16 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Minefeegreen1 sentence2024App. 3d 322, 324 (1975) (“A bail bond violation occurs even if the underlying charge is later declared invalid.”); People v. Minefee, 14 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tompkinsgreen1 sentence2024See 725 ILCS 5/32–10(a-5) (West 2020) (“Any person who knowingly violates a condition of bail bond by possessing a firearm in violation of his or her conditions of bail commits a Class 4 felony for a first violation and a Class 3 felony for a second or subsequent violation.”); see also cases discussing the criminal offense of violation of bail bond—People v. Tompkins, 26 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences1995(See Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95½, par. 6-303(d) ("Any person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of this Section [driving while license suspended/revoked] shall be guilty of a * * * felony").) Had the legislature meant for predicate offenses to include only DUI offenses resulting in convictions under the felony DUI statute, at issue here, we believe that it would have used the term "convicted" rather than "committed." Finally, Pall cites language from two appellate court decisions in further support of his argument that the term "committed" as used in the felony DUI statute must be li 1995(See Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95½, par. 6-303(d) ("Any person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of this Section [driving while license suspended/revoked] shall be guilty of a * * * felony").) Had the legislature meant for predicate offenses to include only DUI offenses resulting in convictions under the felony DUI statute, at issue here, we believe that it would have used the term "convicted" rather than "committed." Finally, Pall cites language from two appellate court decisions in further support of his argument that the term "committed" as used in the felony DUI statute must be li | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Easley
green
2 sentences2015Under these circumstances, only one class of felony conviction is possible for the offense as alleged in the charging instrument." Easley, 2014 IL 115581, ¶ 19 . ¶ 40 Applying the above reasoning to the facts of the case before it, the court noted that the UUW by a felon statute specifically provides that a second or subsequent violation of the section " 'shall be a Class 2 felony.' " (Emphasis omitted.) Easley, 2014 IL 115581 , ¶ 21 (quoting 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(e) (West 2008)). 2015Under these circumstances, only one class of felony conviction is possible for the offense as alleged in the charging instrument." Easley, 2014 IL 115581, ¶ 19 . ¶ 40 Applying the above reasoning to the facts of the case before it, the court noted that the UUW by a felon statute specifically provides that a second or subsequent violation of the section " 'shall be a Class 2 felony.' " (Emphasis omitted.) Easley, 2014 IL 115581 , ¶ 21 (quoting 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(e) (West 2008)). | 8 | 2014–2015 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2019Id. § 11-9.4-1(d). ¶ 11 It is undisputed that Legoo was a convicted child sex offender who was present in a public park. 2019Id. § 11-9.4-1(d). ¶ 11 It is undisputed that Legoo was a convicted child sex offender who was present in a public park. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Pepitone
green
1 sentence2020An initial violation of section 11-9.4-1 is a Class A misdemeanor, and a second or subsequent violation is a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(d) (West 2016). ¶ 16 We recently construed section 11-9.4-1(b) in People v. Pepitone, 2018 IL 122034 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Melton
green
1 sentence2020A second or subsequent violation of this Section is a Class 3 felony.” 720 ILCS 5/12-21.6 (West 1994). ¶ 29 The Melton court determined that there was “no doubt that child endangerment was a criminal offense prior to September 9, 1993, and that it remained so after that date.” Melton, 282 Ill. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Smith
green
1 sentence2013Prior to August 10, 2001, section 6-303(d) provided, “Any person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of this Section shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony if the original revocation or suspension was for a violation of Section 11-401 or 11-501 of -12- 2013 IL App (2d) 121164 this Code, or a similar out-of-state offense, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, a violation of Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, relating to the offense of reckless homicide, or a similar out-of-state offense, or a statutory summary suspension under Section 11-501.1 of this Code.” (Emphases added | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Carlock
green
2 sentences1995(See Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95½, par. 6-303(d) ("Any person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of this Section [driving while license suspended/revoked] shall be guilty of a * * * felony").) Had the legislature meant for predicate offenses to include only DUI offenses resulting in convictions under the felony DUI statute, at issue here, we believe that it would have used the term "convicted" rather than "committed." Finally, Pall cites language from two appellate court decisions in further support of his argument that the term "committed" as used in the felony DUI statute must be li 1995App.3d 1100, 1103 , 58 Ill.Dec. 270 , 430 N.E.2d 212 (court believed that the legislature intended the term "offense" to include only violations that had been reduced to convictions).) The cited cases involved enhancement statutes different from the one at issue here, however, and thus we do not believe that the decisions are relevant to our discussion. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
McLaughlin v. United States
green
1 sentence1986(See McLaughlin v. United States (1986), 476 U.S._, 90 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.