competing harms defense in Maine

2025The competing harms defense is not applicable “merely because a defendant subjectively believes that a threat of imminent physical harm to person or property exists; it is requisite that it be shown as a 12 fact that such physical harm is imminently threatened.” State v. Poole, 568 A.2d 830, 831 (Me. 1990) (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Kee, 398 A.2d 384, 386 (Me. 1979) (noting that “the Legislature regards the ‘circumstances’ giving rise to the need for a choice of harms, i.e., the imminence of physical harm, as circumstances existing in fact”). [¶20] Inherent

1990Although the state bears the burden of proof as to all elements of the offense, and must disprove the competing harms defense once it is generated, the defendant has the burden of establishing that the competing harms defense is generated by ensuring the presence of “evidence sufficient to make the existence of all the facts constituting the defense a reasonable hypothesis for the factfinder to entertain.” State v. Glidden, 487 A.2d 642, 644 (Me.1985); State v. Kee, 398 A.2d 384, 386 (Me.1979); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 101(1) (1983). 4 In order to generate the defense there must be evidence that the de

2025State v. Nadeau, 2007 ME 57 , ¶ 9 & n.1, 920 A.2d 452 . [¶18] In discussing the adoption of the competing harms justification, we have said that it “was not intended as an overlay of self defense, but rather was designed to codify the principle inherent in the common law defense of necessity.” State v. Crocker, 506 A.2d 209, 211 (Me. 1986) (citing State v. Dorsey, 395 A.2d 855, 856 (N.H. 1978)).

1986See State v. Dorsey, 118 N.H. 844, 845 , 395 A.2d 855, 856 (1978).

2007See State v. Raubeson, 488 A.2d 1379,1380 .

1986State v. Barry, 495 A.2d 825, 826 (Me.1985); State v. Raubeson, 488 A.2d 1379, 1380 (Me.1985); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103 (1983).

2001By case law we have crafted an additional requirement to the competing harms defense, which is that there must be evidence that the defendant's conduct is necessary because there is "no reasonable alternative other than violating the law." State v. Moore, 577 A.2d 348, 350 (Me.1990).

2001By case law we have crafted an additional requirement to the competing harms defense, which is that there must be evidence that the defendant’s conduct is necessary because there is “no reasonable alternative other than violating the law.” State v. Moore, 577 A.2d 348, 350 (Me.1990).

2011In finding Brockelbank guilty of aggravated criminal trespass, the jury implicitly found that the State had disproved the defense. “[Ojnce a justification has gone to the fact-finder and the fact-finder finds that the State has disproved the justification, thereby rejecting it, we review the facts in the light most favorable to the State.” Nadeau, 2007 ME 57, ¶ 10 , 920 A.2d 452 . [¶ 11] There are four required elements to the competing harms defense: (1) the defendant or another person must be threatened with imminent physical harm, when viewed objectively; (2) the present conduct must be for

2011In finding Brockelbank guilty of aggravated criminal trespass, the jury implicitly found that the State had disproved the defense. “[Ojnce a justification has gone to the fact-finder and the fact-finder finds that the State has disproved the justification, thereby rejecting it, we review the facts in the light most favorable to the State.” Nadeau, 2007 ME 57, ¶ 10 , 920 A.2d 452 . [¶ 11] There are four required elements to the competing harms defense: (1) the defendant or another person must be threatened with imminent physical harm, when viewed objectively; (2) the present conduct must be for

2025The competing harms defense is not applicable “merely because a defendant subjectively believes that a threat of imminent physical harm to person or property exists; it is requisite that it be shown as a 12 fact that such physical harm is imminently threatened.” State v. Poole, 568 A.2d 830, 831 (Me. 1990) (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Kee, 398 A.2d 384, 386 (Me. 1979) (noting that “the Legislature regards the ‘circumstances’ giving rise to the need for a choice of harms, i.e., the imminence of physical harm, as circumstances existing in fact”). [¶20] Inherent

2001Although we have noted that the common law defense of necessity did not survive the adoption of the Criminal Code, see State v. Poole, 568 A.2d 830, 832 , we have incorporated this common law requirement into the competing harms defense.

2025Id. § 103(1); see also State v. Nobles, 2018 ME 26, ¶¶ 31-32 , 179 A.3d 910 (discussing the evidentiary burden and elements required to generate a competing harms instruction).

2025Id. § 103(1); see also State v. Nobles, 2018 ME 26, ¶¶ 31-32 , 179 A.3d 910 (discussing the evidentiary burden and elements required to generate a competing harms instruction).

2025State v. Nadeau, 2007 ME 57 , ¶ 9 & n.1, 920 A.2d 452 . [¶18] In discussing the adoption of the competing harms justification, we have said that it “was not intended as an overlay of self defense, but rather was designed to codify the principle inherent in the common law defense of necessity.” State v. Crocker, 506 A.2d 209, 211 (Me. 1986) (citing State v. Dorsey, 395 A.2d 855, 856 (N.H. 1978)).

2025When examining the Model Penal Code, one of the “progenitor[s] of section 103,” we noted that an inherent principle of the codification is “that the competing harms defense 10 applies only in the absence of explicit legislative provision.” Crocker, 506 A.2d at 211-12 . [I]n order for the defense to be considered, [t]he issue of competing values must not have been foreclosed by a deliberate legislative choice, as when the law has dealt explicitly with the specific situation that presents the choice of evils.

2025Inst. 1962) (the competing harms defense “cannot succeed if the issue of competing values has been previously foreclosed by a deliberate legislative choice, as when some provision of the law deals explicitly with the specific situation that presents the choice of evils”); State v. Smith, 984 P.2d 1276, 1289 (Haw.

2025See State v. Sexton, 2017 ME 65, ¶ 19 , 159 A.3d 335 .

2025See State v. Sexton, 2017 ME 65, ¶ 19 , 159 A.3d 335 .

2018See Ford , 2013 ME 96 , ¶¶ 15-17, 82 A.3d 75 .

2018See Ford , 2013 ME 96 , ¶¶ 15-17, 82 A.3d 75 .

2009Holland argues that, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to him, he met all of the requirements for presenting the competing harms defense to the jury. [¶ 59] “Before the competing harms justification can be submitted to a fact-finder, there must be evidence that, if believed by the fact-finder, would constitute a justification under 17-A M.R.S. § 103 ... to the charged criminal conduct.” Nadeau, 2007 ME 57 , ¶ 9 n. 1, 920 A.2d at 454 ; see also State v. Lemieux, 2001 ME 46, ¶ 3 , 767 A.2d 295, 297 (“In competing harms cases, we require that the evidence, construed most favorably to

2009Holland argues that, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to him, he met all of the requirements for presenting the competing harms defense to the jury. [¶ 59] “Before the competing harms justification can be submitted to a fact-finder, there must be evidence that, if believed by the fact-finder, would constitute a justification under 17-A M.R.S. § 103 ... to the charged criminal conduct.” Nadeau, 2007 ME 57 , ¶ 9 n. 1, 920 A.2d at 454 ; see also State v. Lemieux, 2001 ME 46, ¶ 3 , 767 A.2d 295, 297 (“In competing harms cases, we require that the evidence, construed most favorably to

2007Rev. 1527 , 1535-36 (2005). [¶ 15] It is also useful to look at New Hampshire case law interpreting the requirements of the competing harms defense because our statute is based on the New Hampshire statute. 2 The New Hampshire Supreme Court summarized the requirements of the competing harms defense as: “[l][t]he otherwise illegal conduct must be urgently necessary, [2] there must be no lawful alternative, and [3] the harm sought to be avoided must outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the violated statute.” State v. L’Heureux, 150 N.H.

2007Rev. 1527 , 1535-36 (2005). [¶ 15] It is also useful to look at New Hampshire case law interpreting the requirements of the competing harms defense because our statute is based on the New Hampshire statute. 2 The New Hampshire Supreme Court summarized the requirements of the competing harms defense as: “[l][t]he otherwise illegal conduct must be urgently necessary, [2] there must be no lawful alternative, and [3] the harm sought to be avoided must outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the violated statute.” State v. L’Heureux, 150 N.H.

2007Rev. 1527 , 1535-36 (2005). [¶ 15] It is also useful to look at New Hampshire case law interpreting the requirements of the competing harms defense because our statute is based on the New Hampshire statute. 2 The New Hampshire Supreme Court summarized the requirements of the competing harms defense as: “[l][t]he otherwise illegal conduct must be urgently necessary, [2] there must be no lawful alternative, and [3] the harm sought to be avoided must outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the violated statute.” State v. L’Heureux, 150 N.H.

2007Rev. 1527 , 1535-36 (2005). [¶ 15] It is also useful to look at New Hampshire case law interpreting the requirements of the competing harms defense because our statute is based on the New Hampshire statute. 2 The New Hampshire Supreme Court summarized the requirements of the competing harms defense as: “[l][t]he otherwise illegal conduct must be urgently necessary, [2] there must be no lawful alternative, and [3] the harm sought to be avoided must outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the violated statute.” State v. L’Heureux, 150 N.H.

2007See id.

2001We “review the trial court’s denial of a request for jury instructions for prejudicial error.” State v. Doyon, 1999 ME 185, ¶ 7 , 745 A.2d 365, 367 (citation omitted). [¶ 3] The competing harms defense applies to “[cjonduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid imminent physical harm to himself or another .... ” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103(1)(1983).

2001We “review the trial court’s denial of a request for jury instructions for prejudicial error.” State v. Doyon, 1999 ME 185, ¶ 7 , 745 A.2d 365, 367 (citation omitted). [¶ 3] The competing harms defense applies to “[cjonduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid imminent physical harm to himself or another .... ” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103(1)(1983).

2001Lemieux contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a jury instruction on the competing harms defense pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103. 2 We disagree and affirm the judgment. 3 [¶ 2] Jury instructions are reviewed “‘as a whole to ensure that they informed the jury correctly and fairly in all necessary respects of the governing law.’ ” State v. Day, 1999 ME 29, ¶ 8 , 724 A.2d 1245, 1247 (quoting State v. Daniels, 663 A.2d 33, 36 (Me.1995)).

2001As we have previously noted, " ‘[gjenerally, inconsistent defenses may be interposed in a criminal case.’ " State v. Knowles, 495 A.2d 335, 338 (Me.1985) (quoting State v. Harris, 189 Conn. 268 , 455 A.2d 342, 344 (1983)).

2001As we have previously noted, " ‘[gjenerally, inconsistent defenses may be interposed in a criminal case.’ " State v. Knowles, 495 A.2d 335, 338 (Me.1985) (quoting State v. Harris, 189 Conn. 268 , 455 A.2d 342, 344 (1983)).

2001As we have previously noted, " ‘[gjenerally, inconsistent defenses may be interposed in a criminal case.’ " State v. Knowles, 495 A.2d 335, 338 (Me.1985) (quoting State v. Harris, 189 Conn. 268 , 455 A.2d 342, 344 (1983)).

2001Lemieux contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a jury instruction on the competing harms defense pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103. 2 We disagree and affirm the judgment. 3 [¶ 2] Jury instructions are reviewed “‘as a whole to ensure that they informed the jury correctly and fairly in all necessary respects of the governing law.’ ” State v. Day, 1999 ME 29, ¶ 8 , 724 A.2d 1245, 1247 (quoting State v. Daniels, 663 A.2d 33, 36 (Me.1995)).

2001Lemieux contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a jury instruction on the competing harms defense pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103. 2 We disagree and affirm the judgment. 3 [¶ 2] Jury instructions are reviewed “‘as a whole to ensure that they informed the jury correctly and fairly in all necessary respects of the governing law.’ ” State v. Day, 1999 ME 29, ¶ 8 , 724 A.2d 1245, 1247 (quoting State v. Daniels, 663 A.2d 33, 36 (Me.1995)).

1997“A defense is ‘in issue’ ... if the evidence is sufficient to make the existence of all facts constituting the defense a reasonable hypothesis for the fact finder to entertain.” State v. Case, 672 A.2d 586, 589 (Me.1996) (quoting State v. Begin, 652 A.2d 102, 106 (Me.1995)). [¶ 5] The competing harms defense applies to “conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid imminent physical harm to himself or another_” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103(1) (1983).

1997See State v. Bassford, 440 A.2d 1059, 1061 (Me.1982) (a “fundamental rule of appellate procedure [is] that a court should avoid expressing opinion on constitutional law whenever a nonconstitu-tional resolution of the issues renders a constitutional ruling unnecessary”) (citation omitted).

1997“A defense is ‘in issue’ ... if the evidence is sufficient to make the existence of all facts constituting the defense a reasonable hypothesis for the fact finder to entertain.” State v. Case, 672 A.2d 586, 589 (Me.1996) (quoting State v. Begin, 652 A.2d 102, 106 (Me.1995)). [¶ 5] The competing harms defense applies to “conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid imminent physical harm to himself or another_” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103(1) (1983).

1990Although the state bears the burden of proof as to all elements of the offense, and must disprove the competing harms defense once it is generated, the defendant has the burden of establishing that the competing harms defense is generated by ensuring the presence of “evidence sufficient to make the existence of all the facts constituting the defense a reasonable hypothesis for the factfinder to entertain.” State v. Glidden, 487 A.2d 642, 644 (Me.1985); State v. Kee, 398 A.2d 384, 386 (Me.1979); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 101(1) (1983). 4 In order to generate the defense there must be evidence that the de

1990Although the state bears the burden of proof as to all elements of the offense, and must disprove the competing harms defense once it is generated, the defendant has the burden of establishing that the competing harms defense is generated by ensuring the presence of “evidence sufficient to make the existence of all the facts constituting the defense a reasonable hypothesis for the factfinder to entertain.” State v. Glidden, 487 A.2d 642, 644 (Me.1985); State v. Kee, 398 A.2d 384, 386 (Me.1979); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 101(1) (1983). 4 In order to generate the defense there must be evidence that the de

1990Kee, 398 A.2d at 386 ; see also People v. Handy, 603 P.2d 941, 943 (Colo.1979).

1988See State v. Thompson, 370 A.2d 650, 654 (Me.1977) (in order to be entitled to requested instruction, record must contain evidence to generate that issue for jury’s consideration).