prerogative hearing in Florida

2026Regul., Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“Factual issues susceptible of ordinary methods of proof that are not infused with policy considerations are the prerogative of the hearing officer as the finder of fact.” (citing McDonald v. Dep’t. of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977))). “[T]he obligation of the agency to honor the hearing officer’s findings of fact cannot be avoided by categorizing [or labeling] a contrary 9 finding as a conclusion of law.” Viering v. Fla. Comm’n on Hum.

2006As this court explained in Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, 475 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (citations omitted and emphasis added): Factual issues susceptible of ordinary methods of proof that are not infused with policy considerations are the prerogative of the hearing officer as the finder of fact.

2002Matters infused with overriding policy considerations include instances where an agency must interpret one of its own rules, as was the case in Baptist Hospital, or where a statute confers broad discretionary authority upon the agency which depends on whether certain criteria are found by the agency to exist, as was the case in McDonald . [7] On the other hand, "[w]here issues `are determinable by ordinary methods *1003 of proof through the weighing of evidence and the judging of the credibility of witnesses,' they are `solely the prerogative of the hearing officer as finder of fact.'" B.B. v.

1989Where issues "are determinable by ordinary methods of proof through the weighing of evidence and the judging of the credibility of witnesses," they are "solely the prerogative of the hearing officer as finder of fact." Holmes v. Turlington, 480 So.2d 150, 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

2026Regul., Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“Factual issues susceptible of ordinary methods of proof that are not infused with policy considerations are the prerogative of the hearing officer as the finder of fact.” (citing McDonald v. Dep’t. of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977))). “[T]he obligation of the agency to honor the hearing officer’s findings of fact cannot be avoided by categorizing [or labeling] a contrary 9 finding as a conclusion of law.” Viering v. Fla. Comm’n on Hum.

2013Regulation, Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 475 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (citing McDonald v. Dep’t of Banking & Fin., 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)).

2017Tedder v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 842 So. 2d 1022 , 7 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

2004Tedder v. Florida Parole Com'n., 842 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), is also instructive: Factual issues susceptible of ordinary methods of proof that are not infused with policy considerations are the prerogative of the hearing officer as the finder of fact....

2006As the Fourth District observed in Griefer v. DiPietro, 708 So.2d 666, 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998): "Rebuttal to challenge the calculations of a defense expert is permissible rebuttal evidence." See also Zanoletti v. Norle Props., Corp., 688 So.2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding the trial court's exclusion of plaintiff's expert testimony for the purpose of rebutting the calculations of the defense's expert was an abuse of discretion).

2002Matters infused with overriding policy considerations include instances where an agency must interpret one of its own rules, as was the case in Baptist Hospital, or where a statute confers broad discretionary authority upon the agency which depends on whether certain criteria are found by the agency to exist, as was the case in McDonald . [7] On the other hand, "[w]here issues `are determinable by ordinary methods *1003 of proof through the weighing of evidence and the judging of the credibility of witnesses,' they are `solely the prerogative of the hearing officer as finder of fact.'" B.B. v.

1988“The requirement that the court make a pretrial voluntariness determination does not undercut the defendant’s traditional prerogative to challenge the confession’s reliability during the course of the trial.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 , 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2145 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636, 643 (1986).

1988“The requirement that the court make a pretrial voluntariness determination does not undercut the defendant’s traditional prerogative to challenge the confession’s reliability during the course of the trial.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 , 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2145 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636, 643 (1986).