21 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2013–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Barnslatergreen2 sentences2019In People v. Barnslater, 373 Ill. 2018See People v. Barnslater, 373 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Ex Parte Tuleygreen2 sentences2019See Tuley, 109 S.W.3d at 392, 397 (requiring that the defendant establish by clear and convincing evidence that no rational jury would convict the applicant in light of the new evidence); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 209 (Tex. Crim. 2018See Tuley, 109 S.W.3d at 392, 397 (requiring that the defendant establish by clear and convincing evidence that no rational jury would convict the applicant in light of the new evidence); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 209 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2024See id. ¶ 83 (“a freestanding actual-innocence claim is independent of any claims of constitutional error at trial and focuses solely on a defendant's factual innocence in light of new evidence” (emphasis added)). ¶ 52 In People v. Martinez, 2021 IL App (1st) 190490 , an appeal from the second-stage dismissal of a successive postconviction petition, this court commented that Hobley “identified no principle or purpose that would be furthered by prohibiting a defendant from using the same evidence to assert both a constitutional claim of trial error and an actual innocence claim.” Id. ¶ 102. 2024The most common interpretation of Hobley to date, as described in Martinez, has been that “[w]hereas Washington held that a defendant was not required to rely on an underlying constitutional claim to assert actual innocence, Hobley found that the defendant was not allowed to rely on the same evidence to pursue both a constitutional claim of trial error and a freestanding actual innocence claim.” 30 No. 1-21-0907 Martinez, 2021 IL App (1st) 190490, ¶ 99 . | 2 | 3 |
House v. Bellgreen2 sentences2013See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006). ¶ 87 The State expands upon this point, arguing that the proper substantive standard for a postconviction freestanding claim of actual innocence in Illinois is an “enhanced Schlup showing.” That proposed standard would force the defendant to prove that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty in light of the new evidence, which is what Schlup requires, and do so by clear and convincing evidence, which would enhance what Schlup requires. 2013See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006). ¶ 87 The State expands upon this point, arguing that the proper substantive standard for a postconviction freestanding claim of actual innocence in Illinois is an “enhanced Schlup showing.” That proposed standard would force the defendant to prove that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty in light of the new evidence, which is what Schlup requires, and do so by clear and convincing evidence, which would enhance what Schlup requires. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hobleygreen2 sentences2022In Orange, the court once again noted that a freestanding actual innocence claim cannot rely upon evidence “ ‘ “used to supplement an assertion of a constitutional violation with respect to [the] trial.” ’ ” Id. at 459 (quoting Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 444 , quoting Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at -9- No. 1-19-1101 479). 2021Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 444 . | 1 | 3 |
People v. Pitsonbargergreen1 sentence2026People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (2002). ¶ 19 Here, Rose’s first successive petition asserted actual innocence, but the claim fails because a freestanding actual innocence claim requires newly discovered, material, noncumulative evidence that would likely change the result on retrial. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2021Compare People v. Jackson, 2018 IL App (1st) 171773 , ¶ 71, aff’d on other grounds, 2021 IL 124818 (following Hobley), with Jackson, 2018 IL App (1st) 171773 , ¶¶ 118-19 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the determination that the defendant’s freestanding actual innocence claim failed on the basis that “the evidence was not presented as a wholly independent basis establishing the defendant’s innocence but to supplement a due process claim” and stating that a freestanding actual innocence claim is “a decidedly good thing” that allows petitioners to bring claims even when they cannot dem 2021Compare People v. Jackson, 2018 IL App (1st) 171773 , ¶ 71, aff’d on other grounds, 2021 IL 124818 (following Hobley), with Jackson, 2018 IL App (1st) 171773 , ¶¶ 118-19 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the determination that the defendant’s freestanding actual innocence claim failed on the basis that “the evidence was not presented as a wholly independent basis establishing the defendant’s innocence but to supplement a due process claim” and stating that a freestanding actual innocence claim is “a decidedly good thing” that allows petitioners to bring claims even when they cannot dem | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2021Compare People v. Jackson, 2018 IL App (1st) 171773 , ¶ 71, aff’d on other grounds, 2021 IL 124818 (following Hobley), with Jackson, 2018 IL App (1st) 171773 , ¶¶ 118-19 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the determination that the defendant’s freestanding actual innocence claim failed on the basis that “the evidence was not presented as a wholly independent basis establishing the defendant’s innocence but to supplement a due process claim” and stating that a freestanding actual innocence claim is “a decidedly good thing” that allows petitioners to bring claims even when they cannot dem | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Coleman
green
2 sentences2024Martinez found Hobley to be inapplicable, as its holding was inconsistent with our supreme court’s more recent opinion in People v. Coleman: “Coleman * * * stated that ‘a freestanding actual-innocence claim is independent of any claims of constitutional error at trial and focuses solely on a defendant’s factual 31 No. 1-21-0907 innocence in light of new evidence.’ Thus, Coleman’s explanation of a freestanding actual innocence claim contemplates that the claims be independent, not that the actual innocence claim be independent of the evidence underlying his other constitutional claim of trial e 2024Martinez found Hobley to be inapplicable, as its holding was inconsistent with our supreme court’s more recent opinion in People v. Coleman: “Coleman * * * stated that ‘a freestanding actual-innocence claim is independent of any claims of constitutional error at trial and focuses solely on a defendant’s factual 31 No. 1-21-0907 innocence in light of new evidence.’ Thus, Coleman’s explanation of a freestanding actual innocence claim contemplates that the claims be independent, not that the actual innocence claim be independent of the evidence underlying his other constitutional claim of trial e | 6 | 2021–2025 |
People v. Washington
green
2 sentences2019A ‘truly persuasive demonstration of innocence’ would effectively reduce the idea to legal fiction.” Id. at 488 . ¶ 32 Despite Illinois generally recognizing freestanding claims of actual innocence, Illinois courts—and indeed, other courts throughout the country—have struggled with whether to recognize, and how to evaluate, such claims of actual innocence after a defendant has pleaded guilty. - 12 - No. 1-15-2994 ¶ 33 Some Illinois courts have expressed doubt as to whether a freestanding actual innocence claim may be brought after a valid and voluntary guilty plea, presuming that in order to p 2018A ‘truly persuasive demonstration of innocence’ would effectively reduce the idea to legal fiction.” Id. at 488 . ¶ 32 Despite Illinois generally recognizing freestanding claims of actual innocence, Illinois courts—and indeed, other courts throughout the country—have struggled with whether to recognize, and how to evaluate, such claims of actual innocence after a defendant has pleaded guilty. ¶ 33 Some Illinois courts have expressed doubt as to whether a freestanding actual innocence claim may be brought after a valid and voluntary guilty plea, presuming that in order to proceed on such a clai | 5 | 2018–2022 |
People v. Edwards
green
2 sentences2018Even more importantly, however, the elements to establish an actual innocence claim in Illinois are well established, and we hesitate to change those elements in the context of a guilty plea without clear guidance from our supreme court. ¶ 55 After considering the various approaches used by other jurisdictions, we conclude that, to overcome the finality of a valid guilty plea, a defendant raising a freestanding actual innocence challenge after a guilty plea must present a “ ‘truly persuasive demonstration of innocence’ ” in the form of “compelling evidence” (Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 488-89 ) 2018Even more importantly, however, the elements to establish an actual innocence claim in Illinois are well established, and we hesitate to change those elements in the context of a guilty plea without clear guidance from our supreme court. ¶ 55 After considering the various approaches used by other jurisdictions, we conclude that, to overcome the finality of a valid guilty plea, a defendant raising a freestanding actual innocence challenge after a guilty plea must present a “ ‘truly persuasive demonstration of innocence’ ” in the form of “compelling evidence” (Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 488-89 ) | 3 | 2018–2026 |
Herrera v. Collins
green
2 sentences2021Instead, federal due process recognizes only gateway actual innocence claims, which are not themselves constitutional claims but are the “gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 . ¶ 99 In Washington, the Illinois Supreme Court found that newly discovered evidence indicating that a defendant is actually innocent, i.e., a freestanding actual innocence claim, presents a cognizable claim as a matter of Illinois due process. 2013Id. at 400 . | 3 | 2013–2021 |
People v. Shaw
neutral
2 sentences2019He cites People v. Shaw , 2018 IL App (1st) 152994 , ¶ 41, --- Ill.Dec ----, --- N.E.3d ----, in which the First District held that "a freestanding actual innocence claim may be brought [in a postconviction proceeding] after a guilty plea, and that a defendant need not challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his or her plea to bring such a claim." On March 19, 2019, however, after defendant filed his brief, the First District withdrew its opinion in Shaw , as defendant informs us in his petition for rehearing. 2019He cites People v. Shaw, 2018 IL App (1st) 152994 , ¶ 41, in which the First District held that “a freestanding actual innocence claim may be brought [in a postconviction proceeding] after a guilty plea, and that a defendant need not challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his or her plea to bring such a claim.” On March 19, 2019, however, after defendant filed his brief, the First District -5- withdrew its opinion in Shaw, as defendant informs us in his petition for rehearing. | 3 | 2019–2019 |
Ex Parte Elizondo
green
2 sentences2019See Tuley, 109 S.W.3d at 392, 397 (requiring that the defendant establish by clear and convincing evidence that no rational jury would convict the applicant in light of the new evidence); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 209 (Tex. Crim. 2018See Tuley, 109 S.W.3d at 392, 397 (requiring that the defendant establish by clear and convincing evidence that no rational jury would convict the applicant in light of the new evidence); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 209 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 2018–2019 |
People v. Taliani
green
2 sentences2022Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 56 . 2021“A freestanding actual innocence claim raised in a successive postconviction petition is an extraordinary remedy.” Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 67 . | 2 | 2021–2022 |
People v. Ortiz
green
2 sentences2024Id. 2024Id. ¶ 61 This court first rejected the State’s argument that the cause and prejudice test be applied to a claim of actual innocence, because applying the test could theoretically bar a petitioner from filing a freestanding actual innocence claim. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Orange
green
1 sentence2022In Orange, the court once again noted that a freestanding actual innocence claim cannot rely upon evidence “ ‘ “used to supplement an assertion of a constitutional violation with respect to [the] trial.” ’ ” Id. at 459 (quoting Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 444 , quoting Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at -9- No. 1-19-1101 479). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.