19 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Charity v. Stategreen2 sentences2018App. 598 , 601, 753 A.2d 556 (2000), are restricted in scope and execution. 4 A Whren stop " 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.' " Ferris , 355 Md. at 369 , 735 A.2d 491 (quoting Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 , 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) ). 2010The ‘Whren stop” is part of the arsenal. 132 Md.App. at 609-10 , 753 A.2d 556 (emphasis supplied). | 2 | 6 |
Pryor v. Stategreen2 sentences2006In Pryor v. State, 122 Md.App. 671, 716 A.2d 338 (1998), Chief Judge Murphy recognized the practical utility to the police of a Whren stop, but reminded us that when such an opportunity is seized, we must “examine an important rule of engagement applicable to the forcible stop of a motorist who commits a minor traffic violation while under police surveillance.” 122 Md.App. at 674 , 716 A.2d 338 . 2006In Pryor v. State, 122 Md.App. 671, 716 A.2d 338 (1998), Chief Judge Murphy recognized the practical utility to the police of a Whren stop, but reminded us that when such an opportunity is seized, we must “examine an important rule of engagement applicable to the forcible stop of a motorist who commits a minor traffic violation while under police surveillance.” 122 Md.App. at 674 , 716 A.2d 338 . | 2 | 6 |
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026In Crosby, 408 Md. at 509-10, 515 , 970 A.2d at 905, 908 , we held that the conduct that caused the law enforcement officer to initiate a traffic stop, which included the petitioner slumping down in his seat as he drove by the officer, “was, by itself, wholly innocent” and that, “[w]ithout particularized and objective reasons that support a different 12 A stop for a traffic violation where law enforcement officers are in fact suspicious of criminal activity is commonly called a “Whren stop[,]” referring to the case of Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), in which the Supreme Court of t 2005In the appellant’s supplemental memorandum to this Court in advance of en banc argument, he argued that the traffic stop was a Whren stop (a stop for a genuine traffic violation but based on a subjective motivation by the police officer inspired by a completely different crime, see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)); and that this Court should depart company with the United States Supreme Court and hold that Whren stops, while constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment, violate Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. | 1 | 4 |
Crosby v. Stategreen2 sentences2026In Crosby, 408 Md. at 509-10, 515 , 970 A.2d at 905, 908 , we held that the conduct that caused the law enforcement officer to initiate a traffic stop, which included the petitioner slumping down in his seat as he drove by the officer, “was, by itself, wholly innocent” and that, “[w]ithout particularized and objective reasons that support a different 12 A stop for a traffic violation where law enforcement officers are in fact suspicious of criminal activity is commonly called a “Whren stop[,]” referring to the case of Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), in which the Supreme Court of t 2026In Crosby, 408 Md. at 509-10, 515 , 970 A.2d at 905, 908 , we held that the conduct that caused the law enforcement officer to initiate a traffic stop, which included the petitioner slumping down in his seat as he drove by the officer, “was, by itself, wholly innocent” and that, “[w]ithout particularized and objective reasons that support a different 12 A stop for a traffic violation where law enforcement officers are in fact suspicious of criminal activity is commonly called a “Whren stop[,]” referring to the case of Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), in which the Supreme Court of t | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2026See id. at 681 , 934 A.2d at 41 . - 28 - We concluded that the traffic stop was a Whren stop 12 and that the deputy “used 11F what he believed to be a tinting violation as a pretext to stop the car in order to allow a backup K-9 officer time to arrive and scan the car for suspected [drugs].” Id. at 685 , 934 A.2d at 43-44 . 2026See id. at 681 , 934 A.2d at 41 . - 28 - We concluded that the traffic stop was a Whren stop 12 and that the deputy “used 11F what he believed to be a tinting violation as a pretext to stop the car in order to allow a backup K-9 officer time to arrive and scan the car for suspected [drugs].” Id. at 685 , 934 A.2d at 43-44 . | 1 | 1 |
Ciak v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27 , 597 S.E.2d 392, 395-96 (2004); State v. Cohen, 347 N.J.Super. 375 , 790 A.2d 202, 205 (App.Div.2002); United States v. Weaver, 145 Fed.Appx. 639 (11th Cir. 2005). 2007See Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27 , 597 S.E.2d 392, 395-96 (2004); State v. Cohen, 347 N.J.Super. 375 , 790 A.2d 202, 205 (App.Div.2002); United States v. Weaver, 145 Fed.Appx. 639 (11th Cir. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cohengreen2 sentences2007See Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27 , 597 S.E.2d 392, 395-96 (2004); State v. Cohen, 347 N.J.Super. 375 , 790 A.2d 202, 205 (App.Div.2002); United States v. Weaver, 145 Fed.Appx. 639 (11th Cir. 2005). 2007See Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27 , 597 S.E.2d 392, 395-96 (2004); State v. Cohen, 347 N.J.Super. 375 , 790 A.2d 202, 205 (App.Div.2002); United States v. Weaver, 145 Fed.Appx. 639 (11th Cir. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
United States of America,appellee v. Luis Navarrete-Barron, A/k/aluis Navarrete,appellantgreen2 sentences2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) (“While either probable cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary”); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Bohannon, 2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) ("While either probable *47 cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary"); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Boha | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John Jay Hill and Malcolm Scott Hillgreen2 sentences2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) (“While either probable cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary”); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Bohannon, 2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) ("While either probable *47 cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary"); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Boha | 1 | 1 |
United States of America v. Curtis Dennis Callarmangreen2 sentences2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) (“While either probable cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary”); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Bohannon, 2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) ("While either probable *47 cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary"); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Boha | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Clinegreen2 sentences2006See Lee v. Cline, 149 Md.App. 38, 56 , 814 A.2d 86, 96-97 (2002), rev’d on other grounds, 384 Md. 245 , 863 A.2d 297 (2004); Pryor v. State, 122 Md.App. 671, 674-75 , 716 A.2d 338, 340 (1998) (holding “that, unless continued detention can be justified by what occurs during the brief period of time ... [a] motorist who is subjected to a ‘Whren stop’ for a minor traffic violation cannot be detained at the scene of the stop longer than it takes—or reasonably should take—to issue a citation ....”) (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 2006See Lee v. Cline, 149 Md.App. 38, 56 , 814 A.2d 86, 96-97 (2002), rev’d on other grounds, 384 Md. 245 , 863 A.2d 297 (2004); Pryor v. State, 122 Md.App. 671, 674-75 , 716 A.2d 338, 340 (1998) (holding “that, unless continued detention can be justified by what occurs during the brief period of time ... [a] motorist who is subjected to a ‘Whren stop’ for a minor traffic violation cannot be detained at the scene of the stop longer than it takes—or reasonably should take—to issue a citation ....”) (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Clinegreen2 sentences2006See Lee v. Cline, 149 Md.App. 38, 56 , 814 A.2d 86, 96-97 (2002), rev’d on other grounds, 384 Md. 245 , 863 A.2d 297 (2004); Pryor v. State, 122 Md.App. 671, 674-75 , 716 A.2d 338, 340 (1998) (holding “that, unless continued detention can be justified by what occurs during the brief period of time ... [a] motorist who is subjected to a ‘Whren stop’ for a minor traffic violation cannot be detained at the scene of the stop longer than it takes—or reasonably should take—to issue a citation ....”) (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 2006See Lee v. Cline, 149 Md.App. 38, 56 , 814 A.2d 86, 96-97 (2002), rev’d on other grounds, 384 Md. 245 , 863 A.2d 297 (2004); Pryor v. State, 122 Md.App. 671, 674-75 , 716 A.2d 338, 340 (1998) (holding “that, unless continued detention can be justified by what occurs during the brief period of time ... [a] motorist who is subjected to a ‘Whren stop’ for a minor traffic violation cannot be detained at the scene of the stop longer than it takes—or reasonably should take—to issue a citation ....”) (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Nathan v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See also Nathan, 370 Md. at 661-62 , 805 A.2d 1086 . 2005See also Nathan, 370 Md. at 661-62 , 805 A.2d 1086 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ferris v. State
green
2 sentences2018App. 598 , 601, 753 A.2d 556 (2000), are restricted in scope and execution. 4 A Whren stop " 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.' " Ferris , 355 Md. at 369 , 735 A.2d 491 (quoting Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 , 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) ). 2018App. 598 , 601, 753 A.2d 556 (2000), are restricted in scope and execution. 4 A Whren stop " 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.' " Ferris , 355 Md. at 369 , 735 A.2d 491 (quoting Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 , 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) ). | 3 | 2000–2018 |
Munafo v. State
green
2 sentences2002Compare Pryor, 122 Md.App. at 681 & n. 6, 716 A.2d 338 (unjustified second stop occurred because canine did not arrive for 20-25 minutes after Whren stop, and officer made no effort to pursue the traffic violation during that time); Graham, 119 Md.App. at 468-69 , 705 A.2d 82 (unjustified second stop of passenger occurred because canine scanned 25 minutes after the stop, and after driver had been arrested for driving without a valid license); Munafo v. State, 105 Md.App. 662, 673 , 660 A.2d 1068 (1995)(unjustified second stop occurred because canine did not arrive until two to three *57 minute 2002Compare Pryor, 122 Md.App. at 681 & n. 6, 716 A.2d 338 (unjustified second stop occurred because canine did not arrive for 20-25 minutes after Whren stop, and officer made no effort to pursue the traffic violation during that time); Graham, 119 Md.App. at 468-69 , 705 A.2d 82 (unjustified second stop of passenger occurred because canine scanned 25 minutes after the stop, and after driver had been arrested for driving without a valid license); Munafo v. State, 105 Md.App. 662, 673 , 660 A.2d 1068 (1995)(unjustified second stop occurred because canine did not arrive until two to three *57 minute | 2 | 2001–2002 |
Whitehead v. State
green
2 sentences2000In Whitehead v. State, 116 Md.App. at 506 , 698 A.2d 1115 , Judge Sonner pointed out that although the Supreme Court has placed its imprimatur on a “Whren stop” generally, it has not yet fleshed out the permissible contours of such a tactic: Whren ... did not provide guidance as to just how far the police may go in detaining and interrogating someone who has been stopped on the pretext of the enforcement of the traffic laws. 2000In Whitehead v. State, 116 Md.App. at 506 , 698 A.2d 1115 , Judge Sonner pointed out that although the Supreme Court has placed its imprimatur on a “Whren stop” generally, it has not yet fleshed out the permissible contours of such a tactic: Whren ... did not provide guidance as to just how far the police may go in detaining and interrogating someone who has been stopped on the pretext of the enforcement of the traffic laws. | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Carter v. State
neutral
1 sentence2025App. 456, 468 , cert. denied, 460 Md. 9 (2018). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Carter v. State
green
1 sentence2025It asserts that, in light of that caselaw, “this Court is without authority to afford [appellant] the relief he requests.” A pretextual stop, or a Whren stop, is a traffic stop “undertaken for the primary purpose of investigating other illegal activity.” Carter v. State, 236 Md. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Jackson v. State
green
1 sentence2018Jackson v. State , 190 Md. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Florida v. Royer
green
2 sentences2018App. 598 , 601, 753 A.2d 556 (2000), are restricted in scope and execution. 4 A Whren stop " 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.' " Ferris , 355 Md. at 369 , 735 A.2d 491 (quoting Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 , 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) ). 2018App. 598 , 601, 753 A.2d 556 (2000), are restricted in scope and execution. 4 A Whren stop " 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.' " Ferris , 355 Md. at 369 , 735 A.2d 491 (quoting Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 , 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Herring v. State
green
2 sentences2012In addition, Herring argued that “the alleged parking violation was simply a pretext for investigating the occupants and contents of the car.” Id. *568 Although we held that the record supported the trial court’s conclusion that “the caretaking function applied and that reasonable articulable suspicion was present,” in our independent application of the law to the facts of the case, we concluded that the conduct of the officers could “just as easily be justified as a Whren stop.” Id. at 74, 16 A.3d 246 . 2012In addition, Herring argued that “the alleged parking violation was simply a pretext for investigating the occupants and contents of the car.” Id. *568 Although we held that the record supported the trial court’s conclusion that “the caretaking function applied and that reasonable articulable suspicion was present,” in our independent application of the law to the facts of the case, we concluded that the conduct of the officers could “just as easily be justified as a Whren stop.” Id. at 74, 16 A.3d 246 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Sanchez-Pena
green
2 sentences2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) (“While either probable cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary”); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Bohannon, 2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) ("While either probable *47 cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary"); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Boha | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Chanthasouxat
green
2 sentences2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) (“While either probable cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary”); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Bohannon, 2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) ("While either probable *47 cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary"); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Boha | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Chavez
green
2 sentences2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) (“While either probable cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary”); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Bohannon, 2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) ("While either probable *47 cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary"); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Boha | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Crawford
green
2 sentences2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) ("While either probable *47 cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary"); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Boha 2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) ("While either probable *47 cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary"); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Boha | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States of America,plaintiff-Appellee v. Armando Lopez-Soto
green
2 sentences2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) (“While either probable cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary”); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Bohannon, 2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) ("While either probable *47 cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary"); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Boha | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Lysander Anthony Weaver
green
2 sentences2007See Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27 , 597 S.E.2d 392, 395-96 (2004); State v. Cohen, 347 N.J.Super. 375 , 790 A.2d 202, 205 (App.Div.2002); United States v. Weaver, 145 Fed. 2007See Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27 , 597 S.E.2d 392, 395-96 (2004); State v. Cohen, 347 N.J.Super. 375 , 790 A.2d 202, 205 (App.Div.2002); United States v. Weaver, 145 Fed.Appx. 639 (11th Cir. 2005). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Bohannon
green
2 sentences2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) (“While either probable cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary”); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Bohannon, 2007See United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir.2001) ("While either probable *47 cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary"); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.2003); State v. Boha | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Graham v. State
green
2 sentences2002Compare Pryor, 122 Md.App. at 681 & n. 6, 716 A.2d 338 (unjustified second stop occurred because canine did not arrive for 20-25 minutes after Whren stop, and officer made no effort to pursue the traffic violation during that time); Graham, 119 Md.App. at 468-69 , 705 A.2d 82 (unjustified second stop of passenger occurred because canine scanned 25 minutes after the stop, and after driver had been arrested for driving without a valid license); Munafo v. State, 105 Md.App. 662, 673 , 660 A.2d 1068 (1995)(unjustified second stop occurred because canine did not arrive until two to three *57 minute 2002Compare Pryor, 122 Md.App. at 681 & n. 6, 716 A.2d 338 (unjustified second stop occurred because canine did not arrive for 20-25 minutes after Whren stop, and officer made no effort to pursue the traffic violation during that time); Graham, 119 Md.App. at 468-69 , 705 A.2d 82 (unjustified second stop of passenger occurred because canine scanned 25 minutes after the stop, and after driver had been arrested for driving without a valid license); Munafo v. State, 105 Md.App. 662, 673 , 660 A.2d 1068 (1995)(unjustified second stop occurred because canine did not arrive until two to three *57 minute | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Snow v. State
green
2 sentences2002Compare Pryor, 122 Md.App. at 681 & n. 6, 716 A.2d 338 (unjustified second stop occurred because canine did not arrive for 20-25 minutes after Whren stop, and officer made no effort to pursue the traffic violation during that time); Graham, 119 Md.App. at 468-69 , 705 A.2d 82 (unjustified second stop of passenger occurred because canine scanned 25 minutes after the stop, and after driver had been arrested for driving without a valid license); Munafo v. State, 105 Md.App. 662, 673 , 660 A.2d 1068 (1995)(unjustified second stop occurred because canine did not arrive until two to three *57 minute 2002Compare Pryor, 122 Md.App. at 681 & n. 6, 716 A.2d 338 (unjustified second stop occurred because canine did not arrive for 20-25 minutes after Whren stop, and officer made no effort to pursue the traffic violation during that time); Graham, 119 Md.App. at 468-69 , 705 A.2d 82 (unjustified second stop of passenger occurred because canine scanned 25 minutes after the stop, and after driver had been arrested for driving without a valid license); Munafo v. State, 105 Md.App. 662, 673 , 660 A.2d 1068 (1995)(unjustified second stop occurred because canine did not arrive until two to three *57 minute | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| McKoy v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| In Re Montrail M. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| In Re Montrail M. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Perkins v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Dennis v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.