traverse hearing (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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traverse hearing in Illinois

18 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1986–2023 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Fellersgreen
illappct · 2016 · cited in 8 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2016–2017
2 sentences

2017See also People v. Fellers, 2016 IL App (4th) 140486, ¶ 36 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an appropriate hearing on the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); Fleming v. Moswin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103475-U , ¶¶ 45-46 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a Batson hearing within 60 days and requiring the parties to file responses within 14 days of trial court’s ruling on remand). ¶ 178 Unlik

2017App. 3d at 352 , 612 N.E.2d at 48 ; see also People v. Fellers, 2016 IL App (4th) 140486, ¶ 36 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an appropriate hearing on the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); Fleming v. Moswin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103475-U , ¶¶ 45-46, 976 N.E.2d 447 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a Batson hearing within 60 days and requiring the parties to file responses within 14

88
Hamilton v. Conleygreen
illappct · 2005 · cited in 7 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See Hamilton v. Conley, 356 Ill.

2017See Hamilton v. Conley, 356 Ill.

77
Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Templegreen
illappct · 2017 · cited in 4 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2023
2 sentences

2019In reaching this result, we wrote the following: “We reject the notion that *** all traverse hearings are akin to a motion to dismiss ***. *** *** We *** reiterate and reaffirm our holding that a traverse hearing is a limited proceeding that affords a landowner the first and only opportunity to challenge a condemnor’s authority and, thus, ‘is akin to a hybrid proceeding in which specific presumptions must be rebutted by landowners challenging the condemnation filing at issue.’ ” Id. ¶¶ 92-93 (quoting Enbridge Energy (Illinois), -4- L.L.C. v. Kuerth, 2016 IL App (4th) 150519, ¶ 169 , 69 N.E.3d

2019Given the limited purpose of a traverse hearing, such broad discovery is a wasteful use of resources that would serve only to complicate, confuse, and delay the proceedings (as this case clearly shows).” Kuerth I, 2016 IL App (4th) 150519, ¶ 170 . ¶ 44 In our remand instructions in this case, we stated that the trial court “should permit IEPC to challenge landowners’ additional requests for discovery by demonstrating that the information sought is either irrelevant to the traverse proceedings or cumulative because the additional discovery sought already appears in the record or is in the posse

24
Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Hokegreen
illappct · 2017 · cited in 4 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2020
2 sentences

2019This Case ¶ 32 On landowners' first appeal, this court gave the following instructions for remand: "Based on the aforementioned discussion of the proper scope of a traverse hearing, the trial court should consider only two matters on remand, which are landowners' claims challenging (1) the rebuttable presumptions of public use and public necessity and (2) the Commission's determination as to good-faith negotiations, as generally set forth in * * * landowners' July 2014 traverse motion." Hoke , 2017 IL App (4th) 150544 , ¶ 134, 414 Ill.Dec. 664 , 80 N.E.3d 807 . *221 *1280 ¶ 33 Based on this co

2019This Case ¶ 32 On landowners’ first appeal, this court gave the following instructions for remand: “Based on the aforementioned discussion of the proper scope of a traverse hearing, the trial court should consider only two matters on remand, which are landowners’ claims challenging (1) the rebuttable presumptions of public use and public necessity and (2) the Commission’s determination as to good-faith negotiations, as generally set forth in *** landowners’ July 2014 traverse motion.” Hoke, 2017 IL App (4th) 150544, ¶ 134 . ¶ 33 Based on this court’s remand instructions, Pliura argues that the

24
City of Chicago v. St. John's United Church of Christgreen
illappct · 2010 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2016–2017
2 sentences

2017App. 3d 505, 516 , 935 N.E.2d 1158, 1170 (2010) (“A court’s inquiry into the existence of necessity in an eminent domain case is limited but crucial.” (Internal quotations marks omitted.)). ¶ 166 Based on the aforementioned discussion of the proper scope of a traverse hearing, the trial court on remand should consider only two matters, which are landowners’ claims challenging (1) the rebuttable presumptions of public use and public necessity and (2) the Commission’s determination as to good-faith, as generally set forth in paragraphs 2 through 6 of landowners’ July 2014 traverse motion. ¶ 167

2016App. 3d 505, 516 , 935 N.E.2d 1158, 1170 (2010) (“A court’s inquiry into the existence of necessity in an eminent do- main case is limited but crucial.” (Internal quotations marks omitted.)). ¶ 166 Based on the aforementioned discussion of the proper scope of a traverse hearing, - 55 - the trial court on remand should consider only two matters, which are landowners’ claims chal- lenging (1) the rebuttable presumptions of public use and public necessity and (2) the Commis- sion’s determination as to good-faith, as generally set forth in paragraphs 2 through 6 of land- owners’ July 2014 traverse

22
Department of Transportation Ex Rel. People v. 151 Interstate Road Corp.green
ill · 2004 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020See 151 Interstate Road, 209 Ill. 2d at 480-81 (“Because good-faith negotiations with the landowner are a condition precedent to condemnation proceedings under the Eminent Domain Act, the question of whether a condemnor has negotiated in good faith bears directly on whether the condemnor was exercising its right of eminent domain improperly.”).

11
Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Deangreen
ill · 1983 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020We further agree with the Fourth District’s determination that the ICC’s findings in this regard are worthy of a strong presumption, requiring landowners to “present clear and convincing evidence before the applicable rebuttable presumptions burst.” Kuerth, 2016 IL App (4th) 150519, ¶ 140 ; see also Franciscan Sisters, 95 Ill. 2d at 460 . ¶ 95 Despite this agreement, we respectfully disagree with the Fourth District’s conclusion that ICC orders establish a prima facie case on the issue of good-faith negotiations.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Enbridge Energy, LLC v. Kuerth green
illappct · 2016
2 sentences

2020Before providing specific directions concerning the traverse hearing on remand, we consider the Fourth District’s interpretation and application of section 5-5-5(c) in Kuerth. ¶ 91 In Kuerth, the Fourth District first examined the legislative history of section 5-5-5(c) and noted that “[t]he legislature passed the Act ‘in an attempt to limit the use of condemnation power to assist private development.’ ” 2016 IL App (4th) 150519 , ¶ 125 (quoting Richard F. Friedman, Initial Procedures and Pleadings of the State and Other Condemning Bodies, in Illinois Eminent Domain Practice § 2.1 (Ill.

2019In reaching this result, we wrote the following: “We reject the notion that *** all traverse hearings are akin to a motion to dismiss ***. *** *** We *** reiterate and reaffirm our holding that a traverse hearing is a limited proceeding that affords a landowner the first and only opportunity to challenge a condemnor’s authority and, thus, ‘is akin to a hybrid proceeding in which specific presumptions must be rebutted by landowners challenging the condemnation filing at issue.’ ” Id. ¶¶ 92-93 (quoting Enbridge Energy (Illinois), -4- L.L.C. v. Kuerth, 2016 IL App (4th) 150519, ¶ 169 , 69 N.E.3d

102017–2020
Fleming v. Moswin green
illappct · 2012
2 sentences

2017See also People v. Fellers, 2016 IL App (4th) 140486, ¶ 36 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an appropriate hearing on the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); Fleming v. Moswin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103475-U , ¶¶ 45-46, 976 N.E.2d 447 (while retaining jurisdiction - 39 - over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a Batson hearing within 60 days and requiring the parties to file responses within 14 days of the trial court’s rul

2017App. 3d at 352 , 612 N.E.2d at 48 ; see also People v. Fellers, 2016 IL App (4th) 140486, ¶ 36 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an appropriate hearing on the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); Fleming v. Moswin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103475-U , ¶¶ 45-46, 976 N.E.2d 447 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a Batson hearing within 60 days and requiring the parties to file responses within 14

42017–2017
Ramos v. Kewanee Hospital green
illappct · 2013
2 sentences

2019In preparation for a typical trial, discovery ‘includes not only what is admissible at trial, but also that which leads to admissible evidence.’ Ramos v. Kewanee Hospital, 2013 IL App (3d) 120001, ¶ 76 , 992 N.E.2d 103 .

2019In preparation for a typical trial, discovery ‘includes not only what is admissible at trial, but also that which leads to admissible evidence.’ Ramos v. Kewanee Hospital, 2013 IL App (3d) 120001, ¶ 76 , 992 N.E.2d 103 .

32016–2019
Altenheim German Home v. Bank of America green
illappct · 2007
2 sentences

2020Id. ¶ 58 ii.

2019Id. ¶ 58 ii.

22019–2020
City of Chicago v. Midland Smelting Co. green
illappct · 2008
2 sentences

2018City of Chicago v. Midland Smelting Co. , 385 Ill.

2018City of Chicago v. Midland Smelting Co., 385 Ill.

22018–2018
People v. Bohanan green
illappct · 1993
2 sentences

2017App. 3d at 352 , 612 N.E.2d at 48 ; see also People v. Fellers, 2016 IL App (4th) 140486, ¶ 36 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an appropriate hearing on the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); Fleming v. Moswin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103475-U , ¶¶ 45-46, 976 N.E.2d 447 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a Batson hearing within 60 days and requiring the parties to file responses within 14

2017App. 3d at 352 , 612 N.E.2d at 48 ; see also People v. Fellers, 2016 IL App (4th) 140486, ¶ 36 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an ap- propriate hearing on the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); Fleming v. Moswin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103475-U , ¶¶ 45-46 (while retaining jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a Batson hearing within 60 days and requiring the parties to file responses within 14 days of the tr

22017–2017
Department of Transportation v. Keller green
illappct · 1984
2 sentences

2017App. 3d 976 , 469 N.E.2d 262 (1984), respondent landowners argued that the trial court erred by restricting testimony as to the issue of necessity at a traverse hearing.

2016App. 3d 976 , 469 N.E.2d 262 (1984), re- spondent landowners argued that the trial court erred by restricting testimony as to the issue of necessity at a traverse hearing.

22016–2017
City of Springfield v. West Koke Mill Development Corp. green
illappct · 2000
2 sentences

2017In so ruling, the court stated that after considering the parties’ filings in support of and in opposition to landowners’ discovery requests and traverse motions, which included IEPC’s July and August 2014 condemnation complaints, the court did not view landowners’ discovery requests “appropriate.” ¶ 38 Prior to conducting a hearing on landowners’ traverse motions, the trial court re- cessed briefly to consider City of Springfield v. West Koke Mill Development Corp., 312 Ill.

2017In so ruling, the court stated that after considering the parties’ filings in support of and in opposition to landowners’ discovery requests and traverse motions, which included IEPC’s July and August 2014 condemnation complaints, the court did not view landowners’ discovery requests “appropriate.” ¶ 38 Prior to conducting a hearing on landowners’ traverse motions, the trial court recessed briefly to consider City of Springfield v. West Koke Mill Development Corp., 312 Ill.

22017–2017
Manns v. Briell green
illappct · 2004
1 sentence

2019We further stated that the trial court should require “any discovery request to set forth with specificity (1) the information the party seeks, (2) the alleged source of that information, and (3) the relevance of the information sought, given the limited remand in this case.” Id. ¶ 103. ¶ 45 “A trial court is given great latitude in determining the scope of discovery, and discovery orders will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Briell, 349 Ill.

12019–2019
People Ex Rel. Director of Finance v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n green
ill · 1981
2 sentences

1986(People v. Young Women’s Christian Association (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 219 , 427 N.E.2d 70 .) As our supreme court stated in People v. Young Women’s Christian Association, “the absence of a legislative finding of necessity would not be fatal if it were otherwise unequivocally established by the record that the property was necessary for Sangamon County circuit court use.

1986(People v. Young Women’s Christian Association (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 219 , 427 N.E.2d 70 .) As our supreme court stated in People v. Young Women’s Christian Association, “the absence of a legislative finding of necessity would not be fatal if it were otherwise unequivocally established by the record that the property was necessary for Sangamon County circuit court use.

11986–1986
City of Chicago v. Barnes green
ill · 1964
2 sentences

1986(City of Chicago v. Barnes (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 255 , 195 N.E.2d 629 .) If the condemning body fails to specifically make such a determination, it is not fatal to the condemnation procedure provided the evidence presented by the condemning body in the traverse hearing discloses a necessity.

1986(City of Chicago v. Barnes (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 255 , 195 N.E.2d 629 .) If the condemning body fails to specifically make such a determination, it is not fatal to the condemnation procedure provided the evidence presented by the condemning body in the traverse hearing discloses a necessity.

11986–1986

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IL § 735 ILCS 30/5-5-5 (13) IL § 220 ILCS 5/8-509 (9) IL § 735 ILCS 30/1-1-1 (9) IL § 735 ILCS 30/10-5-5 (9) IL § 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (9) IL § 220 ILCS 5/15-401 (7) IL § 220 ILCS 5/1-101 (3) IL § 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 281 (1976–2026) IL 18 (1986–2023) CO 7 (2012–2026) GA 7 (1908–2026)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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