Cofield test in New Jersey

2026The Fourth Cofield Prong Lastly, defendant argues that prong four of the Cofield test is unsatisfied because the "probative value of the evidence" supporting the aggravated sexual assault would have been outweighed by its prejudicial effect, if admitted at a trial solely based on statutory rape charges. 127 N.J. at 338 .

2026The Fourth Cofield Prong Lastly, defendant argues that prong four of the Cofield test is unsatisfied because the "probative value of the evidence" supporting the aggravated sexual assault would have been outweighed by its prejudicial effect, if admitted at a trial solely based on statutory rape charges. 127 N.J. at 338 .

2022Application of the second prong of the Cofield test "is limited to cases that replicate the circumstances in Cofield," Williams, 190 N.J. at 131 , and defendant makes no showing circumstances A-4005-17 43 similar to those extant in Cofield are present here. 10 Thus, we reject defendant's argument that any purported lack of similarity or close temporal proximity between the robbery and murder under Cofield's second factor required the denial of the State's joinder motion.

2022Application of the second prong of the Cofield test "is limited to cases that replicate the circumstances in Cofield," Williams, 190 N.J. at 131 , and defendant makes no showing circumstances A-4005-17 43 similar to those extant in Cofield are present here. 10 Thus, we reject defendant's argument that any purported lack of similarity or close temporal proximity between the robbery and murder under Cofield's second factor required the denial of the State's joinder motion.

2022However, as the Court explained in Rose, "[t]he second prong of the Cofield test, addressing the similarity and temporality of the evidence, is not found in Rule 404(b), and is not universally required." 206 N.J. at 163 .

2022However, as the Court explained in Rose, "[t]he second prong of the Cofield test, addressing the similarity and temporality of the evidence, is not found in Rule 404(b), and is not universally required." 206 N.J. at 163 .

2024The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [ 127 N.J. at 338 (quoting Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 Emory L.J. 135 , 160 (1989)).] See also State v. Carlucci, 217 N.J. 129, 140-41 (2014) (reaffirming the Cofield test).

2024The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [ 127 N.J. at 338 (quoting Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 Emory L.J. 135 , 160 (1989)).] See also State v. Carlucci, 217 N.J. 129, 140-41 (2014) (reaffirming the Cofield test).

2025A-1412-22 7 This Cofield analysis is designed to reduce the risks that a jury might convict a defendant because that individual appears to be "a 'bad' person in general." Id. at 336 (internal citation omitted); see also State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 608 (2004).

2025A-1412-22 7 This Cofield analysis is designed to reduce the risks that a jury might convict a defendant because that individual appears to be "a 'bad' person in general." Id. at 336 (internal citation omitted); see also State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 608 (2004).

2022The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [Barden, 195 N.J. at 389 (citations omitted) (quoting Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338).] A-4830-18 41 The Cofield analysis is intended to reduce the underlying danger that the factfinder may convict a defendant because "he or she is a 'bad person' who must be guilty of the crime charged." State v. Castagna, 400 N.J.

2022The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [Barden, 195 N.J. at 389 (citations omitted) (quoting Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338).] A-4830-18 41 The Cofield analysis is intended to reduce the underlying danger that the factfinder may convict a defendant because "he or she is a 'bad person' who must be guilty of the crime charged." State v. Castagna, 400 N.J.

2014See, e.g., State v. Darby, 174 N.J. at 520-21, 809 A.2d 138 (2002) (stating Cofield standard is rendered meaningless if “other-crime evidence is admissible merely to support the credibility of a witness”); P.S., supra, 202 N.J. at 256 , 997 A.2d 163 (noting “other-crimes evidence should not be admitted solely to bolster the credibility of a witness against a defendant”).

2014See, e.g., State v. Darby, 174 N.J. at 520-21, 809 A.2d 138 (2002) (stating Cofield standard is rendered meaningless if “other-crime evidence is admissible merely to support the credibility of a witness”); P.S., supra, 202 N.J. at 256 , 997 A.2d 163 (noting “other-crimes evidence should not be admitted solely to bolster the credibility of a witness against a defendant”).

2018To satisfy the first prong of the Cofield test, the "proffered evidence must be 'relevant to a material issue genuinely in dispute.' " State v. Gillispie , 208 N.J. 59 , 86, 26 A.3d 397 (2011) (quoting State v. Darby , 174 N.J. 509 , 519, 809 A.2d 138 (2002) ).

2018To satisfy the first prong of the Cofield test, the "proffered evidence must be 'relevant to a material issue genuinely in dispute.' " State v. Gillispie , 208 N.J. 59 , 86, 26 A.3d 397 (2011) (quoting State v. Darby , 174 N.J. 509 , 519, 809 A.2d 138 (2002) ).

2021In sum, we conclude that Judge Oxley did not abuse his wide discretion by deciding to try the robbery and related charges together, see Weaver, 219 N.J. at 149 , and in applying the Cofield test.

2021In sum, we conclude that Judge Oxley did not abuse his wide discretion by deciding to try the robbery and related charges together, see Weaver, 219 N.J. at 149 , and in applying the Cofield test.

2025"The four-part Cofield test governing the admissibility of other-crimes evidence is a well-settled feature of New Jersey's evidence jurisprudence." Green, 236 N.J. at 82 .

2025"The four-part Cofield test governing the admissibility of other-crimes evidence is a well-settled feature of New Jersey's evidence jurisprudence." Green, 236 N.J. at 82 .

2021The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338 .] A-5846-17 19 Under the first prong of the Cofield test, "[e]vidence is relevant if it tends 'to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.'" State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 565 (1999) (quoting N.J.R.E. 401).

2021The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338 .] A-5846-17 19 Under the first prong of the Cofield test, "[e]vidence is relevant if it tends 'to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.'" State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 565 (1999) (quoting N.J.R.E. 401).

2025Our Supreme Court explained in State v. Green: [N.J.R.E.] 404(b) bars "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts" when used "to show that [a] person acted in conformity therewith." However, evidence of prior "crimes, wrongs, or acts" may be used to show "intent, . . . knowledge, . . . or absence of mistake or accident." Because evidence of a defendant's other crimes "has a unique tendency" to prejudice the jury, other-crimes evidence proffered under [N.J.R.E.] 404(b) "must pass [a] rigorous test." [ 236 N.J. 71, 81 (2018) (alterations and omissions in original) (first quoting Rule 404(b); then

2025Our Supreme Court explained in State v. Green: [N.J.R.E.] 404(b) bars "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts" when used "to show that [a] person acted in conformity therewith." However, evidence of prior "crimes, wrongs, or acts" may be used to show "intent, . . . knowledge, . . . or absence of mistake or accident." Because evidence of a defendant's other crimes "has a unique tendency" to prejudice the jury, other-crimes evidence proffered under [N.J.R.E.] 404(b) "must pass [a] rigorous test." [ 236 N.J. 71, 81 (2018) (alterations and omissions in original) (first quoting Rule 404(b); then

2021See State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496 , 517 n.5 (2014) (observing that "details that . . . dovetail with the facts of the case" constitute direct proof of the charged offense, which "should be analyzed for relevance under [Rule] 401 and evaluated under [Rule] 403's standard for prejudice, and not the standard for prejudice under a Cofield analysis" (citing Rose, 206 N.J. at 177-78 )).

2021See State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496 , 517 n.5 (2014) (observing that "details that . . . dovetail with the facts of the case" constitute direct proof of the charged offense, which "should be analyzed for relevance under [Rule] 401 and evaluated under [Rule] 403's standard for prejudice, and not the standard for prejudice under a Cofield analysis" (citing Rose, 206 N.J. at 177-78 )).

2020However, where, as here, with respect to Timmons, "[w]hen a person charged with a criminal offense seeks to use other-crimes evidence defensively, the Cofield standard does not govern because 'an accused is entitled to advance in his defense any evidence which may rationally tend to refute his guilt or buttress his innocence of the charge made.'" Weaver, 219 N.J. at 150 (quoting State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 453 (1978)); see also State v. Williams, __ N.J. __, __ (2019) (slip op. at 12) (reiterating that the Cofield factors do not apply to A-2567-17T4 35 a reverse Rule 404(b) situation, but t

2020However, where, as here, with respect to Timmons, "[w]hen a person charged with a criminal offense seeks to use other-crimes evidence defensively, the Cofield standard does not govern because 'an accused is entitled to advance in his defense any evidence which may rationally tend to refute his guilt or buttress his innocence of the charge made.'" Weaver, 219 N.J. at 150 (quoting State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 453 (1978)); see also State v. Williams, __ N.J. __, __ (2019) (slip op. at 12) (reiterating that the Cofield factors do not apply to A-2567-17T4 35 a reverse Rule 404(b) situation, but t

2014See State v. P.S., 202 N.J. 232, 256 (2010) ("[I]n assessing the fourth prong [of the Cofield test], 18 A-4061-12T1 courts should consider whether the matter can be proved adequately by other evidence."); Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 303 (same).

2014See State v. P.S., 202 N.J. 232, 256 (2010) ("[I]n assessing the fourth prong [of the Cofield test], 18 A-4061-12T1 courts should consider whether the matter can be proved adequately by other evidence."); Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 303 (same).

2019J. at 164. "[T]he third prong of our Cofield test requires that the judge serve as a gatekeeper to the admission of other-crime evidence." Hernandez, 170 N.J. at 123 .

2007Hernandez, supra, 170 N.J. at 127, 133 , - 784 A.2d 1225 (ordering new trial and remand for N.J.R.E. 104 hearing “on all aspects of the precise other-crime testimony”); see also State v. Bakka, 176 N.J. 533, 547 , 826 A.2d 604 (2003) (holding that before introducing “evidence of a defendant’s [license] revocation along with the reasons for that revocation” in vehicular homicide case, “trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing and apply” Cofield factors); State v. Stevens, 222 N.J.Super. 602, 614 , 537 A.2d 774 (App.Div.1988) (noting that court must conduct hearing outside presence of jury

2024"The mere bolstering of a witness's credibility does not satisfy the relevancy element of the Cofield test." State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 582 (2018).

2024"The mere bolstering of a witness's credibility does not satisfy the relevancy element of the Cofield test." State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 582 (2018).

2021The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [ 127 N.J. at 338 (citation omitted); see also State v. Carlucci, 217 N.J. 129, 140-41 (2014) (reaffirming the Cofield test).] Further, even if relevant under N.J.R.E. 404(b), such evidence must nevertheless survive the crucible for all relevant evidence: "relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." State v

2021The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [ 127 N.J. at 338 (citation omitted); see also State v. Carlucci, 217 N.J. 129, 140-41 (2014) (reaffirming the Cofield test).] Further, even if relevant under N.J.R.E. 404(b), such evidence must nevertheless survive the crucible for all relevant evidence: "relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." State v

2000We are satisfied, however, that we need not address that question, namely the first prong of the Cofield test, because we are persuaded, even according required deference to the other-crimes ruling of the trial judge, see, e.g., State v. Marrero, supra, 148 N.J. at 483-484 , 691 A. 2d 293 ; State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 131 , 594 A. 2d 232 (1991), that Gerardi's testimony cannot meet the third prong, namely that the evidence is clear and convincing.

2000We are satisfied, however, that we need not address that question, namely the first prong of the Cofield test, because we are persuaded, even according required deference to the other-crimes ruling of the trial judge, see, e.g., State v. Marrero, supra, 148 N.J. at 483-484 , 691 A. 2d 293 ; State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 131 , 594 A. 2d 232 (1991), that Gerardi's testimony cannot meet the third prong, namely that the evidence is clear and convincing.

2021State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 485 (2001) ("The third prong of the Cofield test 'requires some showing that the person against whom the evidence is being used actually committed the other crime or wrong.'" A-4130-18T1 12 (quoting State v. G.V., 162 N.J. 252, 275 (2000) (Coleman, J., concurring in part)).

2021State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 485 (2001) ("The third prong of the Cofield test 'requires some showing that the person against whom the evidence is being used actually committed the other crime or wrong.'" A-4130-18T1 12 (quoting State v. G.V., 162 N.J. 252, 275 (2000) (Coleman, J., concurring in part)).

2020"To satisfy the first prong of the Cofield test, the 'proffered evidence must be relevant to a material issue genuinely in dispute.'" Garrison, 228 N.J. at 194 (quoting State v. Gillispie, 208 N.J. 59, 86 (2011)).

2020"To satisfy the first prong of the Cofield test, the 'proffered evidence must be relevant to a material issue genuinely in dispute.'" Garrison, 228 N.J. at 194 (quoting State v. Gillispie, 208 N.J. 59, 86 (2011)).

2022The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [Barden, 195 N.J. at 389 (citations omitted) (quoting Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338).] A-4830-18 41 The Cofield analysis is intended to reduce the underlying danger that the factfinder may convict a defendant because "he or she is a 'bad person' who must be guilty of the crime charged." State v. Castagna, 400 N.J.

2022The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [Barden, 195 N.J. at 389 (citations omitted) (quoting Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338).] A-4830-18 41 The Cofield analysis is intended to reduce the underlying danger that the factfinder may convict a defendant because "he or she is a 'bad person' who must be guilty of the crime charged." State v. Castagna, 400 N.J.

2022"However, if the trial court admits evidence of other bad acts without applying the four-step Cofield analysis, the trial judge's determination does not receive deference and the reviewing court reviews the issue de novo. " State v. Goodman, 415 N.J.

2020See State v. Goodman, 415 N.J.

2022Much for the same reasons, Berry's testimony failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the Cofield test: "The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice." 127 N.J. at 338 . "[R]elevant evidence loses some of its probative value if there is other less inflammatory evidence available to prove that point." State v. Long, 173 N.J. 138, 164 (2002).

2022Much for the same reasons, Berry's testimony failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the Cofield test: "The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice." 127 N.J. at 338 . "[R]elevant evidence loses some of its probative value if there is other less inflammatory evidence available to prove that point." State v. Long, 173 N.J. 138, 164 (2002).

2019The test for assessing prejudice is "whether, assuming the charges were tried separately, evidence of the offenses sought to be severed would be admissible under [N.J.R.E. 404(b)] in the trial of the remaining charges." N.J.R.E. 404(b) requirements must be met, and the evidence of other crimes or bad acts must be "relevant to prove a fact genuinely in dispute and the evidence is necessary as proof of the disputed issue[.]" [ 215 N.J. at 73 (citations omitted).] The inapplicability of prongs one and two under the Cofield test render any further analysis unnecessary.

2019The test for assessing prejudice is "whether, assuming the charges were tried separately, evidence of the offenses sought to be severed would be admissible under [N.J.R.E. 404(b)] in the trial of the remaining charges." N.J.R.E. 404(b) requirements must be met, and the evidence of other crimes or bad acts must be "relevant to prove a fact genuinely in dispute and the evidence is necessary as proof of the disputed issue[.]" [ 215 N.J. at 73 (citations omitted).] The inapplicability of prongs one and two under the Cofield test render any further analysis unnecessary.

2019Having found the trial court abused its discretion through the improper admission of irrelevant bad-act evidence, we now consider whether the error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2; see also Prall, 231 N.J. at 587-88 . "[T]o warrant reversal of defendant's conviction, [the] errors, singly or collectively, must 'raise a reasonable doubt' as to whether they affected the result reached by the jury." Prall, 231 N.J. at 588 (quoting State v. A-3720-17T1 16 Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336-37 (1971)); accord State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136 , 149- 50 (2008).

2019Having found the trial court abused its discretion through the improper admission of irrelevant bad-act evidence, we now consider whether the error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2; see also Prall, 231 N.J. at 587-88 . "[T]o warrant reversal of defendant's conviction, [the] errors, singly or collectively, must 'raise a reasonable doubt' as to whether they affected the result reached by the jury." Prall, 231 N.J. at 588 (quoting State v. A-3720-17T1 16 Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336-37 (1971)); accord State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136 , 149- 50 (2008).

2022State v. Krivacska, 341 N.J.

2022State v. Krivacska, 341 N.J.

2021State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 485 (2001) ("The third prong of the Cofield test 'requires some showing that the person against whom the evidence is being used actually committed the other crime or wrong.'" A-4130-18T1 12 (quoting State v. G.V., 162 N.J. 252, 275 (2000) (Coleman, J., concurring in part)).

2021State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 485 (2001) ("The third prong of the Cofield test 'requires some showing that the person against whom the evidence is being used actually committed the other crime or wrong.'" A-4130-18T1 12 (quoting State v. G.V., 162 N.J. 252, 275 (2000) (Coleman, J., concurring in part)).

2020Ibid. [State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 565 (1999).] The fourth prong of the Cofield test is considered the most difficult to overcome.

2020Ibid. [State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 565 (1999).] The fourth prong of the Cofield test is considered the most difficult to overcome.