income factors (New York) · Go Syfert
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income factors in New York

17 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1960–2025 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (15)

CaseFollowedCited
Davydova v. Sasonovgreen
nyappdiv · 2013 · cited in 7 New York opinions naming this issue, 2014–2025
2 sentences

2025Courts considering applications for pendente lite child support may, in their discretion, apply the CSSA standards and guidelines, but they are not required to do so" ( Davydova v. Sasonov, 109 AD3d 955, 957 , 972 N.Y.S.2d 293 [emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Barra v. Barra, 191 AD3d 831 , 832, 138 N.Y.S.3d 377 ).

2025Courts considering applications for pendente lite child support may, in their discretion, apply the CSSA standards and guidelines, but they are not required to do so" ( Davydova v. Sasonov, 109 AD3d 955, 957 , 972 N.Y.S.2d 293 [emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Barra v. Barra, 191 AD3d 831 , 832, 138 N.Y.S.3d 377 ).

67
Barra v. Barragreen
nyappdiv · 2021 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2023–2025
2 sentences

2025Courts considering applications for pendente lite child support may, in their discretion, apply the CSSA standards and guidelines, but they are not required to do so" ( Davydova v. Sasonov, 109 AD3d 955, 957 , 972 N.Y.S.2d 293 [emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Barra v. Barra, 191 AD3d 831 , 832, 138 N.Y.S.3d 377 ).

2025Courts considering applications for pendente lite child support may, in their discretion, apply the CSSA standards and guidelines, but they are not required to do so" ( Davydova v. Sasonov, 109 AD3d 955, 957 , 972 N.Y.S.2d 293 [emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Barra v. Barra, 191 AD3d 831 , 832, 138 N.Y.S.3d 377 ).

22
Sachs v. Adeligreen
nyappdiv · 2005 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Accordingly, defendant made a sufficient showing, in the context of this discovery motion, that the tax returns are "necessary to the litigation" ( Sachs v Adeli , 26 AD3d 52, 56 [1st Dept 2005]; compare Williams v New York City Hous.

11
Maksoud v. Maksoudgreen
nyappdiv · 2010 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013“Courts considering applications for pendente lite child support may, in their discretion, apply the CSSA standards and guidelines, but they are not required to do so” (Rubin v Della Salla, 78 AD3d 504, 505 [2010] [emphasis added]; see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [7]; George v George, 192 AD2d 693, 693 [1993]; accord Maksoud v Maksoud, 71 AD3d 643, 644 [2010]; Otto v Otto, 13 AD3d 503, 503 [2004]; but see Meyer v Meyer, 173 AD2d 1021, 1022 [1991]; Quilty v Quilty, 169 AD2d 979, 980 [1991]).

11
Arelis Carmen S. v. Daniel H.green
nyappdiv · 2010 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013“Courts considering applications for pendente lite child support may, in their discretion, apply the CSSA standards and guidelines, but they are not required to do so” (Rubin v Della Salla, 78 AD3d 504, 505 [2010] [emphasis added]; see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [7]; George v George, 192 AD2d 693, 693 [1993]; accord Maksoud v Maksoud, 71 AD3d 643, 644 [2010]; Otto v Otto, 13 AD3d 503, 503 [2004]; but see Meyer v Meyer, 173 AD2d 1021, 1022 [1991]; Quilty v Quilty, 169 AD2d 979, 980 [1991]).

11
Pappas v. Pappasgreen
nyappdiv · 2013 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013The court’s application of the present income rule in this case would be consistent with the often repeated principle that the purpose of pendente lite relief is to ensure that a needy spouse is provided with funds for his or her support {Fales v Fales, 102 AD3d 734 [2d Dept 2013]), and that an award “should reflect an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse with due regard for the parties’ preseparation standard of living.” (Pappas v Pappas, 103 AD3d 615, 616 [2d Dept 2013], quoting Campanaro v Campanaro, 292 AD2d 330, 330

2013The court’s application of the present income rule in this case would be consistent with the often repeated principle that the purpose of pendente lite relief is to ensure that a needy spouse is provided with funds for his or her support {Fales v Fales, 102 AD3d 734 [2d Dept 2013]), and that an award “should reflect an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse with due regard for the parties’ preseparation standard of living.” (Pappas v Pappas, 103 AD3d 615, 616 [2d Dept 2013], quoting Campanaro v Campanaro, 292 AD2d 330, 330

11
Quilty v. Quiltygreen
nyappdiv · 1991 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013“Courts considering applications for pendente lite child support may, in their discretion, apply the CSSA standards and guidelines, but they are not required to do so” (Rubin v Della Salla, 78 AD3d 504, 505 [2010] [emphasis added]; see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [7]; George v George, 192 AD2d 693, 693 [1993]; accord Maksoud v Maksoud, 71 AD3d 643, 644 [2010]; Otto v Otto, 13 AD3d 503, 503 [2004]; but see Meyer v Meyer, 173 AD2d 1021, 1022 [1991]; Quilty v Quilty, 169 AD2d 979, 980 [1991]).

11
George v. Georgegreen
nyappdiv · 1993 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013“Courts considering applications for pendente lite child support may, in their discretion, apply the CSSA standards and guidelines, but they are not required to do so” (Rubin v Della Salla, 78 AD3d 504, 505 [2010] [emphasis added]; see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [7]; George v George, 192 AD2d 693, 693 [1993]; accord Maksoud v Maksoud, 71 AD3d 643, 644 [2010]; Otto v Otto, 13 AD3d 503, 503 [2004]; but see Meyer v Meyer, 173 AD2d 1021, 1022 [1991]; Quilty v Quilty, 169 AD2d 979, 980 [1991]).

11
Otto v. Ottogreen
nyappdiv · 2004 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013“Courts considering applications for pendente lite child support may, in their discretion, apply the CSSA standards and guidelines, but they are not required to do so” (Rubin v Della Salla, 78 AD3d 504, 505 [2010] [emphasis added]; see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [7]; George v George, 192 AD2d 693, 693 [1993]; accord Maksoud v Maksoud, 71 AD3d 643, 644 [2010]; Otto v Otto, 13 AD3d 503, 503 [2004]; but see Meyer v Meyer, 173 AD2d 1021, 1022 [1991]; Quilty v Quilty, 169 AD2d 979, 980 [1991]).

11
Culhane v. Holtgreen
nyappdiv · 2006 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013(Matter of Azrak v Azrak, 60 AD3d 937 [2d Dept 2009]; Matter of Moran v Grillo, 44 AD3d 859 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Matter of Culhane v Holt, 28 AD3d 251 [1st Dept 2006]; Matter of Taraskas v Rizzuto, 38 AD3d 910 [2d Dept 2007], citing Matter of Kellogg v Kellogg, 300 AD2d 996 [4th Dept 2002] [income earned during a tax year not completed at the commencement of trial may, under some circumstances, be weighed by the court].) It is clear that in the child support context, the present income rule, as enunciated in the above cases, may be applied when appropriate.

11
Campanaro v. Campanarogreen
nyappdiv · 2002 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013The court’s application of the present income rule in this case would be consistent with the often repeated principle that the purpose of pendente lite relief is to ensure that a needy spouse is provided with funds for his or her support {Fales v Fales, 102 AD3d 734 [2d Dept 2013]), and that an award “should reflect an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse with due regard for the parties’ preseparation standard of living.” (Pappas v Pappas, 103 AD3d 615, 616 [2d Dept 2013], quoting Campanaro v Campanaro, 292 AD2d 330, 330

2013The court’s application of the present income rule in this case would be consistent with the often repeated principle that the purpose of pendente lite relief is to ensure that a needy spouse is provided with funds for his or her support {Fales v Fales, 102 AD3d 734 [2d Dept 2013]), and that an award “should reflect an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse with due regard for the parties’ preseparation standard of living.” (Pappas v Pappas, 103 AD3d 615, 616 [2d Dept 2013], quoting Campanaro v Campanaro, 292 AD2d 330, 330

11
Glosenger v. Peralesgreen
ny · 1994 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
1 sentence

2008(Id. at 462.) Income uniformity for persons within the same classification is also required by federal regulations: “a Medicaid agency must use an income standard . . . that is . . . [u]niform for all individuals in a covered group.” (Matter of Glosenger v Perales, 83 NY2d 984, 987, 989 [1994] [dicta], quoting 42 CFR 435.811.) The continued equality between the two groups within that neediest classification of section 209 (2) could have been achieved by legislating that in those years when the Medicaid eligibility standard was lower than the section 209 (2) standard all of those in the class,

11
Zaldin v. Concord Hotelgreen
ny · 1979 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
1 sentence

1987A unanimous Court of Appeals held in Zaldin v Concord Hotel ( 48 NY2d 107, 113 [1979]) that "[W]hen * * * a statute is free from ambiguity and its sweep unburdened by qualification or exception, we must do no more and no less than apply the language as it is written” (see also, Matter of Kamhi v Planning Bd., 59 NY2d 385, 391 [1983]).

11
Kamhi v. Planning Boardgreen
ny · 1983 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
1 sentence

1987A unanimous Court of Appeals held in Zaldin v Concord Hotel ( 48 NY2d 107, 113 [1979]) that "[W]hen * * * a statute is free from ambiguity and its sweep unburdened by qualification or exception, we must do no more and no less than apply the language as it is written” (see also, Matter of Kamhi v Planning Bd., 59 NY2d 385, 391 [1983]).

11
Kolmer v. Kolmergreen
nysupct · 1959 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1960–1960
1 sentence

1960The husband’s present income and assets are then highly relevant matters (see Kolmer v. Kolmer, 19 Misc 2d 298, 301, 305 [Wasservogel, Spec.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Meyer v. Meyergreen
nyappdiv · 1991 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013“Courts considering applications for pendente lite child support may, in their discretion, apply the CSSA standards and guidelines, but they are not required to do so” (Rubin v Della Salla, 78 AD3d 504, 505 [2010] [emphasis added]; see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [7]; George v George, 192 AD2d 693, 693 [1993]; accord Maksoud v Maksoud, 71 AD3d 643, 644 [2010]; Otto v Otto, 13 AD3d 503, 503 [2004]; but see Meyer v Meyer, 173 AD2d 1021, 1022 [1991]; Quilty v Quilty, 169 AD2d 979, 980 [1991]).

11

Also cited on this issue (14)

CaseCitedYears
Azrak v. Azrak green
nyappdiv · 2009
1 sentence

2013(Matter of Azrak v Azrak, 60 AD3d 937 [2d Dept 2009]; Matter of Moran v Grillo, 44 AD3d 859 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Matter of Culhane v Holt, 28 AD3d 251 [1st Dept 2006]; Matter of Taraskas v Rizzuto, 38 AD3d 910 [2d Dept 2007], citing Matter of Kellogg v Kellogg, 300 AD2d 996 [4th Dept 2002] [income earned during a tax year not completed at the commencement of trial may, under some circumstances, be weighed by the court].) It is clear that in the child support context, the present income rule, as enunciated in the above cases, may be applied when appropriate.

12013–2013
Fales v. Fales green
nyappdiv · 2013
2 sentences

2013The court’s application of the present income rule in this case would be consistent with the often repeated principle that the purpose of pendente lite relief is to ensure that a needy spouse is provided with funds for his or her support {Fales v Fales, 102 AD3d 734 [2d Dept 2013]), and that an award “should reflect an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse with due regard for the parties’ preseparation standard of living.” (Pappas v Pappas, 103 AD3d 615, 616 [2d Dept 2013], quoting Campanaro v Campanaro, 292 AD2d 330, 330

2013The court’s application of the present income rule in this case would be consistent with the often repeated principle that the purpose of pendente lite relief is to ensure that a needy spouse is provided with funds for his or her support {Fales v Fales, 102 AD3d 734 [2d Dept 2013]), and that an award “should reflect an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse with due regard for the parties’ preseparation standard of living.” (Pappas v Pappas, 103 AD3d 615, 616 [2d Dept 2013], quoting Campanaro v Campanaro, 292 AD2d 330, 330

12013–2013
Shane v. Shane neutral
nyappdiv · 2013
1 sentence

2013(Stock v Stock, 108 AD3d 663 [2d Dept 2013]; Shane v Shane, 104 AD3d 837 [2d Dept 2013].) Here, to establish plaintiffs income as reported on the parties’ last filed income tax return at $802,548.59 ($819,049 less $16,500.41), after giving due consideration to the amount of income above $524,000, may result in a presumptive award of temporary maintenance that exceeds defendant’s legitimate monthly expenses (Chusid v Silvera, 110 AD3d 660 [2d Dept 2013]) and would be unjust and inappropriate.

12013–2013
Stock v. Stock green
nyappdiv · 2013
1 sentence

2013(Stock v Stock, 108 AD3d 663 [2d Dept 2013]; Shane v Shane, 104 AD3d 837 [2d Dept 2013].) Here, to establish plaintiffs income as reported on the parties’ last filed income tax return at $802,548.59 ($819,049 less $16,500.41), after giving due consideration to the amount of income above $524,000, may result in a presumptive award of temporary maintenance that exceeds defendant’s legitimate monthly expenses (Chusid v Silvera, 110 AD3d 660 [2d Dept 2013]) and would be unjust and inappropriate.

12013–2013
Chusid v. Silvera green
nyappdiv · 2013
1 sentence

2013(Stock v Stock, 108 AD3d 663 [2d Dept 2013]; Shane v Shane, 104 AD3d 837 [2d Dept 2013].) Here, to establish plaintiffs income as reported on the parties’ last filed income tax return at $802,548.59 ($819,049 less $16,500.41), after giving due consideration to the amount of income above $524,000, may result in a presumptive award of temporary maintenance that exceeds defendant’s legitimate monthly expenses (Chusid v Silvera, 110 AD3d 660 [2d Dept 2013]) and would be unjust and inappropriate.

12013–2013
Torrance v. Stout green
nyappdiv · 2007
1 sentence

2013(Matter of Azrak v Azrak, 60 AD3d 937 [2d Dept 2009]; Matter of Moran v Grillo, 44 AD3d 859 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Matter of Culhane v Holt, 28 AD3d 251 [1st Dept 2006]; Matter of Taraskas v Rizzuto, 38 AD3d 910 [2d Dept 2007], citing Matter of Kellogg v Kellogg, 300 AD2d 996 [4th Dept 2002] [income earned during a tax year not completed at the commencement of trial may, under some circumstances, be weighed by the court].) It is clear that in the child support context, the present income rule, as enunciated in the above cases, may be applied when appropriate.

12013–2013
Moran v. Grillo green
nyappdiv · 2007
1 sentence

2013(Matter of Azrak v Azrak, 60 AD3d 937 [2d Dept 2009]; Matter of Moran v Grillo, 44 AD3d 859 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Matter of Culhane v Holt, 28 AD3d 251 [1st Dept 2006]; Matter of Taraskas v Rizzuto, 38 AD3d 910 [2d Dept 2007], citing Matter of Kellogg v Kellogg, 300 AD2d 996 [4th Dept 2002] [income earned during a tax year not completed at the commencement of trial may, under some circumstances, be weighed by the court].) It is clear that in the child support context, the present income rule, as enunciated in the above cases, may be applied when appropriate.

12013–2013
Kellogg v. Kellogg green
nyappdiv · 2002
1 sentence

2013(Matter of Azrak v Azrak, 60 AD3d 937 [2d Dept 2009]; Matter of Moran v Grillo, 44 AD3d 859 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Matter of Culhane v Holt, 28 AD3d 251 [1st Dept 2006]; Matter of Taraskas v Rizzuto, 38 AD3d 910 [2d Dept 2007], citing Matter of Kellogg v Kellogg, 300 AD2d 996 [4th Dept 2002] [income earned during a tax year not completed at the commencement of trial may, under some circumstances, be weighed by the court].) It is clear that in the child support context, the present income rule, as enunciated in the above cases, may be applied when appropriate.

12013–2013
Rodriguez v. Wing green
ny · 1999
1 sentence

2008(Id. at 462.) Income uniformity for persons within the same classification is also required by federal regulations: “a Medicaid agency must use an income standard . . . that is . . . [u]niform for all individuals in a covered group.” (Matter of Glosenger v Perales, 83 NY2d 984, 987, 989 [1994] [dicta], quoting 42 CFR 435.811.) The continued equality between the two groups within that neediest classification of section 209 (2) could have been achieved by legislating that in those years when the Medicaid eligibility standard was lower than the section 209 (2) standard all of those in the class,

12008–2008
MATTER OF CASSANO v. Cassano green
ny · 1995
1 sentence

1995In Matter of Cassano v Cassano ( 85 NY2d 649 ), the Court of Appeals addressed the issue posed in the instant case.

11995–1995
Atkins v. Rivera green
scotus · 1986
2 sentences

1994Although not defined terms, courts and Congress have consistently recognized the difference between "income standards” and "methodologies” used to determine Medicaid eligibility (see, Atkins v Rivera, 477 US 154, 163-166 ; Camacho v Perales, 786 F2d 32, 43-45 [2d Cir]).

1994The difference between an income standard and a methodology recognized in Camacho was subsequently adopted by Congress in amending the Medicaid laws (see, HR Rep No. 100-391 [I], 100 Cong, 1st Sess 504-505, reprinted in 1987 US Code Cong & Admin News 2313-1, 2313-324 — 2313-325), and has also been adopted by the Supreme Court (see, Atkins v Rivera, 477 US, at 165 ).

11994–1994
People v. Genova green
nyappdiv · 1987
1 sentence

1993It is clear that, regardless of the validity of a regulation as written, and taking into account that an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation must be afforded great weight, the courts must intervene when there is a showing that such an interpretation is irrational, arbitrary and capricious (see, Matter of Johnson v Joy, 48 NY2d 689 ; Matter of Rosenkrantz v McMickens, 131 AD2d 389 ).

11993–1993
Johnson v. Joy green
ny · 1979
1 sentence

1993It is clear that, regardless of the validity of a regulation as written, and taking into account that an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation must be afforded great weight, the courts must intervene when there is a showing that such an interpretation is irrational, arbitrary and capricious (see, Matter of Johnson v Joy, 48 NY2d 689 ; Matter of Rosenkrantz v McMickens, 131 AD2d 389 ).

11993–1993
Cummings v. State green
nyappdiv · 1978
1 sentence

1983An award for consequential damages for loss of a buffer zone is proper (Cummings v State of New York, 62 AD2d 1084 ).

11983–1983

Statutes the citing opinions construe

NY § N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 236 (8) NY § N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 237 (5) NY § N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 240 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 17 (1960–2025) NJ 16 (1987–2021) OR 7 (1986–2016) IL 6 (1943–2026) CA 4 (1976–2020) PA 3 (1931–2016) ND 3 (1992–2012) FL 3 (1976–2022) CT 3 (1967–1998) NM 2 (2014–2014) LA 2 (2002–2017) WI 2 (1981–2006) MA 2 (2007–2011) ME 2 (1917–1998) AZ 2 (1995–1995) CO 2 (2022–2022) TX 2 (1978–1978) UT 2 (2004–2012) IA 2 (2016–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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