claim without hearing in Colorado

2025See Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 77 .

2025See Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 77 . 6 To the extent that Finch contests the postconviction court’s quoted findings, he argues that, as a blanket rule, a hearing is necessary so that his counsel and an unnamed expert could testify about whether counsel’s performance was deficient.

2026P. 35(c) petition for ineffective assistance of counsel, a cumulative error argument is more properly characterized as “cumulative prejudice.” See Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1081 (Colo. 2007). 19 therefore conclude that the postconviction court did not err by denying this claim without a hearing.

2022See Dunlap, 173 P.3d at 1068 . ¶ 33 Accordingly, we discern no error in the postconviction court’s decision to deny this claim without a hearing.

2026See People v. Delgado, 2019 COA 55, ¶¶ 36-37 (explaining that the defendant’s “vague assertions” and “conclusory statements” that defense counsel failed to properly investigate the victim’s history of abuse by others didn’t establish prejudice). 2.

2021Delgado , ¶ 8. 13 4.

2020See Osorio, 170 P.3d at 799 ; see also Aarness, 150 P.3d at 1277 .

2015See Osorio , 170 P.3d at 799 (A court may “deny relief where the allegations of counsel’s deficient performance are merely conclusory, vague, or lacking in detail.”). ¶64        The record therefore also supports the postconviction court’s decision to deny this claim without a hearing.

2026See Moore v. People, 2014 CO 8, ¶ 23 .

2026See People v. McDowell, 219 P.3d 332, 340 (Colo. App. 2009) (concluding that the defendant could not have been prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to raise a defense that would not have succeeded).

2025See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 ; see also Villanueva, ¶¶ 68-69. 13 ¶ 37 Because Countryman did not sufficiently allege prejudice, the postconviction court did not err by denying this claim without a hearing.

2025See People v. Vondra, 240 P.3d 493, 494 (Colo. App. 2010).

2025Villanueva, ¶ 68 (conclusory allegations of prejudice are insufficient under Strickland); see also People v. Pendleton, 2015 COA 154, ¶ 34 (“[T]he mere possibility that 10 additional investigation would have revealed useful information does not establish ineffective assistance.”).1 ¶ 30 We therefore conclude that the postconviction court properly denied this claim without a hearing, though on slightly different grounds.

2024See, e.g., People v. Zuniga, 80 P.3d 965, 973 (Colo. App. 2003). ¶ 32 Nor does Cook explain how he was prejudiced by postconviction counsel’s alleged failure to investigate.

2024“Trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance ‘when the essential and foundational information required to trigger such an investigation is withheld from the defendant’s attorney by the defendant himself.’” People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 295 (Colo. 1996) (citation omitted); see also Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F.2d 885, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that “trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise claims to which his client has neglected to supply the essential underlying facts . . . ; clairvoyance is not

2024See People v. Villanueva, 2016 14 COA 70 , ¶ 68 (a conclusory allegation of prejudice is insufficient under Strickland); cf. People v. Sudduth, 991 P.2d 315, 317 (Colo. App. 1999) (concluding that the record belied the defendant’s allegation that he was insufficiently advised and that the trial court properly rejected the claim without a hearing). ¶ 32 Thus, the postconviction court did not err by denying this claim. 2.

2024“Trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance ‘when the essential and foundational information required to trigger such an investigation is withheld from the defendant’s attorney by the defendant himself.’” People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 295 (Colo. 1996) (citation omitted); see also Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F.2d 885, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that “trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise claims to which his client has neglected to supply the essential underlying facts . . . ; clairvoyance is not

2024The postconviction court further observed, “That [Cook] now attempts to repackage these claims as ineffective assistance of post- conviction counsel does not change the fact that [Cook] has repeatedly raised these same underlying issues.” We agree with the postconviction court’s decision to deny this claim without a hearing, albeit for a reason other than successiveness. ¶ 29 Even assuming that repackaging Cook’s original pro se ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim as a claim for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for abandoning the original claim can successfully evade

2022Cf. People v. Urrutia, 893 P.2d 1338,1342-43 (Colo. App. 1994) (finding harmless error when the trial court did not indicate that jurors were under any time limit to reach a consensus or declare a deadlock); People v. Fell, 832 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Colo. App. 1991) (telling a prospective juror that they “will be out of here” in approximately two and one-half days was not coercive); Allen v. People, 660 P.2d 896, 898 (Colo. 1983) (instruction that jury only had another fifteen minutes to deliberate before a mistrial was declared was coercive). ¶ 28 Therefore, we discern no error in the postconvicti

2022Cf. People v. Urrutia, 893 P.2d 1338,1342-43 (Colo. App. 1994) (finding harmless error when the trial court did not indicate that jurors were under any time limit to reach a consensus or declare a deadlock); People v. Fell, 832 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Colo. App. 1991) (telling a prospective juror that they “will be out of here” in approximately two and one-half days was not coercive); Allen v. People, 660 P.2d 896, 898 (Colo. 1983) (instruction that jury only had another fifteen minutes to deliberate before a mistrial was declared was coercive). ¶ 28 Therefore, we discern no error in the postconvicti

2022Cf. People v. Urrutia, 893 P.2d 1338,1342-43 (Colo. App. 1994) (finding harmless error when the trial court did not indicate that jurors were under any time limit to reach a consensus or declare a deadlock); People v. Fell, 832 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Colo. App. 1991) (telling a prospective juror that they “will be out of here” in approximately two and one-half days was not coercive); Allen v. People, 660 P.2d 896, 898 (Colo. 1983) (instruction that jury only had another fifteen minutes to deliberate before a mistrial was declared was coercive). ¶ 28 Therefore, we discern no error in the postconvicti

2020See Osorio, 170 P.3d at 799 ; see also Aarness, 150 P.3d at 1277 .

2014See Venzor, 121 P.3d at 262 .

2011See People v. Hartkemeyer, 843 P.2d 92, 93 (Colo.App.1992).