evidential standard in New Jersey

2026Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). "[T]he evaluation of every motion for summary judgment requires the court, trial or appellate, to review the motion record against not only the elements of the cause of action but also the evidential standard governing that cause of action." Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 40 .

2026A-2420-24 6 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he evaluation of every motion for summary judgment requires the court, trial or appellate, to review the motion record against not only the elements of the cause of action but also the evidential standard governing that cause of action." Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 40 . "[A] negligence cause of action requires the establishment of four elements: (1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) actual and proximate causation, and (4) damages." Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014) (alteration in ori

2026We apply "the same evidential standard: if, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according [them] . . . the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could A-0675-24 10 differ, the motion must be denied." Ibid. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004)).

2026Both motions are governed by "the same evidential standard: 'if, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied[.]'" Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004) (quoting Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000)).

2026A motion for judgment at the close of all evidence under Rule 4:40-1 is judged A-2181-23 10 "by the same evidential standard," which is "[i]f, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according [them] the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied." Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004) (quoting Est. of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000)).

2026Both motions are governed by "the same evidential standard: 'if, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied[.]'" Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004) (quoting Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000)).

1996In State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 619 , 477 A.2d 308 (1984), we noted that at a capital sentencing proceeding, “a defendant is entitled to the use of all reliable, helpful information.” Indeed, sentencing deliberations may appropriately take into account factors that would not satisfy conventional evidential standards. “[T]he sentencing process should embrace an evidential inquiry ‘broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information that may be considered, or the source from which it may come.’” Id. at 620 , 477 A.2d 308 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 , 92

1996In State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 619 , 477 A.2d 308 (1984), we noted that at a capital sentencing proceeding, “a defendant is entitled to the use of all reliable, helpful information.” Indeed, sentencing deliberations may appropriately take into account factors that would not satisfy conventional evidential standards. “[T]he sentencing process should embrace an evidential inquiry ‘broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information that may be considered, or the source from which it may come.’” Id. at 620 , 477 A.2d 308 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 , 92

2026The motion should only "be granted where no rational juror could conclude that the plaintiff marshaled sufficient evidence to satisfy each prima facie element of a cause of action." Godfrey v. Princeton Theological Seminary, 196 N.J. 178, 197 (2008).

2021The motion should only "be granted where no rational juror could conclude that the plaintiff marshaled sufficient evidence to satisfy each prima facie element of a cause of action." Godfrey v. Princeton Theological Seminary, 196 N.J. 178, 197 (2008). [ 225 N.J. 373, 397 (2016) (alteration in original).] As with summary judgment motions, the court must determine whether the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Frugis, 177 N.J. at 269 (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 536 ).

2025Permits, 185 N.J. 452, 466-67 (2006) (recognizing in State actions, "due process is a flexible and fact-sensitive concept," and "a function of what reason and justice require under the circumstances"). "[W]here no disputed issues of material fact exist, an administrative agency need not hold an evidential hearing in a contested case." Frank v. Ivy Club, 120 N.J. 73, 98 (1990).

2022"It is well- established that where no disputed issues of material fact exist, an administrative agency need not hold an evidential hearing in a contested case." Frank v. Ivy Club, 120 N.J. 73, 98 (1990); see also N.J.A.C. 17:1-1.3(g) ("If the granted appeal involves solely a question of law, the Board . . . may . . . issue a final determination, which shall include detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, based upon the documents, submissions and legal arguments of the parties.").

2025"Thus, 'neither the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the elements of the cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action.'" Ibid. (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)).

2024When assessing a summary judgment motion, "[t]he motion court must analyze the record in light of the substantive standard and burden of proof that a factfinder would apply in the event that the case were tried." Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016). "[T]he motion court . . . can [not] ignore the elements of the cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action." Ibid. (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)).

2023The court must then determine "whether a rational factfinder could resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party," id. at 481 (quoting Perez v. Professionally Green, LLC, 215 N.J. 388, 405-06 (2013)), bearing in mind "neither the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the elements of a cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action ," Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014).

2021The court must then determine "whether a rational factfinder could resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non -moving party," id. at 481 (quoting Perez v. Professionally Green, LLC, 215 N.J. 388, 405-06 (2013)), bearing in mind "neither the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the elements of the cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action." Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 38 .

2021Nonetheless, "under certain circumstances, a search warrant's validity may be questioned, in which case an evidential hearing may be afforded." Ibid. (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)).

2021Nonetheless, "under certain circumstances, a search warrant's validity may be questioned, in which case an evidential hearing may be afforded." Ibid. (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56 ).

2026A-2420-24 6 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he evaluation of every motion for summary judgment requires the court, trial or appellate, to review the motion record against not only the elements of the cause of action but also the evidential standard governing that cause of action." Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 40 . "[A] negligence cause of action requires the establishment of four elements: (1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) actual and proximate causation, and (4) damages." Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014) (alteration in ori

2018A-4455-16T3 6 We must decide "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins.

2025Stated differently, A-1241-23 20 "summary judgment should be granted . . . 'against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449 , 472 (2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

2020In that regard, "[s]ummary judgment should be granted . . . 'against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" Friedman v. Martinez, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op. at 30) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

2021The CFA affords "relief to consumers from 'fraudulent practices in the marketplace.'" Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., 203 N.J. 496, 521 (2010) (quoting Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 11 (2004)).

2020When the resolution of a material issue rests on opposing certifications, a "[d]efendant ha[s] a right to an evidential hearing on the contested issue[]." Ibid. ("If the . . . judge found some [conflicting] evidence in the certifications, he should have scheduled a plenary hearing"); see also Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 25-26 (2004).2 2 Defendant also asserts that the State violated Rule 7:7-7(b)(1) because the appellate prosecutor conceded during oral argument before the Law Division that she could not open the link to the video allegedly sent to defendant’s trial attorney; as

2018See State v. Macon , 57 N.J. 325 , 333, 273 A.2d 1 (1971).

2018See State v. Macon , 57 N.J. 325 , 333, 273 A.2d 1 (1971).

2020Super. 596, 601 (App. Div. 2016) (citing Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 ).] "The practical effect of [Rule 4:46-2(c)] is that neither the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the elements of the cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J.

2019Thus, summary judgment is properly granted "[o]nly 'when the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Ibid. (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 ). "[T]he evaluation of every motion for summary judgment requires the court, trial or appellate, to review the motion record against not only the elements of the cause of action but also the evidential standard governing that cause of action." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014).

2010All three are governed by the same evidential standard: [I]f, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied____ [Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 , 754 A.2d 544 (2000) (quoting Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 415 , 690 A.2d 575 (1997) (quoting Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5-6 , 258 A.2d 706 (1969))) (citations and quotations omitted in

2010All three are governed by the same evidential standard: [I]f, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied____ [Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 , 754 A.2d 544 (2000) (quoting Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 415 , 690 A.2d 575 (1997) (quoting Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5-6 , 258 A.2d 706 (1969))) (citations and quotations omitted in

2019We apply the following evidential standard: "[i]f, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him [or her] the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied." Id. at 456 (quoting Verdicchio, 179 N.J. at 30 ).

2019We apply the following evidential standard: "[i]f, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him [or her] the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied." Id. at 456 (quoting Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004)).

1996In State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 619 , 477 A.2d 308 (1984), we noted that at a capital sentencing proceeding, “a defendant is entitled to the use of all reliable, helpful information.” Indeed, sentencing deliberations may appropriately take into account factors that would not satisfy conventional evidential standards. “[T]he sentencing process should embrace an evidential inquiry ‘broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information that may be considered, or the source from which it may come.’” Id. at 620 , 477 A.2d 308 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 , 92

1996In State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 619 , 477 A.2d 308 (1984), we noted that at a capital sentencing proceeding, “a defendant is entitled to the use of all reliable, helpful information.” Indeed, sentencing deliberations may appropriately take into account factors that would not satisfy conventional evidential standards. “[T]he sentencing process should embrace an evidential inquiry ‘broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information that may be considered, or the source from which it may come.’” Id. at 620 , 477 A.2d 308 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 , 92

2024"When no issue of fact exists, and only a question of law remains, this [c]ourt affords no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court." Templo Fuente, 224 N.J. at 199 .

2018Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).] "The practical effect of [Rule 4:46-2(c)] is that neither the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the elements of the cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014).

2020In both motions, we apply "'the same evidential standard: "if, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him [or her] the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied."'" Ibid. (quoting Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000)).

2020In both motions, we apply "'the same evidential standard: "if, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him [or her] the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied."'" Ibid. (quoting Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004)).

1994The Supreme Court addressed the necessity for conducting an evidential hearing under such circumstances in Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 479 , 577 A.2d 143 (1990), involving contested facts with respect to the setting aside of a settlement agreement.

1994The Supreme Court addressed the necessity for conducting an evidential hearing under such circumstances in Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 479 , 577 A.2d 143 (1990), involving contested facts with respect to the setting aside of a settlement agreement.

2020See Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 .

1986We reverse and remand for a preliminary evidential hearing as prescribed by Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973).

2016Thus, “neither the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the elements of the cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action.” Bhagat, *481 supra, 217 N.J. at 38 , 84 A.3d 583 ; see, e.g., id. at 47-48, 84 A.3d 583 (reviewing grant of summary judgment in light of elements of valid and irrevocable gift and clear and convincing standard of proof); Durando, supra, 209 N.J. at 253-57, 37 A.3d 449 (applying clear and convincing evidentiary standard to grant of summary judgment in defamation action); Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 542-45 , 666 A.2d 146 (evaluating motion

2014“Although courts construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in a summary judgment motion, the ‘dear and convincing' standard in [a] defamation action adds an additional weight to the plaintiffs’ usual ‘preponderance of the evidence’ burden.” [Id. at 253, 37 A.3d 449 (citations omitted).] In short, the evaluation of every motion for summary judgment requires the court, trial or appellate, to review the motion record against not only the elements of the cause of action but also the evidential standard governing that cause of action.

2026Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). "[T]he evaluation of every motion for summary judgment requires the court, trial or appellate, to review the motion record against not only the elements of the cause of action but also the evidential standard governing that cause of action." Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 40 .

2026"Bald assertions [in a certification] are not capable of either supporting or defeating summary judgment." Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J.

2025As the BPU found here, the record before the ALJ demonstrates the intervenors were afforded "ample opportunity to argue against the [s]tipulation." The BPU's decision is consonant with our decision in Petition of PSE&G, 304 A-0386-23 15 N.J.