revestment doctrine in Illinois

2024See, e.g., People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237, 240-41 (1983) (under 6 the “narrow terms” of the revestment doctrine, opposing litigants may revest a court with jurisdiction through conduct that is inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment). ¶ 26 Accordingly, the circuit court’s order of November 9, 2022, which denied Reyes’s “motion to re-instate,” and its order of March 16, 2023, which denied his “motion for subpoenas” and “motion for reconsideration,” are hereby vacated.

2021Accordingly, we now address the merits of the State’s argument. ¶ 20 Pursuant to the revestment doctrine, “litigants may revest a court which has general jurisdiction over the matter with both personal and subject[-]matter jurisdiction over the particular cause after the 30-day period following final judgment during which post-judgment motions must ordinarily be filed.” People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237, 240 (1983).

2024See People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 8 (addressing the revestment doctrine when no motion is filed within the 30-day window); People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 303 (2003) (finding the trial court no longer had authority to address a motion to vacate the judgment or reconsider the sentence where more than 30 days had elapsed since sentencing).

2024However, “under limited circumstances, the circuit court may be revested with jurisdiction after a judgment becomes final.” Id. ¶ 17 (citing People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 25 ). “[F]or the revestment doctrine to apply, both parties must: (1) actively participate in the proceedings; (2) fail to object to the untimeliness of the late filing; and (3) assert positions that make the proceedings inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment and support the setting aside of at least part of that judgment.

2014We expressly reject the reasoning used to justify the application of the revestment doctrine in Minniti, 373 Ill.

2014We expressly reject the reasoning used to justify the application of the revestment doctrine in Minniti, 373 Ill.

2012We then acknowledged, however, that decisions accepting the revestment doctrine were “admittedly in tension with Flowers.” Montiel, 365 Ill.

2007We have since reconciled Kaeding with Flowers, holding that the latter did not abrogate the revestment doctrine, because "it is not consent but active participation that revests jurisdiction." (Emphasis in original.) People v. Montiel, 365 Ill.

2020“Under the revestment doctrine, litigants may revest a trial court with personal and subject matter jurisdiction, after the 30-day period following final judgment, if they actively participate in proceedings that are inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment.” People v. Bannister, 236 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (2009).

2020“Under the revestment doctrine, litigants may revest a trial court with personal and subject matter jurisdiction, after the 30-day period following final judgment, if they actively participate in proceedings that are inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment.” People v. Bannister, 236 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (2009).

2024See People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 8 (addressing the revestment doctrine when no motion is filed within the 30-day window); People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 303 (2003) (finding the trial court no longer had authority to address a motion to vacate the judgment or reconsider the sentence where more than 30 days had elapsed since sentencing).

2014That rationale directly contradicts the explanation in Flowers that subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived or cured by consent (Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 303 ), creating the purported conflict relied on by the State. ¶ 16 Initially, we observe that the revestment doctrine was not even mentioned in Flowers.

2009See People v. Price, 364 Ill.App.3d 543, 546-47 , 301 Ill.Dec. 400 , 846 N.E.2d 1003 (2006) (although leaving open the question of whether the revestment doctrine survived Flowers, the court noted that Flowers was "consistent with the maxim that a party may not waive an objection to subject matter jurisdiction"). *257 Although the majority in its opinion summarily holds that the revestment doctrine bestowed upon the parties and the circuit court the authority to wipe away Johnson's prior double murder convictions 13 years after their entry and allow him to plead guilty to one count of murder a

2009App. 3d at 65 , 867 N.E.2d at 1246 (applying the revestment doctrine where the defendant filed an untimely postjudgment motion but the State appeared at the hearing and failed to object to the untimeliness of the motion; due to revestment, the notice of appeal filed within 30 days of the ruling on the untimely postjudgment motion vested the appellate court with jurisdiction); see also People v. Price, 364 Ill.

2012App. 3d at 605 . ¶ 22 In applying the revestment doctrine to the case, we noted that Flowers used language similar to that in Toman, 375 Ill. at 302 , which was decided before the supreme court’s application of the revestment doctrine in Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d at 241 .

2009In doing so, the Second District noted the Flowers decision used language similar to Toman v. Park Castles Apartment Building Corp., 375 Ill. 293, 302 , 31 N.E.2d 299, 304 (1940), which was decided before the supreme court’s application of the revestment doctrine in People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237, 241 , 456 N.E.2d 11, 14 (1983).

2013In so holding, we follow Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d 253, 260 (1981), over later appellate court cases that broadened the revestment doctrine. ¶2 I.

2012Nothing in the proceedings was inconsistent with the judgment.” Sears, 85 Ill. 2d at 260 . ¶ 15 In Kaeding, the supreme court observed that, although it had not had “occasion to apply the revestment doctrine in recent years (cf. Sears[, 85 Ill. 2d at 260 ]), it enjoy[ed] continued vitality in our appellate court.” Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d at 241 (citing Sabatino v. Kozy Kottage Inn, Inc., 102 Ill.

2009The revestment doctrine has only been “applied where the circuit court loses jurisdiction over a matter because of the passage of time after a judgment.” Wierzbicki v. Gleason, 388 Ill.

2009App. 3d 921, 928 , 906 N.E.2d 7, 15 (2009) (refusing to apply the revestment doctrine outside the situation where a trial court loses jurisdiction because of the expiration of 30 days after judgment; the appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument that the revestment doctrine made an order entered after the notice of appeal was filed valid when the appeal was dismissed).

2021Lowenthal v. McDonald, 367 Ill.

2020Lowenthal v. McDonald, 367 Ill.

2001We agree with defendant that the revestment doctrine allows the parties to revest a court with jurisdiction when the parties “actively participate in proceedings which are inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment.” People v. Hubbard, 170 Ill.

2001We agree with defendant that the revestment doctrine allows the parties to revest a court with jurisdiction when the parties "actively participate in proceedings which are inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment." People v. Hubbard , 170 Ill.

2014The dissenting justice maintained that the majority erred by relying on cases that misconstrued the revestment doctrine and were factually distinguishable. 2012 IL App (2d) 110209, ¶ 44 (McLaren, J., dissenting).

2014The dissenting justice maintained that the majority erred by relying on cases that misconstrued the revestment doctrine and were factually distinguishable. 2012 IL App (2d) 110209, ¶ 44 (McLaren, J., dissenting).

2017See, e.g., People v. Buffkin, 2016 IL App (2d) 140792, ¶¶ 11-13 (on appeal from the denial of his postconviction petition, defendant could raise new claim of error regarding DNA analysis fee where the parties agreed to revest the appellate court with jurisdiction); People v. White, 2016 IL App (2d) 140479, ¶ 42 (following Buffkin).

2016Although generally the revestment doctrine is applied to a late attack in a trial court (see id. ¶ 8), we see no basis for holding that it cannot be applied to a late attack in this court. -5- 2016 IL App (2d) 140792 ¶ 13 And, indeed, the criteria of the doctrine are satisfied here.

2010App. 3d 55, 65 (2007), citing People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237, 240-41 (1983); People v. Henry, 329 Ill.

2010App. 3d 55, 65 (2007), citing People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237, 240-41 (1983); People v. Henry, 329 Ill.

2023See People v. Ruddock, 2022 IL App (1st) 173023, ¶ 57 . ¶ 20 The State advances multiple theories as to why the circuit court’s April 1, 2016 order (and the subsequent orders) are not void, specifically (1) that a circuit court has the inherent authority to vacate its own orders, (2) defendant filed a postjudgment motion simultaneously with the December 18, 2015 notice of appeal, rendering the notice ineffective; and (3) the revestment doctrine obviates any jurisdictional issues. ¶ 21 The first argument fails because that legal maxim simply does not apply; the issue here is whether the court l

2023See People v. Ruddock, 2022 IL App (1st) 173023, ¶ 57 . ¶ 20 The State advances multiple theories as to why the circuit court’s April 1, 2016 order (and the subsequent orders) are not void, specifically (1) that a circuit court has the inherent authority to vacate its own orders, (2) defendant filed a postjudgment motion simultaneously with the December 18, 2015 notice of appeal, rendering the notice ineffective; and (3) the revestment doctrine obviates any jurisdictional issues. ¶ 21 The first argument fails because that legal maxim simply does not apply; the issue here is whether the court l

2023See Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 34 . ¶ 22 The State next argues that the record suggests defendant filed a motion to reconsider the circuit court’s summary dismissal order simultaneously with his notice of appeal, and as such, the notice of appeal had no effect while the motion to reconsider was pending, per Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (eff.

2023See Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 34 . ¶ 22 The State next argues that the record suggests defendant filed a motion to reconsider the circuit court’s summary dismissal order simultaneously with his notice of appeal, and as such, the notice of appeal had no effect while the motion to reconsider was pending, per Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (eff.

2017See, e.g., People v. Buffkin, 2016 IL App (2d) 140792, ¶¶ 11-13 (on appeal from the denial of his postconviction petition, defendant could raise new claim of error regarding DNA analysis fee where the parties agreed to revest the appellate court with jurisdiction); People v. White, 2016 IL App (2d) 140479, ¶ 42 (following Buffkin).

2017See, e.g., People v. Buffkin, 2016 IL App (2d) 140792, ¶¶ 11-13 (on appeal from the denial of his postconviction petition, defendant could raise new claim of error regarding DNA analysis fee where the parties agreed to revest the appellate court with jurisdiction); People v. White, 2016 IL App (2d) 140479, ¶ 42 (following Buffkin).

2012Nothing in the proceedings was inconsistent with the judgment.” Sears, 85 Ill. 2d at 260 . ¶ 15 In Kaeding, the supreme court observed that, although it had not had “occasion to apply the revestment doctrine in recent years (cf. Sears[, 85 Ill. 2d at 260 ]), it enjoy[ed] continued vitality in our appellate court.” Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d at 241 (citing Sabatino v. Kozy Kottage Inn, Inc., 102 Ill.

1983See, e.g., Sabatino v. Kozy Kottage Inn, Inc. (1981), 102 Ill.

2014Noting the factual similarity of the two cases, we concluded that the revestment doctrine did not apply where “nothing in [the plaintiff’s] conduct implied any hint of willingness to having the judgment set aside.” Archer Daniels Midland, 103 Ill. 2d at 540 . ¶ 22 In Kaeding, this court examined the application of the doctrine when both parties’ untimely postjudgment motions sought alteration of the prior judgment.

2014Noting the factual similarity of the two cases, we concluded that the revestment doctrine did not apply where “nothing in [the plaintiff’s] conduct implied any hint of willingness to having the judgment set aside.” Archer Daniels Midland, 103 Ill. 2d at 540 . ¶ 22 In Kaeding, this court examined the application of the doctrine when both parties’ untimely postjudgment motions sought alteration of the prior judgment.

2001"The doctrine of revestment provides that `all further proceedings upon the merits of a previously dismissed action are inconsistent with a prior order dismissing the action, it follows that any further proceeding upon the merits of a cause operates to nullify the order of dismissal.' ( Gentile v. Hansen, (1984) 131 Ill.App.3d 250, 255 [ 86 Ill.Dec. 515 ], 475 N.E.2d 894, 897-98 .) A petition to vacate a dismissal order is not strictly necessary. ( Gentile, 131 Ill.App.3d at 255 [ 86 Ill.Dec. 515 ], 475 N.E.2d at 897-98 .) The doctrine of revestment applies to actions which are dismissed for w

2001“The doctrine of revestment provides that ‘all further proceedings upon the merits of a previously dismissed action are inconsistent with a prior order dismissing the action, it follows that any farther proceeding upon the merits of a cause operates to nullify the order of dismissal.’ (Gentile v. Hansen, (1984) 131 Ill.

1991App. 3d 775 ); (2) under the revestment doctrine (see In re Marriage of Demond (1986), 142 Ill.

1991App.3d 392 , 132 Ill.Dec. 654 , 540 N.E.2d 394 ; In re Marriage of Shelton (1984), 127 Ill.App.3d 775 , 83 Ill.Dec. 11 , 469 N.E.2d 618 ); (2) under the revestment doctrine (see In re Marriage of Demond (1986), 142 Ill.App.3d 134, 137-38 , 96 Ill.Dec. 455 , 491 N.E.2d 501 (property disposition could be modified where parties actively participated in proceedings which were inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment); see also In re Marriage of Wharrie (1989), 182 Ill.App.3d 434, 435-36 , 130 Ill.Dec. 972 , 538 N.E.2d 183 ; but cf. Licciardi v. Collins (1989), 180 Ill.App.3d 1051, 1056 ,

1999Petitioner argues that the revestment doctrine does not apply to a dissolution action and cites in support of his position Licciardi v. Collins, 180 Ill.App.3d 1051, 1056 , 129 Ill.Dec. 790 , 536 N.E.2d 840 (1989).

1999Petitioner argues that the revestment doctrine does not apply to a dissolution action and cites in support of his position Licciardi v. Collins, 180 Ill.

2012People v. Gutman, 401 Ill.App.3d 199, 210 , 340 Ill.Dec. 342 , 928 N.E.2d 61 (2010) (this portion of Gutman was affirmed without comment in People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 46 , 355 Ill.Dec. 207 , 959 N.E.2d 621 ).

2012People v. Gutman, 401 Ill.App.3d 199, 210 , 340 Ill.Dec. 342 , 928 N.E.2d 61 (2010) (this portion of Gutman was affirmed without comment in People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 46 , 355 Ill.Dec. 207 , 959 N.E.2d 621 ).