20 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 2011–2023 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Patrick P. Smith v. Cumberland Countygreen2 sentences2021This standard requires only that the plaintiff produce "enough evidence to allow the [trier-of-fact] to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor." Id.; see also Estate ofSmith v. Cumberland Cty., 2013 ME 13, 119 , 60 A.3d 759 ("[i]n order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff in a tort case must point to evidence in the record to support each element of his or her claim... evidence of factual 2 elements offered to prove a claimed tort, submitted in opposition to summary judgment, need not be persuasive ... but the evidence must be sufficient to allow a fact-finder to make a fac 2021This standard requires only that the plaintiff produce "enough evidence to allow the [trier-of-fact] to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor." Id.; see also Estate ofSmith v. Cumberland Cty., 2013 ME 13, 119 , 60 A.3d 759 ("[i]n order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff in a tort case must point to evidence in the record to support each element of his or her claim... evidence of factual 2 elements offered to prove a claimed tort, submitted in opposition to summary judgment, need not be persuasive ... but the evidence must be sufficient to allow a fact-finder to make a fac | 2 | 2 |
Camden National Bank v. Ilene F. Weintraubgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g. , Camden Nat'l Bank v. Weintraub , 2016 ME 101 , ¶ 11, 143 A.3d 788 (stating that to make a "prima facie case" as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, see 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2017), the claimant must present "only some evidence on every element of proof necessary to obtain the desired remedy," without regard to the reliability or credibility of the evidence (quotation marks omitted) ); Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage, Inc. , 2012 ME 103 , ¶ 12, 48 A.3d 774 (stating that to defeat a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must satisfy the "prima facie evidence standard [that]. . . req 2018See, e.g. , Camden Nat'l Bank v. Weintraub , 2016 ME 101 , ¶ 11, 143 A.3d 788 (stating that to make a "prima facie case" as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, see 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2017), the claimant must present "only some evidence on every element of proof necessary to obtain the desired remedy," without regard to the reliability or credibility of the evidence (quotation marks omitted) ); Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage, Inc. , 2012 ME 103 , ¶ 12, 48 A.3d 774 (stating that to defeat a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must satisfy the "prima facie evidence standard [that]. . . req | 2 | 2 |
Anderson v. Stategreen2 sentences2014A. Prima Facie Evidence [¶24] The prima facie evidence standard “regards the preliminary burden of production of evidence; it requires proof only of ‘enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor.’” Cookson v. State (Cookson II), 2011 ME 53, ¶ 8 , 17 A.3d 1208 (quoting Anderson v. Delaware, 831 A.2d 858, 865-66 (Del. 2003)). 2014A. Prima Facie Evidence [¶ 24] The prima facie evidence standard “regards the preliminary burden of production of evidence; it requires proof only of ‘enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor.’ ” Cookson v. State (Cookson II), 2011 ME 58, ¶8 , 17 A.3d 1208 (quoting Anderson v. Delaware, 831 A.2d 858, 865-66 (Del.2003)). | 2 | 2 |
Curtis v. Portergreen2 sentences2021Id. ¶¶ 33, 36; see Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶¶ 8-9 , 784 A.2d 18 (detailing the standard afforded the nonmoving party facing summary judgment). [The standard] requires proof only of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor. 2021Id. ¶¶ 33, 36; see Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶¶ 8-9 , 784 A.2d 18 (detailing the standard afforded the nonmoving party facing summary judgment). [The standard] requires proof only of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Beanegreen2 sentences2014“Prima facie evidence means evidence that, if unrebutted or unexplained, is sufficient to maintain the proposition.” Town of Blue Hill v. Leighton, 2011 ME 103 , ¶ 12 n.5, 30 A.3d 848 (quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Beane, 146 Me. 328, 331 , 81 A.2d 924 (1951). 2014“Prima facie evidence means evidence that, if unrebutted or unexplained, is sufficient to maintain the proposition.” Town of Blue Hill v. Leighton, 2011 ME 103 , ¶ 12 n.5, 30 A.3d 848 (quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Beane, 146 Me. 328, 331 , 81 A.2d 924 (1951). | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdinegreen2 sentences2011The evidence sought to be analyzed, or the additional information that the new technology is capable of providing regarding evidence sought to be reanalyzed, is material to the issue of whether the person is the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime that resulted in the conviction. 15 M.R.S. § 2138(4-A). [¶ 8] "Prima facie" in this context regards the preliminary burden of production of evidence; it requires proof only of "enough evidence to allow the fact-trier *1212 to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor." [6] Anderson v. State, 831 A.2d 858, 865-66 (Del.2003) (quotat 2011The evidence sought to be analyzed, or the additional information that the new technology is capable of providing regarding evidence sought to be reanalyzed, is material to the issue of whether the person is the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime that resulted in the conviction. 15 M.R.S. § 2138(4-A). [¶ 8] "Prima facie" in this context regards the preliminary burden of production of evidence; it requires proof only of "enough evidence to allow the fact-trier *1212 to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor." [6] Anderson v. State, 831 A.2d 858, 865-66 (Del.2003) (quotat | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lougee Conservancy v. Citimortgage, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023This standard requires only that the Plaintiff produce "enough evidence to allow the [trier-of-fact] to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor." Id. 2023This standard requires "proof only of enough evidence to allow the [trier-of-fact] to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor." Lougee Conservancy, 2012 ME 103 , ,r 12, 48 A.3d 774 . | 14 | 2018–2023 |
Nader v. Maine Democratic Party
green
2 sentences2022Id. ,r 13 (quoting Nader I, 2012 ME 57 if 34, 41 .3d 551.) It does not depend on the reliability or credibility of the evidence. 2012Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 34 , 41 A.3d 551 . | 2 | 2012–2022 |
John P. Thurlow v. Zakia C. Nelson
green
1 sentence2022Id. ,r 13 (quoting Nader I, 2012 ME 57 if 34, 41 .3d 551.) It does not depend on the reliability or credibility of the evidence. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Berry v. Mainestream Fin.
green
1 sentence2022“As a central tenet of summary judgment motion practice, facts not set forth in the statement of material facts are not in the summary judgment record, even if the fact in question can be gleaned from affidavits or other documents attached to, and even referred to in portions of, a statement of material fact." Berry v. Mainestream Fin., 2019 ME 27, ¶ 7 , 202 A.3d 1195 (quoting 2 HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶ 22 , 28 A.3d 1158 ) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay
green
2 sentences2022“As a central tenet of summary judgment motion practice, facts not set forth in the statement of material facts are not in the summary judgment record, even if the fact in question can be gleaned from affidavits or other documents attached to, and even referred to in portions of, a statement of material fact." Berry v. Mainestream Fin., 2019 ME 27, ¶ 7 , 202 A.3d 1195 (quoting 2 HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶ 22 , 28 A.3d 1158 ) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). 2022“As a central tenet of summary judgment motion practice, facts not set forth in the statement of material facts are not in the summary judgment record, even if the fact in question can be gleaned from affidavits or other documents attached to, and even referred to in portions of, a statement of material fact." Berry v. Mainestream Fin., 2019 ME 27, ¶ 7 , 202 A.3d 1195 (quoting 2 HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶ 22 , 28 A.3d 1158 ) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Jacob Berry v. Mainstream Finance
green
1 sentence2022“As a central tenet of summary judgment motion practice, facts not set forth in the statement of material facts are not in the summary judgment record, even if the fact in question can be gleaned from affidavits or other documents attached to, and even referred to in portions of, a statement of material fact." Berry v. Mainestream Fin., 2019 ME 27, ¶ 7 , 202 A.3d 1195 (quoting 2 HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶ 22 , 28 A.3d 1158 ) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Cookson v. State
green
2 sentences2014A. Prima Facie Evidence [¶24] The prima facie evidence standard “regards the preliminary burden of production of evidence; it requires proof only of ‘enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor.’” Cookson v. State (Cookson II), 2011 ME 53, ¶ 8 , 17 A.3d 1208 (quoting Anderson v. Delaware, 831 A.2d 858, 865-66 (Del. 2003)). 2014A. Prima Facie Evidence [¶24] The prima facie evidence standard “regards the preliminary burden of production of evidence; it requires proof only of ‘enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor.’” Cookson v. State (Cookson II), 2011 ME 53, ¶ 8 , 17 A.3d 1208 (quoting Anderson v. Delaware, 831 A.2d 858, 865-66 (Del. 2003)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Penelope W.
green
1 sentence2014A. Prima Facie Evidence [¶ 24] The prima facie evidence standard “regards the preliminary burden of production of evidence; it requires proof only of ‘enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor.’ ” Cookson v. State (Cookson II), 2011 ME 58, ¶8 , 17 A.3d 1208 (quoting Anderson v. Delaware, 831 A.2d 858, 865-66 (Del.2003)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Town of Blue Hill v. Leighton
green
2 sentences2014“Prima facie evidence means evidence that, if unrebutted or unexplained, is sufficient to maintain the proposition.” Town of Blue Hill v. Leighton, 2011 ME 103 , ¶ 12 n.5, 30 A.3d 848 (quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Beane, 146 Me. 328, 331 , 81 A.2d 924 (1951). 2014“Prima facie evidence means evidence that, if unrebutted or unexplained, is sufficient to maintain the proposition.” Town of Blue Hill v. Leighton, 2011 ME 103 , ¶ 12 n.5, 30 A.3d 848 (quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Beane, 146 Me. 328, 331 , 81 A.2d 924 (1951). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.