purely de novo standard in Tennessee

2014“However, a trial court’s conclusions of law—such as whether counsel’s performance was deficient or whether that deficiency was prejudicial—are reviewed under a purely de novo standard, with no presumption of correctness given to the trial court’s conclusions.” Id. -2- The trial court ruled following the hearing that upon its review there was absolutely no proof of ineffective assistance of counsel by trial counsel.

2013“However, a trial court’s conclusions of law—such as whether counsel’s performance was deficient or whether that deficiency was prejudicial—are reviewed under a purely de novo standard, with no -6- presumption of correctness given to the trial court’s conclusions.” Id.

2012Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 357 (Tenn. 2005), Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

2012Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 357 (Tenn. 2005), Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

2017However, a trial court’s conclusions of law are examined “under a purely de novo standard of review, affording no presumption of correctness to those findings.” Davenport, 2005 WL 3533299 at *6 (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993)(citing Estate of Adkins v. White Consol.

2012Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 357 (Tenn. 2005), Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

2003“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).

2003“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).

2003“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).

2003“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).

2012In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn.2002) (citing Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450 , 457 n. 5 (Tenn.2001)).

2012In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450 , 457 n. 5 (Tenn. 2001)).

2026“Evidence ‘favorable to an accused’ includes evidence deemed to be exculpatory in nature and evidence that could be used to impeach the [S]tate’s witnesses.” Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52, 55-56 (Tenn. 2001).

2025Evidence “favorable to the accused” includes both “evidence deemed to be exculpatory in nature and evidence that could be used to impeach the state’s witnesses.” Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52, 55-56 (Tenn. 2001).

2008Additionally, our supreme court, in setting forth the standard for identifying a constitutionally valid guilty plea, has noted that “before a trial judge can accept a guilty plea, there must be an affirmative showing that it was given intelligently and voluntarily.” State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 , 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711 (1969)).

2006“However, a trial court’s conclusions of law-- such as whether counsel’s performance was deficient or whether that deficiency was prejudicial--are reviewed under a purely de novo standard, with no presumption of correctness given to the trial court’s conclusions.” Id. -4- Additionally, our supreme court, in setting forth the standard for identifying a constitutionally valid guilty plea, noted that “before a trial judge can accept a guilty plea, there must be an affirmative showing that it was given intelligently and voluntarily.” State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) (citing to Boy

2008Additionally, our supreme court, in setting forth the standard for identifying a constitutionally valid guilty plea, has noted that “before a trial judge can accept a guilty plea, there must be an affirmative showing that it was given intelligently and voluntarily.” State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 , 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711 (1969)).

2006“However, a trial court’s conclusions of law-- such as whether counsel’s performance was deficient or whether that deficiency was prejudicial--are reviewed under a purely de novo standard, with no presumption of correctness given to the trial court’s conclusions.” Id. -4- Additionally, our supreme court, in setting forth the standard for identifying a constitutionally valid guilty plea, noted that “before a trial judge can accept a guilty plea, there must be an affirmative showing that it was given intelligently and voluntarily.” State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) (citing to Boy

2001However, the conclusions of law in post-conviction proceedings, such as whether counsel’s performance was deficient or whether that deficiency was prejudicial -- are reviewed under a purely de novo standard, with no presumption of correctness given to the trial court’s conclusions. -4- See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999).

2001However, a trial court’s conclusions of law–such as whether counsel’s performance was deficient or whether that deficiency was prejudicial–are reviewed under a purely de novo standard, with no presumption of correctness given to the trial court’s conclusions. -10- Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461 (holding that appellate review of the trial court’s conclusion regarding the effectiveness of counsel is de novo because it involves a mixed question of law and fact).

2005See Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997).

2003See Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn.1997).

2020See Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 217 (reviewing findings of fact at a suppression hearing under a purely de novo standard when the only evidence considered by the trial court was that of a videotape).

2001See Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 217 (reviewing findings of fact at a suppression hearing under a purely de novo standard when the only evidence considered by the trial court was that of a videotape); Landers v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.

2014See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001). -10- Ineffective Assistance of Counsel When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that “(a) the services rendered by trial counsel were deficient and (b) that the deficient performance was prejudicial.” See Powers v. State, 942 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tenn. Crim.

2013See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001). -4- When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that “(a) the services rendered by trial counsel were deficient and (b) that the deficient performance was prejudicial.” See Powers v. State, 942 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tenn. Crim.

2002Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 6-7 (Tenn. 1982).

2002Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 6-7 (Tenn. 1982).

2024Mr. Thomas is required to “prov[e] a constitutional violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tenn. 1995) (citing State v. Spurlock, 874 S.W.2d 602, 610 (Tenn. Crim.

2024Mr. Thomas is required to “prov[e] a constitutional violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tenn. 1995) (citing State v. Spurlock, 874 S.W.2d 602, 610 (Tenn. Crim.

2020On appellate review of suppression issues, the prevailing party “is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.” State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)).

2020On appellate review of suppression issues, the prevailing party “is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.” State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)).

2018App. 10(b) (stating “Issues which are not supported by argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived by this court.”); State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 393 (Tenn. 2005). -3- reviewed under a purely de novo standard, with no presumption of correctness.

2017Indus., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).

2013See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.2d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

2012See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 56 , 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that “[although the Court of Appeals correctly stated that the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion, it engaged in an analysis that more closely resembled de novo review of the facts presented and- determined that, in its view, the degree of variance [from the Guidelines] was not warranted”).

2012See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 56 , 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that “[although the Court of Appeals correctly stated that the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion, it engaged in an analysis that more closely resembled de novo review of the facts presented and- determined that, in its view, the degree of variance [from the Guidelines] was not warranted”).

2011See State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2001). -7- However, the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law are reviewed under a purely de novo standard with no presumption of correctness.

2011S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn.2001).

2010Campbell v. State, 904 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tenn. 1995).

2006Our high court further noted that “a plea is not ‘voluntary’ if it is the product of ‘[i]gnorence, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, [or] subtle or blatant threats,’” Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43 ), or if the defendant is “incompetent or otherwise not in control of his mental facilities” when the plea was entered.

2005See Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993); Adams v. Dean Roofing Co., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). -7- IV.

2005See Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169 .