grant of a special exception in Maryland

19 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

Case	Followed	Cited
Gotach Center for Health v. BD. OF CTY. COMM'RS OF FREDERICK CTY.green mdctspecapp · 1984 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010Gotach, 60 Md.App. at 485 , 483 A.2d at 790 (emphasis added). 23 We hold today that the role played by the presumption of compatibility associated with a local legislature’s election to provide in its zoning ordinance for allowing a use only through the grant of a special exception (or grant a particular special exception application), as discussed in the reported cases, applies in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary. 24 See Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 21 , 666 A.2d at 1263 303 (“In the absence of a provision in a zoning statute clearly requiring a stricter standard than Schu 2010Gotach, 60 Md.App. at 485 , 483 A.2d at 790 (emphasis added). 23 We hold today that the role played by the presumption of compatibility associated with a local legislature’s election to provide in its zoning ordinance for allowing a use only through the grant of a special exception (or grant a particular special exception application), as discussed in the reported cases, applies in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary. 24 See Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 21 , 666 A.2d at 1263 303 (“In the absence of a provision in a zoning statute clearly requiring a stricter standard than Schu	1	1
Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Board of Appealsred md · 1967 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in	1	1
Luxmanor Citizens Ass'n v. Burkartgreen md · 1972 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009We held that the action of the Board was not made void by the subsequent amendment—a holding based largely on the appellants’ failure to raise the impact of the amendatory ordinance in the Circuit Court proceedings. 11 Luxmanor, 266 Md. at 644, 646 , 296 A.2d at 410, 411 . 2009We held that the action of the Board was not made void by the subsequent amendment—a holding based largely on the appellants’ failure to raise the impact of the amendatory ordinance in the Circuit Court proceedings. 11 Luxmanor, 266 Md. at 644, 646 , 296 A.2d at 410, 411 .	1	1
Pattison v. Corbygreen md · 1961 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in	1	1
Marcus v. Montgomery County Councilgreen md · 1964 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in	1	1
Sugarloaf Citizens' Ass'n v. Department of Environmentred md · 1996 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (21)

Case	Cited	Years
Schultz v. Pritts green md · 1981 2 sentences 2002Appellants contend that Foxshire failed to adduce substantial evidence before the Board to support the conclusion that the proposal met the prescribed standards and requirements for the grant of a special exception as set forth in Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1 , 432 A.2d 1319 (1981) and, as a result of this failure, the Board erred in granting the special exception. 2002Appellants contend that Foxshire failed to adduce substantial evidence before the Board to support the conclusion that the proposal met the prescribed standards and requirements for the grant of a special exception as set forth in Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1 , 432 A.2d 1319 (1981) and, as a result of this failure, the Board erred in granting the special exception.	6	1986–2010
Willow Grove Citizens Association v. County Council Prince George's County green mdctspecapp · 2017 1 sentence 2025Id. at 165 .	1	2025–2025
Mossburg v. Montgomery County green mdctspecapp · 1995 2 sentences 2010Gotach, 60 Md.App. at 485 , 483 A.2d at 790 (emphasis added). 23 We hold today that the role played by the presumption of compatibility associated with a local legislature’s election to provide in its zoning ordinance for allowing a use only through the grant of a special exception (or grant a particular special exception application), as discussed in the reported cases, applies in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary. 24 See Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 21 , 666 A.2d at 1263 303 (“In the absence of a provision in a zoning statute clearly requiring a stricter standard than Schu 2010Gotach, 60 Md.App. at 485 , 483 A.2d at 790 (emphasis added). 23 We hold today that the role played by the presumption of compatibility associated with a local legislature’s election to provide in its zoning ordinance for allowing a use only through the grant of a special exception (or grant a particular special exception application), as discussed in the reported cases, applies in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary. 24 See Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 21 , 666 A.2d at 1263 303 (“In the absence of a provision in a zoning statute clearly requiring a stricter standard than Schu	1	2010–2010
Halle Companies v. Crofton Civic Ass'n green md · 1995 2 sentences 2009Indeed, QACC Section 18:1-120(B) states that “the Board may reverse, affirm, or modify, wholly or partly, the order, requirement, decision, or determination from which the appeal is taken.” In Halle Companies v. Crofton Civic Association, 339 Md. 131 , 661 A.2d 682 (1995), we considered the nature of a de novo review by a county board of appeals to determine whether the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals exceeded its authority by imposing a condition upon the grant of a special exception. 2009Indeed, QACC Section 18:1-120(B) states that “the Board may reverse, affirm, or modify, wholly or partly, the order, requirement, decision, or determination from which the appeal is taken.” In Halle Companies v. Crofton Civic Association, 339 Md. 131 , 661 A.2d 682 (1995), we considered the nature of a de novo review by a county board of appeals to determine whether the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals exceeded its authority by imposing a condition upon the grant of a special exception.	1	2009–2009
Daihl v. County Board of Appeals green md · 1970 2 sentences 2009We addressed our decisions in Daihl v. County Board of Appeals, 258 Md. 157 , 265 A.2d 227 (1970) and County Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Equitable Savings and Loan Association, Inc., 261 Md. 246 , 274 A.2d 363 (1971), in which we held that a board of appeals cannot review actions which were not appealed specifically: 213 “[T]he context in which the term de novo is used ... means that on appeal there shall be a de novo hearing on those issues which have been appealed and not on every matter covered in the application. 2009We addressed our decisions in Daihl v. County Board of Appeals, 258 Md. 157 , 265 A.2d 227 (1970) and County Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Equitable Savings and Loan Association, Inc., 261 Md. 246 , 274 A.2d 363 (1971), in which we held that a board of appeals cannot review actions which were not appealed specifically: 213 “[T]he context in which the term de novo is used ... means that on appeal there shall be a de novo hearing on those issues which have been appealed and not on every matter covered in the application.	1	2009–2009
Slate v. Zitomer green md · 1975 2 sentences 2009We also note that the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in Slate observed, 275 Md. at 540 , 341 A.2d 789 , that that Court had “set forth rules ‘to aid in determining whether a statute is to be applied retrospectively or prospectively’ ” in Janda v. Gen. 2009We also note that the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in Slate observed, 275 Md. at 540 , 341 A.2d 789 , that that Court had “set forth rules ‘to aid in determining whether a statute is to be applied retrospectively or prospectively’ ” in Janda v. Gen.	1	2009–2009
Cassidy v. Baltimore County Board of Appeals green md · 1958 2 sentences 2009In Cassidy , citizens protesting the grant of a special exception to the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company applied to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for a writ of certiorari, and argued “that neither the [Zoning] Commissioner nor the Board of Zoning Appeals had authority ... to grant a special exception when ... the notice to the public did not specifically mention a request for a special exception, but stated only that a reclassification was sought.” Id. at 421 , 146 A.2d at 897 . 2009In Cassidy , citizens protesting the grant of a special exception to the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company applied to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for a writ of certiorari, and argued “that neither the [Zoning] Commissioner nor the Board of Zoning Appeals had authority ... to grant a special exception when ... the notice to the public did not specifically mention a request for a special exception, but stated only that a reclassification was sought.” Id. at 421 , 146 A.2d at 897 .	1	2009–2009
Powell v. Calvert County green md · 2002 2 sentences 2009Cf. Powell v. Calvert County, 368 Md. 400, 415 , 795 A.2d 96 (2002) (no vested right in the grant of a special exception “because the litigation dealing with the special exception had not reached its final conclusion”). 2009Cf. Powell v. Calvert County, 368 Md. 400, 415 , 795 A.2d 96 (2002) (no vested right in the grant of a special exception “because the litigation dealing with the special exception had not reached its final conclusion”).	1	2009–2009
County Fed. S. & L. v. Equitable S. & L. green md · 1971 2 sentences 2009We addressed our decisions in Daihl v. County Board of Appeals, 258 Md. 157 , 265 A.2d 227 (1970) and County Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Equitable Savings and Loan Association, Inc., 261 Md. 246 , 274 A.2d 363 (1971), in which we held that a board of appeals cannot review actions which were not appealed specifically: 213 “[T]he context in which the term de novo is used ... means that on appeal there shall be a de novo hearing on those issues which have been appealed and not on every matter covered in the application. 2009We addressed our decisions in Daihl v. County Board of Appeals, 258 Md. 157 , 265 A.2d 227 (1970) and County Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Equitable Savings and Loan Association, Inc., 261 Md. 246 , 274 A.2d 363 (1971), in which we held that a board of appeals cannot review actions which were not appealed specifically: 213 “[T]he context in which the term de novo is used ... means that on appeal there shall be a de novo hearing on those issues which have been appealed and not on every matter covered in the application.	1	2009–2009
Hartman v. Prince George's County green md · 1972 2 sentences 2007In Hartman v. Prince George’s County, supra, 264 Md. 320 , 286 A.2d 88 , landowners in Prince George’s County sought from the District Council the grant of a special exception and a variance in order to use their land for a filling station and an automobile repair business. 2007In Hartman v. Prince George’s County, supra, 264 Md. 320 , 286 A.2d 88 , landowners in Prince George’s County sought from the District Council the grant of a special exception and a variance in order to use their land for a filling station and an automobile repair business.	1	2007–2007
11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Incorporated, T/a Warwick Books v. Prince George's County, Maryland green ca4 · 1995 2 sentences 1996Id. at 229 , 110 S.Ct. at 123 606. 5 The standards enunciated in these cases, in both the zoning and licensing contexts, were applied in the two Fourth Circuit cases. 11126 Baltimore, supra, 58 F.3d 988 , involved a challenge to provisions of the Prince George’s County zoning ordinance that precluded adult bookstores from operating anywhere in the county except through the grant of a special exception and satisfaction of certain other requirements. 1996Id. at 229 , 110 S.Ct. at 123 606. 5 The standards enunciated in these cases, in both the zoning and licensing contexts, were applied in the two Fourth Circuit cases. 11126 Baltimore, supra, 58 F.3d 988 , involved a challenge to provisions of the Prince George’s County zoning ordinance that precluded adult bookstores from operating anywhere in the county except through the grant of a special exception and satisfaction of certain other requirements.	1	1996–1996
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas green scotus · 1990 1 sentence 1996Id. at 229 , 110 S.Ct. at *123 606. 5 The standards enunciated in these cases, in both the zoning and licensing contexts, were applied in the two Fourth Circuit cases. 11126 Baltimore, supra, 58 F.3d 988 , involved a challenge to provisions of the Prince George’s County zoning ordinance that precluded adult bookstores from operating anywhere in the county except through the grant of a special exception and satisfaction of certain other requirements.	1	1996–1996
Sharp v. Howard County Board of Appeals green mdctspecapp · 1993 1 sentence 1995In the recent case of Sharp v. Howard County Bd. of Appeals, 98 Md.App. 57, 73 , 632 A.2d 248 (1993), Judge Harrell, for this Court, noted the position of the appellants in that case: [A]ppellants postulate that Schultz v. Pritts can only be correctly applied if the agency ... first identifies the universe of potential adverse effects inherently associated with the abstract special exception use (which the legislative body was presumptively aware of when it permitted the use only after the grant of a special exception).	1	1995–1995
Montgomery County v. Mossburg green md · 1962 2 sentences 1995“It has long been held and is firmly established that it is not only proper but desirable to attach to the grant of a special exception conditions which do not violate or go beyond the law and are appropriate and reasonable.” Mossburg, 228 Md. at 558 , 180 A.2d at 852 . 1995“It has long been held and is firmly established that it is not only proper but desirable to attach to the grant of a special exception conditions which do not violate or go beyond the law and are appropriate and reasonable.” Mossburg, 228 Md. at 558 , 180 A.2d at 852 .	1	1995–1995
Kassab v. Burkhardt neutral mdctspecapp · 1977 2 sentences 1991In Kassab v. Burkhardt, 34 Md.App. 699 , 368 A.2d 1064 (1977), it was conceded that a certain utility did not exist, and that the ordinance required its existence prior to the grant of a special exception. 1991In Kassab v. Burkhardt, 34 Md.App. 699 , 368 A.2d 1064 (1977), it was conceded that a certain utility did not exist, and that the ordinance required its existence prior to the grant of a special exception.	1	1991–1991
Neuman v. Mayor of Baltimore green md · 1968 2 sentences 1973The Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance required, inter alia, that the Board determine whether the grant of a special exception would menace the public health, safety, security, or morals and, as a further guide, the Board was required to give consideration to: “ ‘(1) The population density in the area in the vicinity of the premises for which application for a Special Exception under the provisions of this section is made indicating a need for the services of a physician or of a dentist, as the case may be, in such area. “ ‘(2) The testimony of property owners in the area in the vicinity of the p 1973The Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance required, inter alia, that the Board determine whether the grant of a special exception would menace the public health, safety, security, or morals and, as a further guide, the Board was required to give consideration to: “ ‘(1) The population density in the area in the vicinity of the premises for which application for a Special Exception under the provisions of this section is made indicating a need for the services of a physician or of a dentist, as the case may be, in such area. “ ‘(2) The testimony of property owners in the area in the vicinity of the p	1	1973–1973
Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, Inc. green md · 1953 1 sentence 1970In Rockville Fuel and Feed Company, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of the City of Gaithersburg, 257 Md. 183, 188 , 262 A. 2d 499, 502 , we said: “In Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, Inc., 202 Md. 279, 287 , we went to some pains to stress that the special exception is a valid zoning mechanism that delegates to an administrative board a limited authority to permit enumerated uses which the legislative body has determined can, prima facie, properly be allowed in a specified use district, absent any fact or circumstance in a particular case which would change this presumptive finding.” There cannot	1	1970–1970
Westview Park Improvement & Civic Ass'n v. Hayes green md · 1970 2 sentences 1970In Westview Park Improvement & Civic Ass’n. v. Hayes, 256 Md. 575, 582-83 , 261 A. 2d 164, 168 , the application was for reclassification of a lot from R. 6 to a business zone and then the grant of a special exception to extend a filling station, a use not permitted in R. 6 and permitted in the business district only by special exception. 1970In Westview Park Improvement & Civic Ass’n. v. Hayes, 256 Md. 575, 582-83 , 261 A. 2d 164, 168 , the application was for reclassification of a lot from R. 6 to a business zone and then the grant of a special exception to extend a filling station, a use not permitted in R. 6 and permitted in the business district only by special exception.	1	1970–1970
Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. Board of Appeals green md · 1970 2 sentences 1970In Rockville Fuel and Feed Company, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of the City of Gaithersburg, 257 Md. 183, 188 , 262 A. 2d 499, 502 , we said: “In Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, Inc., 202 Md. 279, 287 , we went to some pains to stress that the special exception is a valid zoning mechanism that delegates to an administrative board a limited authority to permit enumerated uses which the legislative body has determined can, prima facie, properly be allowed in a specified use district, absent any fact or circumstance in a particular case which would change this presumptive finding.” There cannot 1970In Rockville Fuel and Feed Company, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of the City of Gaithersburg, 257 Md. 183, 188 , 262 A. 2d 499, 502 , we said: “In Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, Inc., 202 Md. 279, 287 , we went to some pains to stress that the special exception is a valid zoning mechanism that delegates to an administrative board a limited authority to permit enumerated uses which the legislative body has determined can, prima facie, properly be allowed in a specified use district, absent any fact or circumstance in a particular case which would change this presumptive finding.” There cannot	1	1970–1970
Oursler v. Board of Zoning Appeals green md · 1954 1 sentence 1962Oursler v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 204 Md. 397 ; Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 168 ; 2 Metzenbaum, Law of Zoning (2d ed.), Ch.	1	1962–1962
Baylis v. CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE green md · 1959 1 sentence 1962Oursler v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 204 Md. 397 ; Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 168 ; 2 Metzenbaum, Law of Zoning (2d ed.), Ch.	1	1962–1962

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MD § Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 10-222 (4) MD § Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-301 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

PA 54 (1952–2026) MD 19 (1962–2025) RI 16 (1970–2010) NY 5 (1935–2000) IN 4 (1994–2003) IL 4 (1910–1973) NH 3 (1903–1999) DC 3 (1972–2003) AZ 2 (1949–1965) HI 2 (1960–1973)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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Case	Followed	Cited
Gotach Center for Health v. BD. OF CTY. COMM'RS OF FREDERICK CTY.green mdctspecapp · 1984 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010Gotach, 60 Md.App. at 485 , 483 A.2d at 790 (emphasis added). 23 We hold today that the role played by the presumption of compatibility associated with a local legislature’s election to provide in its zoning ordinance for allowing a use only through the grant of a special exception (or grant a particular special exception application), as discussed in the reported cases, applies in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary. 24 See Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 21 , 666 A.2d at 1263 303 (“In the absence of a provision in a zoning statute clearly requiring a stricter standard than Schu 2010Gotach, 60 Md.App. at 485 , 483 A.2d at 790 (emphasis added). 23 We hold today that the role played by the presumption of compatibility associated with a local legislature’s election to provide in its zoning ordinance for allowing a use only through the grant of a special exception (or grant a particular special exception application), as discussed in the reported cases, applies in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary. 24 See Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 21 , 666 A.2d at 1263 303 (“In the absence of a provision in a zoning statute clearly requiring a stricter standard than Schu	1	1
Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Board of Appealsred md · 1967 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in	1	1
Luxmanor Citizens Ass'n v. Burkartgreen md · 1972 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009We held that the action of the Board was not made void by the subsequent amendment—a holding based largely on the appellants’ failure to raise the impact of the amendatory ordinance in the Circuit Court proceedings. 11 Luxmanor, 266 Md. at 644, 646 , 296 A.2d at 410, 411 . 2009We held that the action of the Board was not made void by the subsequent amendment—a holding based largely on the appellants’ failure to raise the impact of the amendatory ordinance in the Circuit Court proceedings. 11 Luxmanor, 266 Md. at 644, 646 , 296 A.2d at 410, 411 .	1	1
Pattison v. Corbygreen md · 1961 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in	1	1
Marcus v. Montgomery County Councilgreen md · 1964 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in	1	1
Sugarloaf Citizens' Ass'n v. Department of Environmentred md · 1996 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in 2009Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 297 , 686 A.2d at 618 (citations omitted); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 146-47 , 230 A.2d at 294 (holding that landowners whose properties were “contiguous or close in proximity” to a proposed hotel had standing to challenge in court the grant of a special exception); see also Marcus v. Montgomery County, 235 Md. 535, 538 , 201 A.2d 777, 779 (1964) (“[T]he text writers and the cases in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions are in general agreement that an adjacent owner—in the sense of being near or close 272 by—as well as an abutting owner, whose legal rights have been in	1	1