Monroe-Farrell inquiry in District of Columbia

2013Exchanges such as the one that occurred in this case could frustrate the purpose of a Monroe-Farrell inquiry, which is to “determine the truth and scope of the defendant’s allegations.” Monroe, supra, 389 A.2d at 820 .

2013Exchanges such as the one that occurred in this case could frustrate the purpose of a Monroe-Farrell inquiry, which is to “determine the truth and scope of the defendant’s allegations.” Monroe, supra, 389 A.2d at 820 .

2013When a criminal defendant “alleges pretrial that defense counsel is unable to render reasonably effective assistance, due to his lack of preparation or other substantial reason, the Sixth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty on the trial court to conduct an inquiry into the complaint.” Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755, 760 (D.C.1978) (citation omit ted). 5 This inquiry has come to be known as a “Monroe-Farrell inquiry” or “Monroe-Farrell hearing.” See, e.g., McFadden v. United States, 614 A.2d 11, 18 (D.C. 1992); Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 592 (D.C.1991).

2013When a criminal defendant “alleges pretrial that defense counsel is unable to render reasonably effective assistance, due to his lack of preparation or other substantial reason, the Sixth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty on the trial court to conduct an inquiry into the complaint.” Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755, 760 (D.C.1978) (citation omit ted). 5 This inquiry has come to be known as a “Monroe-Farrell inquiry” or “Monroe-Farrell hearing.” See, e.g., McFadden v. United States, 614 A.2d 11, 18 (D.C. 1992); Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 592 (D.C.1991).

2004See Bass v. United States, 580 A.2d 669, 671 (D.C. 1990). [9] Error cannot be extrapolated from the trial court's statement that it "didn't make the standard Monroe-Farrell inquiry." Even if the trial court's inquiry was not "standard" it was not necessarily insufficient.

2004See Bass v. United States, 580 A.2d 669, 671 (D.C. 1990). [9] Error cannot be extrapolated from the trial court's statement that it "didn't make the standard Monroe-Farrell inquiry." Even if the trial court's inquiry was not "standard" it was not necessarily insufficient.

2013When a criminal defendant “alleges pretrial that defense counsel is unable to render reasonably effective assistance, due to his lack of preparation or other substantial reason, the Sixth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty on the trial court to conduct an inquiry into the complaint.” Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755, 760 (D.C.1978) (citation omit ted). 5 This inquiry has come to be known as a “Monroe-Farrell inquiry” or “Monroe-Farrell hearing.” See, e.g., McFadden v. United States, 614 A.2d 11, 18 (D.C. 1992); Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 592 (D.C.1991).

2013When a criminal defendant “alleges pretrial that defense counsel is unable to render reasonably effective assistance, due to his lack of preparation or other substantial reason, the Sixth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty on the trial court to conduct an inquiry into the complaint.” Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755, 760 (D.C.1978) (citation omit ted). 5 This inquiry has come to be known as a “Monroe-Farrell inquiry” or “Monroe-Farrell hearing.” See, e.g., McFadden v. United States, 614 A.2d 11, 18 (D.C. 1992); Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 592 (D.C.1991).

1995See also Robinson v. United States, 565 A.2d 964, 969 (D.C.1989) (court did not err in failing to conduct Monroe-Farrell inquiry, where appellant had made many requests for new attorney but when court asked appellant to state the basis for desire for a new attorney, “appellant himself concluded that he was ready and willing to go forward with his present attorney”); Gordon v. United States, 582 A.2d 944, 947 (D.C.1990) (judge did not eiT in failing to ask questions of defense counsel when, after judge addressed appellant’s problems and questions, appellant said she wanted to go to trial and wo

1995See Robinson v. United States, 565 A.2d 964, 969 (D.C.1989) (holding that court did not eiT in failing to conduct Monroe-Farrell inquiry, where appellant had made many requests for new attorney but when court asked appellant to state the basis for desire for a new attorney, “appellant himself concluded that he was ready and willing to go forward with his present attorney”); Gordon v. United States, 582 A.2d 944, 946 (D.C.1990) (judge did not err in failing to ask questions of defense counsel when, after judge addressed appellant’s problems and questions, appellant said she wanted to go to tria

2013When a criminal defendant “alleges pretrial that defense counsel is unable to render reasonably effective assistance, due to his lack of preparation or other substantial reason, the Sixth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty on the trial court to conduct an inquiry into the complaint.” Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755, 760 (D.C.1978) (citation omit ted). 5 This inquiry has come to be known as a “Monroe-Farrell inquiry” or “Monroe-Farrell hearing.” See, e.g., McFadden v. United States, 614 A.2d 11, 18 (D.C. 1992); Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 592 (D.C.1991).

2013When a criminal defendant “alleges pretrial that defense counsel is unable to render reasonably effective assistance, due to his lack of preparation or other substantial reason, the Sixth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty on the trial court to conduct an inquiry into the complaint.” Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755, 760 (D.C.1978) (citation omit ted). 5 This inquiry has come to be known as a “Monroe-Farrell inquiry” or “Monroe-Farrell hearing.” See, e.g., McFadden v. United States, 614 A.2d 11, 18 (D.C. 1992); Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 592 (D.C.1991).

2013See 459 A.2d at 1066 .

1995If the judge in a § 23-110 motion hearing determined that trial counsel was in fact constitutionally prepared, the Monroe-Farrell issue would effectively disappear from the case, even if the inquiry actually made had been insufficient. ( John) Matthews v. United States, 459 A.2d 1063, 1066 (D.C.1983).

2006In McKenzie v. United States, 659 A.2d 838 (D.C.1995), we held that “[w]hen a defendant makes complaints that might trigger a full Monroe-Farrell inquiry, but later tells the court that he is now satisfied with his counsel or no longer desires new counsel, the court need not continue further into the matter.” Id. at 840 (citation omitted).

2006In McKenzie v. United States, 659 A.2d 838 (D.C.1995), we held that “[w]hen a defendant makes complaints that might trigger a full Monroe-Farrell inquiry, but later tells the court that he is now satisfied with his counsel or no longer desires new counsel, the court need not continue further into the matter.” Id. at 840 (citation omitted).

1995See also Robinson v. United States, 565 A.2d 964, 969 (D.C.1989) (court did not err in failing to conduct Monroe-Farrell inquiry, where appellant had made many requests for new attorney but when court asked appellant to state the basis for desire for a new attorney, “appellant himself concluded that he was ready and willing to go forward with his present attorney”); Gordon v. United States, 582 A.2d 944, 947 (D.C.1990) (judge did not eiT in failing to ask questions of defense counsel when, after judge addressed appellant’s problems and questions, appellant said she wanted to go to trial and wo

1995See Robinson v. United States, 565 A.2d 964, 969 (D.C.1989) (holding that court did not eiT in failing to conduct Monroe-Farrell inquiry, where appellant had made many requests for new attorney but when court asked appellant to state the basis for desire for a new attorney, “appellant himself concluded that he was ready and willing to go forward with his present attorney”); Gordon v. United States, 582 A.2d 944, 946 (D.C.1990) (judge did not err in failing to ask questions of defense counsel when, after judge addressed appellant’s problems and questions, appellant said she wanted to go to tria

2013See Mills v. United States, 796 A.2d 26, 31 (D.C.2002) (concluding that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Monroe-Farrell inquiry where the court appeared to assume that defense counsel had adequately prepared in the instant case based on his prior trial performance); Nelson, supra, 601 A.2d at 592 (“Simply declaring that counsel was a competent attorney ... did not establish that she was capable of rendering adequate assistance in this case.”); Monroe, supra, 389 A.2d at 822 (“[The] view that since defense counsel was a generally competent attorney, he ipso facto was able to render

2006See, e.g., Mills v. United States, 796 A.2d 26, 28 (D.C.2002) (“In Monroe we held that: ‘When a defendant makes a pretrial challenge to the effectiveness of counsel ... ’ ”); Garrett v. United States, 642 A.2d 1312 , 1314 n. 1 (D.C.1994) (“Under ... the Monroe/Farrell rule, when an accused raised pretrial claims of ineffective assistance ... ”); Bass v. United States, 580 A.2d 669, 670 (D.C. 1990) (quoting Monroe).

2003Any claim of ineffectiveness must be specific and detailed; “[g]eneral assertions that a defendant wants a new lawyer are not enough to trigger a Monroe-Farrell inquiry.” Matthews v. United States, 629 A.2d 1185, 1191 (D.C.1993) (citations and footnote omitted).

2003Any claim of ineffectiveness must be specific and detailed; “[g]eneral assertions that a defendant wants a new lawyer are not enough to trigger a Monroe-Farrell inquiry.” Matthews v. United States, 629 A.2d 1185, 1191 (D.C.1993) (citations and footnote omitted).

1995See Garrett, supra, 642 A.2d at 1314 n. 1 (D.C.1994) (“The precise form, substance and scope of the inquiry is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” citing Farrell ). 11 The case before us is unusual in that a rather lengthy Monroe-Farrell inquiry was in fact made, and therefore appellant is challenging the sufficiency of that inquiry, rather than alleging that the court did not inquire at all into his pretrial allegations of ineffectiveness, as was the case not only in Monroe itself but also in the great majority of cases addressing the Monroe-Farrell issue.

1995See Garrett, supra, 642 A.2d at 1314 n. 1 (D.C.1994) (“The precise form, substance and scope of the inquiry is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” citing Farrell ). 11 The case before us is unusual in that a rather lengthy Monroe-Farrell inquiry was in fact made, and therefore appellant is challenging the sufficiency of that inquiry, rather than alleging that the court did not inquire at all into his pretrial allegations of ineffectiveness, as was the case not only in Monroe itself but also in the great majority of cases addressing the Monroe-Farrell issue.

2002In Moore v. United States, 675 A.2d 71 (D.C.1996), we summarized the Monroe-Farrell inquiry requirements: In Monroe we held that: “When a defendant makes a pretrial challenge to the effectiveness of counsel ... on the ground that counsel, due to lack of investigation, preparation or other substantial reason, is not rendering reasonably effective assistance, the trial court has a constitutional duty to conduct an inquiry sufficient to determine the truth and scope of the defendant’s allegations.” 389 A.2d at 820 [ (citations omitted) ].

2002In Moore v. United States, 675 A.2d 71 (D.C.1996), we summarized the Monroe-Farrell inquiry requirements: In Monroe we held that: “When a defendant makes a pretrial challenge to the effectiveness of counsel ... on the ground that counsel, due to lack of investigation, preparation or other substantial reason, is not rendering reasonably effective assistance, the trial court has a constitutional duty to conduct an inquiry sufficient to determine the truth and scope of the defendant’s allegations.” 389 A.2d at 820 [ (citations omitted) ].

2004While we discourage such practice, Pierce v. United States, 402 A.2d 1237 , 1245 n. 8 (D.C.1979), it did not render the court’s inquiry insufficient where a significant portion of the inquiry took place in the defendant’s presence, where the defendant was given an opportunity to address the court regarding his complaints, and where defense counsel demonstrated he had responded to appellant’s concerns.

2004While we discourage such practice, Pierce v. United States, 402 A.2d 1237 , 1245 n. 8 (D.C.1979), it did not render the court’s inquiry insufficient where a significant portion of the inquiry took place in the defendant’s presence, where the defendant was given an opportunity to address the court regarding his complaints, and where defense counsel demonstrated he had responded to appellant’s concerns.

2004See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 585 A.2d 766, 770-71 (D.C.1991). [14] This current assertion of appellant that trial counsel had "ignored" exculpatory witnesses, a mixture of pre-and mid-trial competence, was nowhere raised by appellant before the trial court, even as part of the Monroe-Farrell inquiry into his then three-months old complaint.

2004See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 585 A.2d 766, 770-71 (D.C.1991). [14] This current assertion of appellant that trial counsel had "ignored" exculpatory witnesses, a mixture of pre-and mid-trial competence, was nowhere raised by appellant before the trial court, even as part of the Monroe-Farrell inquiry into his then three-months old complaint.

2003See Lane, 737 A.2d at 547-548 ; Gordon v. United States, 582 A.2d 944, 946-947 (D.C.1990).

2003See Lane, 737 A.2d at 547-548 ; Gordon v. United States, 582 A.2d 944, 946-947 (D.C.1990).

1993Kimes v. United States, 569 A.2d 104, 114 (D.C.1989).

1993Kimes v. United States, 569 A.2d 104, 114 (D.C.1989).

1993Following trial counsel’s statement on appellant’s behalf, the trial judge sentenced appellant as an adult to a total of 30 years and four months to life. 8 Following the denial of a motion for a reduction of sentence on March 18, 1987, by Judge Scott, who was substituted for the deceased trial judge, appellant filed, on September 18,1987, a motion to dismiss the indictment or for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence and Brady violations by the prosecutor relating to Hill. 9 Appellant also filed, on April 18, *1190 1988, a supplementary motion to vacate his convictions and f

1993Following trial counsel’s statement on appellant’s behalf, the trial judge sentenced appellant as an adult to a total of 30 years and four months to life. 8 Following the denial of a motion for a reduction of sentence on March 18, 1987, by Judge Scott, who was substituted for the deceased trial judge, appellant filed, on September 18,1987, a motion to dismiss the indictment or for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence and Brady violations by the prosecutor relating to Hill. 9 Appellant also filed, on April 18, *1190 1988, a supplementary motion to vacate his convictions and f

1980It is true that, in bringing the ineffectiveness claim, the defendant must be deemed to have waived the lawyer-client privilege “so far as necessary to defend the attorney’s character.” West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240 , 245 n. 3 (Tex.1978); see Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125 , 95 S.Ct. 811 , 42 L.Ed.2d 826 (1975); 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2327 at 638 (McNaughton ed. 1961).

1980It is true that, in bringing the ineffectiveness claim, the defendant must be deemed to have waived the lawyer-client privilege “so far as necessary to defend the attorney’s character.” West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240 , 245 n. 3 (Tex.1978); see Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125 , 95 S.Ct. 811 , 42 L.Ed.2d 826 (1975); 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2327 at 638 (McNaughton ed. 1961).