facts necessary to establish violation in Georgia

2025“A person commits the offense of hijacking a motor vehicle in the first degree when such person while in possession of a firearm or weapon obtains a motor vehicle from an individual or the presence of another individual by force and violence or intimidation or attempts or conspires to do so.” OCGA § 16-5-44.1. (b) (1) (emphasis supplied). “[T]o withstand a general demurrer, an indictment must: (1) recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish violation of a criminal statute.” Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 13

2025“A person commits the offense of hijacking a motor vehicle in the first degree when such person while in possession of a firearm or weapon obtains a motor vehicle from an individual or the presence of another individual by force and violence or intimidation or attempts or conspires to do so.” OCGA § 16-5-44.1. (b) (1) (emphasis supplied). “[T]o withstand a general demurrer, an indictment must: (1) recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish violation of a criminal statute.” Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 13

2019Thus, a legally sufficient indictment must either "(1) recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish violation of a criminal statute." Id. at 141 (1), 800 S.E.2d 356 . "[I]f the accused can admit all the indictment or *558 accusation or citation charges and still be innocent of having committed any offense, the indictment or accusation or citation is defective." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Thomason , 196 Ga. App. at 448 (2), 396 S.E.2d 79 .

2019Thus, a legally sufficient indictment must either "(1) recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish violation of a criminal statute." Id. at 141 (1), 800 S.E.2d 356 . "[I]f the accused can admit all the indictment or *558 accusation or citation charges and still be innocent of having committed any offense, the indictment or accusation or citation is defective." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Thomason , 196 Ga. App. at 448 (2), 396 S.E.2d 79 .

2018If either of these requisites is met, then the accused cannot admit the allegations of the indictment and yet be not guilty of the crime charged."); see also Brooks v. State , 299 Ga. 474 , 476 (1), 788 S.E.2d 766 (2016).

2018If either of these requisites is met, then the accused cannot admit the allegations of the indictment and yet be not guilty of the crime charged."); see also Brooks v. State , 299 Ga. 474 , 476 (1), 788 S.E.2d 766 (2016).

2017A valid indictment “[uses] the language of the statute, including] the essential elements of the offense, and [is] sufficiently definite to advise [the accused] of what he must be prepared to confront.” Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 818, 819 (1) ( 537 SE2d 327 ) (2000). 9 In sum, to withstand a general demurrer, an indictment must: (1) recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish violation of a criminal statute.

2017A valid indictment “[uses] the language of the statute, including] the essential elements of the offense, and [is] sufficiently definite to advise [the accused] of what he must be prepared to confront.” Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 818, 819 (1) ( 537 SE2d 327 ) (2000). 9 In sum, to withstand a general demurrer, an indictment must: (1) recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish violation of a criminal statute.

2019Indeed, we have before explained that "[t]he true test of the sufficiency of an indictment" to withstand a general demurrer is " '[i]f all the facts which the indictment charges can be admitted, and still the accused be innocent, the indictment is bad; but if, taking the facts alleged as premises, the guilt of the accused follows as a legal conclusion, the indictment is good.' " Allen v. State , 300 Ga. 500 , 502, 796 S.E.2d 708 (2017) (citation omitted).

2019Indeed, we have before explained that "[t]he true test of the sufficiency of an indictment" to withstand a general demurrer is " '[i]f all the facts which the indictment charges can be admitted, and still the accused be innocent, the indictment is bad; but if, taking the facts alleged as premises, the guilt of the accused follows as a legal conclusion, the indictment is good.' " Allen v. State , 300 Ga. 500 , 502, 796 S.E.2d 708 (2017) (citation omitted).

2024See Powell, 318 Ga. at 880 (2) (noting that we have framed the general-demurrer inquiry both ways).

2023If either of these requisites is met, then the accused cannot admit the allegations of the indictment and yet be not guilty of the crime charged.” Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137, 141 (1) ( 800 SE2d 356 ) (2017); see also Smith, 266 Ga. at 54 (1) (“It is established in Georgia that . . . a criminal indictment which does not recite language from the Code must allege every essential element of the crime charged.”).

2021See Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 397 (4) ( 850 SE2d 41 ) (2020) (A general demurrer can be raised “at any time during trial[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 32 Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878, 880 (2) ( 799 SE2d 229 ) (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted). 33 Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137, 141 (1) ( 800 SE2d 356 ) (2017). 13 (a) Driving too fast for conditions The accusation alleged that Woods did drive a vehicle at a speed greater than reasonable and prudent under the conditions and without having regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing when approaching and go

2021See Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 397 (4) ( 850 SE2d 41 ) (2020) (A general demurrer can be raised “at any time during trial[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 32 Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878, 880 (2) ( 799 SE2d 229 ) (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted). 33 Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137, 141 (1) ( 800 SE2d 356 ) (2017). 13 (a) Driving too fast for conditions The accusation alleged that Woods did drive a vehicle at a speed greater than reasonable and prudent under the conditions and without having regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing when approaching and go

2021See Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 397 (4) ( 850 SE2d 41 ) (2020) (A general demurrer can be raised “at any time during trial[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 32 Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878, 880 (2) ( 799 SE2d 229 ) (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted). 33 Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137, 141 (1) ( 800 SE2d 356 ) (2017). 13 (a) Driving too fast for conditions The accusation alleged that Woods did drive a vehicle at a speed greater than reasonable and prudent under the conditions and without having regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing when approaching and go

2021See Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 397 (4) ( 850 SE2d 41 ) (2020) (A general demurrer can be raised “at any time during trial[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 32 Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878, 880 (2) ( 799 SE2d 229 ) (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted). 33 Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137, 141 (1) ( 800 SE2d 356 ) (2017). 13 (a) Driving too fast for conditions The accusation alleged that Woods did drive a vehicle at a speed greater than reasonable and prudent under the conditions and without having regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing when approaching and go

2021If, however, the admission of the facts alleged would lead necessarily to the conclusion that the accused is guilty of a crime, the indictment is sufficient to withstand a general demurrer.32 “In sum, to withstand a general demurrer, an indictment must: (1) recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish violation of a criminal statute.”33 presented at trial); Jackson v. State, 350 Ga. App. 80 , 81 (2) ( 827 SE2d 919 ) (2019) (“When hearsay evidence is erroneously admitted in violation of the confrontation

2020See also State v. Mondor, 306 Ga. 338, 341 (1) ( 830 SE2d 206 ) (2019) (an indictment is sufficient to withstand a general demurrer if it “recite[s] the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged” or “allege[s] the facts necessary to establish violation of a criminal statute” (citations and punctuation omitted)). 12 another prosecution for the same offense.” (Emphasis supplied.)).

2020See also State v. Mondor, 306 Ga. 338, 341 (1) ( 830 SE2d 206 ) (2019) (an indictment is sufficient to withstand a general demurrer if it “recite[s] the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged” or “allege[s] the facts necessary to establish violation of a criminal statute” (citations and punctuation omitted)). 12 another prosecution for the same offense.” (Emphasis supplied.)).

2020See also Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69-70 (II) (B) ( 98 SCt 2170 , 57 LE2d 43) (1978) (“[O]nce Congress has defined a statutory offense by its prescription of the ‘allowable unit of prosecution,’ that prescription determines the scope of protection afforded by a prior conviction or acquittal.” (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)).

2020See also Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69-70 (II) (B) ( 98 SCt 2170 , 57 LE2d 43) (1978) (“[O]nce Congress has defined a statutory offense by its prescription of the ‘allowable unit of prosecution,’ that prescription determines the scope of protection afforded by a prior conviction or acquittal.” (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)).