inconsistent verdict rule in Georgia

2022Because the inconsistent verdict rule has since been abolished, see Milam, 255 Ga. at 562 (2), including in the context of contradictory verdicts reached between principals and 17 2.

2019The inconsistent verdict rule was abolished by our Supreme Court in Milam v. State , 255 Ga. 560 (2), 341 S.E.2d 216 (1986).

2021He now appeals from the denial of his motion in arrest of the judgment, contending that the trial court erred because (1) his conviction was unlawfully augmented from the narrowly drawn indictment without support from the evidence, and (2) his conviction is not subject to the abolition of the inconsistent verdict rule, pursuant to Turner v. State.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 1 283 Ga. 17 ( 655 SE2d 589 ) (2008).

2021He now appeals from the denial of his motion in arrest of the judgment, contending that the trial court erred because (1) his conviction was unlawfully augmented from the narrowly drawn indictment without support from the evidence, and (2) his conviction is not subject to the abolition of the inconsistent verdict rule, pursuant to Turner v. State.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 1 283 Ga. 17 ( 655 SE2d 589 ) (2008).

2018See also Milam v. State , 255 Ga. 560 , 562 (2), 341 S.E.2d 216 (1986) (abolishing the inconsistent verdict rule in criminal cases), citing United States v. Powell , 469 U.S. 57 , 67, 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). 14 According to the State's appellate brief, in an order dated August 23, 2017, the court granted the State's motion to introduce the evidence of Houseworth's subsequent DUI.

2018See also Milam v. State , 255 Ga. 560 , 562 (2), 341 S.E.2d 216 (1986) (abolishing the inconsistent verdict rule in criminal cases), citing United States v. Powell , 469 U.S. 57 , 67, 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). 14 According to the State's appellate brief, in an order dated August 23, 2017, the court granted the State's motion to introduce the evidence of Houseworth's subsequent DUI.

2006This contention is without merit, however, as the inconsistent verdict rule has been abolished in Georgia, Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797, 799 (2) ( 471 SE2d 508 ) (1996), and this is not a case of guilty verdicts on mutually exclusive crimes.

2006This contention is without merit, however, as the inconsistent verdict rule has been abolished in Georgia, Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797, 799 (2) ( 471 SE2d 508 ) (1996), and this is not a case of guilty verdicts on mutually exclusive crimes.

2016See also Cash v. State, 297 Ga. 859, 864 ( 778 SE2d 785 ) (2015) (explaining that even “[a] defendant who lacks knowledge that his co-defendant possessed the gun that was used to commit an aggravated assault may nevertheless be a party to the aggravated assault,” if he shared a criminal intent to commit an assault on the victim); Hines v. State, 276 Ga. 491, 492 ( 578 SE2d 868 ) (2003) (explaining that Georgia does not recognize “an inconsistent verdict rule, which would permit a defendant to challenge the factual findings underlying a guilty verdict on one count as inconsistent with the findi

2016See also Cash v. State, 297 Ga. 859, 864 ( 778 SE2d 785 ) (2015) (explaining that even “[a] defendant who lacks knowledge that his co-defendant possessed the gun that was used to commit an aggravated assault may nevertheless be a party to the aggravated assault,” if he shared a criminal intent to commit an assault on the victim); Hines v. State, 276 Ga. 491, 492 ( 578 SE2d 868 ) (2003) (explaining that Georgia does not recognize “an inconsistent verdict rule, which would permit a defendant to challenge the factual findings underlying a guilty verdict on one count as inconsistent with the findi

2016Such verdicts are deemed constitutionally tolerable because they may reflect an exercise of lenity by the jury that is not necessarily grounded in its view of the evidence.14 “An exception to the inconsistent verdict rule exists when the appellate record makes transparent the jury’s reasoning why it found the defendant not guilty of one of the 14 (Citations omitted.) State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 377 (1) ( 774 SE2d 106 ) (2015). 11 charges.”15 In this case, however, there were multiple shooters, and the fact that the jury acquitted Babbitt of felony murder and armed robbery does not “make tr

2016Such verdicts are deemed constitutionally tolerable because they may reflect an exercise of lenity by the jury that is not necessarily grounded in its view of the evidence.14 “An exception to the inconsistent verdict rule exists when the appellate record makes transparent the jury’s reasoning why it found the defendant not guilty of one of the 14 (Citations omitted.) State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 377 (1) ( 774 SE2d 106 ) (2015). 11 charges.”15 In this case, however, there were multiple shooters, and the fact that the jury acquitted Babbitt of felony murder and armed robbery does not “make tr

1998In light of the abolition of the inconsistent verdict rule in criminal cases in Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562 (2) ( 341 SE2d 216 ) (1986), the sole question is whether the evidence was sufficient within the meaning of Jackson v. Virginia, supra. White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 29 (1) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997).

1998In light of the abolition of the inconsistent verdict rule in criminal cases in Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562 (2) ( 341 SE2d 216 ) (1986), the sole question is whether the evidence was sufficient within the meaning of Jackson v. Virginia, supra. White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 29 (1) ( 486 SE2d 338 ) (1997).

2025The correct procedure for the court to achieve what it was seeking in this case “would have been the grant of a motion in arrest of judgment[.]” Id.; State v. Robinson, 275 Ga. App. 117, 117-118 ( 619 SE2d 806 ) (2005) (reversing the grant of motion in arrest of judgment premised on the inconsistent verdict rule where defendant was found guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, but was acquitted of the predicate felony); OCGA § 17-9-61 (setting forth the grounds and procedure for motion in arrest).

2025The correct procedure for the court to achieve what it was seeking in this case “would have been the grant of a motion in arrest of judgment[.]” Id.; State v. Robinson, 275 Ga. App. 117, 117-118 ( 619 SE2d 806 ) (2005) (reversing the grant of motion in arrest of judgment premised on the inconsistent verdict rule where defendant was found guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, but was acquitted of the predicate felony); OCGA § 17-9-61 (setting forth the grounds and procedure for motion in arrest).

2016Such verdicts are deemed constitutionally tolerable because they may reflect an exercise of lenity by the jury that is not necessarily grounded in its view of the evidence.14 “An exception to the inconsistent verdict rule exists when the appellate record makes transparent the jury’s reasoning why it found the defendant not guilty of one of the 14 (Citations omitted.) State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 377 (1) ( 774 SE2d 106 ) (2015). 11 charges.”15 In this case, however, there were multiple shooters, and the fact that the jury acquitted Babbitt of felony murder and armed robbery does not “make tr

2016Such verdicts are deemed constitutionally tolerable because they may reflect an exercise of lenity by the jury that is not necessarily grounded in its view of the evidence.14 “An exception to the inconsistent verdict rule exists when the appellate record makes transparent the jury’s reasoning why it found the defendant not guilty of one of the 14 (Citations omitted.) State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 377 (1) ( 774 SE2d 106 ) (2015). 11 charges.”15 In this case, however, there were multiple shooters, and the fact that the jury acquitted Babbitt of felony murder and armed robbery does not “make tr

2013See Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562 ( 341 SE2d 216 ) (1986) (abolishing the inconsistent verdict rule); Kimble v. State, 236 Ga. App. 391, 392-396 (1) ( 512 SE2d 306 ) (1999) (following Milam and overruling adverse precedent misapplying the inconsistent verdict rule).

2013See Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562 ( 341 SE2d 216 ) (1986) (abolishing the inconsistent verdict rule); Kimble v. State, 236 Ga. App. 391, 392-396 (1) ( 512 SE2d 306 ) (1999) (following Milam and overruling adverse precedent misapplying the inconsistent verdict rule).

2006Such an individualized assessment of the reason for the inconsistency would be based either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury’s deliberations that courts generally will not undertake.” Smashum v. State, 261 Ga. 248, 249 (2) ( 403 SE2d 797 ) (1991).

2006Such an individualized assessment of the reason for the inconsistency would be based either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury’s deliberations that courts generally will not undertake.” Smashum v. State, 261 Ga. 248, 249 (2) ( 403 SE2d 797 ) (1991).

1999The Powell Court was careful to distinguish cases involving mutually exclusive multiple convictions, pointing out that “[n]othing in this opinion is intended to decide the proper resolution of a situation where a defendant is convicted of two crimes, where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other.” Id. at 69, n. 8 ; compare Thomas v. State, 199 Ga. App. 586 -587 ( 405 SE2d 512 ) (1991), rev’d on other grounds, 261 Ga. 854 ( 413 SE2d 196 ) (1992) (setting forth the rule against mutually exclusive guilty verdicts). *394 Because Milam, 255 Ga. at 562, expli

1999The Powell Court was careful to distinguish cases involving mutually exclusive multiple convictions, pointing out that “[n]othing in this opinion is intended to decide the proper resolution of a situation where a defendant is convicted of two crimes, where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other.” Id. at 69, n. 8 ; compare Thomas v. State, 199 Ga. App. 586 -587 ( 405 SE2d 512 ) (1991), rev’d on other grounds, 261 Ga. 854 ( 413 SE2d 196 ) (1992) (setting forth the rule against mutually exclusive guilty verdicts). *394 Because Milam, 255 Ga. at 562, expli

2011See Parker v. Mooneyham, 256 Ga. 334, 335 ( 349 SE2d 182 ) (1986) (holding that the principles applicable to inconsistent verdicts against one defendant are applicable to inconsistent verdicts between co-defendants), overruled on other grounds by State v. Freeman, 264 Ga. 276 ( 444 SE2d 80 ) (1994); see also Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562 (2) ( 341 SE2d 216 ) (1986) (adopting the reasoning of United States v. Powell, 469 U. S. 57 (105 SC 471, 83 LE2d 461) (1984), in abolishing the inconsistent-verdict rule in Georgia). 3 When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must be viewed in

2011See Parker v. Mooneyham, 256 Ga. 334, 335 ( 349 SE2d 182 ) (1986) (holding that the principles applicable to inconsistent verdicts against one defendant are applicable to inconsistent verdicts between co-defendants), overruled on other grounds by State v. Freeman, 264 Ga. 276 ( 444 SE2d 80 ) (1994); see also Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562 (2) ( 341 SE2d 216 ) (1986) (adopting the reasoning of United States v. Powell, 469 U. S. 57 (105 SC 471, 83 LE2d 461) (1984), in abolishing the inconsistent-verdict rule in Georgia). 3 When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must be viewed in

2003Rather, as noted in Division 1, supra, “the inconsistent verdict rule has long been abolished in criminal cases.” Walker v. State, 271 Ga. 328 , 329 *421 (1) ( 519 SE2d 670 ) (1999). 9.

2003Rather, as noted in Division 1, supra, “the inconsistent verdict rule has long been abolished in criminal cases.” Walker v. State, 271 Ga. 328 , 329 *421 (1) ( 519 SE2d 670 ) (1999). 9.

2022Accord Thornton v. State, 298 Ga. 709, 714-715 (2) ( 784 SE2d 417 ) (2016) (concluding that jury’s acquittal of codefendant for 14 conspiracy to commit murder did not require reversal of defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder because the inconsistent verdict rule has been abolished in Georgia).

2022Accord Thornton v. State, 298 Ga. 709, 714-715 (2) ( 784 SE2d 417 ) (2016) (concluding that jury’s acquittal of codefendant for 14 conspiracy to commit murder did not require reversal of defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder because the inconsistent verdict rule has been abolished in Georgia).

2016Although on appeal Fitzpatrick mentions that trial counsel could have done a better job representing him on this point, he does not argue or enumerate as error the trial court’s determination on motion for new trial that he received effective assistance of counsel, so we do not address the issue here. “[DJriving under the influence can be the predicate offense for a conviction for causing serious injury by vehicle.” Kirkland v. State, 206 Ga. App. 27, 34 (17) ( 424 SE2d 638 ) (1992), citing OCGA § 40-6-394, supra. Georgia has abolished the inconsistent verdict rule.

2016Although on appeal Fitzpatrick mentions that trial counsel could have done a better job representing him on this point, he does not argue or enumerate as error the trial court’s determination on motion for new trial that he received effective assistance of counsel, so we do not address the issue here. “[DJriving under the influence can be the predicate offense for a conviction for causing serious injury by vehicle.” Kirkland v. State, 206 Ga. App. 27, 34 (17) ( 424 SE2d 638 ) (1992), citing OCGA § 40-6-394, supra. Georgia has abolished the inconsistent verdict rule.

2016Such verdicts are deemed constitutionally tolerable because they may reflect an exercise of lenity by the jury that is not necessarily grounded in its view of the evidence.14 “An exception to the inconsistent verdict rule exists when the appellate record makes transparent the jury’s reasoning why it found the defendant not guilty of one of the 14 (Citations omitted.) State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 377 (1) ( 774 SE2d 106 ) (2015). 11 charges.”15 In this case, however, there were multiple shooters, and the fact that the jury acquitted Babbitt of felony murder and armed robbery does not “make tr

2016Such verdicts are deemed constitutionally tolerable because they may reflect an exercise of lenity by the jury that is not necessarily grounded in its view of the evidence.14 “An exception to the inconsistent verdict rule exists when the appellate record makes transparent the jury’s reasoning why it found the defendant not guilty of one of the 14 (Citations omitted.) State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 377 (1) ( 774 SE2d 106 ) (2015). 11 charges.”15 In this case, however, there were multiple shooters, and the fact that the jury acquitted Babbitt of felony murder and armed robbery does not “make tr

2016Such verdicts are deemed constitutionally tolerable because they may reflect an exercise of lenity by the jury that is not necessarily grounded in its view of the evidence.14 “An exception to the inconsistent verdict rule exists when the appellate record makes transparent the jury’s reasoning why it found the defendant not guilty of one of the 14 (Citations omitted.) State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 377 (1) ( 774 SE2d 106 ) (2015). 11 charges.”15 In this case, however, there were multiple shooters, and the fact that the jury acquitted Babbitt of felony murder and armed robbery does not “make tr

2016Such verdicts are deemed constitutionally tolerable because they may reflect an exercise of lenity by the jury that is not necessarily grounded in its view of the evidence.14 “An exception to the inconsistent verdict rule exists when the appellate record makes transparent the jury’s reasoning why it found the defendant not guilty of one of the 14 (Citations omitted.) State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 377 (1) ( 774 SE2d 106 ) (2015). 11 charges.”15 In this case, however, there were multiple shooters, and the fact that the jury acquitted Babbitt of felony murder and armed robbery does not “make tr

2015See also Reese v. State, 308 Ga. App. 528, 528-529 ( 707 SE2d 913 ) (2011) (verdict of not guilty of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute but guilty of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute near a housing project was not repugnant); Artis v. State, 299 Ga. App. 287, 292-293 (5) ( 682 SE2d 375 ) (2009) (verdict of not guilty of armed robbery but guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was not repugnant).

2015See also Reese v. State, 308 Ga. App. 528, 528-529 ( 707 SE2d 913 ) (2011) (verdict of not guilty of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute but guilty of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute near a housing project was not repugnant); Artis v. State, 299 Ga. App. 287, 292-293 (5) ( 682 SE2d 375 ) (2009) (verdict of not guilty of armed robbery but guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was not repugnant).

2014But he argues that his case falls into the rare exception that “reversal of an inconsistent verdict may occur . . . where, instead of being left to speculate as to the jury’s deliberations, the appellate record makes transparent the jury’s rationale.” Guajardo v. State, 290 Ga. 172, 174 (2) ( 718 SE2d 292 ) (2011).

2014But he argues that his case falls into the rare exception that “reversal of an inconsistent verdict may occur . . . where, instead of being left to speculate as to the jury’s deliberations, the appellate record makes transparent the jury’s rationale.” Guajardo v. State, 290 Ga. 172, 174 (2) ( 718 SE2d 292 ) (2011).

2013However, this argument is wholly without 6 Goolsby, 299 Ga. App. at 330 (punctuation omitted). 7 Id. at 330-31 (punctuation omitted). 8 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 9 Although this is the only argument Muldrow makes as to the sufficiency of the evidence against him, we note that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his other convictions as well. 4 merit due to Georgia’s rejection of the inconsistent-verdict rule.10 It is well established that a defendant “cannot attack as inconsistent a jury verdict of guilty on one count and not guilty on

2013However, this argument is wholly without 6 Goolsby, 299 Ga. App. at 330 (punctuation omitted). 7 Id. at 330-31 (punctuation omitted). 8 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 9 Although this is the only argument Muldrow makes as to the sufficiency of the evidence against him, we note that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his other convictions as well. 4 merit due to Georgia’s rejection of the inconsistent-verdict rule.10 It is well established that a defendant “cannot attack as inconsistent a jury verdict of guilty on one count and not guilty on

2013See Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 502, 504 (4) ( 651 SE2d 715 ) (2007); see also Baker v. State, 254 Ga. App. 19, 20 (1) ( 561 SE2d 185 ) (2002) (defendant’s conviction for kidnapping based on the use of a gun as the means of force was not inconsistent with his convictions for robbery as a lesser included offense of armed robbery and assault and battery as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault). 2.

2013See Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 502, 504 (4) ( 651 SE2d 715 ) (2007); see also Baker v. State, 254 Ga. App. 19, 20 (1) ( 561 SE2d 185 ) (2002) (defendant’s conviction for kidnapping based on the use of a gun as the means of force was not inconsistent with his convictions for robbery as a lesser included offense of armed robbery and assault and battery as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault). 2.

2017J., and Reese, J., concur. 1 The jury acquitted Dowda of an additional misdemeanor charge of attempted theft by taking firewood (OCGA §§ 16-4-1 and 16-8-2). 2 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3 We note that the jury was entitled to conclude that Dowda committed the offense of trespass, even though it acquitted him of the charge of attempted theft, because Georgia has abolished the inconsistent verdict rule.

2017J., and Reese, J., concur. 1 The jury acquitted Dowda of an additional misdemeanor charge of attempted theft by taking firewood (OCGA §§ 16-4-1 and 16-8-2). 2 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3 We note that the jury was entitled to conclude that Dowda committed the offense of trespass, even though it acquitted him of the charge of attempted theft, because Georgia has abolished the inconsistent verdict rule.

1988As to the latter “in Georgia we have abolished the inconsistent verdict rule. [Cits.]” Robinson v. State, 257 Ga. 194, 196 (3) ( 357 SE2d 74 ) (1987).

1988As to the latter “in Georgia we have abolished the inconsistent verdict rule. [Cits.]” Robinson v. State, 257 Ga. 194, 196 (3) ( 357 SE2d 74 ) (1987).

2011See Parker v. Mooneyham, 256 Ga. 334, 335 ( 349 SE2d 182 ) (1986) (holding that the principles applicable to inconsistent verdicts against one defendant are applicable to inconsistent verdicts between co-defendants), overruled on other grounds by State v. Freeman, 264 Ga. 276 ( 444 SE2d 80 ) (1994); see also Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562 (2) ( 341 SE2d 216 ) (1986) (adopting the reasoning of United States v. Powell, 469 U. S. 57 (105 SC 471, 83 LE2d 461) (1984), in abolishing the inconsistent-verdict rule in Georgia). 3 When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must be viewed in

2011See Parker v. Mooneyham, 256 Ga. 334, 335 ( 349 SE2d 182 ) (1986) (holding that the principles applicable to inconsistent verdicts against one defendant are applicable to inconsistent verdicts between co-defendants), overruled on other grounds by State v. Freeman, 264 Ga. 276 ( 444 SE2d 80 ) (1994); see also Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562 (2) ( 341 SE2d 216 ) (1986) (adopting the reasoning of United States v. Powell, 469 U. S. 57 (105 SC 471, 83 LE2d 461) (1984), in abolishing the inconsistent-verdict rule in Georgia). 3 When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must be viewed in

2016As such, we have refused to apply the inconsistent verdict rule not only in cases where a single defendant receives inconsistent verdicts as to two or more charges (see, e.g., Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291 (4) ( 687 SE2d 427 ) (2009)), but also in cases where co-defendants, who are tried together, receive inconsistent verdicts as to each other.

2016As such, we have refused to apply the inconsistent verdict rule not only in cases where a single defendant receives inconsistent verdicts as to two or more charges (see, e.g., Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291 (4) ( 687 SE2d 427 ) (2009)), but also in cases where co-defendants, who are tried together, receive inconsistent verdicts as to each other.