prosecutor committed error in Kansas

2022In King, we relied on State v. Corbett, 281 Kan. 294, 315-16 , 130 P.3d 1179 (2006), in holding the prosecutor erred by repeatedly using the phrase "we know." 14 We acknowledged in King that Corbett recognized a prosecutor discussing uncontroverted evidence could appropriately use "we know." But Corbett also gave notice that a prosecutor commits error by using "we know" when discussing controverted evidence because doing so improperly expresses the prosecutor's opinion.

2022In King, we relied on State v. Corbett, 281 Kan. 294, 315-16 , 130 P.3d 1179 (2006), in holding the prosecutor erred by repeatedly using the phrase "we know." 14 We acknowledged in King that Corbett recognized a prosecutor discussing uncontroverted evidence could appropriately use "we know." But Corbett also gave notice that a prosecutor commits error by using "we know" when discussing controverted evidence because doing so improperly expresses the prosecutor's opinion.

2021State v. Thomas, 311 Kan. 905 , 910, 468 P.3d 323 (2020).

2020The prosecutor committed error if "'the act complained of [fell] outside the wide latitude afforded to prosecutors to conduct the State's case in a way that does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.'" State v. Thomas, 311 Kan. 905 , 910, 468 P.3d 323 (2020) (quoting State v. Chandler, 307 Kan. 657 , Syl. ¶ 6, 414 P.3d 713 [2018]).

2026In considering a claim of prosecutorial error, an appellate court first assesses whether the prosecutor committed error by deciding whether the "'acts complained of fall outside the wide latitude afforded prosecutors to conduct the State's case and attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner that does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.'" State v. J.L.J., 318 Kan. 720 , 725, 547 P.3d 501 (2024).

2026Generally speaking, a "prosecutor has wide latitude in crafting arguments and drawing 'reasonable inferences from the evidence but may not comment on facts outside the evidence.'" [Citations omitted.]" State v. Longoria, 301 Kan. 489, 524 , 343 P.3d 1128 (2015).

2026Generally speaking, a "prosecutor has wide latitude in crafting arguments and drawing 'reasonable inferences from the evidence but may not comment on facts outside the evidence.'" [Citations omitted.]" State v. Longoria, 301 Kan. 489, 524 , 343 P.3d 1128 (2015).

2025State v. Watson, 313 Kan. 170 , 179, 484 P.3d 877 (2021).

2024In 7 State v. Finley, 273 Kan. 237, 245 , 42 P.3d 723 (2002), the defendant claimed, among other things, the prosecutor committed error by expressing her opinion on defendant's testimony as "'incredible'" and "'virtually impossible to believe.'" Our Supreme Court found: "The prosecutor based her argument on an inference drawn from the nature of the defendant's conflicting stories, not on the prosecutor's knowledge of the defendant's veracity." 273 Kan. at 246 .

2024In 7 State v. Finley, 273 Kan. 237, 245 , 42 P.3d 723 (2002), the defendant claimed, among other things, the prosecutor committed error by expressing her opinion on defendant's testimony as "'incredible'" and "'virtually impossible to believe.'" Our Supreme Court found: "The prosecutor based her argument on an inference drawn from the nature of the defendant's conflicting stories, not on the prosecutor's knowledge of the defendant's veracity." 273 Kan. at 246 .

2022For example, in People v. Rundle, 43 Cal. 4th 76, 195 , 180 P.3d 224 (2008), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390 , 198 P.3d 11 (2009), the defendant argued the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by claiming "'the entire defense in this case is to blame others,' by calling the [mitigation defense theory] 'penalty phase madness,' and by referring to defendant as a 'snitch' in discussing his assistance to the authorities at the jail." The court rejected the prosecutorial error claim, saying there was "nothing deceptive or reprehensible about these comments, and they

2022For example, in People v. Rundle, 43 Cal. 4th 76, 195 , 180 P.3d 224 (2008), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390 , 198 P.3d 11 (2009), the defendant argued the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by claiming "'the entire defense in this case is to blame others,' by calling the [mitigation defense theory] 'penalty phase madness,' and by referring to defendant as a 'snitch' in discussing his assistance to the authorities at the jail." The court rejected the prosecutorial error claim, saying there was "nothing deceptive or reprehensible about these comments, and they

2022For example, in People v. Rundle, 43 Cal. 4th 76, 195 , 180 P.3d 224 (2008), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390 , 198 P.3d 11 (2009), the defendant argued the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by claiming "'the entire defense in this case is to blame others,' by calling the [mitigation defense theory] 'penalty phase madness,' and by referring to defendant as a 'snitch' in discussing his assistance to the authorities at the jail." The court rejected the prosecutorial error claim, saying there was "nothing deceptive or reprehensible about these comments, and they

2022For example, in People v. Rundle, 43 Cal. 4th 76, 195 , 180 P.3d 224 (2008), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390 , 198 P.3d 11 (2009), the defendant argued the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by claiming "'the entire defense in this case is to blame others,' by calling the [mitigation defense theory] 'penalty phase madness,' and by referring to defendant as a 'snitch' in discussing his assistance to the authorities at the jail." The court rejected the prosecutorial error claim, saying there was "nothing deceptive or reprehensible about these comments, and they

2022State v. De La Torre, 300 Kan. 591 , 331 P.3d 815 (2014), offers another clear example.

2022State v. De La Torre, 300 Kan. 591 , 331 P.3d 815 (2014), offers another clear example.

2021See Wilson, 309 Kan. at 78-79; McCaughtry, 2018 WL 1659940 , at *3-4; Roland, 2010 WL 1078454 at *3 .

2020And "when there is no error, there can be no errors to contribute to cumulative error and there is no basis for reversal." State v. Barlett, 308 Kan. 78 , 91, 418 P.3d 1253 (2018). 17 WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SNYDER'S KIDNAPPING CONVICTION?

2020It first held that the prosecutor committed error by making the "gold standard" comment for the following reasons: (1) the prosecutor had commented on facts not in evidence because nobody had testified that the Finding Words protocol was the "gold standard"; (2) the prosecutor indicated to the jury that the Finding Words protocol was the judicially approved "gold standard" by citing to an appellate opinion; (3) the prosecutor indicated to the jury that she was an expert on Finding Words protocol by citing to an appellate opinion; and (4) the prosecutor relied on language from the appellate opi

2020Our Supreme Court then held that the prosecutor's comment constituted reversible error because it bolstered the complaining witness' testimony while undermining the defense expert's testimony. 298 Kan. at 613 .

2020See Chandler, 307 Kan. at 678-79 ; Hall, 292 Kan. at 848 . (3) Inference stacking Gardner claims the prosecutor committed error by inviting the jury to make unreasonable and impermissible inferences.

2018To answer this, we examine the comments at issue "in the context in which they were made, not in isolation." State v. Brown , 300 Kan. 542 , 560, 331 P.3d 781 (2014).

2018To answer this, we examine the comments at issue "in the context in which they were made, not in isolation." State v. Brown , 300 Kan. 542 , 560, 331 P.3d 781 (2014).

2017State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 708 , 245 P.3d 1030 (2011), overruled on other grounds by State v. Astorga, 299 Kan. 395 , 324 P.3d 1046 (2014). 27 Here, Clark's objection came after several questions had been asked but still sufficiently contemporaneously to the questions that the district court was able to consider whether the prosecutor committed an error at a time when the mistake could have been corrected.

2017State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 708 , 245 P.3d 1030 (2011), overruled on other grounds by State v. Astorga, 299 Kan. 395 , 324 P.3d 1046 (2014). 27 Here, Clark's objection came after several questions had been asked but still sufficiently contemporaneously to the questions that the district court was able to consider whether the prosecutor committed an error at a time when the mistake could have been corrected.

2017State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 708 , 245 P.3d 1030 (2011), overruled on other grounds by State v. Astorga, 299 Kan. 395 , 324 P.3d 1046 (2014). 27 Here, Clark's objection came after several questions had been asked but still sufficiently contemporaneously to the questions that the district court was able to consider whether the prosecutor committed an error at a time when the mistake could have been corrected.

2017State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 708 , 245 P.3d 1030 (2011), overruled on other grounds by State v. Astorga, 299 Kan. 395 , 324 P.3d 1046 (2014). 27 Here, Clark's objection came after several questions had been asked but still sufficiently contemporaneously to the questions that the district court was able to consider whether the prosecutor committed an error at a time when the mistake could have been corrected.

2017See State v. Dull, 298 Kan. 832, 837 , 317 P.3d 104 (2014) (prosecutor committed error when he asserted that the story the victim told her mother was "the truth"); State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 64 , 105 P.3d 1222 (2005) (prosecutorial error where prosecutor stated during closing argument "you know [victim] was telling the truth").

2017See State v. Dull, 298 Kan. 832, 837 , 317 P.3d 104 (2014) (prosecutor committed error when he asserted that the story the victim told her mother was "the truth"); State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 64 , 105 P.3d 1222 (2005) (prosecutorial error where prosecutor stated during closing argument "you know [victim] was telling the truth").

2014In Magallanez , this court emphasized the danger “when prosecutors embellish the burden of proof required in criminal cases, and the prosecutor committed this error by diluting the reasonable doubt standard in this case.” Magallanez, 290 Kan. at 926-27 .

2014In Magallanez, this court emphasized the danger "when prosecutors embellish the burden of proof required in criminal cases, and the prosecutor committed this error by diluting the reasonable doubt standard in this case." Magallanez, 290 Kan. at 926-27 .