parties dispute standard (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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parties dispute standard in Illinois

20 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2026 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation v. Walter Jacobson and Cbs, Inc.green
ca7 · 1983 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006The parties dispute whether this privilege can be defeated by allegations of actual malice. 3 More than 20 years ago, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “Illinois law is in disarray on the question whether actual malice defeats the privilege of fair summary.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 272 (7th Cir. 1983).

2006The parties dispute whether this privilege can be defeated by allegations of actual malice. [3] More than 20 years ago, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "Illinois law is in disarray on the question whether actual malice defeats the privilege of fair summary." Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 272 (7th Cir.1983).

22
People v. Simmsgreen
ill · 2000 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019The State relies on the abuse of discretion standard used by our supreme court when reviewing the propriety of the State's closing arguments in People v. Simms , 192 Ill. 2d 348 , 397, 249 Ill.Dec. 654 , 736 N.E.2d 1092 (2000).

2019The State relies on the abuse of discretion standard used by our supreme court when reviewing the propriety of the State's closing arguments in People v. Simms , 192 Ill. 2d 348 , 397, 249 Ill.Dec. 654 , 736 N.E.2d 1092 (2000).

12
People v. Eddmondsgreen
ill · 1991 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill.2d 501, 510 , 161 Ill.Dec. 306 , 578 N.E.2d 952 (1991).

2012People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill.2d 501, 510 , 161 Ill.Dec. 306 , 578 N.E.2d 952 (1991).

12
People v. Piatkowskigreen
ill · 2007 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d 551, 564-65 (2007); Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 88 (“Without reversible error, there can be no plain error.”). ¶ 64 The parties dispute the standard of review for the underlying error.

11
People v. Jacksongreen
ill · 2020 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d 551, 564-65 (2007); Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 88 (“Without reversible error, there can be no plain error.”). ¶ 64 The parties dispute the standard of review for the underlying error.

11
People v. Parkergreen
ill · 2006 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021Ammons cites People v. Parker, 223 Ill. 2d 494, 501 (2006), which holds that this court must review de novo whether the jury instructions accurately conveyed to the jury the applicable law.

11
People v. Sargentgreen
ill · 2010 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020Feb. 1, 1994) provides that “[n]o party may raise on appeal the failure to give an instruction unless the party shall have tendered it.” See also People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 188 (2010).

11
Raintree Health Care Center v. Illinois Human Rights Commissiongreen
ill · 1996 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016The Act provides that the allowance of attorney fees and costs is in the discretion of the court (775 ILCS 5/10-102(C)(2) (West 2014)), and indeed, our supreme court has applied an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a fee award (Raintree Health Care Center v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 173 Ill. 2d 469, 494 (1996)).

11
Iqbal Mathur, Marilyn F. Longwell and John P. Madden v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois Universitygreen
ca7 · 2003 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016App. 3d 1046, 1064 (1987); see also Mathur v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 317 F.3d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Fee- shifting statutes in civil rights legislation are intended to allow litigants access to attorneys who would otherwise be inaccessible, given the low retainers many plaintiffs can afford.”). ¶ 15 Initially, the parties dispute the standard of review.

11
United States v. Cronicgreen
scotus · 1984 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012While the State argues for the well-established Strickland standard, the defendant invites this court to deviate from the Strickland standard and to instead apply a standard pronounced in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1984), which eliminated the need for a specific showing of prejudice in circumstances where a presumption of prejudice can be made–such as when there is a complete denial of counsel or if counsel completely fails to subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board green
ill · 2007
2 sentences

2018Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 533 . ¶ 25 The parties dispute which standard of review is appropriate.

2018Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 533 . ¶ 25 The parties dispute which standard of review is appropriate.

32017–2018
Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc. green
ill · 1966
2 sentences

2006In Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 112 (1966), we stated that section 611 of the first Restatement of Torts “definitely expresses the prevailing, if not unanimous, weight of judicial authority.” Lulay, 34 Ill. 2d at 115 .

2006In Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 112 (1966), we stated that section 611 of the first Restatement of Torts “definitely expresses the prevailing, if not unanimous, weight of judicial authority.” Lulay, 34 Ill. 2d at 115 .

22006–2006
People v. Larson green
illappct · 2022
1 sentence

2023Defendant argues we should apply a de novo standard, citing People v. Larson, 2022 IL App (3d) 190482 .

12023–2023
People v. Hale green
ill · 2013
1 sentence

2021Citing People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140 , defendant proposes that we should review his claim de novo.

12021–2021
People v. Roberts green
illappct · 2013
1 sentence

2019Defendant, relying on People v. Roberts, 2013 IL App (2d) 110524 , contends that de novo review is proper because the evidence “affirmatively established” the Racine house was unoccupied, “no evidence” showed anyone intended to reside there within a reasonable time, and the only question is whether, as a matter of law, the house is a dwelling.

12019–2019
Employers Insurance v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust green
ill · 1999
2 sentences

2018Plaintiff cites the well-settled proposition that "[g]enerally, an abuse of discretion standard is utilized to review a circuit court's decision to award attorney fees and costs under section 155." Employers Insurance of Wausau , 186 Ill. 2d at 160 , 237 Ill.Dec. 82 , 708 N.E.2d 1122 .

2018Plaintiff cites the well-settled proposition that "[g]enerally, an abuse of discretion standard is utilized to review a circuit court's decision to award attorney fees and costs under section 155." Employers Insurance of Wausau , 186 Ill. 2d at 160 , 237 Ill.Dec. 82 , 708 N.E.2d 1122 .

12018–2018
Morris v. Auto-Owners Insurance green
illappct · 1993
2 sentences

2018App. 3d 500 , 506, 180 Ill.Dec. 222 , 606 N.E.2d 1299 (1993). ¶ 31 The parties dispute our standard of review.

2018App. 3d 500 , 506, 180 Ill.Dec. 222 , 606 N.E.2d 1299 (1993). ¶ 31 The parties dispute our standard of review.

12018–2018
People v. Clairmont green
illappct · 2011
1 sentence

2016Clairmont, 2011 IL App (2d) 100924, ¶ 12 .2 ¶ 36 Defendant here argues that the State failed to meet the foundational requirement of showing that the Breathalyzer machine was certified as accurate within the required time frame, specifically, within 62 days prior to defendant’s test. ¶ 37 The parties dispute the standard of review.

12016–2016
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey green
ill · 2013
1 sentence

2016Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 27 . 4 1-14-3720 ¶ 14 Initially, the parties dispute the standard of review for motions to vacate.

12016–2016

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IL § 40 ILCS 5/3-106 (3) IL § 40 ILCS 5/3-114.1 (3) IL § 40 ILCS 5/3-131 (3) IL § 40 ILCS 5/3-140 (3) IL § 735 ILCS 5/3-101 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 20 (2006–2026) CA 20 (1985–2026) TX 11 (2011–2026) WI 6 (1998–2021) AZ 6 (1987–2021) WA 5 (2010–2018) IN 4 (1997–2013) GA 3 (2024–2025) OH 3 (2006–2025) CO 3 (2022–2025) KS 3 (2008–2020) NM 2 (2005–2005) UT 2 (2014–2025) MT 2 (2015–2015) DE 2 (2019–2025) WV 2 (2015–2021) NY 2 (2005–2008) MI 2 (2006–2018) AK 2 (1993–2021) MA 2 (2006–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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