political subdivision immunity in Ohio

2010No. 07AP-1077, 2008-Ohio-4889, ¶54-55 (injured party was suing the Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disability (MRDD)).1 In reaching that decision, the Tenth Appellate District reviewed the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2007-Ohio-1946 , where the supreme court found that R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) applies to strip the political subdivision of immunity because the Ohio Nursing Home Patients’ Bill of Rights expressly imposed liability.

2010No. 07AP-1077, 2008-Ohio-4889, ¶54-55 (injured party was suing the Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disability (MRDD)).1 In reaching that decision, the Tenth Appellate District reviewed the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2007- Ohio-1946, where the supreme court found that R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) applies to strip the political subdivision of immunity because the Ohio Nursing Home Patients’ Bill of Rights expressly imposed liability.

2025Smith v. McBride, 2011- Ohio-4674, ¶ 13, citing Colbert v. Cleveland, 2003-Ohio-3319 ; Lambert v. Clancy, 2010-Ohio-1483 .

2025Lambert v. Clancy, 2010-Ohio-1483, ¶ 22 .

2025Smith v. McBride, 2011-Ohio-4674, ¶ 15 .

2023Smith v. McBride, 130 Ohio St.3d 51 , 2011-Ohio- 4674, 955 N.E.2d 954 , ¶ 13, citing Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215 , 2003- Ohio-3319, 790 N.E.2d 781 ; Lambert v. Clancy, 125 Ohio St.3d 231 , 2010-Ohio- 1483, 927 N.E.2d 585 .

2018"If any of the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) do apply and no defense in that section protects the political subdivision from liability, then the third tier of the analysis requires a court to determine whether any of the defenses in R.C. 2744.03 apply, thereby providing the political subdivision a defense against liability." (Ellipsis sic.) Riffle v. Physicians & Surgeons Ambulance Serv., Inc. , 135 Ohio St.3d 357 , 2013-Ohio-989 , 986 N.E.2d 983 , ¶ 15, quoting *234 Colbert v. Cleveland , 99 Ohio St.3d 215 , 2003-Ohio-3319 , 790 N.E.2d 781 , ¶ 7-9. c.

2018"If any of the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) do apply and no defense in that section protects the political subdivision from liability, then the third tier of the analysis requires a court to determine whether any of the defenses in R.C. 2744.03 apply, thereby providing the political subdivision a defense against liability." (Ellipsis sic.) Riffle v. Physicians & Surgeons Ambulance Serv., Inc. , 135 Ohio St.3d 357 , 2013-Ohio-989 , 986 N.E.2d 983 , ¶ 15, quoting *234 Colbert v. Cleveland , 99 Ohio St.3d 215 , 2003-Ohio-3319 , 790 N.E.2d 781 , ¶ 7-9. c.

2026Id. {¶41} The second tier examines whether any of the five exceptions apply to strip the political subdivision of its immunity.

2018Id. {¶ 16} The political subdivision immunity is an affirmative defense and the burden of proof is on the political subdivision to establish general immunity.

2025Instead, R.C. 4112.05 sets forth the procedure to be followed in charging such persons with such unlawful discriminatory practices.” Id. at ¶ 41. {¶20} Viewing the present appeal under the lens of Ohio case law construing the meaning of “express liability” under R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), we conclude that there are no “direct or unmistakable terms” in R.C. 4112.01 that make Appellants liable as a “proprietor” of a “place of public accommodation.” Butler, 92 Ohio St.3d at 357 .

2012Butler v. Jordan, 92 Ohio St.3d 354 , 2001-Ohio-204 , 750 N.E.2d 554 , paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. {¶17} Therefore, by application of the foregoing, none of the five exceptions to immunity listed in R.C. 2744.02(B) apply herein to expose the EFS to liability, and it is therefore immune as a matter of law. {¶18} As to the issue of the liability of the individual employees, we note that R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) provides that an employee is personally immune from liability unless: (a) The employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee’s employment or official

2022“If any of the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) do apply and no defense in that section protects the political subdivision from liability, then the third tier of the analysis requires a court to determine whether any of the defenses in R.C. 2744.03 apply, thereby providing the political subdivision a defense against liability.” (Ellipses added in Pelletier.) Pelletier v. Campbell, 153 Ohio St.3d 611 , 2018- Ohio-2121, 109 N.E.3d 1210, ¶ 15 , quoting Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215 , 2003-Ohio-3319 , 790 N.E.2d 781, ¶ 7-9 . {¶ 33} It is not disputed that Greenville City Schools

2022“If any of the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) do apply and no defense in that section protects the political subdivision from liability, then the third tier of the analysis requires a court to determine whether any of the defenses in R.C. 2744.03 apply, thereby providing the political subdivision a defense against liability.” (Ellipses added in Pelletier.) Pelletier v. Campbell, 153 Ohio St.3d 611 , 2018- Ohio-2121, 109 N.E.3d 1210, ¶ 15 , quoting Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215 , 2003-Ohio-3319 , 790 N.E.2d 781, ¶ 7-9 . {¶ 33} It is not disputed that Greenville City Schools

2022Dept. of Human Servs., 70 Ohio St.3d 450 , 639 N.E.2d 105 (1994).

2022Dept. of Human Servs., 70 Ohio St.3d 450 , 639 N.E.2d 105 (1994).

2019Elston v. Howland Local Schools, 113 Ohio St.3d 314 , 2007-Ohio-2070 , 865 N.E.2d 845, ¶ 10-13 .

2019Elston v. Howland Local Schools, 113 Ohio St.3d 314 , 2007-Ohio-2070 , 865 N.E.2d 845, ¶ 10-13 .

2017Political-subdivision immunity is an affirmative defense.” (Citation omitted.) Argabrite v. Neer, 149 Ohio St.3d 349 , 2016-Ohio-8374 , 75 N.E.3d 161, ¶ 6 .

2017Political-subdivision immunity is an affirmative defense.” (Citation omitted.) Argabrite v. Neer, 149 Ohio St.3d 349 , 2016-Ohio-8374 , 75 N.E.3d 161, ¶ 6 .

2019Summit No. 26885, 2013-Ohio-5411 , we reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for additional consideration because the court “failed to conduct all three parts of the political-subdivision immunity analysis before ruling on the * * * motion for summary judgment.” Id. at ¶ 7, 9.

2019Summit No. 26885, 2013-Ohio-5411, ¶ 7 .

2018Slane v. Hilliard , 10th Dist., 2016-Ohio-306 , 59 N.E.3d 545 , ¶ 30.

2017Franklin No. 15AP-602, 2016-Ohio-826 , 2016 WL 853272 , ¶ 18, citing Slane v. Hilliard , 2016-Ohio-306 , 59 N.E.3d 545 , ¶ 30, citing Jones v. Lucas Metro.

2013Thus, the trial court’s ruling forecloses ECOT from enjoying the benefit of the alleged immunity. {¶ 18} The court of appeals justified its interpretation of Hubbell by referring to the waiver rule discussed in Turner: “We find that no caveat or niche has yet been carved out giving a political subdivision an exception to the waiver provision of the Civil Rules.” 2012-Ohio-1185, ¶ 18 .

2013Thus, the trial court’s ruling forecloses ECOT from enjoying the benefit of the alleged immunity. {¶ 18} The court of appeals justified its interpretation of Hubbell by referring to the waiver rule discussed in Turner : “We find that no caveat or niche has yet been carved out giving a political subdivision an exception to the waiver provision of the Civil Rules.” 2012-Ohio-1185 , 2012 WL 985838 , ¶ 18.

2002The judgment in Stevens was reversed by this court in Stevens v. Ackman (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 182 , 743 N.E.2d 901 , on unrelated grounds. 2 January Term, 2002 No. 2000-2004). 91 Ohio St.3d 1477 , 744 N.E.2d 774 , and 91 Ohio St.3d 1478 , 744 N.E.2d 775 . {¶8} We concur in the judgment of the court of appeals that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the city based on the political subdivision immunity provided by R.C.

2002(Nov. 12, 1998), Muskingum App. No. CT98-0010, 1998 WL 817826 , on the question “whether an edge drop on the berm of a county or city road, in and of itself, constitutes a nuisance within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3)?” {¶ 7} The case is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists (case No. 2000-2141) and upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal (case No. 2000-2004). 91 Ohio St.3d 1477 , 744 N.E.2d 774 , and 91 Ohio St.3d 1478 , 744 N.E.2d 775 . {¶ 8} We concur in the judgment of the court of appeals that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favo

2002The judgment in Stevens was reversed by this court in Stevens v. Ackman (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 182 , 743 N.E.2d 901 , on unrelated grounds. 2 January Term, 2002 No. 2000-2004). 91 Ohio St.3d 1477 , 744 N.E.2d 774 , and 91 Ohio St.3d 1478 , 744 N.E.2d 775 . {¶8} We concur in the judgment of the court of appeals that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the city based on the political subdivision immunity provided by R.C.

2002(Nov. 12, 1998), Muskingum App. No. CT98-0010, 1998 WL 817826 , on the question “whether an edge drop on the berm of a county or city road, in and of itself, constitutes a nuisance within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3)?” {¶ 7} The case is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists (case No. 2000-2141) and upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal (case No. 2000-2004). 91 Ohio St.3d 1477 , 744 N.E.2d 774 , and 91 Ohio St.3d 1478 , 744 N.E.2d 775 . {¶ 8} We concur in the judgment of the court of appeals that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favo

2002(Nov. 12, 1998), Muskingum App. No. CT98-0010, 1998 WL 817826 , on the question “whether an edge drop on the berm of a county or city road, in and of itself, constitutes a nuisance within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3)?” {¶ 7} The case is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists (case No. 2000-2141) and upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal (case No. 2000-2004). 91 Ohio St.3d 1477 , 744 N.E.2d 774 , and 91 Ohio St.3d 1478 , 744 N.E.2d 775 . {¶ 8} We concur in the judgment of the court of appeals that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favo

2002(Nov. 12, 1998), Muskingum App. No. CT98-0010, 1998 WL 817826 , on the question “whether an edge drop on the berm of a county or city road, in and of itself, constitutes a nuisance within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3)?” {¶ 7} The case is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists (case No. 2000-2141) and upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal (case No. 2000-2004). 91 Ohio St.3d 1477 , 744 N.E.2d 774 , and 91 Ohio St.3d 1478 , 744 N.E.2d 775 . {¶ 8} We concur in the judgment of the court of appeals that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favo

2025“If any of the exceptions enumerated in R.C. 2744.02(B) applies, the court proceeds to the third tier of the analysis and determines whether any of the defenses enumerated in R.C. 2744.03 applies to provide the political subdivision a defense against liability.” Bykova at id., citing Coventry Courts, LLC at id.

2025“If any of the exceptions enumerated in R.C. 2744.02(B) applies, the court proceeds to the third tier of the analysis and determines whether any of the defenses enumerated in R.C. 2744.03 applies to provide the political subdivision a defense against liability.” Bykova at id., citing Coventry Courts, LLC at id.

2025M.J. v. Akron City School Dist., 2023-Ohio-4764 , ¶ 8- 9 (9th Dist.). {¶9} In M.J., we reversed and remanded for further proceedings because the trial court “erred when it failed to conduct all three parts of the political-subdivision immunity analysis before ruling on Appellants’ motions for summary judgment” Id. at ¶ 13.

2025Conaway at id. {¶ 26} In the first-tier, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) sets forth the basic premise of the political subdivision immunity law.