professional judgment rule in New York

2026Therefore, the Supreme Court erred in granting the government defendants' separate motions pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.</p> <p>We also conclude that the Supreme Court should not have granted the government defendants' motions based on governmental function immunity.</p> <p>B. <i>The Government Defendants Failed to Conclusively Establish that Their Actions Were Shielded from Liability by Governmental Function Immunity or Absolute Immunity</i></p> <p>Governmental function immunity, sometimes referred to as the professional

2019Nevertheless, the City was entitled to dismissal of the common-law negligence claims based on the professional judgment rule. " That rule 'insulates a municipality from liability for its employees' performance of their duties where the . . . conduct involves the exercise of professional judgment such as electing one among many acceptable methods of carrying out tasks, or making tactical decisions'" ( Malay v City of Syracuse , 151 AD3d 1624, 1625 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 904 [2017], quoting Johnson v City of New York , 15 NY3d 676, 680 [2010]).

2017Nevertheless, the professional judgment rule “presupposes *1626 that judgment and discretion are exercised in compliance with the municipality’s procedures, because ‘the very basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery becomes irrevelant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies and exercises no judgment or discretion’” (Johnson, 15 NY3d at 681 [emphasis added]; see Valdez, 18 NY3d at 80 ; Lubecki v City of New York, 304 AD2d 224, 233-234 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701 [2004]).

2005Williams v City of New York ( 2 NY3d 352, 367 [2004] ), which was predicated on a violation of General Municipal Law § 205-e, does not require a different conclusion, and the professional judgment rule is likewise inapplicable (Lubecki, 304 AD2d at 233-234 ).

2010Immunity under the professional judgment rule "`reflects a value judgment that—despite injury to a member of the public—the broader interest in having government officers and employees free to exercise judgment and discretion in their official functions, unhampered by fear of second-guessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from imposing liability for that injury'" ( Mon v City of New York, 78 NY2d 309, 313 [1991], quoting Haddock v City of New York, 75 NY2d 478, 484 [1990]). *681 This immunity, however, presupposes that judgment and discretion are exercised in compli

2010Immunity under the professional judgment rule "`reflects a value judgment that—despite injury to a member of the public—the broader interest in having government officers and employees free to exercise judgment and discretion in their official functions, unhampered by fear of second-guessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from imposing liability for that injury'" ( Mon v City of New York, 78 NY2d 309, 313 [1991], quoting Haddock v City of New York, 75 NY2d 478, 484 [1990]). *681 This immunity, however, presupposes that judgment and discretion are exercised in compli

2011On appeal, the Court held the evidence demonstrated that the tow truck operator was negligent and declined to find, as urged by the TBTA, that the professional judgment standard of the TBTA’s employee was the equivalent to the standard that a firefighter was held to in Kenavan v City of New York ( 70 NY2d 558 [1987]).

2010The professional judgment rule insulates a municipality from liability for its employees' performance of their duties "`where the . . . conduct involves the exercise of professional judgment such as electing one among many acceptable methods of carrying out tasks, or making tactical decisions'" ( McCormack v City of New York, 80 NY2d 808, 811 [1992], quoting Kenavan v City of New York, 70 NY2d 558, 569 [1987]).

2019Newsome v County of Suffolk , 109 AD3d 802, 803 [2d Dept 2013]; Arias v City of New York , 22 AD3d 436, 437 [2d Dept 2005]; Lubecki v City of New York , 304 AD2d 224, 233-234 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701 [2004]; Rodriguez v City of New York , 189 AD2d 166, 178 [1st Dept 1993]), the Court of Appeals has stated that the rule requires the officer to exercise discretion in compliance with the municipality's "own procedures" ( Haddock v City of New York , 75 NY2d 478, 485 [1990]; see Johnson v City of New York , 15 NY3d at 681 ).

2017Here, we conclude that defendants established as a matter of law that the police officers’ conduct in firing the CS gas canisters into the building involved the exercise of professional judgment, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Johnson, 15 NY3d at 681 ; Arias v City of New York, 22 AD3d 436, 437 [2005]; cf. Lubecki, 304 AD2d at 234-235 ).

2014The Supreme Court properly awarded summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action, which, inter alia, alleged negligence in the effectuation of the plaintiff’s arrest, because the defendants established, prima facie, that, pursuant to the professional judgment rule, they are immune from liability arising from claims of judgmental errors (see Johnson v City of New York, 15 NY3d 676, 680-681 [2010]; cf. Newsome v County of Suffolk, 109 AD3d 802 [2013]), and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to that showing (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557,

2014The Supreme Court properly awarded summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action, which, inter alia, alleged negligence in the effectuation of the plaintiff’s arrest, because the defendants established, prima facie, that, pursuant to the professional judgment rule, they are immune from liability arising from claims of judgmental errors (see Johnson v City of New York, 15 NY3d 676, 680-681 [2010]; cf. Newsome v County of Suffolk, 109 AD3d 802 [2013]), and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to that showing (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557,

2014The Supreme Court properly awarded summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action, which, inter alia, alleged negligence in the effectuation of the plaintiff’s arrest, because the defendants established, prima facie, that, pursuant to the professional judgment rule, they are immune from liability arising from claims of judgmental errors (see Johnson v City of New York, 15 NY3d 676, 680-681 [2010]; cf. Newsome v County of Suffolk, 109 AD3d 802 [2013]), and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to that showing (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557,

2014The Supreme Court properly awarded summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action, which, inter alia, alleged negligence in the effectuation of the plaintiff’s arrest, because the defendants established, prima facie, that, pursuant to the professional judgment rule, they are immune from liability arising from claims of judgmental errors (see Johnson v City of New York, 15 NY3d 676, 680-681 [2010]; cf. Newsome v County of Suffolk, 109 AD3d 802 [2013]), and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to that showing (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557,

2019Newsome v County of Suffolk , 109 AD3d 802, 803 [2d Dept 2013]; Arias v City of New York , 22 AD3d 436, 437 [2d Dept 2005]; Lubecki v City of New York , 304 AD2d 224, 233-234 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701 [2004]; Rodriguez v City of New York , 189 AD2d 166, 178 [1st Dept 1993]), the Court of Appeals has stated that the rule requires the officer to exercise discretion in compliance with the municipality's "own procedures" ( Haddock v City of New York , 75 NY2d 478, 485 [1990]; see Johnson v City of New York , 15 NY3d at 681 ).

2003The professional judgment rule or “judgment error” rule is based on principles which give recognition to the fact that the government has been entrusted to make certain judgments and determinations in planning, designing and establishing standards (Rodriguez v City of New York, 189 AD2d 166 [1993]).

2010The professional judgment rule insulates a municipality from liability for its employees’ performance of their duties “ ‘where the . . . conduct involves the exercise of professional judgment such as electing one among many acceptable methods of carrying out tasks, or making tactical decisions’ ” (McCormack v City of New York, 80 NY2d 808, 811 [1992], quoting Kenavan v City of New York, 70 NY2d 558, 569 [1987]).

2010The professional judgment rule insulates a municipality from liability for its employees' performance of their duties "`where the . . . conduct involves the exercise of professional judgment such as electing one among many acceptable methods of carrying out tasks, or making tactical decisions'" ( McCormack v City of New York, 80 NY2d 808, 811 [1992], quoting Kenavan v City of New York, 70 NY2d 558, 569 [1987]).

2025At this juncture, the professional judgment rule is not available as a defense because the record does not allow us to make a determination that defendants' course of conduct was reasonable as a matter of law ( see Escape Airports [USA], Inc. v Kent, Beatty & Gordon, LLP , 79 AD3d 437, 439 [1st Dept 2010]).

2025Absent a finding that the attorney's courses of conduct were reasonable as a matter of a law, a determination that a course of conduct constitutes malpractice requires findings of fact ( see Bernstein v Oppenheim & Co. , 160 AD2d 428, 430 [1st Dept 1990]).

2019Nevertheless, the City was entitled to dismissal of the common-law negligence claims based on the professional judgment rule. " That rule 'insulates a municipality from liability for its employees' performance of their duties where the . . . conduct involves the exercise of professional judgment such as electing one among many acceptable methods of carrying out tasks, or making tactical decisions'" ( Malay v City of Syracuse , 151 AD3d 1624, 1625 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 904 [2017], quoting Johnson v City of New York , 15 NY3d 676, 680 [2010]).

2017Nevertheless, the professional judgment rule “presupposes *1626 that judgment and discretion are exercised in compliance with the municipality’s procedures, because ‘the very basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery becomes irrevelant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies and exercises no judgment or discretion’” (Johnson, 15 NY3d at 681 [emphasis added]; see Valdez, 18 NY3d at 80 ; Lubecki v City of New York, 304 AD2d 224, 233-234 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701 [2004]).

2015Such considerations unquestionably implicate trial strategy and tactics, the hallmarks of matters ultimately left to the professional judgment of defense counsel ( see People v Colville , 20 NY3d at 28-29).

2015Such considerations unquestionably implicate trial strategy and tactics, the hallmarks of matters ultimately left to the professional judgment of defense counsel (see People v Colville, 20 NY3d at 28-29).

2010Rosner v Paley, 65 NY2d 736 , 738 [1985]; Zarin v Reid & Priest, 184 AD2d 385, 386-387 [1992]).

2010Immunity under the professional judgment rule “ ‘reflects a value judgment that—despite injury to a member of the public—the broader interest in having government officers and employees free to exercise judgment and discretion in their official functions, unhampered by fear of second-guessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from imposing liability for that injury’ ” (Mon v City of New York, 78 NY2d 309, 313 [1991], quoting Haddock v City of New York, 75 NY2d 478, 484 [1990]).

2010Immunity under the professional judgment rule "`reflects a value judgment that—despite injury to a member of the public—the broader interest in having government officers and employees free to exercise judgment and discretion in their official functions, unhampered by fear of second-guessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from imposing liability for that injury'" ( Mon v City of New York, 78 NY2d 309, 313 [1991], quoting Haddock v City of New York, 75 NY2d 478, 484 [1990]). *681 This immunity, however, presupposes that judgment and discretion are exercised in compli

2005Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs (see Campbell v City of Elmira, 84 NY2d 505, 509 [1994]), we find the evidence in the record reflects that after having been shot several times, the decedent, who had been acting erratically possibly due to emotional disturbance, “went down” and “might have been trying to get up again,” as Thomas Cusanelli testified, or was actually “startling] to get up again,” as a coworker testified, when the officers fired the shot that struck Cusanelli.

2005Williams v City of New York ( 2 NY3d 352, 367 [2004] ), which was predicated on a violation of General Municipal Law § 205-e, does not require a different conclusion, and the professional judgment rule is likewise inapplicable (Lubecki, 304 AD2d at 233-234 ).