premeditation instruction in Nevada

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79, 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11.6 Nev. 215, 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (20

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79, 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11.6 Nev. 215, 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (20

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79, 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11.6 Nev. 215, 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (20

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79 , 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664 , 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11. 6 Nev. 215, 236-37 , 994 P.2d 700, 714-15

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79, 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11.6 Nev. 215, 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (20

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79, 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11.6 Nev. 215, 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (20

2015See Nika v. State, 124 Nev. 1272, 1286-87 , 1289 198 P.3d 839, 849-50, 851 (2008) (disagreeing with Polk and holding that the premeditation instruction set forth in Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (2000), did not apply to cases that were final when Byford was decided); Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 (holding that a petitioner must show an impediment external to the defense to overcome procedural bars); cf. Phelps v. Dir., Nev.

2015See Nika v. State, 124 Nev. 1272, 1286-87 , 1289 198 P.3d 839, 849-50, 851 (2008) (disagreeing with Polk and holding that the premeditation instruction set forth in Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (2000), did not apply to cases that were final when Byford was decided); Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 (holding that a petitioner must show an impediment external to the defense to overcome procedural bars); cf. Phelps v. Dir., Nev.

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79, 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11.6 Nev. 215, 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (20

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79, 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11.6 Nev. 215, 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (20

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79, 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11.6 Nev. 215, 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (20

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79 , 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664 , 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11. 6 Nev. 215, 236-37 , 994 P.2d 700, 714-15

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79, 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11.6 Nev. 215, 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (20

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79, 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11.6 Nev. 215, 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (20

2015Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 660 , 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988) (holding that mental deficiency and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute good cause), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Haberstroh, 119 Nev. 173, 180-81 , 69 P.3d 676, 681 (2003); Riker, 121 Nev. at 236, 112 P.3d at 1077 (holding that this court does not arbitrarily "ignore H procedural default rules" and that "any prior inconsistent application of statutory default rules would not provide a basis for this court to ignore the rules, which are mandatory").

2015Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 660, 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988) (holding that mental deficiency and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute good cause), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Haberstroh, 119 Nev. 173, 180-81, 69 P.3d 676, 681 (2003); Riker, 121 Nev. at 236, 112 P.3d at 1077 (holding that this court does not arbitrarily "ignore[ ] procedural default rules" and that "any prior inconsistent application of statutory default rules would not provide a basis for this court to ignore the rules, which are mandatory").

2015Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 660 , 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988) (holding that mental deficiency and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute good cause), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Haberstroh, 119 Nev. 173, 180-81 , 69 P.3d 676, 681 (2003); Riker, 121 Nev. at 236, 112 P.3d at 1077 (holding that this court does not arbitrarily "ignore H procedural default rules" and that "any prior inconsistent application of statutory default rules would not provide a basis for this court to ignore the rules, which are mandatory").

2015Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 660 , 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988) (holding that mental deficiency and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute good cause), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Haberstroh, 119 Nev. 173, 180-81 , 69 P.3d 676, 681 (2003); Riker, 121 Nev. at 236, 112 P.3d at 1077 (holding that this court does not arbitrarily "ignore H procedural default rules" and that "any prior inconsistent application of statutory default rules would not provide a basis for this court to ignore the rules, which are mandatory").

2015Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 660 , 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988) (holding that mental deficiency and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute good cause), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Haberstroh, 119 Nev. 173, 180-81 , 69 P.3d 676, 681 (2003); Riker, 121 Nev. at 236, 112 P.3d at 1077 (holding that this court does not arbitrarily "ignore H procedural default rules" and that "any prior inconsistent application of statutory default rules would not provide a basis for this court to ignore the rules, which are mandatory").

2015Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 660 , 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988) (holding that mental deficiency and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute good cause), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Haberstroh, 119 Nev. 173, 180-81 , 69 P.3d 676, 681 (2003); Riker, 121 Nev. at 236, 112 P.3d at 1077 (holding that this court does not arbitrarily "ignore H procedural default rules" and that "any prior inconsistent application of statutory default rules would not provide a basis for this court to ignore the rules, which are mandatory").

2015See Nika v. State, 124 Nev. 1272, 1286-87 , 1289 198 P.3d 839, 849-50, 851 (2008) (disagreeing with Polk and holding that the premeditation instruction set forth in Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (2000), did not apply to cases that were final when Byford was decided); Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 (holding that a petitioner must show an impediment external to the defense to overcome procedural bars); cf. Phelps v. Dir., Nev.

2015See Nika v. State, 124 Nev. 1272, 1286-87 , 1289 198 P.3d 839, 849-50, 851 (2008) (disagreeing with Polk and holding that the premeditation instruction set forth in Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (2000), did not apply to cases that were final when Byford was decided); Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 (holding that a petitioner must show an impediment external to the defense to overcome procedural bars); cf. Phelps v. Dir., Nev.

1996Premeditation The premeditation instruction 21 given in this case mirrors that approved by this court in Powell v. State, 108 Nev. 700, 708-10 , 838 P.2d 921, 926-27 (1992), vacated on other grounds, 511 U.S. 79 (1994).

1996Premeditation The premeditation instruction 21 given in this case mirrors that approved by this court in Powell v. State, 108 Nev. 700, 708-10 , 838 P.2d 921, 926-27 (1992), vacated on other grounds, 511 U.S. 79 (1994).

1996Premeditation The premeditation instruction [21] given in this case mirrors that approved by this court in Powell v. State, 108 Nev. 700, 708-10 , 838 P.2d 921, 926-27 (1992), vacated on other grounds, 511 U.S. 79 , 114 S.Ct. 1280 , 128 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994).

1996Premeditation The premeditation instruction 21 given in this case mirrors that approved by this court in Powell v. State, 108 Nev. 700, 708-10 , 838 P.2d 921, 926-27 (1992), vacated on other grounds, 511 U.S. 79 (1994).

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79, 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11.6 Nev. 215, 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 714-15 (20

2020This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79 , 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664 , 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "maf for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 11. 6 Nev. 215, 236-37 , 994 P.2d 700, 714-15

2018See, e.g., Leonard v. State (Leonard II), 117 Nev. 53, 78-79 , 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (determining that the statutory language defining implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Byford, 116 Nev. at 232, 994 P.2d at 712 (upholding malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 1011 , 965 P.2d 903, 912 (1998) (upholding anti-sympathy instruction 6 Archanian improperly incorporates by reference other parts of his opening brief to s

2018See, e.g., Leonard v. State (Leonard II), 117 Nev. 53, 78-79 , 17 P.3d 397, 413 (2001) (determining that the statutory language defining implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Byford, 116 Nev. at 232, 994 P.2d at 712 (upholding malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 1011 , 965 P.2d 903, 912 (1998) (upholding anti-sympathy instruction 6 Archanian improperly incorporates by reference other parts of his opening brief to s

2016SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0 ) 1947A First-degree murder Adams argues that he is actually innocent of first-degree murder because the premeditation instruction given, an instruction substantially similar to that commonly referred to as the Kazalyn 2 instruction, was erroneous and unconstitutionally vague as it "failed to meaningfully define the statutory elements of first-degree murder in a way that distinguishe[d] between first- and second-degree murder." He contends that the trial court's use of the Kazalyn instruction was wrong because this court's decision in Hem v. State was the rule at t

2016SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0 ) 1947A First-degree murder Adams argues that he is actually innocent of first-degree murder because the premeditation instruction given, an instruction substantially similar to that commonly referred to as the Kazalyn 2 instruction, was erroneous and unconstitutionally vague as it "failed to meaningfully define the statutory elements of first-degree murder in a way that distinguishe[d] between first- and second-degree murder." He contends that the trial court's use of the Kazalyn instruction was wrong because this court's decision in Hem v. State was the rule at t

2014He acknowledges that he challenged the premeditation instruction in his third post-conviction petition but argues that this court should nevertheless revisit his claim, see Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315-16 , 535 P.2d 797, 798-99 (1975), and that the procedural bars do not apply because this court's decision in Nika v. State, 124 Nev. 1272 , 198 P.3d 839 (2008), changed the law.

2014He acknowledges that he challenged the premeditation instruction in his third post-conviction petition but argues that this court should nevertheless revisit his claim, see Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315-16 , 535 P.2d 797, 798-99 (1975), and that the procedural bars do not apply because this court's decision in Nika v. State, 124 Nev. 1272 , 198 P.3d 839 (2008), changed the law.

2008See Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887 , 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001).

2008See Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887 , 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001).

1996If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. [20] See also Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 , ___, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1247 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) ("An instruction cast in the terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states the government's burden of proof"); Canape, 109 Nev. at 872 , 859 P.2d at 1028 (reaffirming Lord ). [21] The premeditation instruction given to the jury reads: Premeditation is a design, a determination to kill, distinctly formed in the mind at any moment before or

1996If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. [20] See also Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 , ___, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1247 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) ("An instruction cast in the terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states the government's burden of proof"); Canape, 109 Nev. at 872 , 859 P.2d at 1028 (reaffirming Lord ). [21] The premeditation instruction given to the jury reads: Premeditation is a design, a determination to kill, distinctly formed in the mind at any moment before or

1996If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. [20] See also Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 , ___, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1247 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) ("An instruction cast in the terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states the government's burden of proof"); Canape, 109 Nev. at 872 , 859 P.2d at 1028 (reaffirming Lord ). [21] The premeditation instruction given to the jury reads: Premeditation is a design, a determination to kill, distinctly formed in the mind at any moment before or

1996If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. [20] See also Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 , ___, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1247 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) ("An instruction cast in the terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states the government's burden of proof"); Canape, 109 Nev. at 872 , 859 P.2d at 1028 (reaffirming Lord ). [21] The premeditation instruction given to the jury reads: Premeditation is a design, a determination to kill, distinctly formed in the mind at any moment before or