exception to political subdivision immunity in Ohio

2026Under this scenario, the City is not covered by immunity. {¶29} We must further consider, however, that intentional infliction of emotional distress is an intentional tort. {¶30} In Sampson, 2012-Ohio-570 , the Ohio Supreme Court analyzed this exception to political-subdivision immunity from tort liability, specifically considering the applicability of R.C. 2744.09(B) to employer-intentional-tort claims by public employees.

2013Auth., 131 Ohio St.3d 418 , 2012-Ohio-570 , 966 N.E.2d 247 , for Lisa Vacha to show that her intentional-tort claim is causally related to her employment relationship with the city, which would mean that the exception to political-subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.09(B) is applicable.

2006The Supreme Court in Hubbard held: {¶ 20} "The exception to political-subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02 (B)(4) applies to all cases where an injury resulting from the negligence of an employee of a political subdivision occurs within or on the grounds of buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function. * * *." Id. at syllabus. {¶ 21} The trial court seized upon an inconsequential pronoun within the concurring and dissenting opinion of Hubbard to support its position that a building "used in connection with the performance of a governmental function" mus

2005Hubbard v. Canton City Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451 , 2002-Ohio-6718 , 780 N.E.2d 543 , ¶ 13.

2006The exception is not confined to injury resulting from physical defects or negligent use of grounds or buildings." Hubbard, 97 Ohio St.3d 451 at paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 28} Appellant states that the April 9, 2003 amendment to R.C. 2744.02 did not effectively change the rule of law as outlined.

2005Hubbard v. Canton City Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451 , 2002-Ohio-6718 , 780 N.E.2d 543 , ¶ 13.

2001Middletown argued that the exception to political subdivision immunity found in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) (“political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by their failure to keep public roads * * * open, in repair, and free from nuisance”) was not applicable in the circumstances of this case to defeat its immunity. 2 January Term, 2001 {¶ 4} The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, relying on this court’s decisions in Dickerhoof v. Canton (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 128 , 6 OBR 186, 451 N.E.2d 1193 ; Manufacturer’s Natl.

2001Middletown argued that the exception to political subdivision immunity found in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) (“political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by their failure to keep public roads * * * open, in repair, and free from nuisance”) was not applicable in the circumstances of this case to defeat its immunity. 2 January Term, 2001 {¶ 4} The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, relying on this court’s decisions in Dickerhoof v. Canton (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 128 , 6 OBR 186, 451 N.E.2d 1193 ; Manufacturer’s Natl.

2001We agree with the court of appeals but arrive at our conclusions by way of a slightly different analytical approach. {¶ 21} In Campbell, supra, we held that R.C. 2151.99 imposes a criminal penalty for failure to report, pursuant to R.C. 2151.421(A)(1), known or suspected child abuse.

2001Campbell v. Burton, supra. However, unlike R.C.

2022Rather, “[o]ur role, in exercise of the judicial power granted to us by the Constitution, is to interpret and apply the law enacted by the General Assembly.” Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 491 , 2012-Ohio-5685 , 983 N.E.2d 1253 , ¶ 29. {¶ 42} R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) creates an exception to political-subdivision immunity for a physical defect.

2022Rather, “[o]ur role, in exercise of the judicial power granted to us by the Constitution, is to interpret and apply the law enacted by the General Assembly.” Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 491 , 2012-Ohio-5685 , 983 N.E.2d 1253 , ¶ 29. {¶ 42} R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) creates an exception to political-subdivision immunity for a physical defect.

2019(No. 2018-0377—Submitted June 12, 2019—Decided November 20, 2019.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, No. 17 MA 0045, 2018-Ohio-341 . _______________________ SUPREME COURT OF OHIO KENNEDY, J. {¶ 1} This discretionary appeal from the Seventh District Court of Appeals presents the issue whether, under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, R.C.

2019Pursuant to R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(a), “[t]he provision or nonprovision of police, fire, emergency medical, ambulance, and rescue services or protection” is a governmental function. 10 January Term, 2019 {¶ 25} Moving to the second tier of the sovereign-immunity analysis, R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)—as noted above—establishes an exception to political-subdivision immunity for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the political subdivision’s employees. {¶ 26} R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a), however, provides the political subdivision a “full defense[ ] to that liability” when “[a] member of a municipal corpo

2019SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-4740 MCCONNELL ET AL., APPELLEES, v. DUDLEY; COITSVILLE TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT ET AL., APPELLANTS. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as McConnell v. Dudley, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4740 .] Political-subdivision immunity—R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)—The exception to political- subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle does not encompass an action alleging that the political subdivision negligently hired, trained, or supervised a police officer who was involved in a moto

2019SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-4740 MCCONNELL ET AL., APPELLEES, v. DUDLEY; COITSVILLE TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT ET AL., APPELLANTS. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as McConnell v. Dudley, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4740 .] Political-subdivision immunity—R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)—The exception to political- subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle does not encompass an action alleging that the political subdivision negligently hired, trained, or supervised a police officer who was involved in a moto

2018Our holding is consistent with the legislature’s limitation of the definition of “public roads” to “focus[] solely on the roadway itself.” See Howard, 119 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2008-Ohio-2792 , 891 N.E.2d 311 , at ¶ 29; R.C. 2744.01(H). {¶20} Because we determine that the curb upon which Mauntel sustained her injury is not part of the “public roads” for purposes of the exception to political- subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), the trial court erred in determining that R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) applies.

2018Pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(B)(2), "political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the negligent performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political subdivisions." "* * * [B]efore R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) will remove a political subdivision's immunity, the plaintiff must establish: (1) the elements required to sustain a negligence action-duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages; and (2) that the negligence arose out of a 'proprietary function.' " Pierce v. Gallipolis , 4th Dist., 2015-Ohio-2995 , 39 N.E.3d 858 , ¶

2018R.C. 2744.09 states that the chapter does not apply to employment claims or to claims based on the federal Constitution, but fails to mention an exception for state constitutional torts." Id. at 185 , 765 N.E.2d 889 .

2018R.C. 2744.09 states that the chapter does not apply to employment claims or to claims based on the federal Constitution, but fails to mention an exception for state constitutional torts." Id. at 185 , 765 N.E.2d 889 .

2014Hopkins relies upon two cases for this position: Muenchenbach v. Preble Cty. and Putka v. Parma, supra. {¶25} The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Appellate District in Putka held that a backhoe involved in an accident while being driven from a city garage to a jobsite was a motor vehicle for purposes of R.C. 4511.01(B), and therefore, a motor vehicle for purposes of the exception to political subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1). 90 Ohio App.3d 647, 652 .

2014Hopkins relies upon two cases for this position: Muenchenbach v. Preble Cty. and Putka v. Parma, supra. {¶25} The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Appellate District in Putka held that a backhoe involved in an accident while being driven from a city garage to a jobsite was a motor vehicle for purposes of R.C. 4511.01(B), and therefore, a motor vehicle for purposes of the exception to political subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1). 90 Ohio App.3d 647, 652 .

2014Specifically, it contended that the exception to political subdivision immunity found in R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), as interpreted in Cater v. Cleveland[], 83 Ohio St.3d 24 [, (1998)], did not apply to indoor swimming pools.

2013(Nos. 2011-1050 and 2011-1327—Submitted February 26, 2013—Decided July 17, 2013.) APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 10CA009750, 2011-Ohio-2446 . _________________ FRENCH, J. {¶ 1} This certified-conflict and discretionary appeal presents the following two issues: (1) whether R.C. 2744.09(B), an exception to political- subdivision immunity from tort liability, applies to employer-intentional-tort claims by a political subdivision’s employee and (2) whether appellant, the city of North Ridgeville, was entitled to summary judgment on its former employee’s em

2009(No. 2007-1304 — Submitted September 17, 2008 — Decided March 31, 2009.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 2006CA00102, 2007-Ohio-2815 . __________________ SYLLABUS BY THE COURT The exception to political subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) for “negligent operation of any motor vehicle” does not encompass supervision of the conduct of the passengers of the vehicle. __________________ CUPP, J. {¶ 1} The facts alleged in this case are disturbing.

2009(No. 2007-1304 — Submitted September 17, 2008 — Decided March 31, 2009.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 2006CA00102, 2007-Ohio-2815 . __________________ SYLLABUS BY THE COURT The exception to political subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) for “negligent operation of any motor vehicle” does not encompass supervision of the conduct of the passengers of the vehicle. __________________ CUPP, J. {¶ 1} The facts alleged in this case are disturbing.

2009Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2009-Ohio-1360 .] Political subdivision immunity — R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) — The exception to political subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) for “negligent operation of any motor vehicle” does not encompass supervision of the conduct of the passengers of the vehicle.

2009Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2009-Ohio-1360 .] Political subdivision immunity — R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) — The exception to political subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) for “negligent operation of any motor vehicle” does not encompass supervision of the conduct of the passengers of the vehicle.

2005Liming, 89 Ohio St.3d 556 -557 ; Cianciola v. City of Fairlawn, 156 Ohio App.3d 16 , 2004-Ohio-327 , at ¶ 13 . {¶ 12} As none of the exceptions listed in R.C. 2744.02 (B) are applicable to the case sub judice, we need not proceed to the third tier of analysis.

2005Liming, 89 Ohio St.3d 556 -557 ; Cianciola v. City of Fairlawn, 156 Ohio App.3d 16 , 2004-Ohio-327 , at ¶ 13 . {¶ 12} As none of the exceptions listed in R.C. 2744.02 (B) are applicable to the case sub judice, we need not proceed to the third tier of analysis.

2002Therefore, it does not fall within the exception to political subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4).” Id. at 90-91, 749 N.E.2d 854 . {¶ 45} The present case requires us to revisit our decision in Summers and ask how liberally we are to construe R.C. 2744.01(G)(1)(b) in favor of governmental immunity.

2002In Greene Cty., the Ohio Supreme Court held: {¶ 46} “[W]hen the political subdivision at issue is not one of the bodies specifically mentioned within R.C. 2744.01(F), the exceptions to immunity of R.C. 2744.02(B) should be construed in a way that leads to a finding of immunity for only the central core functions of the political subdivision.” Id. at 560, 733 N.E.2d 1141 . {¶ 47} In Summers , this court held that the “logical corollary” to this rule “is that if the political subdivision is one of those specifically listed in R.C. 2744.01(F), the exceptions to immunity found in R.C. 2744.02(B) s

2002In Greene Cty., the Ohio Supreme Court held: {¶ 46} “[W]hen the political subdivision at issue is not one of the bodies specifically mentioned within R.C. 2744.01(F), the exceptions to immunity of R.C. 2744.02(B) should be construed in a way that leads to a finding of immunity for only the central core functions of the political subdivision.” Id. at 560, 733 N.E.2d 1141 . {¶ 47} In Summers , this court held that the “logical corollary” to this rule “is that if the political subdivision is one of those specifically listed in R.C. 2744.01(F), the exceptions to immunity found in R.C. 2744.02(B) s

2002In Greene Cty., the Ohio Supreme Court held: {¶ 46} “[W]hen the political subdivision at issue is not one of the bodies specifically mentioned within R.C. 2744.01(F), the exceptions to immunity of R.C. 2744.02(B) should be construed in a way that leads to a finding of immunity for only the central core functions of the political subdivision.” Id. at 560, 733 N.E.2d 1141 . {¶ 47} In Summers , this court held that the “logical corollary” to this rule “is that if the political subdivision is one of those specifically listed in R.C. 2744.01(F), the exceptions to immunity found in R.C. 2744.02(B) s