import waiver in New York

2014The defense expert thus opined that, because of defendant’s “cognitive and abstracting deficits,” he “was not capable of intelligently waiving his Miranda rights” (see Fare, 442 US at 725 ; Dunn, 195 AD2d at 242-243 ).

2014The defense expert thus opined that, because of defendant’s “cognitive and abstracting deficits,” he “was not capable of intelligently waiving his Miranda rights” (see Fare, 442 US at 725 ; Dunn, 195 AD2d at 242-243 ).

2014The defense expert thus opined that, because of defendant’s “cognitive and abstracting deficits,” he “was not capable of intelligently waiving his Miranda rights” (see Fare, 442 US at 725 ; Dunn, 195 AD2d at 242-243 ).

2014The defense expert thus opined that, because of defendant’s “cognitive and abstracting deficits,” he “was not capable of intelligently waiving his Miranda rights” (see Fare, 442 US at 725 ; Dunn, 195 AD2d at 242-243 ).

1891J., (Anon., 6 Mass. 147 ,) “is, the cohabitation of the wife after the commission of the offense, and after she believes, on probable evidence, the guiltof her husband, is conclusive evidence of the remission.” The evidence offered on the part of the defendant clearly shows that, whether the plaintiff had venereal disease or not, the wife believed he did have it, and, having cohabited with him after such belief, the evidence respecting condonation is conclusive.

1891J., 6 Mass., 147 , “is, the cohabitation of the wife after the commission of the offense, and after she believes, on probable evidence, the guilt of her husband, is conclusive evidence of the remission.” The evidence offered on the part of the defendant clearly shows, that, whether the plaintiff had venereal disease or not, the wife believed he did have it, and having cohabited with him after such, belief, the evidence respecting condonation is conclusive.

2019Each defendant orally confirmed on the record that he or she understood the import of the waiver (see Bradshaw, 18 NY3d at 265 ; DeSimone, 80 NY2d at 279 ).

2019Each defendant orally confirmed on the record that he or she understood the import of the waiver (see Bradshaw, 18 NY3d at 265 ; DeSimone, 80 NY2d at 279 ).

2002A party may seek to vacate an accounting decree on the ground that a waiver and consent he or she executed was obtained through “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct” (CPLR 5015 [a] [3]; Matter of Paul , 105 AD2d, supra at 930), or “any other ground tending to destroy the validity of the waiver” (Matter of Celantano, 31 Misc 2d 727 ; Matter of Sturges, 24 Misc 2d 14 ).

2002A party may seek to vacate an accounting decree on the ground that a waiver and consent he or she executed was obtained through “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct” (CPLR 5015 [a] [3]; Matter of Paul , 105 AD2d, supra at 930), or “any other ground tending to destroy the validity of the waiver” (Matter of Celantano, 31 Misc 2d 727 ; Matter of Sturges, 24 Misc 2d 14 ).

2001Although defendant and his mother testified at the Huntley hearing that defendant did not understand the warnings, they admitted that neither of them had informed the interrogating officer that they did not understand what he was saying, nor did they ask any questions about the warnings. “[I]t is neither the duty nor function of police to provide a suspect with a general legal education; all that is required is for the suspect to grasp the essential elements of his Miranda rights and the immediate import of those rights on the custodial interrogation process” (People v Smith, supra, at 233 ).

1996Insurance Co. v Morton Intl., 512 US 1245 ), the Supreme Court of New Jersey, citing the aforesaid West Virginia decision, and applying what it labeled "regulatory estoppel”, reached the same result as the West Virginia court, refusing to enforce the literal meaning of the same pollution exclusion provision and holding that the insurer was estopped from asking the court to given the provision an interpretation contrary to the representations as to the import of the clause made by the insurer to the New Jersey Department of Insurance and the Insurance Departments of other States including West

1993As we observed in that case, Labor Law § 240 (l)’s list of required safety devices (e.g., "scaffolding,” "hoists,” "braces,” "irons” and "stays”), all of which are used in connection with elevation differentials, evinces a clear legislative intent to provide "ex *501 ceptional protection” for workers against the "special hazards” that arise when the work site either is itself elevated or is positioned below the level where "materials or load [are] hoisted or secured” ( 78 NY2d, at 514 ).

1990Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

1989As we stated in People v Jandrew ( 101 AD2d 90, 91 ), there is "no logical reason why defendant’s general waiver of the right to appeal, it appearing from the surrounding circumstances that defendant comprehended the import of his waiver, should not include a waiver of the right to appeal from the denial of his suppression motion”.

1972It has been held that whether an import has been so acted upon as to lose its tax immunity must be assessed in a practical way (Youngstown Go. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 534, 545 ).

1875(See Collins v. Hoxie, 9 Paige, 81 -87.) Such seems to be the import of rule 51.