deception rule in Washington

1972Watts v. Dietrich, supra. *857 In limiting application of the deception doctrine to the extreme case for policy reasons, the Supreme Court has recently required the deception to be “tantamount to an entrapment, a deception of such marked character as to lure a reasonably prudent driver into the illusion that he has a fair margin of safety in proceeding into the intersection and on through it.” Mondor v. Rhoades, 63 Wn.2d 159, 167 , 385 P.2d 722 (1963).

1972Watts v. Dietrich, supra. *857 In limiting application of the deception doctrine to the extreme case for policy reasons, the Supreme Court has recently required the deception to be “tantamount to an entrapment, a deception of such marked character as to lure a reasonably prudent driver into the illusion that he has a fair margin of safety in proceeding into the intersection and on through it.” Mondor v. Rhoades, 63 Wn.2d 159, 167 , 385 P.2d 722 (1963).

2016The deception doctrine is limited to matters in which a favored driver has "deceived a -8- No. 74366-0-1/9 reasonably prudent disfavored driver into believing that he or she can make a left turn with a fair margin of safety." Rjfe, 37 Wn.

2000The deception doctrine was developed to "cushion the harsh effects of the negligence per se doctrine as applied to collisions resulting from left turns at or between intersections." Hammel v. Rife, 37 Wash.App. 577, 582 , 682 P.2d 949 (1984).

2017App. 61, 66 , 813 P.2d 142 (1991). ¶22 Unlike contributory fault, the deception defense always puts what the defendant saw at issue because “[o]ne cannot be deceived by that which he does not see.” Tobias v. Rainwater, 71 Wn.2d 845, 853 , 431 P.2d 156 (1967).

2017App. 61, 66 , 813 P.2d 142 (1991). ¶22 Unlike contributory fault, the deception defense always puts what the defendant saw at issue because “[o]ne cannot be deceived by that which he does not see.” Tobias v. Rainwater, 71 Wn.2d 845, 853 , 431 P.2d 156 (1967).

1968Charlton v. Baker, 61 Wn.2d 369 , 378 P.2d 432 (1963); see also Bowen v. Odland, 200 Wash. 257 , 93 P.2d 366 (1939).

1968Charlton v. Baker, 61 Wn.2d 369 , 378 P.2d 432 (1963); see also Bowen v. Odland, 200 Wash. 257 , 93 P.2d 366 (1939).

2017App. *14 468, 475, 8 P.3d 1058 (2000).

2017The court accepted Groeschell’s assertion that she had not willfully misrepresented whether she had raised the defense at arbitration, but found, in its oral ruling, that, before hiring an expert and asserting this defense on the eve of trial, Groeschell should have assessed “whether it was appropriate to inject it at such a late date before trial.” 5 In its written ruling, the trial court found that Groeschell’s actions were “unfair” to Hedger and caused her to “divert her attention away from trial preparation to investigate th[at] particular defense and prepare to address it at trial.” 6 The

2017The court accepted Groeschell’s assertion that she had not willfully misrepresented whether she had raised the defense at arbitration, but found, in its oral ruling, that, before hiring an expert and asserting this defense on the eve of trial, Groeschell should have assessed “whether it was appropriate to inject it at such a late date before trial.” 5 In its written ruling, the trial court found that Groeschell’s actions were “unfair” to Hedger and caused her to “divert her attention away from trial preparation to investigate th[at] particular defense and prepare to address it at trial.” 6 The

2017But the deception doctrine applies only “where a favored party has somehow deceived a reasonably prudent disfavored driver so as to cause that driver to proceed on the assumption that there was a fair margin of safety.” Wood v. City of Bellingham, 62 Wn.

2017App. 61, 66 , 813 P.2d 142 (1991). ¶22 Unlike contributory fault, the deception defense always puts what the defendant saw at issue because “[o]ne cannot be deceived by that which he does not see.” Tobias v. Rainwater, 71 Wn.2d 845, 853 , 431 P.2d 156 (1967).

2016App. at 582 (citing Chapman v. Claxton, 6 Wn.

1985"For a private individual to initiate an action under the Consumer Protection Act, 'the conduct complained of must: (1) be unfair or deceptive; (2) be within the sphere of trade or commerce; and (3) impact the public interest.'" McRae v. *268 Bolstad, 101 Wn.2d 161, 165 , 676 P.2d 496 (1984).

1985"For a private individual to initiate an action under the Consumer Protection Act, 'the conduct complained of must: (1) be unfair or deceptive; (2) be within the sphere of trade or commerce; and (3) impact the public interest.'" McRae v. *268 Bolstad, 101 Wn.2d 161, 165 , 676 P.2d 496 (1984).

1984App. 279, 283-84 , 640 P.2d 1087 , review denied, 97 Wn.2d 1020 (1982), we recently summarized the factual situations in which the deception doctrine may be applied: The "deception doctrine" has been applied in two distinct situations.

1972In contending for application of the deception rule, defendant relies upon the so-called “clear stretch of road doctrine” as enunciated in Bockstruck v. Jones, 60 Wn.2d 679 , 374 P.2d 996 (1962) and more recently applied in Harris v. Fiore, 70 Wn.2d 357 , 423 P.2d 63 (1967).

1972In contending for application of the deception rule, defendant relies upon the so-called “clear stretch of road doctrine” as enunciated in Bockstruck v. Jones, 60 Wn.2d 679 , 374 P.2d 996 (1962) and more recently applied in Harris v. Fiore, 70 Wn.2d 357 , 423 P.2d 63 (1967).

1972In contending for application of the deception rule, defendant relies upon the so-called “clear stretch of road doctrine” as enunciated in Bockstruck v. Jones, 60 Wn.2d 679 , 374 P.2d 996 (1962) and more recently applied in Harris v. Fiore, 70 Wn.2d 357 , 423 P.2d 63 (1967).

1972In contending for application of the deception rule, defendant relies upon the so-called “clear stretch of road doctrine” as enunciated in Bockstruck v. Jones, 60 Wn.2d 679 , 374 P.2d 996 (1962) and more recently applied in Harris v. Fiore, 70 Wn.2d 357 , 423 P.2d 63 (1967).

1968Froemming v. Spokane City Lines, 71 Wn.2d 265 , 427 P.2d 1003 (1967), states the proposition this way, at 270: It will be observed that the deception rule prescribes standards of care for both drivers.

1968Froemming v. Spokane City Lines, 71 Wn.2d 265 , 427 P.2d 1003 (1967), states the proposition this way, at 270: It will be observed that the deception rule prescribes standards of care for both drivers.

1967Golub v. Mantopoli, 65 Wn.2d 361 , 397 P.2d 433 (1964).

1967Golub v. Mantopoli, 65 Wn.2d 361 , 397 P.2d 433 (1964).

1967As stated by this court in Cramer v. Bock, 21 Wn.2d 13, 16 , 149 P.2d 525 (1944): We hold to the view, and are of the opinion, that an instruction pointing out the rule relative to deception is only authorized when the evidence shows or justifies an inference that the disfavored driver was deceived by the actions of the favored driver and had reasonable grounds for going forward.

1967As stated by this court in Cramer v. Bock, 21 Wn.2d 13, 16 , 149 P.2d 525 (1944): We hold to the view, and are of the opinion, that an instruction pointing out the rule relative to deception is only authorized when the evidence shows or justifies an inference that the disfavored driver was deceived by the actions of the favored driver and had reasonable grounds for going forward.

1967Under such circumstances, we hold that the deception rule was not applicable as a matter of law, notwithstanding appellant’s possibly exceeding the speed limit, and it was error for the court to submit the issue of deception to the jury under the instruction given 4 Pasero v. Tacoma Transit Co., 35 Wn.2d 97 , 211 P.2d 160 (1949).

1967Under such circumstances, we hold that the deception rule was not applicable as a matter of law, notwithstanding appellant’s possibly exceeding the speed limit, and it was error for the court to submit the issue of deception to the jury under the instruction given 4 Pasero v. Tacoma Transit Co., 35 Wn.2d 97 , 211 P.2d 160 (1949).

1964If the behavior of the car and driver on the right would not deceive the reasonably prudent driver on the left to such an extent as to entrap him, then the disfavored driver has failed to yield the right of way...." See, also, Sanders v. Crimmins, 63 Wn. (2d) 702, 388 P. (2d) 913 ; Chavers v. Ohad, 59 Wn. (2d) 646, 369 P. (2d) 831 , and the specially concurring opinion per Rosellini, J.

1964If the behavior of the car and driver on the right would not deceive the reasonably prudent driver on the left to such an extent as to entrap him, then the disfavored driver has failed to yield the right of way. 99 See, also, Sanders v. Crimmins, 63 Wn. (2d) 702, 388 P. (2d) 913 ; Chavers v. Ohad, 59 Wn. (2d) 646, 369 P. (2d) 831 , and the specially concurring opinion per Rosellini, J.

1964If the behavior of the car and driver on the right would not deceive the reasonably prudent driver on the left to such an extent as to entrap him, then the disfavored driver has failed to yield the right of way...." See, also, Sanders v. Crimmins, 63 Wn. (2d) 702, 388 P. (2d) 913 ; Chavers v. Ohad, 59 Wn. (2d) 646, 369 P. (2d) 831 , and the specially concurring opinion per Rosellini, J.

1964If the behavior of the car and driver on the right would not deceive the reasonably prudent driver on the left to such an extent as to entrap him, then the disfavored driver has failed to yield the right of way. 99 See, also, Sanders v. Crimmins, 63 Wn. (2d) 702, 388 P. (2d) 913 ; Chavers v. Ohad, 59 Wn. (2d) 646, 369 P. (2d) 831 , and the specially concurring opinion per Rosellini, J.

1963McHugh v. Mason, 154 Wash. 572 , 283 Pac. 184 (1929), coming under the above statute, hints at the deception rule and anticipates Martin v. Hadenfeldt, supra, though Garrett v. Byerly, 155 Wash. 351 , 284 Pac. 343 , 68 A.L.R. 254 (1930), seems to have revived the old priority rule that the right of way belonged to the vehicle first entering the intersection.

1963McHugh v. Mason, 154 Wash. 572 , 283 Pac. 184 (1929), coming under the above statute, hints at the deception rule and anticipates Martin v. Hadenfeldt, supra, though Garrett v. Byerly, 155 Wash. 351 , 284 Pac. 343 , 68 A.L.R. 254 (1930), seems to have revived the old priority rule that the right of way belonged to the vehicle first entering the intersection.

1963McHugh v. Mason, 154 Wash. 572 , 283 Pac. 184 (1929), coming under the above statute, hints at the deception rule and anticipates Martin v. Hadenfeldt, supra, though Garrett v. Byerly, 155 Wash. 351 , 284 Pac. 343 , 68 A.L.R. 254 (1930), seems to have revived the old priority rule that the right of way belonged to the vehicle first entering the intersection.

1963McHugh v. Mason, 154 Wash. 572 , 283 Pac. 184 (1929), coming under the above statute, hints at the deception rule and anticipates Martin v. Hadenfeldt, supra, though Garrett v. Byerly, 155 Wash. 351 , 284 Pac. 343 , 68 A.L.R. 254 (1930), seems to have revived the old priority rule that the right of way belonged to the vehicle first entering the intersection.