parent-child tort immunity in Illinois

2001The parent-child tort immunity doctrine bars a child from maintaining an action for damages against her or his parent and was first recognized in the case of Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill.

1993The appellate court concluded that this court had not adopted the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, but the doctrine had been recognized by the appellate court in Foley v. Foley (1895), 61 Ill.

2010Stallman II, 152 Ill.App.3d at 689 , 105 Ill.Dec. 635 , 504 N.E.2d 920 .

2010We conclude, therefore, that we may abandon our holding in Stallman I insofar as it recognized the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in Illinois.” Stallman II, 152 Ill.

1988App. 3d at 865 .) The Stallman I court then stated that it did “agree with plaintiff *** that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine should not be applied to this case so as to defeat plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence against her mother” ( 129 Ill.

1987App. 3d, 859, 865 , 473 N.E.2d 400, 404 .) Since the appeal involved solely the sufficiency of plaintiff’s complaint, we remanded the cause to the trial court to determine the facts and then to determine whether those facts fell into any exceptions to the parent-child tort immunity rule.

1993Stat. 1967, ch. 122, pars. 24 — 24, 34 — 84a.) (Kobylanski, 63 Ill. 2d 165 (tort liability of teacher standing in loco parentis no greater than that of parent so that teacher’s liability limited to willful and wanton conduct); see also Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d 47 ; Thomas, 77 Ill. 2d 165 ; Tanari, 69 Ill. 2d 630 .) However, in allowing teachers the parent-child immunity defense because the School Code granted them in loco parentis status, this court did not reexamine the public policies underlying the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, nor the scope of the immunity as applied to negligence cases

1988Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill.2d 165 , 347 N.E.2d 705 ; Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill.2d 47 , 373 N.E.2d 1323 . • 2 The plaintiff mother as next friend of the minor further alleges that an ordinance was violated and that the defendant father was covered by insurance and consequently the immunity granted by the doctrine is not applicable in the instant case.

1993Defendant argues that the appellate court ignored binding authority ( Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill.2d 267 , 126 Ill.Dec. 60 , 531 N.E.2d 355 ; Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill.2d 47 , 15 Ill.Dec. 639 , 373 N.E.2d 1323 ; Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill.2d 451 , 216 N.E.2d 137 ; Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill.2d 608 , 131 N.E.2d 525 ) which recognizes application of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in the area of negligence.

1993Defendant argues that the appellate court ignored binding authority (Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 267 ; Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47 ; Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 451 ; Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608 ) which recognizes application of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in the area of negligence.

1998App. 3d 510 , 680 N.E.2d 822 (1997), where the defendants were foster parents who argued that they were immune from liability for the injuries and death of their foster child pursuant to the doctrines of parent-child tort immunity and sovereign immunity. 1 In holding that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine barred the plaintiff’s negligence claims against the defendant foster parents, the Augsburger court reasoned that “foster parents *** have responsibility in regard to the supervision and discipline of those children under their care. *** Foster parents are nearly as much in need of leew

1998App. 3d 510 , 680 N.E.2d 822 (1997), where the defendants were foster parents who argued that they were immune from liability for the injuries and death of their foster child pursuant to the doctrines of parent-child tort immunity and sovereign immunity. 1 In holding that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine barred the plaintiff’s negligence claims against the defendant foster parents, the Augsburger court reasoned that “foster parents *** have responsibility in regard to the supervision and discipline of those children under their care. *** Foster parents are nearly as much in need of leew

1998NOTES [1] The Augsburger court subsequently held that the foster parents were not agents of the state and, therefore, not protected under the sovereign immunity doctrine because the relationship between the foster parents and the state was too remote, i.e., the foster parents had contracted with a private corporation which had contracted with DCFS. [2] Cates in fact states only, without discussion, that an exception to the parent-child tort immunity doctrine allows children to sue their grandparents; Cates does not contain any discussion of summer camps, day-care centers or medical and psychol

1998Cates in fact states only, without discussion, that an exception to the parent-child tort immunity doctrine allows children to sue their grandparents; Cates does not contain any discussion of summer camps, day-care centers or medical and psychological treatment facilities "Illinois Nurses Ass’n v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 196 Ill.

1993The parent-child tort immunity doctrine first appeared in American case law in Hewlett v. George (1891), 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 , which held that parents are immune from tort actions brought by their unemancipated minor children.

1993The parent-child- tort immunity doctrine was unknown at English common law and arose in American case law as the result of three decisions, often termed “the great trilogy” (Hewlett, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (married, minor child barred from suing mother for malicious imprisonment in insane asylum); McKelvey v. McKelvey (1903), 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 (minor child barred from suing parent for cruel and inhumane punishment); Roller v. Roller (1905), 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (minor child barred from suing father for rape)).

1993(See Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 Fordham L.Rev. 489, 511 (1982); Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 San Diego L.Rev. 325, 339 (1984); see also Nocktonick v. Nocktonick (1980), 227 Kan. 758 , 611 P.2d 135 ; Hebel v. Hebel (Alaska 1967), 435 P.2d 8 .) We do not, however, consider such a basis a sound reason to impose liability. ( Schenk v. Schenk (1968), 100 Ill.App.2d 199, 205 , 241 N.E.2d 12 .) Having expressed this significant caveat, we approach the question of whet

1993(See Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 Fordham L.Rev. 489, 511 (1982); Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 San Diego L.Rev. 325, 339 (1984); see also Nocktonick v. Nocktonick (1980), 227 Kan. 758 , 611 P.2d 135 ; Hebel v. Hebel (Alaska 1967), 435 P.2d 8 .) We do not, however, consider such a basis a sound reason to impose liability. ( Schenk v. Schenk (1968), 100 Ill.App.2d 199, 205 , 241 N.E.2d 12 .) Having expressed this significant caveat, we approach the question of whet

1993Stat. 1967, ch. 122, pars. 24 — 24, 34 — 84a.) (Kobylanski, 63 Ill. 2d 165 (tort liability of teacher standing in loco parentis no greater than that of parent so that teacher’s liability limited to willful and wanton conduct); see also Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d 47 ; Thomas, 77 Ill. 2d 165 ; Tanari, 69 Ill. 2d 630 .) However, in allowing teachers the parent-child immunity defense because the School Code granted them in loco parentis status, this court did not reexamine the public policies underlying the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, nor the scope of the immunity as applied to negligence cases

1987Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 165, 171 , 395 N.E.2d 538, 541 ; Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49 , 373 N.E.2d 1323, 1324 ; Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 165, 170 , 347 N.E.2d 705, 708 .

1993Illinois courts also reject application of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine as a bar to third-party contribution actions against allegedly negligent parents. ( Hartigan v. Beery (1984), 128 Ill.App.3d 195 , *724 83 Ill.Dec. 445 , 470 N.E.2d 571 ; Moon v. Thompson (1984), 127 Ill.App.3d 657 , 82 Ill.Dec. 831 , 469 N.E.2d 365 ; Larson v. Buschkamp (1982), 105 Ill.App.3d 965 , 61 Ill.Dec. 732 , 435 N.E.2d 221 .) The Larson court reasoned that (1) several Illinois decisions had restricted application of the doctrine, (2) the child's injury rather than the suit disrupted the family, and (3)

1993Illinois courts also reject application of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine as a bar to third-party contribution actions against allegedly negligent parents. ( Hartigan v. Beery (1984), 128 Ill.App.3d 195 , *724 83 Ill.Dec. 445 , 470 N.E.2d 571 ; Moon v. Thompson (1984), 127 Ill.App.3d 657 , 82 Ill.Dec. 831 , 469 N.E.2d 365 ; Larson v. Buschkamp (1982), 105 Ill.App.3d 965 , 61 Ill.Dec. 732 , 435 N.E.2d 221 .) The Larson court reasoned that (1) several Illinois decisions had restricted application of the doctrine, (2) the child's injury rather than the suit disrupted the family, and (3)

1987App. 3d 234, 235-36 , 403 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 .) Since the appellate court created the parent-child tort immunity rule, it is free to modify and interpret the doctrine to correspond with prevalent considerations of public policy and social needs.

1982App. 3d 234 , 403 N.E.2d 1256 .) Thus, while we conclude that in Illinois the courts continue generally to give vitality to the parent-child tort immunity doctrine as a consequence of public policy considerations favoring the promotion of family harmony and the prevention of intrafamily litigation and strife (see Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49 , 373 N.E.2d 1323 ), the rule has been modified where the purpose of the doctrine will not be served.

2001Paterson, 294 Ill.

1998Illinois Nurses Ass'n v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 244 Ill.App.3d 1 , 184 Ill.Dec. 812 , 614 N.E.2d 13 (1991).

1998Illinois Nurses Ass'n v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 244 Ill.App.3d 1 , 184 Ill.Dec. 812 , 614 N.E.2d 13 (1991).

1993Defendant argues that the appellate court ignored binding authority (Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 267 ; Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47 ; Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 451 ; Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608 ) which recognizes application of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in the area of negligence.

1993Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 267 , represents an instance where the application of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in an automobile negligence case was before this court.

1993With such extreme cases as its basis, legal criticism of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine inevitably followed. ( Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352 , 150 A. 905 ; 43 Harv.

1993With such extreme cases as its basis, legal criticism of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine inevitably followed. ( Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352 , 150 A. 905 ; 43 Harv.

1993(See Lawber v. Doil (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 323 , 138 Ill.Dec. 585 , 547 N.E.2d 752 .) The basis for upholding the immunity despite the death of the child was to prevent the tortfeasor from sharing in any benefits which might inure to the tortfeasor because of the marriage between the two parents.

1993(See Lawber v. Doil (1989), 191 Ill.

1993The parent-child tort immunity doctrine was unknown at English common law and arose in American case law as the result of three decisions, often termed "the great trilogy" ( Hewlett, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (married, minor child barred from suing mother for malicious imprisonment in insane asylum); McKelvey v. McKelvey (1903), 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 (minor child barred from suing parent for cruel and inhumane punishment); Roller v. Roller (1905), 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (minor child barred from suing father for rape)).

1993The parent-child- tort immunity doctrine was unknown at English common law and arose in American case law as the result of three decisions, often termed “the great trilogy” (Hewlett, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (married, minor child barred from suing mother for malicious imprisonment in insane asylum); McKelvey v. McKelvey (1903), 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 (minor child barred from suing parent for cruel and inhumane punishment); Roller v. Roller (1905), 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (minor child barred from suing father for rape)).

1993(See Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 Fordham L.Rev. 489, 511 (1982); Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 San Diego L.Rev. 325, 339 (1984); see also Nocktonick v. Nocktonick (1980), 227 Kan. 758 , 611 P.2d 135 ; Hebel v. Hebel (Alaska 1967), 435 P.2d 8 .) We do not, however, consider such a basis a sound reason to impose liability. ( Schenk v. Schenk (1968), 100 Ill.App.2d 199, 205 , 241 N.E.2d 12 .) Having expressed this significant caveat, we approach the question of whet

1993Dec. 874 , 373 N.E.2d 5 .) However, in allowing teachers the parent-child immunity defense because the School Code granted them in loco parentis status, this court did not reexamine the public policies underlying the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, nor the scope of the immunity as applied to negligence cases between parent and child.

1993Stat. 1967, ch. 122, pars. 24 — 24, 34 — 84a.) (Kobylanski, 63 Ill. 2d 165 (tort liability of teacher standing in loco parentis no greater than that of parent so that teacher’s liability limited to willful and wanton conduct); see also Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d 47 ; Thomas, 77 Ill. 2d 165 ; Tanari, 69 Ill. 2d 630 .) However, in allowing teachers the parent-child immunity defense because the School Code granted them in loco parentis status, this court did not reexamine the public policies underlying the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, nor the scope of the immunity as applied to negligence cases

1993App.3d 448 , 143 Ill.Dec. 316 , 554 N.E.2d 251 ; see also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1992), 154 Ill.2d 90 , 180 Ill.Dec. 691 , 607 N.E.2d 1204 . *717 DISCUSSION Defendant's appeal is premised on the belief that the trial court adhered to precedent and correctly determined that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine bars plaintiff's negligence action.

1993App.3d 448 , 143 Ill.Dec. 316 , 554 N.E.2d 251 ; see also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1992), 154 Ill.2d 90 , 180 Ill.Dec. 691 , 607 N.E.2d 1204 . *717 DISCUSSION Defendant's appeal is premised on the belief that the trial court adhered to precedent and correctly determined that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine bars plaintiff's negligence action.

1993The parent-child- tort immunity doctrine was unknown at English common law and arose in American case law as the result of three decisions, often termed “the great trilogy” (Hewlett, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (married, minor child barred from suing mother for malicious imprisonment in insane asylum); McKelvey v. McKelvey (1903), 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 (minor child barred from suing parent for cruel and inhumane punishment); Roller v. Roller (1905), 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (minor child barred from suing father for rape)).

1993The parent-child- tort immunity doctrine was unknown at English common law and arose in American case law as the result of three decisions, often termed “the great trilogy” (Hewlett, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (married, minor child barred from suing mother for malicious imprisonment in insane asylum); McKelvey v. McKelvey (1903), 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 (minor child barred from suing parent for cruel and inhumane punishment); Roller v. Roller (1905), 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (minor child barred from suing father for rape)).