mental disease or defect defense in Kansas

2018As we previously noted, these decisions occasionally refer to premeditation as part of a "state of mind inquiry" and impliedly or explicitly approve instructions informing the jury that a defendant was not responsible for his or her acts if "'because of mental disease or defect the defendant lacked the premeditation and intent required for first-degree murder.'" (Emphasis added.) State v. White, 279 Kan. 326, 333 , 109 P.3d 1199 (2005) (White I); see also State v. White, 284 Kan. 333, 345 , 161 P.3d 208 (2007) (White II); State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, 619 , 44 P.3d 466 (2002).

2018As we previously noted, these decisions occasionally refer to premeditation as part of a "state of mind inquiry" and impliedly or explicitly approve instructions informing the jury that a defendant was not responsible for his or her acts if "'because of mental disease or defect the defendant lacked the premeditation and intent required for first-degree murder.'" (Emphasis added.) State v. White, 279 Kan. 326, 333 , 109 P.3d 1199 (2005) (White I); see also State v. White, 284 Kan. 333, 345 , 161 P.3d 208 (2007) (White II); State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, 619 , 44 P.3d 466 (2002).

2018This first-degree murder definition has persisted despite our state's abandonment of the common law M'Naghten rule governing the insanity defense in favor of the mental disease or defect defense in 1996, see Comment, Reduction in the Protection for Mentally Ill Criminal Defendants: Kansas Upholds the Replacement of M'Naghten Approach with the Mens Rea Approach, Effectively Eliminating the Insanity Defense [State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003)], 44 Washburn L.J. 213 , 216-17, 227, 229, 233, 244 (2004); Note, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8 Kan.

2018This first-degree murder definition has persisted despite our state's abandonment of the common law M'Naghten rule governing the insanity defense in favor of the mental disease or defect defense in 1996, see Comment, Reduction in the Protection for Mentally Ill Criminal Defendants: Kansas Upholds the Replacement of M'Naghten Approach with the Mens Rea Approach, Effectively Eliminating the Insanity Defense [State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003)], 44 Washburn L.J. 213 , 216-17, 227, 229, 233, 244 (2004); Note, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8 Kan.

2022In Strickland, the Supreme Court explained that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." 466 U.S. at 690-91 .

2022He appears to argue the psychiatrist did not resolve whether his mental health issues caused his conduct, but Mitchell said the psychiatrist concluded he could not offer the mental disease or defect defense based on Villa's drug use. 10 "[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 .

2022Drug use causing temporary incapacity cannot support this defense, but "[e]vidence of defendant's permanent mental incapacity due to long-term use of intoxicants may support a mental disease or defect defense." State v. Cheever, 295 Kan. 229 , Syl. ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 1007 (2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 571 U.S. 87 , 134 S. Ct. 596 , 187 L.

2022Drug use causing temporary incapacity cannot support this defense, but "[e]vidence of defendant's permanent mental incapacity due to long-term use of intoxicants may support a mental disease or defect defense." State v. Cheever, 295 Kan. 229 , Syl. ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 1007 (2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 571 U.S. 87 , 134 S. Ct. 596 , 187 L.

2022Ed. 2d 519 (2013); In re Mason, 245 Kan. 111, 114 , 775 P.2d 179 (1989).

2022Ed. 2d 519 (2013); In re Mason, 245 Kan. 111, 114 , 775 P.2d 179 (1989).

2022Drug use causing temporary incapacity cannot support this defense, but "[e]vidence of defendant's permanent mental incapacity due to long-term use of intoxicants may support a mental disease or defect defense." State v. Cheever, 295 Kan. 229 , Syl. ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 1007 (2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 571 U.S. 87 , 134 S. Ct. 596 , 187 L.

2022Drug use causing temporary incapacity cannot support this defense, but "[e]vidence of defendant's permanent mental incapacity due to long-term use of intoxicants may support a mental disease or defect defense." State v. Cheever, 295 Kan. 229 , Syl. ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 1007 (2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 571 U.S. 87 , 134 S. Ct. 596 , 187 L.

2022Because "[f]ew doctrines are as deeply rooted in our common-law heritage as the insanity defense," Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. ___ , 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1039 , 206 L.

2021He also cites 10 Mullins v. State, 30 Kan.

2019The standard of review for jury instructions is well-known: "'(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the appel

2019The standard of review for jury instructions is well-known: **408 " '(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, th

2019The standard of review for jury instructions is well-known: **408 " '(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, th

2019The standard of review for jury instructions is well-known: **408 " '(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, th

2019The standard of review for jury instructions is well-known: **408 " '(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, th

2019The standard of review for jury instructions is well-known: **408 " '(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, th

2019The standard of review for jury instructions is well-known: **408 " '(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, th

2019The standard of review for jury instructions is well-known: **408 " '(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, th

2012Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 423-24 ; Smith, 451 U.S. at 465 .

2012Cf. State v. Foster, 259 Kan. 198 , 910 P.2d 848 (1996); State v. Williams, 20 Kan.

2012Cf. State v. Foster, 259 Kan. 198 , 910 P.2d 848 (1996); State v. Williams, 20 Kan.

2012K.S.A. 22-3219(2) (“A defendant who files a notice of intention to assert [a mental disease or defect defense] thereby submits and consents to abide by such further orders as the court may make requiring tire mental examination of the defendant... .”)■ See also State v. Ji, 251 Kan. 3, 23 , 832 P.2d 1176 (1992) (State was entitled to use court-ordered examination of defendant to rebut defendant’s insanity defense, despite the fact the examination was conducted without the benefit of Miranda warnings; under K.S.A. 22-3219, the defendant’s notice of intent to assert insanity defense was consent

2012K.S.A. 22-3219(2) (“A defendant who files a notice of intention to assert [a mental disease or defect defense] thereby submits and consents to abide by such further orders as the court may make requiring tire mental examination of the defendant... .”)■ See also State v. Ji, 251 Kan. 3, 23 , 832 P.2d 1176 (1992) (State was entitled to use court-ordered examination of defendant to rebut defendant’s insanity defense, despite the fact the examination was conducted without the benefit of Miranda warnings; under K.S.A. 22-3219, the defendant’s notice of intent to assert insanity defense was consent

2012Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 423-24 ; Smith, 451 U.S. at 465 .

2012If, however, the defendant presents evidence supporting a mental disease or defect defense, the State may use the court-ordered examination for the limited purpose of rebutting the defendant’s mental disease or defect defense. 483 U.S. at 423-24 .

2007The district court determined that White was precluded from receiving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter because he asserted the mental disease or defect defense, citing Ordway, 261 Kan. 776 , and State v. Baacke, 261 Kan. 422 , 932 P.2d 396 (1997).

2007The district court determined that White was precluded from receiving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter because he asserted the mental disease or defect defense, citing Ordway, 261 Kan. 776 , and State v. Baacke, 261 Kan. 422 , 932 P.2d 396 (1997).

2007The district court determined that White was precluded from receiving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter because he asserted the mental disease or defect defense, citing Ordway, 261 Kan. 776 , and State v. Baacke, 261 Kan. 422 , 932 P.2d 396 (1997).

2007While there is evidence of voluntary intoxication through PCP use, Sappington elected to proceed strictly under a mental disease or defect defense. “ ‘ “ ‘It is the duty of the trial court to properly instruct the jury upon a party’s theory of the case.’ ” ’ ” In re Care & Treatment of Foster, 280 Kan. 845, 864 , 127 P.3d 277 (2006).

2007While there is evidence of voluntary intoxication through PCP use, Sappington elected to proceed strictly under a mental disease or defect defense. “ ‘ “ ‘It is the duty of the trial court to properly instruct the jury upon a party’s theory of the case.’ ” ’ ” In re Care & Treatment of Foster, 280 Kan. 845, 864 , 127 P.3d 277 (2006).

2005“Evidence of a defendant’s mental capacity to commit a specific act is not admissible where a mental disease or defect defense under K.S.A. 22-3219 has not been raised.” State v. Papen, 274 Kan. 149 , Syl. ¶ 3, 50 P.3d 37 (2002).

2005“Evidence of a defendant’s mental capacity to commit a specific act is not admissible where a mental disease or defect defense under K.S.A. 22-3219 has not been raised.” State v. Papen, 274 Kan. 149 , Syl. ¶ 3, 50 P.3d 37 (2002).

2002In similar circumstances in State v. Hobson, 234 Kan. 133, 159-60 , 671 P.2d 1365 (1983), the court affirmed the trial court’s excluding expert psychiatric testimony about the defendant’s mental capacity to arrange a murder.

2002In similar circumstances in State v. Hobson, 234 Kan. 133, 159-60 , 671 P.2d 1365 (1983), the court affirmed the trial court’s excluding expert psychiatric testimony about the defendant’s mental capacity to arrange a murder.