special legislation clause in Illinois

2023IV, § 13. ¶ 118 “This court has consistently held that the purpose of the special legislation clause is to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications that discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis.” Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 391 (1997).

2020The special legislation clause is grounded on “the conviction that governments should establish and enforce general principles applicable to all their citizens and not enrich particular classes of individuals at the expense of others.” Id. (citing Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 391-92 (1997)).

2001The special legislation clause “expressly prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated.” Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 391 ; Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 122 .

2001IV, § 13. *953 The special legislation clause "expressly prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated." Best, 179 Ill.2d at 391 , 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d 1057 ; Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill.2d at 122 , 212 Ill.Dec. 883 , 658 N.E.2d 365 .

2025It “prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group and excluding others that are similarly situated.” Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill. 2d 315, 325 (2005) (explaining that a special legislation challenge is typically reviewed “under the - 19 - No. 1-23-0803 same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge”).

2023We disagree. ¶ 215 i. The Applicable Law ¶ 216 “The special legislation clause prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group and excluding others that are similarly situated.” Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill. 2d 315, 325 , 837 N.E.2d 88, 95 (2005).

2020Instead, to contravene the special legislation clause, “the statute must confer on a person, entity, or class of persons or entities a special benefit or exclusive privilege that is denied to others who are similarly situated.” Id. ¶ 87 Here, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of establishing that section 4.5 of the Act discriminates in favor of a select group and against a similarly situated group.

2020Instead, to contravene the special legislation clause, “the statute must confer on a person, entity, or class of persons or entities a special benefit or exclusive privilege that is denied to others who are similarly situated.” Id. ¶ 87 Here, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of establishing that section 4.5 of the Act discriminates in favor of a select group and against a similarly situated group.

2018“The special legislation clause expressly prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special privilege or benefit upon a person or group of persons while excluding others similarly situated.” Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 12, 21 (2003).

2007IV, §13 (“The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable”); Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 12, 21-22 , 802 N.E.2d 752, 758-59 (2003) (“The special legislation clause expressly prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special privilege or benefit upon a person or group of persons while excluding others similarly situated. [Citation.] Although the legislature enjoys broad discretion in making statutory classifications, the legislature is prohibited, under the special legislation clause, from making arbitrary classi

2010See, e.g., In re Estate of Jolliff, 199 Ill.2d 510 , 264 Ill.Dec. 642 , 771 N.E.2d 346 (2002); Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill.2d 21 , 259 Ill. *909 Dec. 753, 759 N.E.2d 533 (2001); DeLuna v. St.

2010See, e.g., In re Estate of Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d 510 (2002); Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21 (2001); DeLuna v. St.

1994It is well settled that review of a special legislation challenge is governed by the same standard that applies to review of equal protection challenges. ( Nevitt v. Langfelder (1993), 157 Ill.2d 116, 125 , 191 Ill.Dec. 36 , 623 N.E.2d 281 ; DeLuna, 147 Ill.2d at 75 , 167 Ill.Dec. 1009 , 588 N.E.2d 1139 ; Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 125 Ill.2d 230, 236 , 125 Ill.Dec. 822 , 531 N.E.2d 1 ; In re Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill.2d at 379 , 95 Ill.Dec. 521 , 489 N.E.2d 1385 .) The statute at issue does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect or quasi-suspect cl

1994It is well settled that review of a special legislation challenge is governed by the same standard that applies to review of equal protection challenges. ( Nevitt v. Langfelder (1993), 157 Ill.2d 116, 125 , 191 Ill.Dec. 36 , 623 N.E.2d 281 ; DeLuna, 147 Ill.2d at 75 , 167 Ill.Dec. 1009 , 588 N.E.2d 1139 ; Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 125 Ill.2d 230, 236 , 125 Ill.Dec. 822 , 531 N.E.2d 1 ; In re Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill.2d at 379 , 95 Ill.Dec. 521 , 489 N.E.2d 1385 .) The statute at issue does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect or quasi-suspect cl

2020See Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 394 (“[I]n evaluating a challenged provision [under the special legislation clause] the court must consider the natural and reasonable effect of the legislation on the rights affected by the provision.”). ¶ 48 In support of this argument, Doe compares section 25(e) to a statutory provision that our supreme court struck down in Grasse v. Dealer’s Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179 (1952).

2020See Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 394 (“[I]n evaluating a challenged provision [under the special legislation clause] the court must consider the natural and reasonable effect of the legislation on the rights affected by the provision.”). ¶ 48 In support of this argument, Doe compares section 25(e) to a statutory provision that our supreme court struck down in Grasse v. Dealer’s Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179 (1952).

1994It is well settled that review of a special legislation challenge is governed by the same standard that applies to review of equal protection challenges. ( Nevitt v. Langfelder (1993), 157 Ill.2d 116, 125 , 191 Ill.Dec. 36 , 623 N.E.2d 281 ; DeLuna, 147 Ill.2d at 75 , 167 Ill.Dec. 1009 , 588 N.E.2d 1139 ; Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 125 Ill.2d 230, 236 , 125 Ill.Dec. 822 , 531 N.E.2d 1 ; In re Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill.2d at 379 , 95 Ill.Dec. 521 , 489 N.E.2d 1385 .) The statute at issue does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect or quasi-suspect cl

1994It is well settled that review of a special legislation challenge is governed by the same standard that applies to review of equal protection challenges. ( Nevitt v. Langfelder (1993), 157 Ill.2d 116, 125 , 191 Ill.Dec. 36 , 623 N.E.2d 281 ; DeLuna, 147 Ill.2d at 75 , 167 Ill.Dec. 1009 , 588 N.E.2d 1139 ; Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 125 Ill.2d 230, 236 , 125 Ill.Dec. 822 , 531 N.E.2d 1 ; In re Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill.2d at 379 , 95 Ill.Dec. 521 , 489 N.E.2d 1385 .) The statute at issue does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect or quasi-suspect cl

2020See Board of Education of Peoria School District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of Support Staff, Security/Policeman’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n Unit No. 114, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 48 (Peoria School District). ¶ 53 When a statute is challenged under the special legislation clause, our analysis is twofold.

2019See Board of Education of Peoria School District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of Support Staff, Security/Policeman’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n Unit No. 114, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 48 (Peoria School District). ¶ 53 When a statute is challenged under the special legislation clause, our analysis is twofold.

2002Because the purpose of this prohibition is to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications which discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis, "a party raising a special legislation claim must, at the very least, prove the existence of an arbitrary legislative classification." Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill.2d 394, 400 , 242 Ill.Dec. 606 , 721 N.E.2d 1137, 1141 (1999).

2002Because the purpose of this prohibition is to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications which discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis, "a party raising a special legislation claim must, at the very least, prove the existence of an arbitrary legislative classification." Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill.2d 394, 400 , 242 Ill.Dec. 606 , 721 N.E.2d 1137, 1141 (1999).

1992As a result, it is for the party challenging a statute’s constitutionality — here, plaintiffs — to rebut these presumptions and prove the unconstitutional nature of the statute.” In Chicago National League Ball Club, the supreme court identified the focus of a court’s inquiry when a special legislation claim is made as follows: “There is a presumption in favor of the validity of any legislation ***. *** When a classification under a statute is called into question, if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to sustain the classification, the existence of that state of facts at the time

1992As a result, it is for the party challenging a statute’s constitutionality — here, plaintiffs — to rebut these presumptions and prove the unconstitutional nature of the statute.” In Chicago National League Ball Club, the supreme court identified the focus of a court’s inquiry when a special legislation claim is made as follows: “There is a presumption in favor of the validity of any legislation ***. *** When a classification under a statute is called into question, if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to sustain the classification, the existence of that state of facts at the time

1997"It is well settled that review of a special legislation challenge is governed by the same standard that applies to review of equal protection challenges. [Citations.]" Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill.2d 409, 417 , 204 Ill.Dec. 136 , 641 N.E.2d 360 (1994).

1997"It is well settled that review of a special legislation challenge is governed by the same standard that applies to review of equal protection challenges. [Citations.]” Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 417 (1994).

2010The plaintiffs relied on Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313 , 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (holding that a $500,000 limit on compensatory damages in medical malpractice actions was arbitrary and violated the special legislation clause), Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill.2d 478 , 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972) (holding that a statute that limited recovery for certain automobile accident victims was an arbitrary and unreasonable classification in violation of the special legislation clause), and Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179 , 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952) (holding that a workers' compensat

2010The plaintiffs relied on Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass’n, 63 Ill. 2d 313 (1976) (holding that a $500,000 limit on compensatory damages in medical malpractice actions was arbitrary and violated the special legislation clause), Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478 (1972) (holding that a statute that limited recovery for certain automobile accident victims was an arbitrary and unreasonable classification in violation of the special legislation clause), and Grasse v. Dealer’s Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179 (1952) (holding that a workers’ compensation provision violated the special legislation cl

2016See Board of Education of Peoria School District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of Support Staff, Security/Policeman’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n Unit No. 114, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 48 (quoting Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 Ill. 2d 103, 109 (1972)). ¶ 43 The mere fact that a law affects only a single person or entity does not make it special and, therefore, invalid under the special legislation clause.

2016The majority even recognizes this: “If an entity is uniquely situated, the special legislation clause will not bar the legislature from enacting a law tailored specifically to address the conditions of that particular entity.” (Emphasis in original.) Supra ¶ 22; Peoria School District, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 55 (“Nothing in the constitution bars the legislature from enacting a law specifically addressing the conditions of an entity that is uniquely situated.” (citing Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (2006))); Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 109 (holding that the constitut

2022Governor Pritzker, Harmon, and Welch disagree, contending plaintiffs’ claims have no legal basis because they have not shown a violation of the circuit courts clause of our state constitution. ¶ 64 Our supreme court in both Bridges v. State Board of Elections, 222 Ill. 2d 482 , 493- 94, 856 N.E.2d 445, 451 (2006), and Hirschfield v. Barrett, 40 Ill. 2d 224, 233 , 239 N.E.2d 831, 836 (1968), found the special legislation clause may not be used to upset legislation enacted in compliance with the judicial article of our state constitution. ¶ 65 Recognizing the obstacle Brides and Hirschfield pose

2022Governor Pritzker, Harmon, and Welch disagree, contending plaintiffs’ claims have no legal basis because they have not shown a violation of the circuit courts clause of our state constitution. ¶ 64 Our supreme court in both Bridges v. State Board of Elections, 222 Ill. 2d 482 , 493- 94, 856 N.E.2d 445, 451 (2006), and Hirschfield v. Barrett, 40 Ill. 2d 224, 233 , 239 N.E.2d 831, 836 (1968), found the special legislation clause may not be used to upset legislation enacted in compliance with the judicial article of our state constitution. ¶ 65 Recognizing the obstacle Brides and Hirschfield pose

2003As we have previously recognized, “[t]he courts of this State must be open to all those similarly situated upon the same conditions, and where procedures are provided which are applicable to some and not applicable to others under substantially like circumstances and there are no discernible logical reasons apparent for the variations, they must fall as violative of [the special legislation clause].” Lorton v. Brown Community Unit School District No. 1, 35 Ill. 2d 362, 366 (1966).

2003As we have previously recognized, "[t]he courts of this State must be open to all those similarly situated upon the same conditions, and where procedures are provided which are applicable to some and not applicable to others under substantially like circumstances and there are no discernible logical reasons apparent for the variations, they must fall as violative of [the special legislation clause]." Lorton v. Brown Community Unit School District No. 1, 35 Ill.2d 362, 366 , 220 N.E.2d 161 (1966).

2020“A special legislation challenge is generally judged under the same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge.” Quinn, 2016 IL 119704, ¶ 24 .

2020“Its purpose, as [the supreme court has] consistently held, is to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications that discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis.” Moline School District No. 40, 2016 IL 119704, ¶ 18 (citing Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 391 (1997)). ¶ 62 In assessing whether a statute violates the special legislation clause, courts apply a two- part analysis: “First, they must determine whether the statutory classification at issue discriminates in favor of a select group.

2010The plaintiffs relied on Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313 , 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (holding that a $500,000 limit on compensatory damages in medical malpractice actions was arbitrary and violated the special legislation clause), Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill.2d 478 , 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972) (holding that a statute that limited recovery for certain automobile accident victims was an arbitrary and unreasonable classification in violation of the special legislation clause), and Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179 , 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952) (holding that a workers' compensat

2010The plaintiffs relied on Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass’n, 63 Ill. 2d 313 (1976) (holding that a $500,000 limit on compensatory damages in medical malpractice actions was arbitrary and violated the special legislation clause), Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478 (1972) (holding that a statute that limited recovery for certain automobile accident victims was an arbitrary and unreasonable classification in violation of the special legislation clause), and Grasse v. Dealer’s Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179 (1952) (holding that a workers’ compensation provision violated the special legislation cl

1994It is well settled that review of a special legislation challenge is governed by the same standard that applies to review of equal protection challenges. ( Nevitt v. Langfelder (1993), 157 Ill.2d 116, 125 , 191 Ill.Dec. 36 , 623 N.E.2d 281 ; DeLuna, 147 Ill.2d at 75 , 167 Ill.Dec. 1009 , 588 N.E.2d 1139 ; Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 125 Ill.2d 230, 236 , 125 Ill.Dec. 822 , 531 N.E.2d 1 ; In re Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill.2d at 379 , 95 Ill.Dec. 521 , 489 N.E.2d 1385 .) The statute at issue does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect or quasi-suspect cl

1994It is well settled that review of a special legislation challenge is governed by the same standard that applies to review of equal protection challenges. ( Nevitt v. Langfelder (1993), 157 Ill.2d 116, 125 , 191 Ill.Dec. 36 , 623 N.E.2d 281 ; DeLuna, 147 Ill.2d at 75 , 167 Ill.Dec. 1009 , 588 N.E.2d 1139 ; Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 125 Ill.2d 230, 236 , 125 Ill.Dec. 822 , 531 N.E.2d 1 ; In re Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill.2d at 379 , 95 Ill.Dec. 521 , 489 N.E.2d 1385 .) The statute at issue does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect or quasi-suspect cl

2016The majority even recognizes this: “If an entity is uniquely situated, the special legislation clause will not bar the legislature from enacting a law tailored specifically to address the conditions of that particular entity.” (Emphasis in original.) Supra ¶ 22; Peoria School District, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 55 (“Nothing in the constitution bars the legislature from enacting a law specifically addressing the conditions of an entity that is uniquely situated.” (citing Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (2006))); Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 109 (holding that the constitut

2016The majority even recognizes this: “If an entity is uniquely situated, the special legislation clause will not bar the legislature from enacting a law tailored specifically to address the conditions of that particular entity.” (Emphasis in original.) Supra ¶ 22; Peoria School District, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 55 (“Nothing in the constitution bars the legislature from enacting a law specifically addressing the conditions of an entity that is uniquely situated.” (citing Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (2006))); Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 109 (holding that the constitut

2007Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64, 86 (2002).

2007Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64, 86 (2002).

2015Accordingly, we examine the two issues together.1 1 Although AFSCME never raised a special legislation challenge below and it could be considered forfeited (Connor v. City of Chicago, 354 Ill.

2015Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 1 Although AFSCME never raised a special legislation challenge below and it could be considered forfeited (Connor v. City of Chicago, 354 Ill.

1994(Illinois Polygraph Society, 83 Ill. 2d at 138 .) The majority states that "review of a special legislation challenge is governed by the same standard that applies to review of equal protection challenges,” and that in this case, the court must determine whether the classification at issue is rationally related to a legitimate State interest. 161 Ill. 2d at 417.

1994East Side Levee & Sanitary District v. Madison County Levee & Sanitary District (1973), 54 Ill.2d 442, 447 , 298 N.E.2d 177 . *368 When a law is attacked as special legislation, it is the duty of the courts to decide whether the classification is unreasonable because it preferentially and arbitrarily includes a class to the exclusion of all others. ( Illinois Polygraph Society, 83 Ill.2d at 138 , 46 Ill.Dec. 574 , 414 N.E.2d 458 .) The majority states that "review of a special legislation challenge is governed by the same standard that applies to review of equal protection challenges," and tha

1985(Anderson v. Wagner (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 295, 316 , 402 N.E.2d 560, 570 .) The plaintiff notes that although the court in Anderson found neither a due process violation nor a special legislation violation of section 13 of article IV of the Illinois Constitution, the court did not succinctly state whether the statute violated the equal protection clause.

1985(Anderson v. Wagner (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 295, 316 , 402 N.E.2d 560, 570 .) The plaintiff notes that although the court in Anderson found neither a due process violation nor a special legislation violation of section 13 of article IV of the Illinois Constitution, the court did not succinctly state whether the statute violated the equal protection clause.