primary-purpose test in Ohio

2024This test is known as the primary-purpose test. {¶31} In Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186 , where the statements were made to a medical professional at a medical facility for the purpose of receiving medical treatment as opposed to statements made to law enforcement, the Court employed the objective- witness test detailed in Crawford.

2011When statements are made to non-law enforcement, Ohio has adopted the “objective witness” test, whereby “a testimonial statement includes one made ‘under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’” State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186 , 2006-Ohio-5482 , 855 N.E.2d 834 , at ¶ 36, quoting Crawford at 52 . {¶19} Conversely, when statements are made to law-enforcement officers or their agents, Ohio employs “the primary-purpose test”: “‘Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interr

2022Consequently, “out-of-court statements violate the Sixth Amendment when they are testimonial and the defendant has had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant." Arnold, 126 Ohio St.3d 290 , 2010-Ohio-2742 , 933 N.E.2d 775 , at ¶ 13, citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 . {¶ 87} In deciding “whether a child declarant's statement made in the course of police interrogation is testimonial or nontestimonial, courts should apply the primary- purpose test: ‘Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively

2022Consequently, “out-of-court statements violate the Sixth Amendment when they are testimonial and the defendant has had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant." Arnold, 126 Ohio St.3d 290 , 2010-Ohio-2742 , 933 N.E.2d 775 , at ¶ 13, citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 . {¶ 87} In deciding “whether a child declarant's statement made in the course of police interrogation is testimonial or nontestimonial, courts should apply the primary- purpose test: ‘Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively

2014Id. at ¶ 49, citing Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1162 and Williams, ___U.S. ___, 132 - 17 - Brown CA2013-02-001 S.Ct. at 2243 (plurality opinion of Alito, J.). {¶ 46} The Maxwell court determined that: [a]n analysis of the primary-purpose test bears out Craig's conclusion that autopsy reports are nontestimonial.

2013In that case, we concluded that a child’s statement to a detective, after the crime scene had been secured, was testimonial and not admissible under the Sixth Amendment. {¶ 24} The United States Supreme Court recently clarified the primary- purpose test in Michigan v. Bryant, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1143 , 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011), providing further explanation of the “ongoing emergency” discussed in Davis.

2025As a result, this statement did not pertain to medical diagnosis or treatment. {¶ 53} Where an interviewer is acting as a police agent for purposes of eliciting statements unrelated to medical diagnosis, the court must “employ the primary-purpose test to determine whether the primary purpose of the interrogation was ‘ “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” ’ ” Arnold, 2010-Ohio-2742, at ¶ 35 , quoting State v. Siler, 2007-Ohio-5637 , paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).

2022Consequently, “out-of-court statements violate the Sixth Amendment when they are testimonial and the defendant has had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant." Arnold, 126 Ohio St.3d 290 , 2010-Ohio-2742 , 933 N.E.2d 775 , at ¶ 13, citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 . {¶ 87} In deciding “whether a child declarant's statement made in the course of police interrogation is testimonial or nontestimonial, courts should apply the primary- purpose test: ‘Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively

2010In one of those cases, the Supreme Court of North Dakota stated, “In cases since Crawford, other states with the functional equivalent of the Children’s Advocacy Center (‘CAC’) involved in this case have held that similar statements made by a child with police involvement inevitably are testimonial.” State v. Blue (2006), 199 N.D. 50 , 717 N.W.2d 558, ¶ 15 .

2007See, e.g., People v. Cage (2007), 40 Cal.4th 965 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 (15-year-old’s statements to police); People v. Sharp (Colo.App.2006), 155 P.3d 577 (five-year-old’s statements to forensic interviewer during visit arranged by police); Hernandez v. State (Fla.App.2007), 946 So.2d 1270 (statements made by child of unknown age to “Child Protection Team” nurse); People v. Stechly (2007), 225 Ill.2d 246 , 312 Ill.Dec. 268 , 870 N.E.2d 333 (five-year-old’s statements to child-sex-abuse personnel); State v. Henderson (Kan.2007), 160 P.3d 776 (three-year-old’s statements to police

2009It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 (internal citations omitted). {¶84} Accordingly, in Davis, the United States Supreme Court formulated what courts around the country have come to refer to as the primary-purpose test (see, e.g., People v. Geier (2007), 41 Cal.4th 555 , 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 161 P.3d 104 ; State v. Kirby (2006), 280 Conn. 361 , 908 A.2d 506 ; State v. Siler, 116 Ohio St.3d 39 , 876 N.E.2d 534

2009It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 (internal citations omitted). {¶84} Accordingly, in Davis, the United States Supreme Court formulated what courts around the country have come to refer to as the primary-purpose test (see, e.g., People v. Geier (2007), 41 Cal.4th 555 , 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 161 P.3d 104 ; State v. Kirby (2006), 280 Conn. 361 , 908 A.2d 506 ; State v. Siler, 116 Ohio St.3d 39 , 876 N.E.2d 534

2009It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 (internal citations omitted). {¶84} Accordingly, in Davis, the United States Supreme Court formulated what courts around the country have come to refer to as the primary-purpose test (see, e.g., People v. Geier (2007), 41 Cal.4th 555 , 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 161 P.3d 104 ; State v. Kirby (2006), 280 Conn. 361 , 908 A.2d 506 ; State v. Siler, 116 Ohio St.3d 39 , 876 N.E.2d 534

2009It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 (internal citations omitted). {¶84} Accordingly, in Davis, the United States Supreme Court formulated what courts around the country have come to refer to as the primary-purpose test (see, e.g., People v. Geier (2007), 41 Cal.4th 555 , 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 161 P.3d 104 ; State v. Kirby (2006), 280 Conn. 361 , 908 A.2d 506 ; State v. Siler, 116 Ohio St.3d 39 , 876 N.E.2d 534

2024Jenkins at ¶ 16 . {¶ 32} In State v. Santellana, 2020-Ohio-5041 , we considered whether admission of a 911 call violated the Confrontation Clause, applying the primary-purpose test.

2024Stevenson at ¶ 61 , citing State v. Ford, 2021-Ohio-3058 (6th Dist.), ¶ 22.

2020Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 , 135 S.Ct. 2173 , 192 L.Ed.2d 306 (2015), Ohio used the primary-purpose test for evaluating whether statements made to law enforcement were testimonial and the objective-witness test for evaluating whether statements made to someone other than law enforcement were testimonial.

2020Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 , 135 S.Ct. 2173 , 192 L.Ed.2d 306 (2015), Ohio used the primary-purpose test for evaluating whether statements made to law enforcement were testimonial and the objective-witness test for evaluating whether statements made to someone other than law enforcement were testimonial.

2016Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach, 32 Ohio St.3d 432, 436-438 , 513 N.E.2d 1340 (1987) (lead opinion) (a chapel in a church complex used for children’s church services in the summer and adult church services in the winter was exempt from taxation; a building used as a boiler building was necessary for the operation of exempt buildings on the church complex and consequently exempt under the primary-purpose test; buildings used as a cafeteria, sleeping rooms, a gymnasium, and a retreat house were merely supportive of or incidental to the public-worship function and not exempt from tax

2016Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach, 32 Ohio St.3d 432, 436-438 , 513 N.E.2d 1340 (1987) (lead opinion) (a chapel in a church complex used for children’s church services in the summer and adult church services in the winter was exempt from taxation; a building used as a boiler building was necessary for the operation of exempt buildings on the church complex and consequently exempt under the primary-purpose test; buildings used as a cafeteria, sleeping rooms, a gymnasium, and a retreat house were merely supportive of or incidental to the public-worship function and not exempt from tax

2016Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach, 32 Ohio St.3d 432, 436-438 , 513 N.E.2d 1340 (1987) (lead opinion) (a chapel in a church complex used for children’s church services in the summer and adult church services in the winter was exempt from taxation; a building used as a boiler building was necessary for the operation of exempt buildings on the church complex and consequently exempt under the primary-purpose test; buildings used as a cafeteria, sleeping rooms, a gymnasium, and a retreat house were merely supportive of or incidental to the public-worship function and not exempt from tax

2016Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach, 32 Ohio St.3d 432, 436-438 , 513 N.E.2d 1340 (1987) (lead opinion) (a chapel in a church complex used for children’s church services in the summer and adult church services in the winter was exempt from taxation; a building used as a boiler building was necessary for the operation of exempt buildings on the church complex and consequently exempt under the primary-purpose test; buildings used as a cafeteria, sleeping rooms, a gymnasium, and a retreat house were merely supportive of or incidental to the public-worship function and not exempt from tax

2016Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach, 32 Ohio St.3d 432, 436-438 , 513 N.E.2d 1340 (1987) (lead opinion) (a chapel in a church complex used for children’s church services in the summer and adult church services in the winter was exempt from taxation; a building used as a boiler building was necessary for the operation of exempt buildings on the church complex and consequently exempt under the primary-purpose test; buildings used as a cafeteria, sleeping rooms, a gymnasium, and a retreat house were merely supportive of or incidental to the public-worship function and not exempt from tax

2016Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach, 32 Ohio St.3d 432, 436-438 , 513 N.E.2d 1340 (1987) (lead opinion) (a chapel in a church complex used for children’s church services in the summer and adult church services in the winter was exempt from taxation; a building used as a boiler building was necessary for the operation of exempt buildings on the church complex and consequently exempt under the primary-purpose test; buildings used as a cafeteria, sleeping rooms, a gymnasium, and a retreat house were merely supportive of or incidental to the public-worship function and not exempt from tax

2007See, e.g., People v. Cage (2007), 40 Cal.4th 965 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 (15-year-old’s statements to police); People v. Sharp (Colo.App.2006), 155 P.3d 577 (five-year-old’s statements to forensic interviewer during visit arranged by police); Hernandez v. State (Fla.App.2007), 946 So.2d 1270 (statements made by child of unknown age to “Child Protection Team” nurse); People v. Stechly (2007), 225 Ill.2d 246 , 312 Ill.Dec. 268 , 870 N.E.2d 333 (five-year-old’s statements to child-sex-abuse personnel); State v. Henderson (Kan.2007), 160 P.3d 776 (three-year-old’s statements to police

2007See, e.g., People v. Cage (2007), 40 Cal.4th 965 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 (15-year-old’s statements to police); People v. Sharp (Colo.App.2006), 155 P.3d 577 (five-year-old’s statements to forensic interviewer during visit arranged by police); Hernandez v. State (Fla.App.2007), 946 So.2d 1270 (statements made by child of unknown age to “Child Protection Team” nurse); People v. Stechly (2007), 225 Ill.2d 246 , 312 Ill.Dec. 268 , 870 N.E.2d 333 (five-year-old’s statements to child-sex-abuse personnel); State v. Henderson (Kan.2007), 160 P.3d 776 (three-year-old’s statements to police

2007See, e.g., People v. Cage (2007), 40 Cal.4th 965 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 (15-year-old’s statements to police); People v. Sharp (Colo.App.2006), 155 P.3d 577 (five-year-old’s statements to forensic interviewer during visit arranged by police); Hernandez v. State (Fla.App.2007), 946 So.2d 1270 (statements made by child of unknown age to “Child Protection Team” nurse); People v. Stechly (2007), 225 Ill.2d 246 , 312 Ill.Dec. 268 , 870 N.E.2d 333 (five-year-old’s statements to child-sex-abuse personnel); State v. Henderson (Kan.2007), 160 P.3d 776 (three-year-old’s statements to police

2007Thus, Lagunas supports the conclusion not only that the primary-purpose test is appropriate in cases involving police interrogation of a child but also that the declarant’s age is not dispositive when determining whether statements to police are testimonial. {¶ 37} We similarly distinguish State v. Bobadilla (Minn.2006), 709 N.W.2d 243 , which APRI primarily relies upon for the proposition that a child’s limited cognitive ability renders his statements nontestimonial.

2007See, e.g., People v. Cage (2007), 40 Cal.4th 965 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 (15-year-old’s statements to police); People v. Sharp (Colo.App.2006), 155 P.3d 577 (five-year-old’s statements to forensic interviewer during visit arranged by police); Hernandez v. State (Fla.App.2007), 946 So.2d 1270 (statements made by child of unknown age to “Child Protection Team” nurse); People v. Stechly (2007), 225 Ill.2d 246 , 312 Ill.Dec. 268 , 870 N.E.2d 333 (five-year-old’s statements to child-sex-abuse personnel); State v. Henderson (Kan.2007), 160 P.3d 776 (three-year-old’s statements to police

2007See, also, Vigil, 127 P.3d at 926, fn. 8 (applying the objective-witness test to a child’s statements to a nonpolice questioner but stating that the child’s statements to police during an investigation are testimonial regardless of child’s expectations); and State v. Mechling (2006), 219 W.Va. 366 , 633 S.E.2d 311 (the objective-witness test applies, generally, but statements generated from police interrogation require application of the analysis in Davis)-, but see State v. Alvarez (App.2006), 213 Ariz. 467 , 143 P.3d 668 ; and People v. Cage, 40 Cal.4th 965 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 20

2007See, also, Vigil, 127 P.3d at 926, fn. 8 (applying the objective-witness test to a child’s statements to a nonpolice questioner but stating that the child’s statements to police during an investigation are testimonial regardless of child’s expectations); and State v. Mechling (2006), 219 W.Va. 366 , 633 S.E.2d 311 (the objective-witness test applies, generally, but statements generated from police interrogation require application of the analysis in Davis)-, but see State v. Alvarez (App.2006), 213 Ariz. 467 , 143 P.3d 668 ; and People v. Cage, 40 Cal.4th 965 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 20

2007See, e.g., People v. Cage (2007), 40 Cal.4th 965 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 (15-year-old’s statements to police); People v. Sharp (Colo.App.2006), 155 P.3d 577 (five-year-old’s statements to forensic interviewer during visit arranged by police); Hernandez v. State (Fla.App.2007), 946 So.2d 1270 (statements made by child of unknown age to “Child Protection Team” nurse); People v. Stechly (2007), 225 Ill.2d 246 , 312 Ill.Dec. 268 , 870 N.E.2d 333 (five-year-old’s statements to child-sex-abuse personnel); State v. Henderson (Kan.2007), 160 P.3d 776 (three-year-old’s statements to police

2007They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. at 822 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 . {¶ 31} Having determined that the primary-purpose test applies in this instance, we next consider the argument of the state and APRI that a child’s statements to police are nontestimonial when the child, because of his or her age and limited understanding of court or trial, could

2007They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. at 822 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 . {¶ 31} Having determined that the primary-purpose test applies in this instance, we next consider the argument of the state and APRI that a child’s statements to police are nontestimonial when the child, because of his or her age and limited understanding of court or trial, could

2007See, e.g., People v. Cage (2007), 40 Cal.4th 965 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 (15-year-old’s statements to police); People v. Sharp (Colo.App.2006), 155 P.3d 577 (five-year-old’s statements to forensic interviewer during visit arranged by police); Hernandez v. State (Fla.App.2007), 946 So.2d 1270 (statements made by child of unknown age to “Child Protection Team” nurse); People v. Stechly (2007), 225 Ill.2d 246 , 312 Ill.Dec. 268 , 870 N.E.2d 333 (five-year-old’s statements to child-sex-abuse personnel); State v. Henderson (Kan.2007), 160 P.3d 776 (three-year-old’s statements to police

2007See, also, Vigil, 127 P.3d at 926, fn. 8 (applying the objective-witness test to a child’s statements to a nonpolice questioner but stating that the child’s statements to police during an investigation are testimonial regardless of child’s expectations); and State v. Mechling (2006), 219 W.Va. 366 , 633 S.E.2d 311 (the objective-witness test applies, generally, but statements generated from police interrogation require application of the analysis in Davis)-, but see State v. Alvarez (App.2006), 213 Ariz. 467 , 143 P.3d 668 ; and People v. Cage, 40 Cal.4th 965 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 20

2007See, also, Vigil, 127 P.3d at 926, fn. 8 (applying the objective-witness test to a child’s statements to a nonpolice questioner but stating that the child’s statements to police during an investigation are testimonial regardless of child’s expectations); and State v. Mechling (2006), 219 W.Va. 366 , 633 S.E.2d 311 (the objective-witness test applies, generally, but statements generated from police interrogation require application of the analysis in Davis)-, but see State v. Alvarez (App.2006), 213 Ariz. 467 , 143 P.3d 668 ; and People v. Cage, 40 Cal.4th 965 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 20

2007In this regard, we agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois, in People v. Stechly, which recently concluded that the objective-witness test applied to statements that a five-year-old child made to her mother but that the primary-purpose test set forth in Davis applied to statements that she made during an interrogation conducted by an agent of the police. 225 Ill.2d at 299-302 , 312 Ill.Dec. 268 , 870 N.E.2d 333 .

2007In this regard, we agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois, in People v. Stechly, which recently concluded that the objective-witness test applied to statements that a five-year-old child made to her mother but that the primary-purpose test set forth in Davis applied to statements that she made during an interrogation conducted by an agent of the police. 225 Ill.2d at 299-302 , 312 Ill.Dec. 268 , 870 N.E.2d 333 .