2d at 687 ; see also State v. Roscoe, 185 Ariz. 68, 71 , 912 P.2d 1297, 1300 (1996). 11 damages that flow directly from the defendant’s criminal conduct, without the intervention of additional causative factors”). 2008Yet the putative victim’s role in a crime may be a threshold question courts must answer in order to determine whether the crime was committed against someone in “the plain language of . . . our constitution.” Knapp, 170 Ariz. at 239 , 823 P.2d at 687 ; see also State v. Roscoe, 185 Ariz. 68, 71 , 912 P.2d 1297, 1300 (1996). 11 damages that flow directly from the defendant’s criminal conduct, without the intervention of additional causative factors”). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Ellis
green
2 sentences2005Third, because juvenile’s criminal conduct directly caused the economic loss “without the intervention of additional causative factors[,]” Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 7 , 39 P.3d at 1133 , the loss was not a non-recoverable consequential damage. 4 Accordingly, the loss in this case was one for which restitution could be ordered. ¶ 15 Juvenile nonetheless relies on State v. Ellis, 172 Ariz. 549 , 838 P.2d 1310 (App.1992), for the proposition that the measure of the victim’s economic loss cannot exceed the car’s fair market value, which in this case was fixed at $9,751.10 by the victim’s insur 2005Third, because juvenile’s criminal conduct directly caused the economic loss “without the intervention of additional causative factors[,]” Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 7 , 39 P.3d at 1133 , the loss was not a non-recoverable consequential damage. 4 Accordingly, the loss in this case was one for which restitution could be ordered. ¶ 15 Juvenile nonetheless relies on State v. Ellis, 172 Ariz. 549 , 838 P.2d 1310 (App.1992), for the proposition that the measure of the victim’s economic loss cannot exceed the car’s fair market value, which in this case was fixed at $9,751.10 by the victim’s insur | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Wideman
green
2 sentences2004In support of this argument, he relies on Wideman , which held that the trial court erred in awarding restitution for travel expenses incurred by the murder victim’s family to attend court hearings because such expenses did not “flow” directly from Wideman’s crime. 165 Ariz. at 369 , 798 P.2d at 1378 . 2004In support of this argument, he relies on Wideman , which held that the trial court erred in awarding restitution for travel expenses incurred by the murder victim’s family to attend court hearings because such expenses did not “flow” directly from Wideman’s crime. 165 Ariz. at 369 , 798 P.2d at 1378 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.