20 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lottgreen2 sentences2026“The former is generally referred to as the ‘other acts test,’ while the latter is known as the ‘joinder test.’” Quinones at ¶ 39 , quoting State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163 (1990). {¶96} Appellant contends that the other-acts test is not met. 2025However, we do not need to consider whether the trial court plainly erred, because, as Mitchell admits in his brief, the evidence presented was simple and direct. “‘[W]hen simple and direct evidence exists, an accused is not prejudiced by joinder regardless of the nonadmissibility of evidence of these crimes as “other acts” under Evid.R. 404(B).’” Belle, 2019-Ohio-787 , at ¶ 24 quoting Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 163 ; see also State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 122 , (1991) (“[I]f the State can meet the joinder test [i.e., the simple and direct test], it need not meet the stricter other-acts te | 3 | 5 |
State v. Franklingreen2 sentences2025However, we do not need to consider whether the trial court plainly erred, because, as Mitchell admits in his brief, the evidence presented was simple and direct. “‘[W]hen simple and direct evidence exists, an accused is not prejudiced by joinder regardless of the nonadmissibility of evidence of these crimes as “other acts” under Evid.R. 404(B).’” Belle, 2019-Ohio-787 , at ¶ 24 quoting Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 163 ; see also State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 122 , (1991) (“[I]f the State can meet the joinder test [i.e., the simple and direct test], it need not meet the stricter other-acts te 2019See also State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 122 , 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991) (if the state can meet the “joinder test,” it need not meet the stricter other-acts test). {¶25} “Simple and direct” evidence means the evidence of each crime is “so clearly separate and distinct as to prevent the jury from considering evidence of [some crimes] as corroborative of the other.” State v. Quinones, 11th Dist. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Quinones, Unpublished Decision (12-9-2005)green2 sentences2025Evidence of each crime is simple and direct when it is “so clearly separate and distinct as to prevent the jury from considering evidence of [one crime] as corroborative of the other.” State v. Quinones, 2005-Ohio-6576, ¶ 48 (11th Dist.). 2019Lake No. 2003-L-015, 2005-Ohio-6576, ¶ 48 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. LaMargreen2 sentences2023Judge Vukovich further noted that “[a] claim of prejudice can be negated if the evidence of each joined offense is simple and direct.” Id. at 199 , citing LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 767 N.E.2d 166 , at ¶ 50 and 52. {¶ 50} As indicated, the evidence here concerning A.H. was not weak. 2023Judge Vukovich further noted that “[a] claim of prejudice can be negated if the evidence of each joined offense is simple and direct.” Id. at 199 , citing LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 767 N.E.2d 166 , at ¶ 50 and 52. {¶ 50} As indicated, the evidence here concerning A.H. was not weak. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bradshawgreen1 sentence2025State v. Bradshaw, 2023-Ohio-1244, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). {¶27} Under the simple and direct test, a claim of prejudice is negated when the offenses subject to joinder are “simple and direct, so that a jury is capable of -11- Case No. 3-24-03 segregating the proof required for each offense.” State v. Shook, 2014-Ohio-3987, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Fletcher, 2004-Ohio-4517, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fletcher, Unpublished Decision (8-27-2004)green1 sentence2025State v. Bradshaw, 2023-Ohio-1244, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). {¶27} Under the simple and direct test, a claim of prejudice is negated when the offenses subject to joinder are “simple and direct, so that a jury is capable of -11- Case No. 3-24-03 segregating the proof required for each offense.” State v. Shook, 2014-Ohio-3987, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Fletcher, 2004-Ohio-4517, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Nicolas Gomezgreen1 sentence2025“To properly apply the rule . . . courts must scrutinize the proponent’s logic to determine exactly how the evidence connects to a proper purpose without relying on any intermediate improper-character inferences.” Id. at ¶ 23, citing United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Shookgreen1 sentence2025State v. Bradshaw, 2023-Ohio-1244, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). {¶27} Under the simple and direct test, a claim of prejudice is negated when the offenses subject to joinder are “simple and direct, so that a jury is capable of -11- Case No. 3-24-03 segregating the proof required for each offense.” State v. Shook, 2014-Ohio-3987, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Fletcher, 2004-Ohio-4517, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Powellgreen1 sentence2024Cuyahoga No. 107276, 2019-Ohio-4345, ¶ 78 (concluding that “although Powell was found guilty for the rape and kidnapping of D.E., the jury found him not guilty of the rape and kidnapping charges associated with A.W.,” which “reflects the jury’s ability to segregate the proof required in each case”). -12- Case No. 1-22-77 {¶27} As a result, because it is dispositive, we need to address only the trial court’s determination that joinder was appropriate under the other-acts test. | 1 | 1 |
State v. N.S.green1 sentence2024Franklin No. 20AP-66, 2020-Ohio-5318, ¶ 37 (concluding that “the sexual assaults on each of the two victims were so similar as to the time, place, and -10- Case No. 1-22-77 manner of commission that the evidence offered to prove the forcible rape and kidnapping charges in one indictment disclosed purposeful action on the part of appellant to commit forcible rape and kidnapping in the other”). {¶24} In its entries joining the cases for trial, the trial court concluded that joinder was appropriate under the other-acts test. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gideongreen2 sentences2024See Gideon, 2021-Ohio-1863 , 174 N.E.3d 381 , at ¶ 15. 2024See Gideon, 2021-Ohio-1863 , 174 N.E.3d 381 , at ¶ 15. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2009See State v. Davis (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 339 , 581 N.E.2d 1362 . 2009See State v. Davis (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 339 , 581 N.E.2d 1362 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wright
green
1 sentence2025Sims, ¶ 39; E.g., State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163 (1990). “ ‘The two tests are disjunctive, so that the satisfaction of one negates a Hocking App. No. 23CA3 9 defendant's claim of prejudice without consideration of the other.’ ” State v. Wright, 2017-Ohio-8702, ¶ 51 , quoting State v. Sullivan, 2011-Ohio-6384 , ¶ 23 (10th Dist.). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Belle
green
1 sentence2025However, we do not need to consider whether the trial court plainly erred, because, as Mitchell admits in his brief, the evidence presented was simple and direct. “‘[W]hen simple and direct evidence exists, an accused is not prejudiced by joinder regardless of the nonadmissibility of evidence of these crimes as “other acts” under Evid.R. 404(B).’” Belle, 2019-Ohio-787 , at ¶ 24 quoting Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 163 ; see also State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 122 , (1991) (“[I]f the State can meet the joinder test [i.e., the simple and direct test], it need not meet the stricter other-acts te | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2023“Thus, policy reasons for the other-acts test should not seep into the application of the joinder test.” Id. 2023Judge Vukovich further noted that “[a] claim of prejudice can be negated if the evidence of each joined offense is simple and direct.” Id. at 199 , citing LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 767 N.E.2d 166 , at ¶ 50 and 52. {¶ 50} As indicated, the evidence here concerning A.H. was not weak. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Smith (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2022Evid.R. 404(B) does not allow the use of evidence of a defendant's other acts solely to prove that a "defendant has the character or propensity to commit a crime." State v. Smith, 162 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2020-Ohio-4441, ¶ 36 . 2022Evid.R. 404(B) does not allow the use of evidence of a defendant's other acts solely to prove that a "defendant has the character or propensity to commit a crime." State v. Smith, 162 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2020-Ohio-4441, ¶ 36 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Armengau
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 60 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Huddleston v. United States
green
2 sentences2012Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 , 108 S.Ct. 1496 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). 2012Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 , 108 S.Ct. 1496 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Yancy
neutral
1 sentence2012Nos. 96527 and 96528, 2011-Ohio-6274, fn. 2 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2012State v. Williams, 195 Ohio App.3d 807 , 2011-Ohio-5650 , 961 N.E.2d 1200 (8th Dist.; en banc), ¶ 64. {¶ 28} The majority opinion only cursorily addresses whether the other- acts testimony unfairly prejudiced Williams, even though that is an essential part of an other-acts analysis. 2012State v. Williams, 195 Ohio App.3d 807 , 2011-Ohio-5650 , 961 N.E.2d 1200 (8th Dist.; en banc), ¶ 64. {¶ 28} The majority opinion only cursorily addresses whether the other- acts testimony unfairly prejudiced Williams, even though that is an essential part of an other-acts analysis. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Hancock
green
1 sentence2011Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, ¶ 122 . {¶ 20} The other-acts exception is not applicable in the current case. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Curry
green
2 sentences2010We note that "[t]he admissibility of other acts evidence is carefully limited because of the substantial danger that the jury will convict the defendant solely because it assumes that the defendant has a propensity to commit criminal acts, or deserves punishment regardless of whether he or she committed the crime charged in the indictment." Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d at 59 , citing State v. Curry (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d - 47 - 66, 68, 72 O.O.2d 37 , 330 N.E.2d 720 . {¶ 170} Had there been separate trials for the offenses against the different victims, a request to admit testimony from other victims w 2010We note that "[t]he admissibility of other acts evidence is carefully limited because of the substantial danger that the jury will convict the defendant solely because it assumes that the defendant has a propensity to commit criminal acts, or deserves punishment regardless of whether he or she committed the crime charged in the indictment." Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d at 59 , citing State v. Curry (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d - 47 - 66, 68, 72 O.O.2d 37 , 330 N.E.2d 720 . {¶ 170} Had there been separate trials for the offenses against the different victims, a request to admit testimony from other victims w | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Adams
green
2 sentences2010State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 158 , 16 O.O.3d 169 , 404 N.E.2d 144 . {¶ 167} Kaufman argues that neither the other-acts test nor the joinder test was satisfied in this case. 2010State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 158 , 16 O.O.3d 169 , 404 N.E.2d 144 . {¶ 167} Kaufman argues that neither the other-acts test nor the joinder test was satisfied in this case. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Schaim
green
2 sentences2010We note that “[t]he admissibility of other acts evidence is carefully limited because of the substantial danger that the jury will convict the defendant solely because it assumes that the defendant has a propensity to commit criminal acts, or deserves punishment regardless of whether he or she committed the crime charged in the indictment.” Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d at 59 , 600 N.E.2d 661 , citing State v. Cury (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 , 72 O.O.2d 37 , 330 N.E.2d 720 . {¶ 170} Had there been separate trials for the offenses against the different victims, a request to admit testimony from other 2010We note that "[t]he admissibility of other acts evidence is carefully limited because of the substantial danger that the jury will convict the defendant solely because it assumes that the defendant has a propensity to commit criminal acts, or deserves punishment regardless of whether he or she committed the crime charged in the indictment." Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d at 59 , citing State v. Curry (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d - 47 - 66, 68, 72 O.O.2d 37 , 330 N.E.2d 720 . {¶ 170} Had there been separate trials for the offenses against the different victims, a request to admit testimony from other victims w | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Flonnory
green
2 sentences2009We have stated that when other-acts evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, “the jury should be instructed that such evidence must not be considered by them as any proof whatsoever that the accused did any act alleged in the indictment.” State v. Flonnory (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 124, 129 , 60 O.O.2d 95 , 285 N.E.2d 726 . 2009We have stated that when other-acts evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, “the jury should be instructed that such evidence must not be considered by them as any proof whatsoever that the accused did any act alleged in the indictment.” State v. Flonnory (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 124, 129 , 60 O.O.2d 95 , 285 N.E.2d 726 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Roberts
green
1 sentence2005Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Hector
green
2 sentences1993As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated in State v. Burson (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 157, 158 , 67 O.O.2d 174, 175 , 311 N.E.2d 526 , 528: “[EJvidence of other acts of a defendant is admissible only when it ‘tends to show1 one of the matters enumerated in the statute [R.C. 2945.59, motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident, scheme, plan or system] and only when it is relevant to proof of guilt of the defendant of the offense in question.” (Emphasis sic.) Citing State v. Hector (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 167 , 48 O.O.2d 199 , 249 N.E.2d 912 . 1993As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated in State v. Burson (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 157, 158 , 67 O.O.2d 174, 175 , 311 N.E.2d 526 , 528: “[EJvidence of other acts of a defendant is admissible only when it ‘tends to show1 one of the matters enumerated in the statute [R.C. 2945.59, motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident, scheme, plan or system] and only when it is relevant to proof of guilt of the defendant of the offense in question.” (Emphasis sic.) Citing State v. Hector (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 167 , 48 O.O.2d 199 , 249 N.E.2d 912 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Burson
green
2 sentences1993As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated in State v. Burson (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 157, 158 , 67 O.O.2d 174, 175 , 311 N.E.2d 526 , 528: “[EJvidence of other acts of a defendant is admissible only when it ‘tends to show1 one of the matters enumerated in the statute [R.C. 2945.59, motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident, scheme, plan or system] and only when it is relevant to proof of guilt of the defendant of the offense in question.” (Emphasis sic.) Citing State v. Hector (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 167 , 48 O.O.2d 199 , 249 N.E.2d 912 . 1993As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated in State v. Burson (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 157, 158 , 67 O.O.2d 174, 175 , 311 N.E.2d 526 , 528: “[EJvidence of other acts of a defendant is admissible only when it ‘tends to show1 one of the matters enumerated in the statute [R.C. 2945.59, motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident, scheme, plan or system] and only when it is relevant to proof of guilt of the defendant of the offense in question.” (Emphasis sic.) Citing State v. Hector (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 167 , 48 O.O.2d 199 , 249 N.E.2d 912 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.