statutory best interest factors in Michigan

2023Id. at 881 .

2019Id. at 878-879 .

2022Demski, 309 Mich App at 446 .

2022Demski, 309 Mich App at 446 .

2019The trial court relied heavily on this Court’s decision in McRoberts v Ferguson, 322 Mich App 125 ; 910 NW2d 721 (2017), to support its decision that the deliberate and repeated obstruction of parenting time constitutes proper cause and change of circumstances to revisit a custody order.

2019The trial court relied heavily on this Court’s decision in McRoberts v Ferguson, 322 Mich App 125 ; 910 NW2d 721 (2017), to support its decision that the deliberate and repeated obstruction of parenting time constitutes proper cause and change of circumstances to revisit a custody order.

2018Defendant cites Rivette v. Rose-Molina , 278 Mich. App. 327 , 332-333, 750 N.W.2d 603 (2008), and Harvey v. Harvey , 470 Mich. 186 , 187-188, 680 N.W.2d 835 (2004), to support his argument that the trial court was required to make an independent factual determination of the statutory best-interest factors even in the face of a mediated agreement between the parents.

2018Defendant cites Rivette v. Rose-Molina , 278 Mich. App. 327 , 332-333, 750 N.W.2d 603 (2008), and Harvey v. Harvey , 470 Mich. 186 , 187-188, 680 N.W.2d 835 (2004), to support his argument that the trial court was required to make an independent factual determination of the statutory best-interest factors even in the face of a mediated agreement between the parents.

2006Specifically, MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that if a child custody dispute has arisen from another action in the circuit court, the court may “[mjodify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances ....” On the basis of this language, this Court held in Dehring v Dehring, 220 Mich App 163, 165 ; 559 NW2d 59 (1996), quoting Rossow v Aranda, 206 Mich App 456, 458 ; 522 NW2d 874 (1994), that if the movant does not establish proper cause or change in circumstances, then the court is precluded from holding a child custody hearing: “ ‘The plain a

2006Specifically, MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that if a child custody dispute has arisen from another action in the circuit court, the court may “[mjodify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances ....” On the basis of this language, this Court held in Dehring v Dehring, 220 Mich App 163, 165 ; 559 NW2d 59 (1996), quoting Rossow v Aranda, 206 Mich App 456, 458 ; 522 NW2d 874 (1994), that if the movant does not establish proper cause or change in circumstances, then the court is precluded from holding a child custody hearing: “ ‘The plain a

2025Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 475 ; 730 NW2d 262 (2007).

2025Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 475 ; 730 NW2d 262 (2007).

2025This too will be a determination made on the basis of the facts of each case, with the relevance of the facts presented being gauged by the statutory best interest factors. [Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512-514 .] “Although the threshold consideration of whether there was proper cause or a change of circumstances might be fact-intensive, the court need not necessarily conduct an evidentiary hearing on the topic.” Corporan, 282 Mich App at 605 .

2025In deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary with regard to a postjudgment motion to change custody, the court must determine, by requiring an offer of proof or otherwise, whether there are contested factual issues that must be resolved in order for the court to make an informed decision on the motion. [MCR 3.210(C)(8).] Although the trial court was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing in making the threshold consideration as to proper cause or change in circumstances, see Corporan, 282 Mich App at 605 , it must determine “by requiring an offer of proof or otherwise, wheth

2024“A trial court may use both the statutory best interest factors in the [CCA], MCL 722.23, and the factors listed in the parenting time statute, MCL 722.27a[(7)] when deciding whether to award parenting time.” Sturgis v Sturgis, 302 Mich App 706, 710 ; 840 NW2d 408 (2013) (alteration and quotation marks omitted).

2024“A trial court may use both the statutory best interest factors in the [CCA], MCL 722.23, and the factors listed in the parenting time statute, MCL 722.27a[(7)] when deciding whether to award parenting time.” Sturgis v Sturgis, 302 Mich App 706, 710 ; 840 NW2d 408 (2013) (alteration and quotation marks omitted).

2000Again, this is not the situation in the case at hand, where the dispute arose after the July 28, 1997, order was entered. [4] I note that the Koron Court remarked that cases cited by the defendant in support of the argument that a trial court is always required to place findings on the record regarding the statutory best interest factors were distinguishable because they involved "modification of the terms of a custody arrangement...." Koron, supra at 192 , 523 N.W.2d 870 .

2000I note that the Koron Court remarked that cases cited by the defendant in support of the argument that a trial court is always required to place findings on the record regarding the statutory best interest factors were distinguishable because they involved “modification of the terms of a custody arrangement. . . .” Koron, supra at 192 .1 also note that in the cases cited there was a dispute between the parties regarding the potential modification.

2022Griffin v Griffin, 323 Mich App 110, 119-120 ; 916 NW2d 292 (2018).

2022Griffin v Griffin, 323 Mich App 110, 119-120 ; 916 NW2d 292 (2018).

2022The trial court’s factual findings regarding an established custodial environment and the statutory best-interest factors “are reviewed under the great weight of the evidence standard and will be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2022The trial court’s factual findings regarding an established custodial environment and the statutory best-interest factors “are reviewed under the great weight of the evidence standard and will be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2020“Such an effective change of custody would necessitate an additional review of the statutory best-interest factors of MCL 722.23 to determine whether [the proponent] could prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the change of custody would be in the child[’s] best interests.” Id. (emphasis added).

2009As noted earlier, at a Lombardo hearing, the circuit court “must consider, evaluate, and determine each of the factors listed at MCL 722.23” for the purpose of “resolving disputes concerning ‘important decisions affecting the welfare of the child’ that arise between joint custodial parents.” Lombardo, 202 Mich App at 160 .

2019Brausch v Brausch, 283 Mich App 339, 355 ; 770 NW2d 77 (2009).

2019Brausch v Brausch, 283 Mich App 339, 355 ; 770 NW2d 77 (2009).

2019We disagree. “[W]hen a modification of custody would change the established custodial environment of a child, the moving party must show by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child’s best interest.” Phillips, 241 Mich App at 25 .

2004Phillips, supra. As we have recognized in prior cases, the Legislature’s directives that a court find “proper cause” (or a change of circumstances) before it determines the existence of a custodial environment and conducts a review of the statutory best interest factors are designed to be obstacles to revisiting custody orders.

2018See MCL 722.26a(1); Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 326 ; 729 NW2d 533 (2006); Nielsen v Nielsen, 163 Mich App 430, 434 ; 415 NW2d 6 (1987).

2018See MCL 722.26a(1); Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 326 ; 729 NW2d 533 (2006); Nielsen v Nielsen, 163 Mich App 430, 434 ; 415 NW2d 6 (1987).

2018Bowers v Bowers, 198 Mich App 320, 328 ; 497 NW2d 602 (1992).

2018Bowers v Bowers, 198 Mich App 320, 328 ; 497 NW2d 602 (1992).

2018See MCL 722.26a(1); Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 326 ; 729 NW2d 533 (2006); Nielsen v Nielsen, 163 Mich App 430, 434 ; 415 NW2d 6 (1987).

2018See MCL 722.26a(1); Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 326 ; 729 NW2d 533 (2006); Nielsen v Nielsen, 163 Mich App 430, 434 ; 415 NW2d 6 (1987).

2017See Dailey v Kloenhamer, 291 Mich App 660, 670 ; 811 NW2d 501 (2011) (custody described in MCL 722.26a[7][b] “is referred to as joint legal custody”). -3- cooperation and agreement between the parties.” Wellman v Wellman, 203 Mich App 277, 281 ; 512 NW2d 68 (1994).

2017See Dailey v Kloenhamer, 291 Mich App 660, 670 ; 811 NW2d 501 (2011) (custody described in MCL 722.26a[7][b] “is referred to as joint legal custody”). -3- cooperation and agreement between the parties.” Wellman v Wellman, 203 Mich App 277, 281 ; 512 NW2d 68 (1994).

2009Schlender v Schlender, 235 Mich App 230, 233 ; 596 NW2d 643 (1999). 7 The trial court never made any determination regarding whether an established custodial environment existed with either party or both parties.

2009Schlender v Schlender, 235 Mich App 230, 233 ; 596 NW2d 643 (1999). 7 The trial court never made any determination regarding whether an established custodial environment existed with either party or both parties.

2006It therefore follows as a corollary that where the party seeking to change custody has not carried the initial burden of establishing either proper cause or a change of circumstances, the trial court is not authorized by statute to revisit an otherwise valid prior custody decision and engage in a reconsideration of the statutory best interest factors. ’ [Emphasis added.]” These initial steps to changing custody — finding a “change of circumstance or proper cause” and not changing an “established custodial environment” without clear and convincing evidence — are intended to “erect a barrier aga

2006It therefore follows as a corollary that where the party seeking to change custody has not carried the initial burden of establishing either proper cause or a change of circumstances, the trial court is not authorized by statute to revisit an otherwise valid prior custody decision and engage in a reconsideration of the statutory best interest factors. ’ [Emphasis added.]” These initial steps to changing custody — finding a “change of circumstance or proper cause” and not changing an “established custodial environment” without clear and convincing evidence — are intended to “erect a barrier aga

2006Specifically, MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that if a child custody dispute has arisen from another action in the circuit court, the court may “[mjodify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances ....” On the basis of this language, this Court held in Dehring v Dehring, 220 Mich App 163, 165 ; 559 NW2d 59 (1996), quoting Rossow v Aranda, 206 Mich App 456, 458 ; 522 NW2d 874 (1994), that if the movant does not establish proper cause or change in circumstances, then the court is precluded from holding a child custody hearing: “ ‘The plain a

2006Specifically, MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that if a child custody dispute has arisen from another action in the circuit court, the court may “[mjodify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances ....” On the basis of this language, this Court held in Dehring v Dehring, 220 Mich App 163, 165 ; 559 NW2d 59 (1996), quoting Rossow v Aranda, 206 Mich App 456, 458 ; 522 NW2d 874 (1994), that if the movant does not establish proper cause or change in circumstances, then the court is precluded from holding a child custody hearing: “ ‘The plain a

2000Hoffman v Hoffman, 119 Mich App 79, 81 ; 326 NW2d 136 (1982); Dowd v Dowd, 97 Mich App 276, 278 ; 293 NW2d 797 (1980).

2000Hoffman v Hoffman, 119 Mich App 79, 81 ; 326 NW2d 136 (1982); Dowd v Dowd, 97 Mich App 276, 278 ; 293 NW2d 797 (1980).