practical finality doctrine in New Mexico

2025We also 3 hold the practical finality exception to the final judgment rule is not 4 applicable, because the [s]tate may obtain judicial review of such a 5 suppression order by filing a nolle prosequi to dismiss some or all of 6 the charges in the magistrate court after the suppression order is 7 entered and refiling in the district court for a trial de novo. 8 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 1 (emphasis added); see id. ¶¶ 22-23. 9 {22} Consequently, a holding that would reset the 182-day time limit within which 10 the state must bring a defendant to trial in magistrate court following an appeal 11 lacking a

2024See 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 1 (“We . . . hold the practical finality exception to the final judgment rule is not applicable, because the State may obtain judicial review of such a suppression order by filing a nolle prosequi to dismiss some or all of the charges in the magistrate court after the suppression order is entered and refiling in the district court for a trial de novo.” (emphasis added)); id. ¶ 27 (“[W]e hold that a new six-month rule period should begin to run when the [s]tate files a nolle prosequi following a suppression order by a magistrate court and refiles in district court.” (emphas

2026Because Heinsen controls, we 15 reject the practical finality standard proposed by the State and abrogate Griego, 16 2004-NMCA-107 ; Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158 ; and Armijo, 1994-NMCA-136 , 17 inasmuch as they conflict with our holding in this case. 18 {16} Under the appropriate standard from Heinsen—which is whether a court’s 19 decision effectively disposes of the issues in a case—the order of the district court 1 is not practically final.

2005The practical finality exception recognizes that the rule of finality is not an “ ‘absolute, inflexible rule,’ ” but a term that is to be given a “ ‘practical, rather than a technical, construction.’ ” Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158, ¶ 10 , 126 N.M. 238 , 968 P.2d 328 (quoting Kelly Inn, 113 N.M. at 236 , 824 P.2d at 1038 ).

1998Sunland Park and the Commission counter with the doctrine of practical finality, under which "an appellate court will review a remand order if the issue raised on appeal would, as a practical matter, not be available for review after a decision on remand." High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, *1189 119 N.M. 29, 34 , 888 P.2d 475, 480 (Ct.App.1994).

1998Sunland Park and the Commission counter with the doctrine of practical finality, under which "an appellate court will review a remand order if the issue raised on appeal would, as a practical matter, not be available for review after a decision on remand." High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, *1189 119 N.M. 29, 34 , 888 P.2d 475, 480 (Ct.App.1994).

1994Appeals appear to be permitted as of right only when they come within (1) the collateral order doctrine, which applies to all otherwise non-final orders, see generally Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 612-14 , 845 P.2d 130, 135-37 (1992), and (2) what has been termed the doctrine of practical finality, see Travis v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 919, 920-23 (7th Cir.1993).

1994Appeals appear to be permitted as of right only when they come within (1) the collateral order doctrine, which applies to all otherwise non-final orders, see generally Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 612-14 , 845 P.2d 130, 135-37 (1992), and (2) what has been termed the doctrine of practical finality, see Travis v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 919, 920-23 (7th Cir.1993).

1994Appeals appear to be permitted as of right only when they come within (1) the collateral order doctrine, which applies to all otherwise non-final orders, see generally Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 612-14 , 845 P.2d 130, 135-37 (1992), and (2) what has been termed the doctrine of practical finality, see Travis v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 919, 920-23 (7th Cir.1993).

1994Appeals appear to be permitted as of right only when they come within (1) the collateral order doctrine, which applies to all otherwise non-final orders, see generally Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 612-14 , 845 P.2d 130, 135-37 (1992), and (2) what has been termed the doctrine of practical finality, see Travis v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 919, 920-23 (7th Cir.1993).

2010Motor Vehicle Div., 2005-NMCA-056, ¶ 6 , 137 N.M. 442 , 112 P.3d 303 (recognizing an exception to the general rule that an order of remand is not sufficiently final for purposes of appeal pursuant to the doctrine of practical finality “if the party opposing remand would be unable to have the propriety of the remand heard at a later date”); Apodaca, 1997-NMCA-051, ¶ 16 , 123 N.M. 372 , 940 P.2d 478 (holding that the defendant could appeal the district court’s order granting a new trial because his “right not to be subjected to a second trial for the same offense could not be remedied once the s

2010Motor Vehicle Div., 2005-NMCA-056, ¶ 6 , 137 N.M. 442 , 112 P.3d 303 (recognizing an exception to the general rule that an order of remand is not sufficiently final for purposes of appeal pursuant to the doctrine of practical finality “if the party opposing remand would be unable to have the propriety of the remand heard at a later date”); Apodaca, 1997-NMCA-051, ¶ 16 , 123 N.M. 372 , 940 P.2d 478 (holding that the defendant could appeal the district court’s order granting a new trial because his “right not to be subjected to a second trial for the same offense could not be remedied once the s

2009Defendant has not presented any new argument to persuade us that 8 the district court’s order is final and immediately appealable. [MIO 6 (citing State 9 v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 127, 129 , 428 P.2d 982, 984 (1967); State v. Boyer, 103 N.M. 10 655, 658-60, 712 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Ct. App. 1985))] 11 For these reasons, we dismiss for lack of a final, appealable order. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 MICHAEL E.

2009Defendant has not presented any new argument to persuade us that 8 the district court’s order is final and immediately appealable. [MIO 6 (citing State 9 v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 127, 129 , 428 P.2d 982, 984 (1967); State v. Boyer, 103 N.M. 10 655, 658-60, 712 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Ct. App. 1985))] 11 For these reasons, we dismiss for lack of a final, appealable order. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 MICHAEL E.

2009Defendant has not presented any new argument to persuade us that 8 the district court’s order is final and immediately appealable. [MIO 6 (citing State 9 v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 127, 129 , 428 P.2d 982, 984 (1967); State v. Boyer, 103 N.M. 10 655, 658-60, 712 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Ct. App. 1985))] 11 For these reasons, we dismiss for lack of a final, appealable order. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 MICHAEL E.