17 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2022 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ettner v. City of Medfordgreen2 sentences2007See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414 , 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435 , 963 P2d 149 , rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable). 2007See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414 , 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435 , 963 P2d 149 , rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable). | 2 | 2 |
Shockey v. City of Portlandgreen2 sentences2007See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414 , 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435 , 963 P2d 149 , rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable). 2007See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414 , 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435 , 963 P2d 149 , rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable). | 2 | 2 |
In re Millergreen2 sentences2007See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414 , 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435 , 963 P2d 149 , rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable). 2000See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414 , 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a common-law wrongful discharge claim); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or App 435 , 963 P2d 149 , rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (holding that, regarding claims for employment discrimination under ORS chapter 659, the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.102(2) was inapplicable). | 2 | 2 |
McManus v. Auchinclossgreen2 sentences2022Cite as 318 Or App 87 (2022) 101 law of this or other jurisdictions.’ [Babick, 333 Or] at 409 * * * When identifying an important public duty, ‘we review statutes and other authorities for evidence of a substantial public policy that would * * * be “thwarted” if an employer were allowed to discharge its employee without liability.’ Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 129 Or App 371, 380 , 879 P2d 1288 (1994), rev dismissed, 321 Or 511 (1995) (quoting Nees [v. Hocks], 272 Or [210, ]219[, 536 P2d 512 (1975)]).” McManus v. Auchincloss, 271 Or App 765 , 771–72, 353 P3d 17 , rev den, 358 Or 145 (201 2022Cite as 318 Or App 87 (2022) 101 law of this or other jurisdictions.’ [Babick, 333 Or] at 409 * * * When identifying an important public duty, ‘we review statutes and other authorities for evidence of a substantial public policy that would * * * be “thwarted” if an employer were allowed to discharge its employee without liability.’ Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 129 Or App 371, 380 , 879 P2d 1288 (1994), rev dismissed, 321 Or 511 (1995) (quoting Nees [v. Hocks], 272 Or [210, ]219[, 536 P2d 512 (1975)]).” McManus v. Auchincloss, 271 Or App 765 , 771–72, 353 P3d 17 , rev den, 358 Or 145 (201 | 1 | 2 |
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenzgreen1 sentence1998See Peterson v. Temple, 323 Or 322 , 327 n 3, 918 P2d 413 (1996) (for purposes of this court’s analysis, “claim” and “cause of action” are synonymous). 5 See Martin Marietta Corporation v. Lorenz, 823 P2d 100, 114-15 (Colo 1992) (the employee’s common-law wrongful-discharge claim did not accrue until his last day on the job, because he did not suffer any injury until he was deprived ofhis job); Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc., 14 Cal 4th 479, 501-02, 59 Cal Rptr 2d 20, 926 P2d 1114 (1996) (a wrongful-discharge claim accrues when the actual dismissal occurs because, prior to the actual t | 1 | 1 |
| Peterson v. Templegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Delaware State College v. Ricksgreen2 sentences1998But see Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 US 250 , 101 S Ct 498 , 66 L Ed 2d 431 (1980) (the plaintifPprofessor’s employment discrimination claim based on a denial of tenure, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 USC section 2000e et seq. and 42 USC section 1981 , accrued when the tenure decision was made, not on the plaintiffs last day of work, because that was when the discriminatory act complained of (denial of tenure) occurred); Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 US 6 , 102 S Ct 28 , 70 L Ed 2d 6 (1981) (the plaintiffs’ unlawful employment practice claims, brought under 42 U 1998But see Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 US 250 , 101 S Ct 498 , 66 L Ed 2d 431 (1980) (the plaintifPprofessor’s employment discrimination claim based on a denial of tenure, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 USC section 2000e et seq. and 42 USC section 1981 , accrued when the tenure decision was made, not on the plaintiffs last day of work, because that was when the discriminatory act complained of (denial of tenure) occurred); Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 US 6 , 102 S Ct 28 , 70 L Ed 2d 6 (1981) (the plaintiffs’ unlawful employment practice claims, brought under 42 U | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lamson v. Crater Lake Motors, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022First, our opinion in Huber itself recognized “that, for purposes of a common-law wrongful discharge claim, an important pub- lic duty could theoretically arise ‘in the absence of a specific legal obligation to perform the act or acts that trigger the discharge,’ ” even if it is also true that “the sources of law that express the asserted ‘public policy’ must in some sense speak directly to those acts.” 235 Or App at 243 (quoting Lamson v. Crater Lake Motors, Inc., 346 Or 628, 637-38 , 216 P3d 852 (2009)). 2022First, our opinion in Huber itself recognized “that, for purposes of a common-law wrongful discharge claim, an important pub- lic duty could theoretically arise ‘in the absence of a specific legal obligation to perform the act or acts that trigger the discharge,’ ” even if it is also true that “the sources of law that express the asserted ‘public policy’ must in some sense speak directly to those acts.” 235 Or App at 243 (quoting Lamson v. Crater Lake Motors, Inc., 346 Or 628, 637-38 , 216 P3d 852 (2009)). | 3 | 2010–2022 |
Nees v. Hocks
green
2 sentences2015Examples of such circumstances include: (1) when the discharge is for exercising a job-related right that reflects an important public policy, see, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or 597 , 588 P2d 1087 (1978) (employee unlawfully discharged for filing workers’ compensation claim); or (2) when the discharge is for fulfilling some important public duty, see, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l, 297 Or 10 , 681 P2d 114 (1984) (employee discharged for refusing to defame another employee); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210 , 536 P2d 512 (1975) (employee discharged for serving on jury).” If a party brings a 2015Examples of such circumstances include: (1) when the discharge is for exercising a job-related right that reflects an important public policy, see, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or 597 , 588 P2d 1087 (1978) (employee unlawfully discharged for filing workers’ compensation claim); or (2) when the discharge is for fulfilling some important public duty, see, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l, 297 Or 10 , 681 P2d 114 (1984) (employee discharged for refusing to defame another employee); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210 , 536 P2d 512 (1975) (employee discharged for serving on jury).” If a party brings a | 2 | 2015–2022 |
Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2022Cite as 318 Or App 87 (2022) 101 law of this or other jurisdictions.’ [Babick, 333 Or] at 409 * * * When identifying an important public duty, ‘we review statutes and other authorities for evidence of a substantial public policy that would * * * be “thwarted” if an employer were allowed to discharge its employee without liability.’ Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 129 Or App 371, 380 , 879 P2d 1288 (1994), rev dismissed, 321 Or 511 (1995) (quoting Nees [v. Hocks], 272 Or [210, ]219[, 536 P2d 512 (1975)]).” McManus v. Auchincloss, 271 Or App 765 , 771–72, 353 P3d 17 , rev den, 358 Or 145 (201 2022Cite as 318 Or App 87 (2022) 101 law of this or other jurisdictions.’ [Babick, 333 Or] at 409 * * * When identifying an important public duty, ‘we review statutes and other authorities for evidence of a substantial public policy that would * * * be “thwarted” if an employer were allowed to discharge its employee without liability.’ Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 129 Or App 371, 380 , 879 P2d 1288 (1994), rev dismissed, 321 Or 511 (1995) (quoting Nees [v. Hocks], 272 Or [210, ]219[, 536 P2d 512 (1975)]).” McManus v. Auchincloss, 271 Or App 765 , 771–72, 353 P3d 17 , rev den, 358 Or 145 (201 | 2 | 2015–2022 |
Huber v. Oregon Department of Education
green
2 sentences2022First, our opinion in Huber itself recognized “that, for purposes of a common-law wrongful discharge claim, an important pub- lic duty could theoretically arise ‘in the absence of a specific legal obligation to perform the act or acts that trigger the discharge,’ ” even if it is also true that “the sources of law that express the asserted ‘public policy’ must in some sense speak directly to those acts.” 235 Or App at 243 (quoting Lamson v. Crater Lake Motors, Inc., 346 Or 628, 637-38 , 216 P3d 852 (2009)). 2012Further, we indicated that in Lamson — the case on which defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings had been predicated — the Supreme Court had “explained that, for purposes of a common-law wrongful discharge claim, an important public duty could theoretically arise ‘in the absence of a specific legal obligation to perform the act or acts that trigger the discharge, [but] the sources of law that express the asserted “public policy” must in some sense speak directly to those acts.’” Huber, 235 Or App at 243 (quoting Lamson, 346 Or at 637-38 ) (brackets in Huber ; emphasis in Lamson). | 2 | 2012–2022 |
Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2022Cite as 318 Or App 87 (2022) 101 law of this or other jurisdictions.’ [Babick, 333 Or] at 409 * * * When identifying an important public duty, ‘we review statutes and other authorities for evidence of a substantial public policy that would * * * be “thwarted” if an employer were allowed to discharge its employee without liability.’ Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 129 Or App 371, 380 , 879 P2d 1288 (1994), rev dismissed, 321 Or 511 (1995) (quoting Nees [v. Hocks], 272 Or [210, ]219[, 536 P2d 512 (1975)]).” McManus v. Auchincloss, 271 Or App 765 , 771–72, 353 P3d 17 , rev den, 358 Or 145 (201 2015When identifying an important public duty, “we review statutes and other authorities for evidence of a substantial public policy that would *** be ‘thwarted’ if an employer were allowed to discharge its employee without liability.” Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 129 Or App 371, 380 , 879 P2d 1288 (1994), rev dismissed, 321 Or 511 (1995) (quoting Nees, 272 Or at 219 ). | 2 | 2015–2022 |
Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006Two years after Nees, the court concluded in Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, 278 Or. 347 , 563 P.2d 1205 (1977), that an employee who was terminated for reporting safety violations could not bring a common-law wrongful discharge claim because the employee had an adequate statutory remedy ( i.e., via a complaint to the United States Department of Labor) to vindicate the important societal interest at stake. 2006Two years after Nees, the court concluded in Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, 278 Or. 347 , 563 P.2d 1205 (1977), that an employee who was terminated for reporting safety violations could not bring a common-law wrongful discharge claim because the employee had an adequate statutory remedy ( i.e., via a complaint to the United States Department of Labor) to vindicate the important societal interest at stake. | 2 | 2006–2021 |
Brown v. Transcon Lines
green
2 sentences2015Examples of such circumstances include: (1) when the discharge is for exercising a job-related right that reflects an important public policy, see, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or 597 , 588 P2d 1087 (1978) (employee unlawfully discharged for filing workers’ compensation claim); or (2) when the discharge is for fulfilling some important public duty, see, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l, 297 Or 10 , 681 P2d 114 (1984) (employee discharged for refusing to defame another employee); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210 , 536 P2d 512 (1975) (employee discharged for serving on jury).” If a party brings a 2015Examples of such circumstances include: (1) when the discharge is for exercising a job-related right that reflects an important public policy, see, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or 597 , 588 P2d 1087 (1978) (employee unlawfully discharged for filing workers’ compensation claim); or (2) when the discharge is for fulfilling some important public duty, see, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l, 297 Or 10 , 681 P2d 114 (1984) (employee discharged for refusing to defame another employee); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210 , 536 P2d 512 (1975) (employee discharged for serving on jury).” If a party brings a | 2 | 2006–2015 |
Delaney v. Taco Time International, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015Examples of such circumstances include: (1) when the discharge is for exercising a job-related right that reflects an important public policy, see, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or 597 , 588 P2d 1087 (1978) (employee unlawfully discharged for filing workers’ compensation claim); or (2) when the discharge is for fulfilling some important public duty, see, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l, 297 Or 10 , 681 P2d 114 (1984) (employee discharged for refusing to defame another employee); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210 , 536 P2d 512 (1975) (employee discharged for serving on jury).” If a party brings a 2015Examples of such circumstances include: (1) when the discharge is for exercising a job-related right that reflects an important public policy, see, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or 597 , 588 P2d 1087 (1978) (employee unlawfully discharged for filing workers’ compensation claim); or (2) when the discharge is for fulfilling some important public duty, see, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l, 297 Or 10 , 681 P2d 114 (1984) (employee discharged for refusing to defame another employee); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210 , 536 P2d 512 (1975) (employee discharged for serving on jury).” If a party brings a | 2 | 2007–2015 |
Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.
green
2 sentences2000He appears to bring this claim both as a statutory claim under ORS 659.030(1)(f) and as a common-law wrongful discharge claim under the principles established in Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298 Or 76 , 689 P2d 1292 (1984). 2000He appears to bring this claim both as a statutory claim under ORS 659.030(1)(f) and as a common-law wrongful discharge claim under the principles established in Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298 Or 76 , 689 P2d 1292 (1984). | 2 | 2000–2009 |
Sherertz v. Brownstein Rask
green
2 sentences2022Before considering those alternative arguments, we note that, as we recently clarified in Sherertz v. Brownstein Rask, 314 Or App 331, 341 , 498 P3d 850 (2021), the “right for the wrong reason” doctrine is not implicated in an appeal such as this one, where the alternative arguments were raised in the trial court and not for the first time on appeal. 2022Before considering those alternative arguments, we note that, as we recently clarified in Sherertz v. Brownstein Rask, 314 Or App 331, 341 , 498 P3d 850 (2021), the “right for the wrong reason” doctrine is not implicated in an appeal such as this one, where the alternative arguments were raised in the trial court and not for the first time on appeal. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Boyd v. Legacy Health
green
1 sentence2022Cite as 318 Or App 87 (2022) 101 law of this or other jurisdictions.’ [Babick, 333 Or] at 409 * * * When identifying an important public duty, ‘we review statutes and other authorities for evidence of a substantial public policy that would * * * be “thwarted” if an employer were allowed to discharge its employee without liability.’ Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 129 Or App 371, 380 , 879 P2d 1288 (1994), rev dismissed, 321 Or 511 (1995) (quoting Nees [v. Hocks], 272 Or [210, ]219[, 536 P2d 512 (1975)]).” McManus v. Auchincloss, 271 Or App 765 , 771–72, 353 P3d 17 , rev den, 358 Or 145 (201 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State
green
1 sentence2022Citing Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659-60 , 20 P3d 180 (2001), defendant contends that we can and should uphold the court’s summary-judgment rul- ing because it was “right for the wrong reason.” As alterna- tive bases on which we might affirm, defendant argues the following: (1) plaintiff’s statutory-retaliation claims fail as a matter of law because he did not engage in “protected activ- ity” under ORS 659A.199(1) or ORS 441.181(1);3 (2) plaintiff’s activity did not fulfill an important public duty as required for a common-law wrongful-discharge claim; and (3 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Kruchek
green
1 sentence2022Citing Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659-60 , 20 P3d 180 (2001), defendant contends that we can and should uphold the court’s summary-judgment rul- ing because it was “right for the wrong reason.” As alterna- tive bases on which we might affirm, defendant argues the following: (1) plaintiff’s statutory-retaliation claims fail as a matter of law because he did not engage in “protected activ- ity” under ORS 659A.199(1) or ORS 441.181(1);3 (2) plaintiff’s activity did not fulfill an important public duty as required for a common-law wrongful-discharge claim; and (3 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Walker v. Oregon Travel Information Council
neutral
1 sentence2021The trial court’s findings on the statutory claim were separate from and do not compromise the jury’s 5 As relevant here, plaintiff’s statutory claim required plaintiff to show that defendant took disciplinary action against her for her “disclosure of any informa- tion that the employee reasonably believes is evidence of: “(A) A violation of any federal or state law statute[.]” Cite as 315 Or App 14 (2021) 21 findings or verdict on the common-law wrongful-discharge claim or implicate the constitutional provision. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Walker v. Oregon Travel Information Council
green
2 sentences2021The court acknowledged that, under its case law, ORS 659A.203(1) “is a statutory source of the important public duty to report government wrongdoing that can support a common-law wrongful-discharge claim.” Id. at 447 . 2021Although plaintiff in this case brought both a statutory whistleblowing claim and a common-law wrongful discharge claim, a plaintiff could not do so today under the current statute.4 Although, in this case, the Court of Appeals cor- rectly concluded that whistleblowing in the public employ- ment context can give rise to a wrongful discharge claim, Walker, 299 Or App at 447 , it incorrectly suggested that the existence of that important public policy rests on a court’s legal determination of the plaintiff’s reasonable belief that her employer violated the law in the whistleblowing context. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Walker v. Oregon Travel Information Council
green
1 sentence2021(CC 15CV02202) (CA A163420) (SC S067211) 484 P3d 1035 Plaintiff brought a statutory whistleblowing claim under ORS 659A.203(1) and a common-law wrongful discharge claim against her employer, a semi- independent state agency, alleging that the employer had unlawfully fired her for whistleblowing. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Deatherage v. Johnson
neutral
1 sentence2021Subsequently, in Deatherage, on which defendant’s argument in response to plaintiff’s first assignment of error is substantially premised, we affirmed a trial court deci- sion dismissing a common-law wrongful discharge claim in which the plaintiff alleged that she was fired in retaliation after she had contacted the Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Division to report health and safety violations at her employer’s place of business. 230 Or App at 424 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Vergara v. Patel
green
1 sentence2020Lane County Circuit Court 17CV35103; A167209 471 P3d 141 Plaintiff brought against defendants two statutory employment claims and a common-law wrongful discharge claim. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Love v. Polk County Fire District
green
2 sentences2019In Love v. Polk County Fire District, 209 Or App 474, 492 , 149 P3d 199 (2006), we held that ORS 659A.203(1), which pro- hibits disciplinary action against certain public employee whistleblowers, is a statutory source of the important public duty to report government wrongdoing that can support a common-law wrongful-discharge claim. 2019In Love v. Polk County Fire District, 209 Or App 474, 492 , 149 P3d 199 (2006), we held that ORS 659A.203(1), which pro- hibits disciplinary action against certain public employee whistleblowers, is a statutory source of the important public duty to report government wrongdoing that can support a common-law wrongful-discharge claim. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp.
green
2 sentences2015Examples of such circumstances include: (1) when the discharge is for exercising a job-related right that reflects an important public policy, see, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or 597 , 588 P2d 1087 (1978) (employee unlawfully discharged for filing workers’ compensation claim); or (2) when the discharge is for fulfilling some important public duty, see, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l, 297 Or 10 , 681 P2d 114 (1984) (employee discharged for refusing to defame another employee); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210 , 536 P2d 512 (1975) (employee discharged for serving on jury).” If a party brings a 2015Examples of such circumstances include: (1) when the discharge is for exercising a job-related right that reflects an important public policy, see, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or 597 , 588 P2d 1087 (1978) (employee unlawfully discharged for filing workers’ compensation claim); or (2) when the discharge is for fulfilling some important public duty, see, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l, 297 Or 10 , 681 P2d 114 (1984) (employee discharged for refusing to defame another employee); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210 , 536 P2d 512 (1975) (employee discharged for serving on jury).” If a party brings a | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp.
green
2 sentences2015Examples of such circumstances include: (1) when the discharge is for exercising a job-related right that reflects an important public policy, see, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or 597 , 588 P2d 1087 (1978) (employee unlawfully discharged for filing workers’ compensation claim); or (2) when the discharge is for fulfilling some important public duty, see, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l, 297 Or 10 , 681 P2d 114 (1984) (employee discharged for refusing to defame another employee); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210 , 536 P2d 512 (1975) (employee discharged for serving on jury).” If a party brings a 2015Examples of such circumstances include: (1) when the discharge is for exercising a job-related right that reflects an important public policy, see, e.g., Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or 597 , 588 P2d 1087 (1978) (employee unlawfully discharged for filing workers’ compensation claim); or (2) when the discharge is for fulfilling some important public duty, see, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l, 297 Or 10 , 681 P2d 114 (1984) (employee discharged for refusing to defame another employee); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210 , 536 P2d 512 (1975) (employee discharged for serving on jury).” If a party brings a | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Carlson v. Crater Lake Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences2011In any event, plaintiff acknowledges that, in Carlson v. Crater Lake Lumber Co., 103 Or App 190, 195 , 796 P2d 1216 (1990), adh’d to as modified on recons, 105 Or App 314 , 804 P2d 511 (1991), this court held that ORS 652.355 provides an adequate remedy for those who have suffered retaliation for bringing a good faith wage claim and, therefore, Oregon does not permit a common-law wrongful discharge claim based on the conduct. 2011In any event, plaintiff acknowledges that, in Carlson v. Crater Lake Lumber Co., 103 Or App 190, 195 , 796 P2d 1216 (1990), adh’d to as modified on recons, 105 Or App 314 , 804 P2d 511 (1991), this court held that ORS 652.355 provides an adequate remedy for those who have suffered retaliation for bringing a good faith wage claim and, therefore, Oregon does not permit a common-law wrongful discharge claim based on the conduct. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Carlson v. Crater Lake Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences2011In any event, plaintiff acknowledges that, in Carlson v. Crater Lake Lumber Co., 103 Or App 190, 195 , 796 P2d 1216 (1990), adh’d to as modified on recons, 105 Or App 314 , 804 P2d 511 (1991), this court held that ORS 652.355 provides an adequate remedy for those who have suffered retaliation for bringing a good faith wage claim and, therefore, Oregon does not permit a common-law wrongful discharge claim based on the conduct. 2011In any event, plaintiff acknowledges that, in Carlson v. Crater Lake Lumber Co., 103 Or App 190, 195 , 796 P2d 1216 (1990), adh’d to as modified on recons, 105 Or App 314 , 804 P2d 511 (1991), this court held that ORS 652.355 provides an adequate remedy for those who have suffered retaliation for bringing a good faith wage claim and, therefore, Oregon does not permit a common-law wrongful discharge claim based on the conduct. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
McCool v. Hillhaven Corporation
green
1 sentence2009Quoting the language from Holien set out above, we concluded that, for the same reasons, the equitable remedies available by statute to whistleblowers were not *571 “adequate” so as to preclude the common-law claim. 97 Or App at 540 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Chardon v. Fernandez green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.