street inquiry in New York

1987It is axiomatic that an officer may only seize and take into custody an individual when the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed a crime (see, People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 ; People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106 ).

1984(People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 .) A stop is an exercise of the common-law right to inquire and is activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

2012The police testimony elicited at trial showed that the officer who issued the summonses observed roughly 100 individuals standing in front of and across the street from the bar; that, upon conducting a “business inspection” of the interior of the premises, he “approximat[ed]” that there were “well over the ... 75 people” allowed by the governing certificate of occupancy; and that upon walking toward the rear of the premises, he observed only “one exit or entrance to the establishment.” With respect to the alleged overcrowding condition, the unadorned police testimony that there were “well over

2009Pursuant to this section, a public entity’s failure to install pedestrian ramps when it resurfaces a street is in violation of the ADA (Kinney v Yerusalim, 9 F3d 1067 [3d Cir 1993]).

2002R.R., supra.) Further, the IAS court recognized the tree-well as an “improvement,” which is included in the bylaws definition of “property.” We find the accident site was squarely within the area for which Future and the Board were obligated to maintain liability insurance and conclude that third-party defendants must bear the costs of 32nd Street’s defense.

1995The totality of the circumstances, including the officer having observed the respondent and another individual gambling with dice in exchange for money on the street in violation of Penal Law § 225.30 (2), possession of a gambling device, fully support the conclusion that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent had just committed a crime, thus justifying his arrest and the subsequent search and seizure (People v Alston, 178 AD2d 153, 155 , lv denied 80 NY2d 827 ; People v Rivera, 67 AD2d 867 ).

1995The totality of the circumstances, including the officer having observed the respondent and another individual gambling with dice in exchange for money on the street in violation of Penal Law § 225.30 (2), possession of a gambling device, fully support the conclusion that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent had just committed a crime, thus justifying his arrest and the subsequent search and seizure (People v Alston, 178 AD2d 153, 155 , lv denied 80 NY2d 827 ; People v Rivera, 67 AD2d 867 ).

1995Nor did the Family Court, in finding that the respondent committed acts constituting unauthorized use of a motor vehicle err in applying the statutory presumption under Penal Law § 165.05 (1) that a person who uses a vehicle without the consent of the owner is presumed to know that he does not have such consent (Matter of Brenda D., 186 AD2d 65 ), and in rejecting the inherently incredible and inconsistent testimony of the respondent and his witness that they did not know that their use of the vehicle at issue was unauthorized.

1987It is axiomatic that an officer may only seize and take into custody an individual when the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed a crime (see, People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 ; People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106 ).

1987Although the defendant was not detained while the street inquiry was in progress, once the defendant was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car, despite his prior indication that he would voluntarily accompany the officer to the precinct, he was seized within the meaning of the 4th Amendment (see, People v Brnja, 50 NY2d 366, 372 ).

1984(People v Hutchinson, 60 AD2d 577 , affd 47 NY2d 823 .) o Viewing this as a street encounter we must determine whether we are dealing with a street inquiry, a stop, or a seizure, and then, whether the quantum of knowledge possessed by the officers was sufficient to justify their activity.

1984(People v Hutchinson, 60 AD2d 577 , affd 47 NY2d 823 .) o Viewing this as a street encounter we must determine whether we are dealing with a street inquiry, a stop, or a seizure, and then, whether the quantum of knowledge possessed by the officers was sufficient to justify their activity.

1981(See United States v Mendenhall, 446 US 544 .) However, though the defendant was not detained against his will while the street inquiry was in progress, as the People concede, from the moment the police directed him to their car for removal to the police station, he had been placed in custody and, concomitantly, the property in the bag had been seized.

1975(People v Rivera, 14 NY2d 441, 446 .) A bulge in a pocket may be equivocal in the message it communicates; a bulge in a waistband, easily palpable and more revealing, is a certain invitation to further exploration without any real violation of the person.

1952Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comrs. ( 174 N. Y. 417, 441 , supra), “ Separate [the items of tangible property] from the franchise by taking away the street privilege, and they are destroyed.” For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that compensation has been properly granted to claimants (City of Little Falls v. State of New York, 198 App. Div. 488 ; City of New York v. New York Tel.

1952Co., 278 N. Y. 9 , supra; United States v. 25.4 Acres of Land, 71 F. Supp. 255, 258 , affd. sub nom.

1952Co., 278 N. Y. 9 , supra; United States v. 25.4 Acres of Land, 71 F. Supp. 255, 258 , affd. sub nom.

1952Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comrs. ( 174 N. Y. 417, 441 , supra), “ Separate [the items of tangible property] from the franchise by taking away the street privilege, and they are destroyed.” For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that compensation has been properly granted to claimants (City of Little Falls v. State of New York, 198 App. Div. 488 ; City of New York v. New York Tel.

1926In the case at bar the covenant Was that Corson avenue (now Vanderbilt avenue) should “ remain * * * open as a public street or road.” That the railway company’s obstruction of the street was a violation of this covenant seems plain, and, as there is no other evidence of abandonment, in my opinion, the doctrine laid down in Mayor, etc., of City of New York v. Law (supra) should be applied, and Vanderbilt avenue be held not to have been abandoned on January 1, 1898, but to have run to the water.

1922(See Matter of City of New York [Pier Old No. 49], 227 N. Y. 119 .) We are not confronted with this question because of the findings of the commission.

1895Houfe v. Town of Fulton, 34 Wis. 608 ; Stark v. Lancaster, 57 N. H. 88; City of Aurora v. Colshire, 55 Ind. 484 ; Phelps v. City of Mankato, 23 Minn. 276 .

1895In Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 189 , it is held that, where the authorities of a city or town have treated a place as a public street, taking charge of it and regulating it as they do other streets, and the injury occurs by reason of negligence, the corporation cannot, when sued for such injury, defend itself by alleging irregularity in the proceedings or a want of authority in establishing the street The rule is well settled that the act of the city in assuming authority to control the land as a street renders it chargeable with the same duties, and imposes upon it the same liabilities, as if

1895Houfe v. Town of Fulton, 34 Wis. 608 ; Stark v. Lancaster, 57 N. H. 88; City of Aurora v. Colshire, 55 Ind. 484 ; Phelps v. City of Mankato, 23 Minn. 276 .

1895Houfe v. Town of Fulton, 34 Wis. 608 ; Stark v. Lancaster, 57 N. H. 88; City of Aurora v. Colshire, 55 Ind. 484 ; Phelps v. City of Mankato, 23 Minn. 276 .