party is entitled immunity in Ohio

2025“The decision to initiate, maintain, or dismiss criminal charges is at the core of the prosecutorial function.” McGruder v. Necaise, 733 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984). -43- {¶ 98} “Whether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.” Pelletier, 2018-Ohio-2121, at ¶ 12 , citing Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292 (1992). i. City of Riverside Immunity {¶ 99} The City of Riverside argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on all of Daly’s claims because it was immune from liability un

2024Thus, “‘[w]hether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.’” McConnell v. Dudley, 158 Ohio St.3d 388 , 2019-Ohio-4740 , 144 N.E.3d 369 , ¶ 17, quoting Pelletier v. Campbell, 153 Ohio St.3d 611 , 2018-Ohio-2121 , 109 N.E.3d 1210, ¶ 12 , citing Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292 , 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992).

2025STANDARDS OF REVIEW {¶19} “‘Whether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.’” McConnell v. Dudley, 2019-Ohio-4740, ¶ 17 , quoting Pelletier v. Campbell, 2018-Ohio- 2121, ¶ 12. “‘The review of a summary judgment denying political-subdivision immunity 3 “When a trial court denies a motion in which a political subdivision . . . seeks immunity under R.C.

2025“The second tier of the analysis places the burden on the plaintiff to overcome this statutory immunity by showing that one of the five exceptions contained in R.C. 2744.02(B) applies.” Id., citing Powell v. Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-4286, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). “‘Whether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.’” McConnell v. Dudley, 2019-Ohio-4740, ¶ 17 , quoting Pelletier v. Campbell, 2018- Ohio-2121, ¶ 12, citing Conley v. Shearer, 1992-Ohio-133 .

2025“The decision to initiate, maintain, or dismiss criminal charges is at the core of the prosecutorial function.” McGruder v. Necaise, 733 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984). -43- {¶ 98} “Whether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.” Pelletier, 2018-Ohio-2121, at ¶ 12 , citing Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292 (1992). i. City of Riverside Immunity {¶ 99} The City of Riverside argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on all of Daly’s claims because it was immune from liability un

2024Thus, “‘[w]hether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.’” McConnell v. Dudley, 158 Ohio St.3d 388 , 2019-Ohio-4740 , 144 N.E.3d 369 , ¶ 17, quoting Pelletier v. Campbell, 153 Ohio St.3d 611 , 2018-Ohio-2121 , 109 N.E.3d 1210, ¶ 12 , citing Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292 , 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992).

2019Partnership, 137 Ohio St.3d 123 , 2013-Ohio- 4530, 998 N.E.2d 437, ¶ 17 . {¶ 18} “The review of a summary judgment denying political-subdivision immunity is de novo and is governed by the summary-judgment standard set forth in Civ.R. 56.” Pelletier at ¶ 13 ; see also Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2005- Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712 , ¶ 8.

2019Partnership, 137 Ohio St.3d 123 , 2013-Ohio- 4530, 998 N.E.2d 437, ¶ 17 . {¶ 18} “The review of a summary judgment denying political-subdivision immunity is de novo and is governed by the summary-judgment standard set forth in Civ.R. 56.” Pelletier at ¶ 13 ; see also Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2005- Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712 , ¶ 8.

2025“The decision to initiate, maintain, or dismiss criminal charges is at the core of the prosecutorial function.” McGruder v. Necaise, 733 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984). -43- {¶ 98} “Whether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.” Pelletier, 2018-Ohio-2121, at ¶ 12 , citing Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292 (1992). i. City of Riverside Immunity {¶ 99} The City of Riverside argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on all of Daly’s claims because it was immune from liability un

2025“The second tier of the analysis places the burden on the plaintiff to overcome this statutory immunity by showing that one of the five exceptions contained in R.C. 2744.02(B) applies.” Id., citing Powell v. Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-4286, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). “‘Whether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.’” McConnell v. Dudley, 2019-Ohio-4740, ¶ 17 , quoting Pelletier v. Campbell, 2018- Ohio-2121, ¶ 12, citing Conley v. Shearer, 1992-Ohio-133 .

2023No. 19AP-145, 2020-Ohio-1134, ¶ 13 (“[w]hether a political subdivision is immune from civil liability is purely a question of law, properly determined prior to trial and preferably on a motion for summary judgment”) (Internal citations omitted.) No. 22AP-760 4 However, though summary judgment is an appropriate mechanism to determine a question of immunity, it is not the only mechanism.

2019Partnership, 137 Ohio St.3d 123 , 2013-Ohio-4530 , 998 ATHENS, 18CA28 18 N.E.2d 437, ¶ 17 (noting the importance of deciding a political subdivision’s entitlement to immunity before trial).

2019“Although the determination of recklessness is typically within the province of the jury, the standard for showing recklessness is high, so summary judgment can be appropriate in those instances where the individual’s conduct does not demonstrate a disposition to perversity.” O’Toole at ¶ 75, citing Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 356 (1994).

2019Partnership, 137 Ohio St.3d 123 , 2013-Ohio- 4530, 998 N.E.2d 437, ¶ 17 . {¶ 18} “The review of a summary judgment denying political-subdivision immunity is de novo and is governed by the summary-judgment standard set forth in Civ.R. 56.” Pelletier at ¶ 13 ; see also Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2005- Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712 , ¶ 8.

2019This is a “rigorous standard[] that will in most circumstances be difficult to establish * * *.” Argabrite v. Neer, 149 Ohio St.3d 349 , 2016-Ohio-8374, ¶ 8 (2016). 18 {¶52} “Whether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.” Pelletier v. Campbell, 153 Ohio St.3d 611 , 2018-Ohio-2121, ¶ 12 (2018); Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292 (1992).

2019This is a “rigorous standard[] that will in most circumstances be difficult to establish * * *.” Argabrite v. Neer, 149 Ohio St.3d 349 , 2016-Ohio-8374, ¶ 8 (2016). 18 {¶52} “Whether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.” Pelletier v. Campbell, 153 Ohio St.3d 611 , 2018-Ohio-2121, ¶ 12 (2018); Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292 (1992).