record during the sentencing hearing in Ohio

2008Mr. Roper has relied on State v. Comer , 99 Ohio St. 3d 463 , 2003-Ohio-4165 , for the proposition that a sentencing court may not impose consecutive sentences without stating its reasons on the record during the sentencing hearing and on Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), for the proposition that his sentence is unconstitutional because, according to him, the trial court was required to engage in judicial fact-finding in order to impose a sentence above the statutory minimum. {¶ 8} Mr. Roper's reliance on these decisions is misplaced, however, because, after the Foster decision, "[

2005On March 18, 2004, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to the Court's decision in State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463 , 2003-Ohio-4165 , finding that the court had failed to make the statutorily required findings on the record during the sentencing hearing on March 20, 2002.

2026The state concedes that Christian’s sentencing entry does not reflect the consecutive sentencing findings that the court articulated on the record during the sentencing hearing. {¶ 39} When a trial court properly makes the statutory findings to justify consecutive sentences at a sentencing hearing but fails to incorporate those findings in its sentencing entry, such a failure is considered to be a clerical error that “may be corrected by the court through a nunc pro tunc entry to reflect what actually occurred in open court.” State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 30 , citing State v. Qualls, 201

2023Standard of Review {¶7} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence “only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1 .

2023Standard of Review {¶7} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence “only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1 .

2018Hamilton No. C-110082, 2012-Ohio-185 , ¶ 31 and 48 (“Rucker I”), we held that a judgment convicting the defendant of an offense that subjects him to the AWA’s registration and notification requirements must accurately reflect his tier classification.

2008Mr. Roper has relied on State v. Comer , 99 Ohio St. 3d 463 , 2003-Ohio-4165 , for the proposition that a sentencing court may not impose consecutive sentences without stating its reasons on the record during the sentencing hearing and on Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), for the proposition that his sentence is unconstitutional because, according to him, the trial court was required to engage in judicial fact-finding in order to impose a sentence above the statutory minimum. {¶ 8} Mr. Roper's reliance on these decisions is misplaced, however, because, after the Foster decision, "[

2008No. 9-07-16, 2007-Ohio-6713 , ¶ 12 . {¶ 10} Here, the trial court specifically stated on the record during the sentencing hearing that it had considered the information contained in the pre-sentence investigation report, the information presented at the sentencing hearing, the information in the record, the factors pertaining to the seriousness of the offense and recidivism, and the statutory sentencing factors present in R.C. 2929.12 and 2929.13 .

2008Mr. Roper has relied on State v. Comer , 99 Ohio St. 3d 463 , 2003-Ohio-4165 , for the proposition that a sentencing court may not impose consecutive sentences without stating its reasons on the record during the sentencing hearing and on Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), for the proposition that his sentence is unconstitutional because, according to him, the trial court was required to engage in judicial fact-finding in order to impose a sentence above the statutory minimum. {¶ 8} Mr. Roper's reliance on these decisions is misplaced, however, because, after the Foster decision, "[

2005State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463 , 469 , 2003-Ohio-4165 , 793 N.E.2d 473 , at paragraph two of the syllabus and ¶ 26, n. 2, and State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324 , 326 , 1999-Ohio-4165 , 715 N.E.2d 131 .

2005State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463 , 469 , 2003-Ohio-4165 , 793 N.E.2d 473 , at paragraph two of the syllabus and ¶ 26, n. 2, and State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324 , 326 , 1999-Ohio-4165 , 715 N.E.2d 131 .

2005State v. Charlton, 101 Ohio St.3d 206 , 2004-Ohio-715 , at ¶ 2 . {¶ 11} On remand from the Supreme Court, the trial court re-sentenced Mr. Charlton, making the requisite findings on the record at the hearing.

2004See R.C. 2929.14 (C); R.C. 2929.19 (B)(2)(d); and State v. Newman (2003), 100 Ohio St.3d 24 , citing, State v. Comer (2003), 99 Ohio St.3d 463 . {¶ 76} With respect to ordering that consecutive sentences be served, the sentencing court must find "that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public * * *." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.14 (E)(4).

2004R.C. 2929.19 (B)(2)(c); State v. Boshko (2000), 139 Ohio App.3d 827 , 838-839 . {¶ 30} In the present case, review of the record reveals that the trial judge stated on the record during the sentencing hearing that, "[t]his was a period of conduct that had gone over for years.