purposeful violation in Missouri

2024See ACLU of Mo. Found. v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 504 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (the trial court could have found from the evidence that it was “no coincidence that more than one year after the ACLU requested the records in question and two days before trial, the [DOC] belatedly produced a group of records . . . even though it had previously steadfastly maintained that it had no obligation to produce any of these records”); Buckner v. Burnett, 908 S.W.2d 908, 911 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995) (“A public official’s intentionally forestalling production of public records until the requester sues w

2024“The standard required to prove a ‘purposeful’ violation under section 610.027 is greater—the party must show that the defendant . . . act[ed] with ‘a conscious design, intent, 12 Because we find substantial evidence supported the determination that the DOC’s violation was “purposeful,” we need not analyze whether the DOC’s violation was “knowing.” See Laut, 491 S.W.3d at 199 (it is a “far greater burden” to prove a purposeful violation than it is a knowing violation). 18 or plan to violate the law and did so with awareness of the probable consequences.’” Id. (internal marks omitted) (quoting

2024See ACLU of Mo. Found. v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 504 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (the trial court could have found from the evidence that it was “no coincidence that more than one year after the ACLU requested the records in question and two days before trial, the [DOC] belatedly produced a group of records . . . even though it had previously steadfastly maintained that it had no obligation to produce any of these records”); Buckner v. Burnett, 908 S.W.2d 908, 911 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995) (“A public official’s intentionally forestalling production of public records until the requester sues w

2015Appellants cite to Buckner v. Burnett, in which the court suggested that if a public official intentionally forestalled production of records, forcing a requester to sue for disclosure, that “would be” a purposeful violation. 908 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995).

2024“The standard required to prove a ‘purposeful’ violation under section 610.027 is greater—the party must show that the defendant . . . act[ed] with ‘a conscious design, intent, 12 Because we find substantial evidence supported the determination that the DOC’s violation was “purposeful,” we need not analyze whether the DOC’s violation was “knowing.” See Laut, 491 S.W.3d at 199 (it is a “far greater burden” to prove a purposeful violation than it is a knowing violation). 18 or plan to violate the law and did so with awareness of the probable consequences.’” Id. (internal marks omitted) (quoting

2024“The standard required to prove a ‘purposeful’ violation under section 610.027 is greater—the party must show that the defendant . . . act[ed] with ‘a conscious design, intent, 12 Because we find substantial evidence supported the determination that the DOC’s violation was “purposeful,” we need not analyze whether the DOC’s violation was “knowing.” See Laut, 491 S.W.3d at 199 (it is a “far greater burden” to prove a purposeful violation than it is a knowing violation). 18 or plan to violate the law and did so with awareness of the probable consequences.’” Id. (internal marks omitted) (quoting

2019And because despite this knowledge, the public governmental entity elected not to disclose in order "to avoid potential contractual liability," that amounted to a purposeful violation of the Sunshine Law, defined as "'a conscious design, intent, or plan to violate the law . . . with awareness of the probable consequences.'" Id. (quoting Spradlin, 982 S.W.2d at 262 ).

2016A, Definitions of knowing and purposeful in section 610.Ó27 This Court very recently, addressed the dispositive issue here: what is required to show .a knowing or purposeful violation of the Sunshine Law?- Strake held that a purposeful violation occurs when the party acts with “ ‘a conscious design, intent, or plan’ to violate the law and d[id] so ‘with awareness of the probable consequences.’ ” Strake, 473 S.W.3d at 646 , citing Spradlin, 982 S.W.2d at 262 .

2022See Chasnoff v. Mokwa, 466 S.W.3d 571, 584 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (similarly holding); section 610.027.4 (providing in relevant part that “[i]f [a] court finds that there was a purposeful violation of [the Sunshine Law], then the court shall order the payment by such body . . . reasonable attorney fees to any party successfully establishing such a violation”); see also Strake v. Robinwood West Community Improvement 14 All further references to section 610.027 are to the version of the statute effective from August 28, 2004 to the present. 15 This Court’s E.D.

2021Malin relies on Chasnoff v. Mokwa, 466 S.W.3d 571 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015), for the proposition that section 610.027.4 provides for attorney’s fees in separate litigation necessary to enforce a judgment in which a purposeful violation of the Sunshine Law has been found.

1998In Kansas City Star Company v. Shields, 771 S.W.2d 101 (Mo.App.1989) the court upheld a finding of a purposeful violation of the statute where there was no statutory exemption applicable, and in Charlier v. Corum, 794 S.W.2d 676 (Mo.App.1990), the court upheld a finding of purposeful conduct even though the defendant had obtained legal advice that his office was not a public governmental body.

1998In Kansas City Star Company v. Shields, 771 S.W.2d 101 (Mo.App.1989) the court upheld a finding of a purposeful violation of the statute where there was no statutory exemption applicable, and in Charlier v. Corum, 794 S.W.2d 676 (Mo.App.1990), the court upheld a finding of purposeful conduct even though the defendant had obtained legal advice that his office was not a public governmental body.

2024See ACLU of Mo. Found. v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 504 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (the trial court could have found from the evidence that it was “no coincidence that more than one year after the ACLU requested the records in question and two days before trial, the [DOC] belatedly produced a group of records . . . even though it had previously steadfastly maintained that it had no obligation to produce any of these records”); Buckner v. Burnett, 908 S.W.2d 908, 911 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995) (“A public official’s intentionally forestalling production of public records until the requester sues w

2024See ACLU of Mo. Found. v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 504 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (the trial court could have found from the evidence that it was “no coincidence that more than one year after the ACLU requested the records in question and two days before trial, the [DOC] belatedly produced a group of records . . . even though it had previously steadfastly maintained that it had no obligation to produce any of these records”); Buckner v. Burnett, 908 S.W.2d 908, 911 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995) (“A public official’s intentionally forestalling production of public records until the requester sues w

2021Section 610.027.4 provides a plaintiff with the 5 Regarding Malin’s third point, we note ex gratia that in Wright v. Rankin, 109 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003), the Southern District of this court held that a party who disputed the trial court's factual findings, but not its judgment, were not “aggrieved” and therefore lacked standing to challenge the trial court’s conclusions, as they had not challenged the ultimate relief afforded by the trial court. 6 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to RSMo 2016. 12 ability to recover civil penalties and fees in conjunction with l

2021“In general, Missouri follows the American Rule, which requires that litigants bear their own attorney’s fees unless otherwise authorized by statute.” Soto v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 502 S.W.3d 38, 58 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016).

2020In Claudia Lee and Associates v. Kansas City, Missouri Board of Zoning Adjustment, 489 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016), a requester alleged a purposeful violation of the Sunshine Law averring that the Board of Zoning Adjustment ("Board") "failed to timely respond to [requesters'] proper sunshine request, and on belief, the [Board] failed to provide all of the documents requested . . . ." The requester further alleged it was prejudiced because of the Boards "vexious [sic] refusal to comply with the Missouri Sunshine Act." Id.

2020In Claudia Lee and Associates v. Kansas City, Missouri Board of Zoning Adjustment, 489 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016), a requester alleged a purposeful violation of the Sunshine Law averring that the Board of Zoning Adjustment ("Board") "failed to timely respond to [requesters'] proper sunshine request, and on belief, the [Board] failed to provide all of the documents requested . . . ." The requester further alleged it was prejudiced because of the Boards "vexious [sic] refusal to comply with the Missouri Sunshine Act." Id.

2013Polk & Co. v. Missouri Dept. of Revenue, 309 S.W.3d 881, 886 (Mo.App.

1998See also, Deaton v. Kidd 932 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Mo.App.1996) (a “good faith belief’ does not negate liability for a purposeful violation).

1998See also, Deaton v. Kidd, 932 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Mo.App.1996) (a "good faith belief" does not negate liability for a purposeful violation).

1998If we read the statute to require a purposeful violation in order to trigger potential liability for attorneys’ fees, then we render unnecessary the phrase “to any party successfully establishing a violation of sections 610.010 to 610.026.” To read the statute, as the trial court and this Court’s majority do, is to edit the section by ending the sentence after the word “fees.” We must, after all, give effect to the statute as written, McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo. banc 1996), and not discard or ignore phrases that are inconsistent with the meaning we want.

1998If we read the statute to require a purposeful violation in order to trigger potential liability for attorneys' fees, then we render unnecessary the phrase "to any party successfully establishing a violation of sections 610.010 to 610.026." To read the statute, as the trial court and this Court's majority do, is to edit the section by ending the sentence after the word "fees." We must, after all, give effect to the statute as written, McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo. banc 1996), and not discard or ignore phrases that are inconsistent with the meaning we want.

1990In the case of Tipton v. Barton, 747 S.W.2d 325, 332 (Mo.App.1988), the eastern district found that “the finding of a purposeful violation must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, or evidence which as a whole shows the fact to be proved more probable than not.” The court entered an assessment of attorney’s fees against the city coordinator as “a public governmental body” who was found to have “purposely” denied disclosure of itemized billing statements prepared for by the city.

1990In the case of Tipton v. Barton, 747 S.W.2d 325, 332 (Mo.App.1988), the eastern district found that “the finding of a purposeful violation must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, or evidence which as a whole shows the fact to be proved more probable than not.” The court entered an assessment of attorney’s fees against the city coordinator as “a public governmental body” who was found to have “purposely” denied disclosure of itemized billing statements prepared for by the city.

1988See Fujita v. Jeffries, 714 S.W.2d 202, 206 [4] (Mo.App.1986).