existence of clear error in West Virginia

2016Syl. pt. 4, in part, id.

2016Syl. pt. 4, in part, id.

2012Syllabus Point 1 of Hinkle v. Black, 164 W.Va. 112 , 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979), also provides the following guidance where a court exceeds its legitimate powers: In determining whether to grant a rule to show cause in prohibition when a court is not acting in excess of its jurisdiction, this Court will look to the adequacy of other available remedies such as appeal and to the over-all economy of effort and money among litigants, lawyers and courts; however, this Court will use prohibition in this discretionary way to correct only substantial, clear-cut, legal errors plainly in contravention of a c

2012Syllabus Point 1 of Hinkle v. Black, 164 W.Va. 112 , 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979), also provides the following guidance where a court exceeds its legitimate powers: In determining whether to grant a rule to show cause in prohibition when a court is not acting in excess of its jurisdiction, this Court will look to the adequacy of other available remedies such as appeal and to the over-all economy of effort and money among litigants, lawyers and courts; however, this Court will use prohibition in this discretionary way to correct only substantial, clear-cut, legal errors plainly in contravention of a c

2006Finally, we held in Syllabus Point 1 of Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138 , 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) that: Where the issue on appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review. *574 We consider these principles applicable to the instant case.

2006Finally, we held in Syllabus Point 1 of Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138 , 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) that: Where the issue on appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review. *574 We consider these principles applicable to the instant case.

2017Va. 52 , 585 S.E.2d 52 (emphasis added).

2017Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight. 3 be allowed to proceed on behalf of the class proposed by the party. 214 W.

2008Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight. 212 W.Va. at 888 , 575 S.E.2d at 867 -68 and syl. pt. 1.

2008Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight. 212 W.Va. at 888 , 575 S.E.2d at 867 -68 and syl. pt. 1.

2007With regard to the specific issue of the admissibility of expert testimony, this Court stated as follows in syllabus point six of Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269 , 406 S.E.2d 700 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 , 112 S.Ct. 301 , 116 L.Ed.2d 244 (1991): "The admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed unless it is clearly wrong." Applying those standards of review to the issue sub judice, we examine the Petitioner's request for a writ of prohibition.

2007With regard to the specific issue of the admissibility of expert testimony, this Court stated as follows in syllabus point six of Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269 , 406 S.E.2d 700 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 , 112 S.Ct. 301 , 116 L.Ed.2d 244 (1991): "The admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed unless it is clearly wrong." Applying those standards of review to the issue sub judice, we examine the Petitioner's request for a writ of prohibition.

2007With regard to the specific issue of the admissibility of expert testimony, this Court stated as follows in syllabus point six of Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269 , 406 S.E.2d 700 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 , 112 S.Ct. 301 , 116 L.Ed.2d 244 (1991): "The admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed unless it is clearly wrong." Applying those standards of review to the issue sub judice, we examine the Petitioner's request for a writ of prohibition.

2007With regard to the specific issue of the admissibility of expert testimony, this Court stated as follows in syllabus point six of Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269 , 406 S.E.2d 700 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 , 112 S.Ct. 301 , 116 L.Ed.2d 244 (1991): “The admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless -it is clearly wrong.” Applying those standards of review to the issue sub judice, we examine the Petitioner’s request for a writ of prohibition.

2007With regard to the specific issue of the admissibility of expert testimony, this Court stated as follows in syllabus point six of Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269 , 406 S.E.2d 700 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 , 112 S.Ct. 301 , 116 L.Ed.2d 244 (1991): "The admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed unless it is clearly wrong." Applying those standards of review to the issue sub judice, we examine the Petitioner's request for a writ of prohibition.

2007With regard to the specific issue of the admissibility of expert testimony, this Court stated as follows in syllabus point six of Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269 , 406 S.E.2d 700 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 , 112 S.Ct. 301 , 116 L.Ed.2d 244 (1991): “The admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless -it is clearly wrong.” Applying those standards of review to the issue sub judice, we examine the Petitioner’s request for a writ of prohibition.

2007With regard to the specific issue of the admissibility of expert testimony, this Court stated as follows in syllabus point six of Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269 , 406 S.E.2d 700 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 , 112 S.Ct. 301 , 116 L.Ed.2d 244 (1991): "The admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed unless it is clearly wrong." Applying those standards of review to the issue sub judice, we examine the Petitioner's request for a writ of prohibition.

2007With regard to the specific issue of the admissibility of expert testimony, this Court stated as follows in syllabus point six of Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269 , 406 S.E.2d 700 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 , 112 S.Ct. 301 , 116 L.Ed.2d 244 (1991): “The admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless -it is clearly wrong.” Applying those standards of review to the issue sub judice, we examine the Petitioner’s request for a writ of prohibition.

2004Further, “[w]hether a witness is qualified to state an opinion is a matter which rests within the discretion of the trial court and its ruling on that point will not ordinarily be disturbed unless it clearly appears that its discretion has been abused.” Syl. pt. 5, Overton v. Fields, 145 W.Va. 797 , 117 S.E.2d 598 (1960).

2004Further, “[w]hether a witness is qualified to state an opinion is a matter which rests within the discretion of the trial court and its ruling on that point will not ordinarily be disturbed unless it clearly appears that its discretion has been abused.” Syl. pt. 5, Overton v. Fields, 145 W.Va. 797 , 117 S.E.2d 598 (1960).

2004Our cases have made clear that "[a] writ of prohibition is available to correct a clear legal error resulting from a trial court's substantial abuse of its discretion in regard to discovery orders." Syl. pt. 1, State Farm v. Stephens, 188 W.Va. 622 , 425 S.E.2d 577 (1992).

2004Our cases have made clear that "[a] writ of prohibition is available to correct a clear legal error resulting from a trial court's substantial abuse of its discretion in regard to discovery orders." Syl. pt. 1, State Farm v. Stephens, 188 W.Va. 622 , 425 S.E.2d 577 (1992).

2003In syllabus point two of Woodall v. Laurita, 156 W.Va. 707 , 195 S.E.2d 717 (1973), this Court also emphasized the distinctive analysis of jurisdictional issues: Where prohibition is sought to restrain a trial court from the abuse of its legitimate powers, rather than to challenge its jurisdiction, the appellate court will review each case on its own particular facts to determine whether a remedy by appeal is both available and adequate, and only if the appellate court determines that the abuse of powers is so flagrant and violative of petitioner's rights as to make a remedy by appeal inadequa

2003In syllabus point two of Woodall v. Laurita, 156 W.Va. 707 , 195 S.E.2d 717 (1973), this Court also emphasized the distinctive analysis of jurisdictional issues: Where prohibition is sought to restrain a trial court from the abuse of its legitimate powers, rather than to challenge its jurisdiction, the appellate court will review each case on its own particular facts to determine whether a remedy by appeal is both available and adequate, and only if the appellate court determines that the abuse of powers is so flagrant and violative of petitioner's rights as to make a remedy by appeal inadequa

2000State Auto Insurance Co. v. Risovich, 204 W.Va. 87 , 511 S.E.2d 498 (1998), as support for his position that "[t]his Court has previously indicated that prohibition is proper with respect to resolving a threshold legal issue regarding insurance coverage." (Citation omitted).

2000State Auto Insurance Co. v. Risovich, 204 W.Va. 87 , 511 S.E.2d 498 (1998), as support for his position that "[t]his Court has previously indicated that prohibition is proper with respect to resolving a threshold legal issue regarding insurance coverage." (Citation omitted).

1998Specifically regarding our review of a civil contempt order, we explained as follows in syllabus point one of Carter v. Carter, 196 W.Va. 239 , 470 S.E.2d 193 (1996), In reviewing the findings of fact and conclusions of law of a circuit court supporting a civil contempt order, we apply a three-pronged standard of review.

1998Specifically regarding our review of a civil contempt order, we explained as follows in syllabus point one of Carter v. Carter, 196 W.Va. 239 , 470 S.E.2d 193 (1996), In reviewing the findings of fact and conclusions of law of a circuit court supporting a civil contempt order, we apply a three-pronged standard of review.