21 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 2010–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United Rentals Northwest, Inc. v. Yearout Mechanical, Inc.green2 sentences2019Qui Tam Plaintiffs attempt to import Section 44-9-6's procedural requirements and "good cause" standards into Section 44-9-9(D), contending that dismissals under Section 44-9-9(D) must satisfy the requirements of Section 44-9-6 in addition to Section 44-9-9(D)'s specific dismissal requirements. 4 Qui Tam Plaintiffs' argument runs afoul of well-established rules of statutory construction. {15} "The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, recognizing that when a statute contains language wh 2019Qui Tam Plaintiffs attempt to import Section 44-9-6's procedural requirements and "good cause" standards into Section 44-9-9(D), contending that dismissals under Section 44-9-9(D) must satisfy the requirements of Section 44-9-6 in addition to Section 44-9-9(D)'s specific dismissal requirements. 4 Qui Tam Plaintiffs' argument runs afoul of well-established rules of statutory construction. {15} "The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, recognizing that when a statute contains language wh | 8 | 18 |
State v. Juangreen2 sentences2014As the Majority Opinion points out, “[t]he words of a statute should be given their ordinary meaning, absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary, as long as the ordinary meaning does not render the statute’s application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust.” Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, ¶ 37 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 2013As the Majority Opinion points out, “[t]he words of a statute should be given their ordinary meaning, absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary, as long as the ordinary meaning does not render the statute’s application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust.” Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, ¶ 37 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). | 3 | 3 |
In Re Rescue Ecoversity Petitiongreen2 sentences2015See In re Rescue Ecoversity Petition, 2012-NMCA-008, ¶ 6 , 270 P.3d 104 (“When interpreting the Constitution, we follow the plain meaning rule.”); United Rentals Nw., Inc. v. Yearout Mech., Inc., 2010-NMSC-030, ¶ 9 , 148 N.M. 426 , 237 P.3d 728 (“The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply ‘the plain meaning rule[.]’” (citation omitted)); see also NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-19 (1997) (“The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.”). 2013See In re Rescue Ecoversity Petition, 2012-NMCA-008, ¶ 6 , 270 P.3d 104 (“When interpreting the Constitution, we follow the plain meaning rule.”); United Rentals Nw., Inc. v. Yearout Mech., Inc., 2010-NMSC-030, ¶ 9 , 148 N.M. 426 , 237 P.3d 728 (“The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply ‘the plain meaning rule[.]’” (citation omitted)); see also NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-19 (1997) (“The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2012We rely on rules of construction as aids in determining legislative intent, State v. Martinez, 92 N.M. 291, 293 , 587 P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 1978), and must interpret Section 41-5-3(A) “as the Legislature understood it at the time it was enacted.” Montoya v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 90, 94 , 476 P.2d 60, 64 (1970). {11} “The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, recognizing that [wjhen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language 2012We rely on rules of construction as aids in determining legislative intent, State v. Martinez, 92 N.M. 291, 293 , 587 P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 1978), and must interpret Section 41-5-3(A) “as the Legislature understood it at the time it was enacted.” Montoya v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 90, 94 , 476 P.2d 60, 64 (1970). {11} “The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, recognizing that [wjhen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language | 2 | 2 |
Midwest Video v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2012We may depart from the plain meaning of the language of a statute, however, to “correct a mistake or an absurdity that the Legislature could not have intended[.]” Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 1998-NMSC-020 , ¶ 28. {12} “It is fundamental that statutes will be construed so that their application will be neither absurd nor unreasonable.” Midwest Video v. Campbell, 80 N.M. 116, 119 , 452 P.2d 185, 188 (1969). 2012We may depart from the plain meaning of the language of a statute, however, to “correct a mistake or an absurdity that the Legislature could not have intended[.]” Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 1998-NMSC-020 , ¶ 28. {12} “It is fundamental that statutes will be construed so that their application will be neither absurd nor unreasonable.” Midwest Video v. Campbell, 80 N.M. 116, 119 , 452 P.2d 185, 188 (1969). | 2 | 2 |
Montoya v. City of Albuquerquegreen2 sentences2012We rely on rules of construction as aids in determining legislative intent, State v. Martinez, 92 N.M. 291, 293 , 587 P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 1978), and must interpret Section 41-5-3(A) “as the Legislature understood it at the time it was enacted.” Montoya v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 90, 94 , 476 P.2d 60, 64 (1970). {11} “The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, recognizing that [wjhen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language 2012We rely on rules of construction as aids in determining legislative intent, State v. Martinez, 92 N.M. 291, 293 , 587 P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 1978), and must interpret Section 41-5-3(A) “as the Legislature understood it at the time it was enacted.” Montoya v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 90, 94 , 476 P.2d 60, 64 (1970). {11} “The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, recognizing that [wjhen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language | 2 | 2 |
Baker v. Hedstromgreen2 sentences2024See Baker v. Hedstrom, 2012-NMCA-073, ¶ 11 , 284 P.3d 400 (“The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, recognizing that when a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). 2019“We rely on rules of construction as aids in determining legislative intent[.]” Id. {20} “The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, recognizing that when a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” United Rentals Nw., Inc. v. Yearout Mech., Inc., 2010-NMSC-030, ¶ 9 , 148 N.M. 426 , 237 P.3d 728 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted); see NMSA 1978, § 12-2A- 19 | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Regents of the University of New Mexico v. New Mexico Federation of Teachers
green
2 sentences2019Fed’n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 28 , 125 N.M. 401 , 962 P.2d 1236 (explaining that “we will not read into a statute or ordinance language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {45} Based on the foregoing, we conclude the district court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence of a clear and convincing nature and that its finding of evident partiality was not an abuse of discretion. 2019Fed’n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 28 , 125 N.M. 401 , 962 P.2d 1236 (explaining that “we will not read into a statute or ordinance language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {45} Based on the foregoing, we conclude the district court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence of a clear and convincing nature and that its finding of evident partiality was not an abuse of discretion. | 3 | 2012–2019 |
Reule Sun Corp. v. Valles
green
2 sentences2019In following the plain meaning rule, “[w]e will not read into a statute language which is not there[.]” Reule Sun Corp. v. Valles, 2010- NMSC-004, ¶ 15, 147 N.M. 512 , 226 P.3d 611 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2019In following the plain meaning rule, “[w]e will not read into a statute language which is not there[.]” Reule Sun Corp. v. Valles, 2010- NMSC-004, ¶ 15, 147 N.M. 512 , 226 P.3d 611 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2010Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37 , 147 N.M. 583 , 227 P.3d 73 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10 , 147 N.M. 177 , 218 P.3d 863 (“The primary indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute.”). 2010Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37 , 147 N.M. 583 , 227 P.3d 73 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10 , 147 N.M. 177 , 218 P.3d 863 (“The primary indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute.”). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Quynh Truong v. Allstate Insurance
green
2 sentences2010Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37 , 147 N.M. 583 , 227 P.3d 73 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10 , 147 N.M. 177 , 218 P.3d 863 (“The primary indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute.”). 2010Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37 , 147 N.M. 583 , 227 P.3d 73 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10 , 147 N.M. 177 , 218 P.3d 863 (“The primary indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute.”). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.